Milton on the Son of God – Part 3

Milton on the Son of God – Part 3

Thomas Allen

[Editor’s note:  Page numbers enclosed in parentheses are references to Milton on the Son of God and the Holy Spirit from His Treatise on Christian Doctrine by John Milton. The author’s comments are enclosed in brackets.]

      Some Trinitarians claim that according to some passages, “Christ is God; now if the Father be the only true God, Christ is not the true God; but if he be not the true God, he must be a false God” (p. 58). To this assertion, Milton replies “that the conclusion is too hastily drawn; for it may be that he is not ‘he that is true,’ either because he is only the image of him that is true, or because he uniformly declares himself to be inferior to him that is true. We are not obliged to say of Christ what the Scriptures do not say” (pp. 58-59). The Scriptures do not call Christ true God. Moreover, “he is not to be called a false God, to whom, as to his beloved Son, he that is the true God has communicated his divine power and glory” (p. 59).
      Trinitarians use Philippians 2:6 (“who being in the form of God”) to support their doctrine. Milton replies:

But this no more proves him to be God than the phrase which follows — “took upon him the form of a servant” — proves that he was really a servant, as the sacred writers nowhere use the word “form” for actual being. But if it be contended that “the form of God” is here taken in a philosophical sense for the essential form, this consequence cannot be avoided, that when Christ laid aside the form, he laid aside also the substance and the efficiency of God; a doctrine against which they protest, and with justice (p. 59).

According to Milton, “‘To be in the form of God,’ . . . seems to be synonymous with being in the image of God; which is often predicated of Christ, even as man is also said, though in a much lower sense, to be the image of God, that is, by creation” (p. 59).
      About Trinitarian gymnastics with the Scriptures, Milton writes:

It is singular, however, that those who maintain the Father and the Son to be one in essence, should revert from the gospel to the times of the law, as if they would make a fruitless attempt to illustrate light by darkness. They say that the Son is not only called God, but also Jehovah, as appears from a comparison of several passages in both testaments. Now Jehovah is the one supreme God; therefore the Son and the Father are one in essence (p. 61).

Further, Milton notes that the name of Jehovah is applied to angels when they represent his divine presence and speak his words. In support, he cites numerous verses (pp. 61-65).
      Then, citing several passages, he illustrates the absurdity of assuming that when one name is mentioned twice in the same sentence that the name is applied to two persons (pp. 65-66).
      Next, he discusses Exodus chapter 23 and 33 where God sends an angle to guide the Israelites. The angel addresses the Israelites as though he was Jehovah — he is called Jehovah. If the Israelites understood the angel to be Jehovah:

it follows that they must have conceived either that there were two Jehovahs, or that Jehovah and the angel were one in essence; which no rational person will affirm to have been their belief. . . . If the people had believed that Jehovah and that angel were one in essence, equal in divinity and glory, why did they mourn, and desire that Jehovah should go up before them, notwithstanding his anger, rather than the angel? . . . If, on the contrary, they did not consider the angel as Jehovah, they must necessarily have understood that he bore the name of Jehovah in the sense in which I suppose him to have borne it, wherein there is nothing either absurd or histrionic (pp 67-68).

      Some Trinitarians argue that this angel was Christ himself — citing 1 Corinthians 10:9 as support (p. 67). Therefore, he was Jehovah. Milton replies, if this angel had been Christ, he would have acted as a moderator and mediator (p. 68). He adds that “whether Christ, or some angel different from the preceding, the very words of Jehovah himself show that he was neither one with Jehovah, nor co-equal, for the Israelites are commanded to hear his voice, not on the authority of his own name, but because the name of Jehovah was in him” (p. 68). Continuing, he remarks, “[If] the angel was Christ, this proves no more than that Christ was an angel, according to their interpretation of Gen. xlviii. 16, ‘the angel which redeemed me from all evil’; and Isa. Ixiii. 9, ‘the angel of his presence saved them’” (p. 68).
      Next, Milton cites several passages from Revelations that he interprets as supporting his Christology (p. 70). Then he comments on the difficulties that they have caused some Trinitarians. For example, one Trinitarian accused the Arians of transposing and confusing some of the verses in the last chapter of Revelations; thus, he rearranged these verses to support his Trinity Doctrine (p. 70). Milton notes that action would have been unnecessary if this Trinitarian had observed that throughout the Old Testament, “angels are accustomed to assume the name and person, and the very words of God and Jehovah, as their own; and that occasionally an angel represents the person and the very words of God, without taking the name either of Jehovah or God, but only in the character of an angel, or even of a man” (p. 71) — for example, Judges 2:1.  About this issue, Milton writes:

But according to divines the name of Jehovah signifies two things, either the nature of God, or the completion of his word and promises. If it signify the nature, and therefore the person of God, why should not he who is invested with his person and presence, be also invested with the name which represents them? If it signify the completion of his word and promises, why should not he, to whom words suitable to God alone are so frequently attributed, be permitted also to assume the name of Jehovah, whereby the completion of these words and promises is represented? Or if that name be so acceptable to God, that he has always chosen to consider it as sacred and peculiar to himself alone, why has he uniformly disused it in the New Testament, which contains the most important fulfilment of his prophecies; retaining only the name of the Lord, which had always been common to him with angels and men? If, lastly, any name whatever can be so pleasing to God, why has he exhibited himself to us in the gospel without any proper name at all (pp. 71-72)?

