Showing posts with label credit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label credit. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 8, 2026

Trump Left Me

Trump Left Me

Thomas Allen


During the 1960s, a common saying in the South was: ”I didn’t leave the Democratic Party; it left me.” Well, I did not leave MAGA Trump; he left me when he left MAGA. Trump promised he was going to be a peace president, but he has become a warmonger. Worse, he became a puppet of Israel. Now, he wants to make Israel great at the expense of American capital and labor. Thus, he has placed Israel before America. Furthermore, he is purging real MAGA people from Congress because they want him to make America great again instead of following the neoconservative foreign interventionism of Bush, Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Biden.

Trump has made some great progress on domestic issues. He is solving the illegal immigration problem, reducing the influence of DEI (diversity, equity, and inclusiveness), eliminating transgenderism, ending affirmative action and quotas, halting the global warming idiocy, and standing up for Whites, who have become second-class citizens in the country that they built.

Unfortunately, Trump has made almost no progress in draining the swamp. At least, he has not surrounded himself with neoconservatives and establishment conservatives as he did in his first administration. Instead, he has surrounded himself with Zionists, who place Israel’s welfare above America’s.

Additionally, Trump has failed to hold the FBI and others in the Justice Department accountable for abusing the law and to give the falsely convicted January-6 protestors justice, although he rightfully pardoned them.

In the realm of the economy, Trump has been mediocre. He was making progress on rebuilding the economy that Biden had destroyed. Now he has undone his work with his stupid and unnecessary war for Greater Israel’s imperialism. 

His war with Iran is only going to hurt the economy of the United States as it drives up energy costs, which drives up the cost of most products and services. Moreover, his war diverts resources from constructive to destructive ends, as it destroys both precious labor (lives) and capital.

Trump’s tariff program, a key component of his economic recovery plan, has focused on bullying other countries with tariffs. He claims that one purpose of his tariffs is to raise revenue. However, raising revenue is secondary. Forcing other countries to bow to his will is their primary purpose.

In addition to tariffs, Trump has continued the traditional governmental policy of picking winners and losers. With subsidies and other federal intervention, he is promoting his favorites, such as artificial intelligence.

Instead of his erratic bullying tariff program and favoritism, Trump should have started eliminating all the unconstitutional agencies and programs that regulate economic activity. (Most federal agencies and programs that regulate economic activity are unconstitutional.)

Excessive credit is the underlying cause of most economic problems. Rather than reducing excess credit, Trump is expanding it with the extravagant growth of the federal budget and resulting debt. Eliminating unconstitutional agencies and their programs (most federal programs are unconstitutional), reducing the armed forces to the level needed to defend America but small enough to thwart foreign interventionism, drastically cutting the budget, and paying down the debt would greatly improve the US economy in the long run. Such action would bring about a sustainable economic boom the likes of which the world has never seen.

However, his interventionist warmongering foreign policy guarantees a growing budget and more debt, which are devastating the American economy. By concentrating on making Israel great instead of making America great, he is undoing all his work to repair the damage that Biden did to the economy.

Unfortunately, in foreign affairs, Trump failed MAGA to the point of destroying it. When he sold his soul to Zionism and Israel and decided to make Israel great instead of America, he betrayed MAGA. 

Nevertheless, Christian Zionists love him and his war with Iran. They are praying that his war becomes a global nuclear war. They need such a war to accelerate Jesus’ return. Some Christian Zionists believe that Trump is the frontman to bring about a nuclear war to hasten Jesus' return. Other people suggest that he may be the Antichrist. (According to John, Jews are the antichrist.)

What has changed since his campaign, when he was promising to keep America out of war? Is it the urgency of his master, Israel, to destroy the largest resistance to Greater Israel? Is it the urgency of the Christian Zionist to quicken Jesus’ return?

Using Bush’s excuse to attack Iraq (if we don’t attack them there, they will attack us here), Trump attacked Iran (his narcissism prevents him from openly admitting that Israel is his master, and he does as it orders him). With only a puny air force and navy, how could Iran threaten the US? Trump must not think that the US Navy and Air Force can protect the United States from an almost nonexistent navy and air force. Moreover, if the United States were not acting as an imperial power with bases scattered throughout the Middle East, Iran would not have any American military or naval assets to attack.

One of Trump’s excuses for his war is to free the Iranians from an oppressive government. Many Iranians sympathize with America and oppose the Ayatollah. Will they continue to view America favorably after the United States kill many of their families and friends? Will they view America favorably after the United States turn their country to rubble and then seize control of Iran’s natural resources?

