Showing posts with label Calvin. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Calvin. Show all posts

Saturday, November 2, 2024

Commentary on John 10:30

Commentary on John 10:30

Thomas Allen

I and my Father are one. (John 10:30)

[Note: most translations since 1900 use “the” instead of “my.” Contrary to the assertions of some Trinitarians, whatever word is used makes no difference.]

John 10:30 is one of the strongest proof texts of Trinitarianism. According to many Trinitarians, this verse proves that Jesus is of the same substance or essence as the Father. Namely, Jesus is claiming to be one with his Father in substance or essence and by that, his deity. He is claiming that he is one of the persons of the Triune God. Thus, these Trinitarians understand this verse to mean that Jesus and the Father are equal and are persons of the same God.

Some Trinitarians claim that the “are” in this verse proves the plurality of persons, i.e., God consists of multiple persons. For Trinitarians, God consists of three persons: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Further, the “one” in this verse proves the unity of God, i.e., the three persons are one God. Consequently, Wesley claims, “Therefore, if He [Jesus] was not God, He must have been the vilest of men.” Thus, if Jesus is not God, he is guilty of blasphemy. 

If this verse proves that Jesus and the Father are both God, it supports modalism just as easily as it supports orthodox Trinitarianism.  It implies that Jesus and the Father are the same God, but are different manifestations, modes, or aspects of God. That is, a modalist understands this verse to mean that Jesus and the Father are the same person but are different manifestations of that person.

Unitarians understand Jesus to mean that he and his Father are united in will and purpose; they are of one mind and purpose. Their conclusion is supported by John 17:11: “And now I am no more in the world, but these are in the world, and I come to thee. Holy Father, keep through thine own name those whom thou hast given me, that they may be one, as we are.” (Emphasis added.) Jesus prays that as he and his Father are one, his followers may be one, i.e., united in purpose. He was not praying that his followers would become one being or substance.

Not only do Unitarians have this understanding, but so do some Trinitarians, such as Erasmus and Calvin. Calvin argues that Jesus is speaking of his agreement with the Father; he is not speaking of the unity of substance. Likewise, in The Layman’s Biblical Commentary, volume 6, Floyd Filson writes about this verse, “Jesus and the Father are one in purpose and in love for the sheep.”

Some Trinitarians take both sides. If the verse is connected to the text that precedes it, it means oneness of purpose. However, if it is connected to the text that follows it, it means oneness of essence, and, therefore, affirms Jesus’ deity.

When this verse is read in context, it is in the context of the good shepherd (Jesus) caring for his sheep (his followers). Jesus is talking about the unity of purpose. He is not talking about the unity of substance or essence. 

A good Christian claims, “I and the Father are one.” However, he is not claiming that he is equal to the Father, of the same substance as the Father, or God. He is claiming that he is in union and agreement with God. This is what Jesus means in John 10:30. What separates him from his followers is that being the Son of God, he is in perfect union and agreement whereas they are not.

Unity can exist without equality. Unity of purpose and enterprise are examples. Another example is the soldiers of an army; an army has a unity of goals and objectives but is hierarchal in structure (no equality).

Thus, John 10:30 refers to the perfect unity of action and purpose between God the Father and Jesus the Messiah. It does not refer to both Jesus and the Father being of the same essence or substance or to the intrinsic deity of Jesus.


Copyright © 2024 by Thomas Coley Allen. 

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Thursday, July 21, 2022

Location of Eden

Location of Eden

Thomas Allen


8 And Jehovah God planted a garden eastward, in Eden; and there he put the man whom he had formed. . . . 10 And a river went out of Eden to water the garden; and from thence it was parted, and became four heads. 11 The name of the first is Pishon: that is it which compasseth the whole land of Havilah, where there is gold; 12 and the gold of that land is good: there is bdellium and the onyx stone. 13 And the name of the second river is Gihon: the same is it that compasseth the whole land of Cush. 14 And the name of the third river is Hiddekel: that is it which goeth in front of Assyria. And the fourth river is the Euphrates. (Genesis, Chapter 2)

Where is Eden located? Several locations have been suggested. They include Palestine, Syria, Armenia, Mongolia, Kashmir, Australia, Mesopotamia, and the North Pole.

Havilah is noted for its gold and gemstones. Because it is noted for its high-quality gold, Havilah is often associated with India or Arabia. If it is in India, the Pishon is the Indus. If Havilah is Arabia, then the Pishon is the sea around the Arabian peninsula.

Many locate Cush in either Ethiopia or Central Asia. Thus, the Gihon is either the Nile (the Ethiopian location) or the Oxus, the Amu Darya (the Central Asian location).

According to the information given in Genesis 2:10-14, one river came out of Eden and divided into four. Because the Euphrates is mentioned as one of these rivers, most people assume that Eden was in Mesopotamia. Under this theory, the Tigris is the Hiddekel. There is much dispute about the two rivers corresponding to Pishon and Gihon. 

Upper Mesopotamia is perhaps the most popular location of Eden. According to proponents of this location, the Euphrates is the Euphrates of Mesopotamia and the Hiddekel is the Tigris. The identity of the Pishon and Gihon are uncertain. Some identify these two rivers with canals between the Euphrates and Tigris. Also, the Karun and Karkheh rivers have been identified as the other two rivers. Others identify them with various small rivers. 