[Some ancient manuscripts of Matthew do contain the name Jehovah, Yahweh.]
      Continuing, Milton discusses Isaiah 8:13, 14 along with 1 Peter 2:7, 8, Zachariah 11:13, 12:10 along with Acts 2:33 and John 19:37, and Malachi 3:1 to illustrate that Jehovah’s messenger is at times called “Jehovah” (pp. 72-75). Concluding, he adds, “That the name and presence of God is used to imply his vicarious power and might resident in the Son, is proved by another prophecy concerning John the Baptist, Isa. xl. 3, ‘the voice of him that crieth in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of Jehovah; make straight in the desert a highway for our God’”(pp. 75-76).
      Milton states “that the Son himself professes to have received from the Father, not only the name of God and of Jehovah, but all that pertains to his own being —  that is to say, his individuality, his existence itself, his attributes, his works, his divine honours; to which doctrine the apostles also, subsequent to Christ, bear their testimony” (p. 76). Then he cites John 3:35, 8:3, and Matthew 11:27 to support this conclusion.
      Next, he comments on Trinitarians using the two natures of Christ to “evade any arguments that may be brought against them. What Scripture says of the Son generally, they apply, as suits their purpose, in a partial and restricted sense; at one time to the Son of God, at another to the Son of Man — now to the Mediator in his divine, now in his human capacity, and now again in his union of both natures” (p. 77). [According to Trinitarians, Christ is 100 percent man and 100 percent God with no commingling of the two natures.] However, “the Son himself says expressly, ‘the Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into his hand,’ John iii. 35 — namely, because ‘he loveth him,’ not because he hath begotten him — and he hath given all things to him as ‘the Son,’ not as Mediator only” (p. 77).
      If Christ’s Deity had remained what it was before he became the mediator as Trinitarians claim, then “why does he ask and receive everything from the Father, and not from himself? If all things come from the Father, why is it necessary (as they maintain it to be) for the mediatorial office, that he should be the true and supreme God” (pp. 77-78). Therefore, all things that the Father gives the Son are the Father’s gifts to the Son (p. 78). In support, Milton cites John 16:15, Acts 17: 9, 10, Isaiah 9:6 (evidence that he receives his name from the Father), Philippians 2:9, Hebrews 1:4, and Ephesians 1:20, 21 (pp. 78-79).
    About the names given the son, Milton writes, “We need be under no concern, however, respecting the name, seeing that the Son receives his very being in like manner from the Father. John vii. 29, ‘I am from him.’ The same thing is implied John i. 1, ‘in the beginning’” (p. 79).
      About John 1:1, Milton notes:

[T]he notion of his eternity is here excluded not only by the decree, . . . but by the name of Son, and by the phrases — “this day have I begotten thee,” and “I will be to him a father.” Besides, the word “beginning” can only here mean “before the foundation of the world,” according to John xvii. 5, as is evident from Col. i. 15-17, “the first born of every creature: for by him were all things created that are in heaven, and that are in earth, etc., and he is before all things, and by him all things consist” (p. 79).