Another popular location for Eden is the Armenian highlands at the headwaters of the Euphrates and Tigris. According to this theory, the Pishon is either the Phasis (Rioni) of Georgia or the Kura, a large tributary of the Araxes (Aras). The Gihon is identified as the Araxes. (For problems with this location, see Davis.)

Calvin and others have suggested that Eden was in the area where the Euphrates and Tigris empty into the Persian Gulf. Here, the two rivers come together and then divide into several mouths. Thus, the Pallakopas canal becomes the Pishon, and the Gihon corresponds with the Kahana or Guhana canal near Babylon. A problem with this theory is that the rivers come together instead of dividing.

Closely related to Calvin’s proposed location is that Eden is located at the head of the Persian Gulf. According to this theory, the four rivers are the Euphrates, Tigris, Kerkha, and Karun. A problem with this theory is that the rivers flow toward Eden instead of away from it.

At least, the two theories that place Eden near the mouths of the Euphrates and Tigris place Eden east of the writer of Genesis. However, they fail to satisfy the description of Havilah.

According to the Scriptures, the Adamic race originated in Eden. Most people erroneously place Eden in the Middle East. The location of Eden as described in Genesis 2:8, 10-14 places it in Central Asia. 

“And Jehovah God planted a garden eastward in Eden; and there he put man [Adam] whom he had formed.” (Genesis 2:8) The garden in Eden was eastward or “in the east” (Moffatt’s translation) or “to the far east” (Ferrar Fenton’s translation). If Moses were the author of Genesis as the fundamentalists claim, then he, being a highly educated man, would have been knowledgeable of the Mesopotamian region. Would not he have said that Eden was in the land of Shinar or Mesopotamia if that is where it was? In Genesis 10:10, 11:2, 14:1, and 24:10, he calls this region Shinar or Mesopotamia. Moses identified Eden as being in the east because it was east of the area which he knew.

If various people who lived long after Moses wrote Genesis as many modernists and liberal theologians claim, then these authors certainly would have been familiar with the Mesopotamian region and would have referred to it by name rather than by a vague description of where Eden was located.

Also, Sargon's Chronicle identifies Eden as east of Mesopotamia. Thus, the inhabitants of Mesopotamia knew that they did not live where Eden was. Saint Ephraem’s Hymns to the True Paradise and Cosmas Indicopleusters’s Christian Topography placed Eden at the western edge of the world’s highest mountains. Hence, it was in the region of the Himalayan and adjacent mountains—although they may have thought of these mountains as near the North Pole. They certainly did not place it in Mesopotamia.

The geography of Mesopotamia does not fit the description of Eden given in Genesis. Only two major rivers are in Mesopotamia: the Euphrates and Tigris. They merge rather than divide. Eden must be found elsewhere.

“Euphrates” in Hebrew is perath and means “a river of the east” (Strongs O.T. #6578). For centuries the “Pishon” has been identified with the Indus or Ganges Rivers in India. In the ancient records, Havilah was equivalent to India. Because the Gihon was said to “compasseth the whole land of Ethiopia,” some Biblical scholars identify the Gihon with the Nile. The word “cush” originates in northern India. Here the Hindu Cush mountains still bear that name. The Hiddekel is often identified as the Tigris. If the Tigris were also called the Hiddekel, it, like the Euphrates, was named for the original river in Eden. Probably this is why Genesis 2:14 refers to it as the river that flows “toward the east of Assyria.” This modifier would prevent confusing it with the river of the same name that flows within Assyria. Except for the Indus River, the rivers commonly thought of as flowing out of Eden do not fit the Biblical description of these rivers.

One place does resemble the description of Eden given in the Bible. That place is the Pamir Plateau in Central Asia between the Hindu Cush on the south and the Tien Shan mountains on the north. Four great rivers flow from this plateau. These are the Indus, Jaxartes (Syr Darya), Oxus (Amu Darya, also called  Gihon), and Tarim. Corresponding to the Pishon is the Kumar (or Chitral) branch of the Indus. The Jaxartes is the original Euphrates. The Tarim (that is its northern branch, the Kashgar river) flows to the east and is probably the Hiddekel. Most likely, the country of Havilah corresponds to the country of Darada toward Chachmises, which is noted for its riches. Thus, the Pishon is the Kumar-Indus; the Gihon is the Oxus;  the Hiddekel is the Kashgar-Tarim; the Euphrates is the Jaraxrtes.

The Pamir Plateau is different from what it was ten thousand years ago. A catastrophe has altered it. Then the plateau was lower and the climate much milder. Today the Pamir Plateau is uninhabited. It covers an area of about 180 by 180 miles and rises 15,000 feet above sea level. Too inhospitable to be inhabited, it is a blank and mysterious place. It is now the “roof of the world.”

The Pamir Plateau matches the geographical description of Eden given in Genesis. It is the land in the east, and it has four great rivers flowing out of it.

However, if the people who claim that the Noachian Flood was global and nearly all, if not all, of the fossil-bearing sedimentary rock formations resulted from the Flood, then trying to locate a place from before the Flood with today’s geography is futile. Today’s geography would have no resemblance to pre-Flood geography. Consequently, the above discussion about the location of Eden is meaningless. 


References

Allen, Thomas Coley. Adam to Abraham: The Early History of Man. Franklinton, North Carolina: TC Allen Company, 1998.

Davis, John D. The Westminster Dictionary of the Bible. Revised by Henry Snyder Gehman. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: 1944.

Douglas, J.D. et al., editors. The New Bible Dictionary. Grand Rapids: Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1962. 

Haberman, Frederick. Tracing Our White Ancestors (White Roots). Second edition.  Phoenix, Arizona: America's Promise Lord's Covenant Church, 1962, reprinted 1979.

Jacobus, Melanchthon W., Edward E. Norse, and Andrew C. Zenos, editors. A New Standard Bible Dictionary. New York, New York: Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1926.

Weisman, Charles A. The Origin of Race and Civilization as Studied and Verified from Science, History, and the Holy Scriptures. Third edition. Burnsville, Minnesota: Weisman Publications, 1990.


Copyright © 2022 by Thomas Coley Allen.

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Monday, October 25, 2021

The Soul

The Soul

Thomas Allen


Is the human soul immortal or mortal? Does the soul continue to exist consciously after the body dies? Or, does it die when the body dies?

There are two views of the nature of man. One is the dualistic view, which is the popular Christian view and the pagan view. The other is the holistic view, which is the Hebrew and Biblical view.

Greek, Egyptian, and other pagan philosophers claim that the soul is immortal and continuous a conscious existence after the body dies. According to the pagan Greeks, the soul is trapped in a material body. When the body dies, the soul is liberated and continuous a conscious existence elsewhere because the soul is immortal and, therefore, indestructible. Consequently, a person cannot really die; he merely transitions to another form. Death is merely the separation of the soul and the body.

The Hebrews claim that the soul is mortal and dies with the body — that is, its conscious existence ends with the death of the body. Since the soul animates the body, it dies (ceases to have consciousness) when the body dies; it not a distinct substance. When the body dies, the soul ceases its function of the animating life-principle of the body, and, therefore, it also dies. Furthermore, according to the Hebrews, the soul and body are an indissoluble unit. Moreover, man does not have a soul; he is a soul.

While the pagans teach a dualistic nature of man (the soul is immortal and the body is mortal), the Hebrews in the Old Testament teach a holistic view (both the soul and body are mortal). The pagan view asserts that the body, which is mortal, and the soul, which is immortal, are two different substances that coexist within one human being. Nevertheless, they are two characteristics of the same person. Thus, human nature consists of two entities (a body and a soul) that function independently — the dualistic view of man.

Contrasting with the pagan idea is the Hebrew. The Hebrew idea is that of an animated body, and the soul animates the body. When one dies, the other also dies. Both the body and the soul are mortal. Consequently, human nature is an indissoluble unity where the body and soul are different aspects of the same person — the holistic view of man.

For the Hebrews of the Old Testament and the early Christians of the New Testament, immortality is a gift from God given at the resurrection. Immortality is not an innate human possession as the pagans and orthodox Christians teach.

Tertullian and Origen introduce the Greek notion of an immoral soul into Christianity. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas expounded this pagan dualistic view of human nature. Consequently, the pagan dualistic concept of man became the orthodox Christian doctrine.

During the Reformation, Calvin, Luther, and most other Protestant leaders maintained that the soul was immortal. According to Calvin and Augustine, when the body dies, the souls of believers enjoy blessings in heaven while the souls of unbelievers suffer torments in hell. (However, the Anabaptists preached the Hebrew holistic concept of the soul, i.e., the soul is mortal and ceases conscious existence when the body dies.)

Adherents of the pagan dualistic nature of man believe that death is the separation of the immortal soul from the mortal body. At the resurrection, the immortal soul is reunited with the body. Today, most Christians believe in this dualistic doctrine.

Conversely, adherents of the Hebrew holistic nature of man believe the soul like the body is mortal and, therefore, dies with the body. At the resurrection, the whole person, body and soul, is resurrected.


What Is the Soul?

What is the soul? The soul is the life-giving force; it is man’s consciousness and awareness. Consequently, the soul is that part of a being that interprets the outside world through the senses. It interprets what one sees, hears, tastes, smells, and feels. Therefore, the soul and not the brain is what sees, hears, tastes, smells, and feels. It is what perceives and evaluates. (Further, the soul is what gives all living creatures their life, consciousness, and awareness.  Consequently, all animals, plants, fungi, protists, and monerans have souls.)

Moreover, the soul is the seat of one’s emotions, personality, intellect, and memory. As such, it is what makes a human being human. It is that part of a person that believes, decides, reasons, judges, rejoices, sorrows, loves, hates, doubts, and the like. Furthermore, from the soul come man’s moral and religious attributes.

The soul is the mind as opposed to the brain. (Some theologians claim that the spirit of man is the mind instead of the soul. [See the last paragraph for a discussion on the spirit of man.]) Through the soul does a person perceive and understand the material world. However, the soul does not reside in the brain and has no corporal nature. On the contrary, the soul is distinct from and independent of the brain.

Although signals received from the senses are analyzed in the brain, the soul is what understands and gives this information meaning and significance. The brain merely serves as a vehicle delivering information to the soul. The soul observes and interprets the information formed in the brain.