[Milton believes that the son created the heavens and the earth. This is also a commonly held belief of Trinitarians. Some unitarians disagree with Milton on this point.]
      About the Son being eternal, Milton remarks, “Him who was begotten from all eternity the Father cannot have begotten, for what was made from all eternity was never in the act of being made; him whom the Father begat from all eternity he still begets; he whom he still begets is not yet begotten, and therefore is not yet a Son; for an action which has no beginning can have no completion” (p. 80). Moreover, “it seems to be altogether impossible that the Son should be either begotten or born from all eternity. If he is the Son, either he must have been originally in the Father, and have proceeded from him, or he must always have been as he is now, separate from the Father, self-existent and independent” (p. 80).  He adds, “If he was originally in the Father, but now exists separately, he has undergone a certain change at some time or other, and is therefore mutable. If he always existed separately from, and independently of, the Father, how is he from the Father, how begotten, how the Son, how separate in subsistence, unless he be also separate in essence (p. 80)?”
      According to Milton, and contrary to Trinitarians, “the Father and the Son differ in essence” (p. 81). Both reason and the Scriptures support this conclusion. Milton writes a lengthy explanation for why they cannot have the same essences (pp. 81-83).
      Next, he comments on the existence of the Son: The Son derives his existence from the Father. In support, he cites John 5:26, 6:57, and Hebrews 1:8, 11, 12 (p. 83).
      About the Son being omnipresent, Milton remarks that “if the Father has given all things to the Son, even his very being and life, he has also given him to be wherever he is” (p. 83). [The Son is not truly omnipresent. A truly omnipresent being cannot move. There is no place where he can move because he is already there. Moreover, if he leaves a place, he is no longer omnipresent because there is a place where he is not. The Son ascended into heaven and will some day descend from heaven — thus, the Son moves from one place to another.] He argues that the apparent omnipresence of Jesus in John 1:48 (“before that Philip called . . . I saw thee”) cannot be used to prove that the Son is of the same essence as the father (pp. 83-84). Likewise, Matthew 18:20 (“there am I in the midst of them”) and 28:20 (“I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world”) do not assert absolute omnipresence (p. 84). [Omnipresence is being everywhere simultaneously. Being many places at once is not omnipresence. For example, a radio broadcast is in many places at once, but it is not omnipresent; it is not everywhere simultaneously.]
      Next, Milton discusses omniscience and cites many verses that purport that Jesus is omniscient (pp. 84-85). Then Milton notes that the Son did not know all things absolutely and cites several verses showing his lack of omniscience (p. 85). [According to Trinitarians, when Jesus appears to be omniscience, for example, John 21:11 {“thou knowest all things”}, he is acting in his divine nature. When he lacks knowledge, as when he did not know when the time of the destruction of the temple or when he would return and the end of the age would occur {Mark 13:32}, he is acting in his human nature. However, according to Revelation 1:1, Jesus is not omniscient; God has to give him the revelation. This occurred after the Son had shed his human body and could no longer be acting in his human nature.]
      Mostly by citing verses, Milton discusses the Son’s authority; his authority comes from the Father (pp. 86-87).
      Whatever omnipotence that he had, he had because all his power came from the Father (p. 87). To support this conclusion, Milton cites several verses. About the Son’s apparent omnipotence, Milton observed that “the nature of these works, although divine, was such, that angels were not precluded from performing similar miracles at the same time and in the same place where Christ himself abode daily” (p. 87) — for example, John 5:4 (“an angel went down at a certain season into the pool”). Moreover, the disciple performed the same works.
      Again citing Scripture, Milton discusses other gifts that Jesus received from the Father. They include the power of conversion (pp. 87-88), creation (pp. 88-89), remission of sins (p. 89), preservation (p. 90), renovation (pp. 90-91), conferring gifts (p. 91), mediatorial, i.e., his passion (pp. 90-91), resuscitation from death (p. 93), future judicial advent (p. 93), divine honors (p. 93), baptism in his name (p. 94), belief in him (pp. 94-96), and judgment (p. 99).
      About the passion, Milton asks, “How then can the Son be considered co-essential and co-equal with the Father (p. 92)?” About Jesus’ exclamation on the cross — “My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?” — he asks, “He whom the Son, himself God, addresses as God, must be the Father — why then did the Son call upon the Father (p. 92)?” Milton’s answer is that because “he felt even his divine nature insufficient to support him under the pains of death” (p. 92).
      Remarking further on Philippians 2:6, he notes that the Son’s possession of the divine gifts that the Father gave him was not robbery. Milton continues, “[I]f this passage imply his co-equality with the Father, it rather refutes than proves his unity of essence; since equality cannot exist but between two or more essences” (p. 100). He adds:

Further, the phrases “he did not think it” — “he made himself of no reputation” (literally, “he emptied himself”) appear inapplicable to the supreme God, For to think is nothing else than to entertain an opinion, which cannot be properly said of God. Nor can the infinite God be said to empty himself, any more than to contradict himself; for infinity and emptiness are opposite terms. But since he emptied himself of that form of God in which he had previously existed, if the form of God is to be taken for the essence of the Deity itself, it would prove him to have emptied himself of that essence, which is impossible (p. 100).

      Lastly, Milton proves that the Father is greater than the Son. For Jesus said, “My Father is greater than all” (John 10:29) and “my Father is greater than I” (John 14:28). Trinitarians respond “that Christ is speaking of his human nature” (p. 100). However, Milton doubts that “his disciples understand him as speaking merely of his human nature” (p. 100). He writes:

If therefore he said this, not of his human nature only (for that the Father was greater than he in his human nature could not admit of a doubt), but in the sense in which he himself wished his followers to conceive of him both as God and man, it ought undoubtedly to be understood as if he had said, My Father is greater than I, whatsoever I am, both in my human and divine nature; otherwise the speaker would not have been he in whom they believed, and instead of teaching them, he would only have been imposing upon them with an equivocation. He must therefore have intended to compare the nature with the person, not the nature of God the Father with the nature of the Son (p. 101).

He cites several verses to support his conclusion that the Father is greater than the Son (pp. 101-105).
      As shown above, Milton presents a unitarian argument akin to that of the Arians and the Jehovah’s Witnesses. All three believe in a preexisting Son, i.e., the Son existed before his conception. They believe that the Son has a beginning and, therefore, is not eternal. Further, they believe that the Father is the supreme God, the only true God, Jehovah of the Old Testament, and that God is one in person. Moreover, Milton was in agreement with most orthodox Christians from the mid-second century to early fourth century; they believed in a preexisting Son who was not eternal and who was subordinate to the Father. [Milton is unclear about whether Jesus was perfect man of a rational soul and the preexisting Son of a rational soul both occupying the same body without confusion of substances similar to the Trinitarian and Valentinian belief or Jesus was a human shell or sentient body with the preexisting Son providing the rational soul or mind similar to the Apollinarian belief or some other model.]

Copyright © 2018 by Thomas Coley Allen.

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