The existence of the soul refutes materialism, and, therefore, it repudiates Darwinism and evolution. Materialists believe that the movement of chemicals in the brain controls a person’s thoughts, emotions, and actions. Blind, unconscious atoms and electrical signals cannot be the source of awareness, perception, thought, beliefs, emotions, and the like.

Some theologians distinguish between the soul of man and the spirit of man. For these theologians, the soul of man is identified with the secular exercise of an individual. The spirit of man is that part of human nature that allies with God. Also, some identify the spirit of man as what makes man a rational being. However, many treat the soul and the spirit as two names for the same entity. This article does not distinguish between the two.


Reference

Bacchiocchi, Samuele. Popular Beliefs: Are They Biblical? Berrien Springs Michigan: Biblical Perspectives, 2008.

Davis, John D. The Westminster Dictionary of the Bible. Revised by Henry Snyder Gehman. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: 1944.

Douglas, J.D. et al., editors. The New Bible Dictionary. Grand Rapids: Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1962.

Jacobus, Melanchthon W., Edward E. Norse, and Andrew C. Zenos, editors. A New Standard Bible Dictionary. New York, New York: Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1926.

Martin, William C. The Layman’s Bible Encyclopedia. Nashville, Tennessee: The Southwest Company, 1964.

Tenney, Merrill C., editor. The Zondervan Pictorial Bible Dictionary. Grand Rapids: Michigan: Zondervan Publishing House, 1967.

Yahya, Harun (Adnan Oktar). Darwin’s Dilemma the Soul. First English edition. Editor Tam Mossman. Translator Carl Nino Rossini. Istanbul, Turkey: Global Publishing, 2008.


Copyright © 2021 by Thomas Coley Allen.

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Monday, May 31, 2021

Calvin’s Views of Jesus and the Trinity

Calvin’s Views of Jesus and the Trinity
Thomas Allen

In History of the Dogma of the Deity of Jesus Christ (revised edition of 1876, translated 1878), Albert Reville, a minister of the French Reformed Church, gives a brief description of Calvin’s views on the Trinity and Jesus. Although Calvin claimed to support the orthodox Trinitarian and Incarnation doctrines of the Catholic Church, his Christology and explanation of the Trinity approached the unitarianism of the modalists or Sabellians.

Calvin maintained “that the finite cannot contain the infinite” (p. 179). This axiom, he used against the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist, which holds that the bread is the actual body of Christ and the wine is his actual blood.

If this axiom is applied to the person of Jesus, it results in a contradiction: “‘the whole plenitude of the Deity dwelt in the human nature of Christ,’ and at the same time, ‘the whole Deity was without him’” (pp. 179-180). Thus, “the Son, or the Word[,] was not circumscribed or enclosed in the man Jesus” (p. 180). While intimately united with Jesus, the Word never ceased to fill the infinite.  Consequently, “the Word was united to the man Jesus, so far as human nature, without false to itself, was capable of embodying the divine perfection” (p. 180). Reville concludes, “If in the place of the Word, we put here the Holy Spirit, which after all only differs from the Word in name, we are on the verge of the most decided Unitarianism” (p. 180).

The divine attributes of which human nature is capable are not omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence. They are moral attributes like holiness, justice, and goodness. Thus, the perfection of Jesus is “moral perfection, holiness, not absolute perfection” (p. 180). Calvin seriously accepted “all those details of the evangelical history in which the truly human nature of Jesus is positively indicated” (p. 180). Reville asks, “Did Calvin himself see that his exegesis . . . disposed of almost all scriptural proofs generally brought forward in support of the Trinity? On thing is certain, that his Commentaries reduced them to nothing” (p. 181). Accordingly, Calvin claimed that the formula of baptism (baptizing in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit — Matthew 28:19) did “not relate to the Trinity of the Divine Persons, but to the triple relation in which God stands towards man in the new economy” (p. 182).

Moreover, Calvin modified “the strict notion of personality as applied to the three terms of the trinity. The three persons (the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) became simply divine attributes or modes. Thus, his doctrine of the Trinity is essentially Sabellianism (which was considered heresy by the fourth century). “In effect, the personality of Jesus, which in the old orthodoxy was a divine personality, becomes once more the human personality of primitive Unitarianism” (p. 182). Consequently, Mary is no longer the Mother of God. Faith becomes one of Jesus’ virtues. Worship should not be paid to Christ because he “possesses only a part of the Divine perfections” (p. 183). Although Jesus is the Mediator, “he cannot be the object of that worship which can be properly addressed only to the absolute Being” (p. 183).

For Calvin, the Holy Spirit “is no longer a person in the true sense of the world; . . . it is God in action in the world and the soul” (p. 183).

Nevertheless, Calvin and his followers claimed to follow the Catholic orthodoxy of the Trinity and defended it against its opponents. However, Calvin had changed the fundamental idea of the Trinity.

Copyright © 2021 by Thomas Coley Allen.

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Sunday, June 21, 2020

Israel Identity

Israel Identity
Thomas Allen

Israel Identity, also called British-Israelism, Christian Identity, and Kingdom Identity, claims that the lost tribes of Israel became the Germanic and Celtic tribes that invaded Europe and settled in Western Europe. The following presents Charles Weisman’s version of the Israel-Identity doctrine as it relates to salvation as given in Is Universalism of God? In this book, Weisman refutes the doctrine of the Universalists that all humans are eventually saved regardless of race or merit.

Weisman appears to be a Calvinist — only more so. Calvin believed that God arbitrary chooses whom to save to everlasting life and whom to condemn to everlasting torment without any foreknowledge of merit. (Thus, Calvin declared that God is not omniscient.) Unlike Calvin, who seems to believe that people of every ethnicity and race have a chance of salvation, Weisman seems to argue that only the unmixed descendants of Israel are saved. However, he is somewhat fuzzy about non-Israelite Whites. Sometimes, he seems to allow the descendants of Abraham (except the Arabs) and possibly Heber a chance of salvation. At other times, he seems to include non-Hebrew Whites in the salvation lottery, but, at other times, he excludes them.

Like all Israel Identity adherents, Weisman includes all Israelites and their modern-day descendants in the salvation lottery. Nevertheless, he is unclear about which Israelites are saved. Does God save nearly all, most, many, or just some? (Israel Identity adherents run the gamut from nearly all to just some.) According to Weisman, if a person is saved, he is merely a robot whom God has programmed to believe in Jesus — although he is not this blatant. As mentioned above, Weisman is hazy about whether God chooses any non-Israelite White for salvation, although he seems inclined to believe that God does not choose any non-Israelite White for salvation. However, he is certain that God chooses no nonwhites for salvation, and, by that, He condemns all nonwhites to eternal damnation.

At the time of Israel’s birth, circa 1844 or 1837 B.C., and the Israelite migration to Egypt around 1715 or 1706 B.C., Whites inhabited most of the Middle East, and much of Egypt and North Africa. Whites also inhabited Europe then. Consequently, Whites vastly outnumbered the Israelites, who were probably less than 100 persons. (Pure Israelites were 13.)

As far as known, none of Israel’s sons married their sisters. Thus, none of Israel’s daughters-in-law were true Israelites. According to the Bible, Joseph married an Egyptian by whom his sons, Ephraim and Manasseh, were born. (According to most Israel Identity adherents, the descendants of Ephraim inhabit England, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Manasseh’s descendants inhabit the United States.) How can the descendants of Israel’s sons be pure Israelites if their mothers were not genetic Israelites?

Since the Israelites settled in lands, such as Mesopotamia, Syria, Asia Minor, North Africa, and Europe that already had a population of Whites greater and often much greater than the Israelite immigrants, what happened to these non-Israelite Whites? The Israelites did not kill all of them or even most of them. Apparently, the Israelites lived among these other Whites or alongside them.

Moreover, how does one distinguish between an Israelite White European and a non-Israelite White European? Like other Israel Identity adherents, Weisman does not satisfactorily answer this question. The closest that he comes to an answer is to declare that the people of the Nordic racial type are true Israelites. If true, this suggests that other Whites are either non-Israelite Whites or a mixture of Israelite and non-Israelite Whites.

As God saves only true Israelites, then He condemns these other Whites to eternal death. Consequently, since only a small number of Europeans are Nordic, God condemns most Whites to eternal death. (Exposure to the sun is the easiest test to determine if one is a Nordic. While most Whites tan when they expose themselves to the sun, Nordics redden.)

That most Israel Identity adherents are Nordic is highly unlikely. Moreover, that most Israel Identity adherents are some pure descendants with no admixture of non-Israelite Whites is even more unlikely. Therefore, if Weisman is correct, few, if any, Israel Identity adherents qualify for God’s salvation lottery.

In his book, Weisman exposes the error of the doctrine of the Universalists that all humans regardless of race or merit are eventually saved to everlasting life in heaven. He does so by arguing that God chooses only Israelites for salvation to everlasting life. Nevertheless, at times, Weisman suggests that some non-Israelites Whites are saved, while at other times, he suggests that no non-Israelite Whites are saved. Like other Israel Identity adherents, he fails to explain how one distinguishes between an Israelite White and a non-Israelite White. However, he is certain that God chooses not to save any nonwhites.

In part, Weisman condemns the Universalist salvation doctrine because it reduces the need for repentance and salvation and removes the fear of judgment; thus, it creates a false sense of security. Such notions encourage licentiousness and otherwise unchristian, unholy lifestyles. Yet, the salvation doctrine of Weisman does the same thing — even more so. As God has already decided whom He will save, then how a person behaves or what a person believes is irrelevant. If behavior and belief are important to salvation, then God programs the person to be saved how to behave and what to believe.

Since God never saves nonwhites, then their behavior and beliefs do not matter. They may as well live by their passions and appetites. Likewise, the same is true for Whites. Since no one knows for sure whether he is an Israelite or whether God has chosen him — although, like all other Israel Identity adherents, Weisman is convinced that he is an Israelite whom God has saved — he may as well act the way that he wants to act and believe whatever he wants to believe. God’s choice and his ancestry decide his salvation and not his behavior or beliefs.

However, Weisman is correct in that Universalism is an egalitarian doctrine that  leads to and encourages the sin of miscegenation. Moreover, Universalism is a false doctrine. Nevertheless, the Israel-Identity doctrine that Weisman substitutes for it is highly questionable.

Copyright © 2020 by Thomas Coley Allen.

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Wednesday, November 8, 2017

Usury

Usury
Thomas Allen

    Usury as used in this article means interest or fees charged on loans or loans on which interest or fees are charged and not just exorbitant interest or fees. Loans may be in money or other goods. Anti-usurers are opponents of usury.
    During the Middle Ages, moralists, the scholastics, claimed that charging interest on loans, usury, was immoral and, therefore, unlawful, although people devised convoluted ways to circumvent this prohibition against charging interest. Even today, some moralists maintain that charging interest on loans is immoral and should be prohibited. They based their argument against usury in part on the teachings of Aristotle and in part on the laws of Moses.
    Since the Reformation, primarily since Calvin, most moralists have ceased believing that charging interest on loans is immoral. (Some have accused Calvin of being a crypto-Jew or an agent of the Jews for justifying usury.)
    Moralists of the Middle Ages claim that if a lender charges interest on a loan, exacting hire for money lent, he is guilty of the sin of extortion. Modern moralists, as Dabney calls them, disagree. They hold that reasonable interest is as just as a reasonable hire for any work or instrument of work.
    Aristotle argued that usury was against nature, unnatural, and beneath the dignity of citizenship. To Aristotle, even the use of money, though necessary, was tainted and not worthy of study. Money, gold and silver, was sterile. (If money is sterile, why are people willing to pay to use it?) If one planted seeds in a chest of gold or silver coins, nothing would grow. (Planting seeds in a box of nebulous electronic money, which is what most of today’s money is, would prove even less fruitful. Nevertheless, if properly watered, seeds planted in a chest of coins will sprout, and these sprouts are eatable.) Moreover, a bag of coins stored for years does not increase by a single coin — thus, proving the barrenness of money. (Food stored for years will not increase in amount either, but unlike gold coins, the stored food will deteriorate and become worthless. Does this mean that food is barren?) Because the use of money was unnatural, usury was unnatural since it is an increase based on money. Only an increase in herds, farming, hunting, and war were natural. Thus, even trade and mechanical arts were unnatural. Money was something used by those involved in trade, and, therefore, its use was base and beneath the dignity of a citizen. Since trade for money was contrary to nature, so was usury on its use. To Aristotle, money was a mere medium of exchange and did not increase by passing from one person to another, so he saw no justification for interest. He never sought to discover why people paid interest and never developed a theory of interest.
    In Exodus 22:25, Moses declares, “If thou lend money to any of my people that is poor by thee, thou shalt not be to him as an usurer, neither shalt thou lay upon him usury.” In Deuteronomy 23:19, he declares, “Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother; usury of money, usury of victuals, usury of any thing that is lent upon usury.” Most who condemn usury today overlook Deuteronomy 23:20, which reads, “Unto a stranger thou mayest lend upon usury; but unto thy brother thou shalt not lend upon usury: that the Lord thy God may bless thee in all that thou settest thine hand to in the land whither thou goest to possess it.” Thus, the laws of Moses allowed charging interest on loans to strangers. The scholastics interpreted “stranger” to be anyone who was not a Christian. Consequently, a Christian could not charge interest on loans to another Christian.
    As the Church forbade Christians from lending Christians money at interest, it drove borrowers to the Jews for loans. As a result, the Church gave the Jews a virtual monopoly on lending money, which largely explains why today Jews dominate banking. (Hypocrite that it was [is], while condemning usury as a venal sin, the Papacy lent and borrowed at interest, although it called the interest “fees,” “gratuities,” etc. — anything but “interest” or “usury.” By the Reformation, the Papacy was allowing charitable loans, called contracts, to pay interest while it continued its prohibition against interest-bearing business loans. Businesses often used “insurance contracts,” which guaranteed the lender a fixed rate of return, otherwise known as interest, instead of a percentage of the profit.) When Christian lending to Christians at interest became acceptable, Christians no longer had to borrow from Jews.
    As Dabney explains, the modern moralists and the Middle Ages moralists, the scholastics, do not disagree on morals, but they do disagree on a merely economic question. They disagree on money being an effective force or influence in the production or creation of new value. Whereas the modern moralists argue that money is an effective force in the production or creation of new value, the scholastics argue that it is not. To the modernists, money is an exchangeable form of capital, and capital is the agent that creates new value. Thus, charging interest is not a moral issue; it is an economic issue.
    The modern moralists and the scholastics agree on the major premise, but they disagree on the minor premise. Both agree that if a person takes something from another for nothing, he is guilty of extortion — the major premise. For the scholastics, the minor premise is that money lent yields nothing in the creation of new value. Therefore, the inference is that charging interest is extortion. For modern moralists, the minor premise is that money lent is the capital that the borrower uses to create new values. Therefore, the inference is that when the lender receives interest on the money lent, he does not extort. As shown, the disagreement between the Middle Ages moralists and the modern moralists is with the minor premise, which is an economic issue and not a moral issue. Much of the opposition to usury, then and now, comes from confusing interest with physical production and associating interest with money. Interest does not have to be in money; it can be in other goods.
    Today, nearly all monetary loans are exchanges of credit. The borrower exchanges his credit for the lender’s credit, which is usually more readily acceptable by the public than is the borrower’s credit. The borrower gives the lender a note, usually written, but occasionally oral, promising to repay the lender the money or credit borrowed. In exchange for this promise, the lender gives the borrower the lender’s credit, although occasionally the lender will give his cash, which today is another form of credit, to the borrower. Today, the credit is lent as checkable deposits where the lender promises to pay all valid checks present against these deposits. (In the past, bank notes were commonly used. The lender promised to pay his notes, which were his credit instruments, when presented for payment.) For the use of the lender’s credit or cash, the lender charged a fee called interest.
    Meyer defines interest “as the price paid for the use of loanable funds. Loanable funds may be used either for purchase of consumer goods or as capital in the process of production.” Mund defines interest as “the price paid for the use of loanable funds (money or credit) which are to be repaid at a later date.”
    According to Menger, interest is the payment for “the exchange of one economic good (the use of capital) for another (money, for instance).” By opposing the charging of interest, anti-usurers hold that money either is not an economic good or, if it is, not worthy of payment. As interest is the payment for the use of capital, the opponents of usury must assume that the use of capital has no value. If it does have value, then why is paying for this value immoral? If it does have value, then the anti-usurers believe that the user of capital is entitled to steal that value. Why is not such theft immoral?
    According to Ely, “[i]nterest represents the difference in value between present and future goods.”  In effect, people who oppose usury claim that the future value of a good is the same as its present value. However, by charging interest, the claim is that a good today is worth more than the same good in the future. That is, an ounce of gold or a loaf of bread is worth more to its holder today than it will be ten years later. Interest represents that difference in value. According to the anti-usurers, an ounce of gold or a loaf of bread ten years from now is worth the same to the holder as it is today. Usury assumes risk over time; zero interest assumes no risk over time. Usury assumes that present enjoyment and satisfaction are greater than future enjoyment and satisfaction; zero interest assumes that future enjoyment and satisfaction are greater in the future than they are in the present. That is, usury assumes that most people prefer to have an automobile today than ten years later. However, anti-usurers believe that people have no time preference and have no more desire for an automobile today than ten years later. If they do and are willing to pay a premium, interest, for an automobile today rather than waiting ten years, they are sinning — just as viewers of pornography are as guilty, as the producers and dealers are, of sin. Likewise, anti-usurers believe that given a choice between receiving $100 today and $100 a year later, people will be indifferent to when they receive the $100. (Most people would probably prefer the $100 today to $101 a year later. However, a majority probably would prefer $200 a year later than $100 today. The $1 and $100 are interest paid for delayed satisfaction.) To the anti-usurers, present value and future value are equal, and, therefore, interest is not only immoral, it is not even needed.
    According, to Alchian and Allen, “Interest is the price of earlier availability, rather than later availability, of rights to use goods.” Whenever people evaluate and exchange present goods or money for future goods or money, interest is involved whether they realize it or not. Moreover, contrary to the implied, if not expressly stated, claim of the anti-usurers, present goods or money are more valuable than the same goods or money in the future. Interest represents the difference in the present and future value.
    Interest is merely a result of people preferring something sooner rather than later. Why is paying for the expression and consideration of this preference a sin? It must be a sin because the moralist anti-usurers want to prohibit usury in the name of morality.
    Rothbard states that “present money is worth more than present expectation of the same amount of future money” — the law of time preference. That is, the future always exchanges at a discount to the present. This discount is the interest that bridges the time preference. Anti-usurers reject the law of time preference, and if it does exist, it is a sin.
    North gives a similar definition: Interest “is the discount we apply to future goods as against present goods.” Moreover, “[i]t is not a uniquely monetary phenomenon.”
    Anti-usurers argue that the future and future goods do not need to be discounted. Thus, they imply that the future is known; people do not live in an uncertain world. Furthermore, they assume that all people will live long enough to enjoy the future; therefore, people do not have to discount the future, i.e., charge interest.
    As interest gives time economic value, the anti-usurers must maintain that time has, or should have, no economic value. An item will have the same value a year or a century from now as it has today. In spite of the assertions of the anti-usurers, time is a scarce economic resource that needs to be economized. (People are not God, who exists outside time; they are prisoners of time.)
    As North notes, “Time is mankind’s only absolutely irreplaceable environmental resource.” Time is the foundation of all economic planning, and interest is the expression of this foundation. Anti-usurers must maintain that either time is irrelevant to economic planning or, if it is relevant, it has no value.
    In the name of morality, anti-usurers would deny compensation, interest, to anyone who saves his money, a present good, and makes it available to entrepreneurs to produce future goods. According to the anti-usurers, this service of capital, saving, to provide an advance in time, as Rothbard calls it, should be without charge; it should be free. To charge for this service is extortion.
    Usury rewards the farsighted and prudent — people who anticipate their future wants and needs and save for them. Anti-usurers want to reward the spendthrift — the impulsive who must have immediate gratification. The anti-usurers would have the prudent to lend to the spendthrift at no charge.
    Interest is payment for the use of capital. Anti-usurers have no problem with paying wages to managers and workers for their labor. Most would not deprive the entrepreneur or owner of his profit for organizing and superintending, either directly or indirectly through managers, the operation of his business. However, they would deprive the capitalist, who may even be a lowly worker via his meager savings or retirement account, of any return on the use of his capital. Thus, the entrepreneur deserves a return on his entrepreneurship; the manager deserves a return on his management; the worker deserves a return on his labor; yet the capitalist does not deserve a return on his capital.
    Besides covering the cost of time preference, part of the interest covers the cost of administrative expenses of transferring money from one person to another. Opponents of usury assume that this cost is either negligible or at least not worthy of compensation. Another part of the interest covers the cost of risk. Most anti-usurers assume that all loans are risk-free. The few who realize that loans do involve risk to the lender believe that such risk should not be compensated. Why would anyone want to risk his money at no cost, zero interest, and give up the present enjoyment and satisfaction that it can bring so that another can satisfy his desires, either in consumption or production, today?
    As Mises notes, when the natural or ordinary interest is zero, no consumption occurs even into eternity. High-interest rates show that people want to consume in the present and near term. Low-interest rates show that people are willing to wait longer to enjoy consumption. At zero interest, which is what the anti-usurers demand, present consumption ceases, and everyone’s labor and resources go toward future consumption. Thus, people would starve as they invest all their labor and resources in capital goods. Do anti-usurers expect lenders to be so future-oriented that they will choose death over usury?
    Hunger prevents the natural rate of interest from becoming zero. If food is available, people will eventually eat it before they starve. Thus, the present value of food will eventually exceed its future value, which means people start applying an interest rate to saving their food for future use, and consuming it in the present.
    Therefore, anti-usurers have to resort to the coercive power of the government to suppress interest to zero. As contradictory as it seems, if the government forces interest to zero, as the anti-usurers want it to do, people will consume their capital. As a result, future goods will become more scarce and eventually cease to exist. Again, people will starve because they have consumed their “seed corn.” The few who survive would return to the hunter-gatherer stage of humanity. Thus, when the government outlaws usury, it forces people to become extremely present-oriented.
    Is starvation what the anti-usurers want? If they succeed in outlawing all interest, starvation is what they will get.
     High interest rates occur when people are present-oriented; they have a high time preference. Low interest rates occur when people are future-oriented; they have a low time preference. Future-oriented people value future income and satisfaction more than present-oriented people value them. Generally, future-oriented people and societies are much wealthier and more advanced than are present-oriented people and societies. The burden of time is much higher for present-oriented people and societies than it is for future-oriented people and societies.
    Anti-usurers seem to prefer present orientation to future orientation. They seem to prefer people consuming everything as quickly as possible to prevent delaying satisfaction, for that implies interest. However, as they demand zero interest, they seem to want to convert everyone to an extremely future-oriented person, who consumes nothing in the present.
    Everything, and every action, carries an interest rate whether noticed or not. Interest guides people in their consumption. Even the farmer uses interest when he decides how much of his crop to consume now and how much to save for planting next season.
    Likewise, when a shipwrecked sailor rations his water consumption, he is employing time preference, interest. By weighing immediately quenching his thirst against quenching his thirst in the future, he is employing time preference, which interest represents.
    Today, many opponents of usury oppose charging interest on loans for immoral reasons rather than moral reasons. They merely want to use other people’s capital, money, to satisfy immediately their consumptive desires without any cost to themselves. With a forced zero-interest loan, the borrower is taking something, the use of another’s capital to save time, from another, the lender, for nothing, which the moralists consider extortion.
    Morally, one may be obliged to lend to a destitute Christian in dire need of the necessities of life at no interest (Exodus 22:25) and perhaps without the thought of repayment. (Actually, today with governments stealing the wealth of the productive and giving it to the poor to provide not only the necessities of life but also many luxuries, no need really exists to lend to the poor and needy.) However, he should ensure that money lent goes for necessities and not for frivolous consumption or pleasure. (Perhaps a better solution is to give the person in need the necessities needed and allow the recipient to pay for them later when he can. [One should never lend any more money to any friend, relative, or acquaintance than he is willing to give them as a gift because he is not likely to be repaid.]) Nevertheless, no one is morally obliged to lend money interest-free to invest in a business, to speculate, or to satisfy consumptive desires.
    Likewise, loans to Christian churches, Christian schools, and Christian charities should be interest-free. But, then, why not just donate the funds?
    In a highly Christianized society, interest rates will be low, but not zero. They are low because Christians are, or should be, future-oriented. As noted above, future orientation causes interest rates to be low.
    Anti-usurers need to decide if they want a future-oriented society in which the wealth of mankind will continue to climb or a present-oriented society in which wealth declines toward the hunter-gatherer level. If they want a future-oriented society with increasing wealth, they need to cease insisting on zero interest, outlawing usury. If they insist on zero interest, outlawing usury, they will create a present-oriented society with declining wealth for all. As Christianity is future-oriented and outlawing usury is present-oriented, the anti-usurers are promoting an unchristian society.
    As the above discussion shows, usury, the payment for time, is essential to life. Without usury, civilization would not and could not exist. Without usury, mankind would only exist in a hunter-gatherer society. Moreover, anti-usurers promote a highly contradictory and impossible society: They want people to be extremely present-oriented, have a high time preference, and extremely future-oriented, have a low time preference, simultaneously. Anti-usurers are nothing more than promoters of “something for nothing.” In short, anti-usurers prefer lower-class living, present orientation, to higher-class living, future orientation.

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Copyright © 2017 by Thomas Coley Allen.

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