Trump campaigned as a peace president. He was going to end the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Gaza war and not start any new wars. He could have quickly ended both the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Gaza war by cutting off all aid to Ukraine and Israel. Instead, he continues to provide them with aid. Worse, he has sold his soul to Israel and Zionism and has made the United States Israel’s muscle thug who beats up any country that opposes Greater Israel.

At least Trump’s war against Iran has been good news for some people. Ambassador Huckabee, Senator Cruz, and most other Christian Zionists must be in rapture heaven (they believe that they will enjoy watching the mayhem from heaven because they will be raptured away before events get really bad). Additionally, warmongers like Senators Graham and Cotton are leaping with joy before Lucifer.

Besides attacking Iran to bring about regime change to suit Israel, Trump also attacked and executed a regime change in Venezuela. It seems that he wanted to capture the oil fields in Venezuela, which are the largest in the world, in preparation for his war for Israel against Iran. Most likely, he knew that petroleum exports from the Middle East would cease once the war started. (I am giving him the benefit of the doubt. When all his shortsightedness, blusters, and erroneous predictions about the war are considered, he may not have known.) Major US oil companies are the chief beneficiaries of his Venezuelan regime change, since they will receive huge profits as the world’s oil supply drops by 20 percent.

Distinguishing between Trump’s foreign policy and the neoconservatives’ is difficult. Both seek regime change and hegemony centered around war.

Nevertheless, Trump has done some good in foreign affairs. He has removed the United States from many of the United Nations’ agencies and programs.

One of the most repugnant acts of Trump is trying to drive and even driving some of his greatest supporters, such as Representatives Tom Massie and Marjorie Taylor Greene, whom he did force to resign, from Congress because they objected to his neoconservative policies of hegemony, regime change, nation-building, being the world’s police force, and making the world safe for Zionism. Instead of Trump meddling in the affairs of foreign countries, they wanted him to concentrate on domestic issues.

Trump wants to be thought of as America’s greatest president. If he had kept his promises of being a peace president, he might have become one of America’s greatest presidents. However, he abandoned his campaign promises and became a warmonger. Now, he may outdo Lincoln and become America’s worst president, especially if his war for Israel against Iran leads to the global greatest depression or a world war. (One person commenting on this remark noted that Trump will have to fail even harder to edge out Lincoln on the race to the bottom, which is true.) If Trump wants to be seen as the greatest president ever, he has failed and failed hard.

At the behest of Israel, Trump is sacrificing America on the altar of Zionism. Will Israel order its subordinate, Trump, to nuke Iran? If so, will Trump do what he has yet to do with Israel and show enough courage to say no, or will he obey his orders? 

By being a pawn of Israel, Trump may have delivered the control of the House and Senate in 2027 and the presidency in 2029 to the Democrats. Taking actions to return the control of the federal government to the Democrats is Trump’s greatest betrayal of MAGA. When the Democrats regain control, they will undo all the good that Trump has done and expand the bad that he has done.

(Here is the best comment that I have seen online discussing Trump attacking Iran. Like diabetes, there are two types of TDS (Trump Derangement Syndrome): TDS Type One: Trump can do nothing right; TDS Type Two: Trump can do no wrong.)


Comment

An anonymous person made the following comment, which summarizes my observations. Of course, Democrats are rejoicing over Trump’s ego, narcissism, and stupidity, and his sacrificing America for Israel, although they will also sacrifice America for Israel.

“We had a good thing, you stupid son of a bitch! We had an Al boom. We had a Supreme Court super majority. We had both branches of Congress. We had everything we needed to save America and it all ran like clockwork. You could’ve shut your mouth, played golf, and stole as much money for your family as you ever needed. It was perfect. But no, you just had to blow it up. You, and your debt to Israel and your ego. You just had to make Netanyahu the man! If you’d done your job, known your place, we’d all be fine right now.” (https://paulcraigroberts.org/are-americans-up-to-the-task-of-survival/)


Copyright © 2026 by Thomas Coley Allen.

More political articles.

Wednesday, February 7, 2018

Poor on Fawcett

Poor on Fawcett
Thomas Allen

    In 1877, Henry Varnum Poor (1812-1905) wrote Money and Its Laws: Embracing a History of Monetary Theories, and a History of the Currency of the United States. He was a financial analyst and founder of a company that evolved into Standard & Poor’s. Poor was a proponent of the real bills doctrine and the classical gold-coin standard and, thus, the quality theory of money. He gave little credence to the quantity theory of money — especially if credit money, such as bank notes, were convertible on demand in species. Also, he contended that the value of money depends on and is derived from the value of the material of which it is made and with paper money, its representation of such value.
    In the latter part of his book, he discusses leading monetary theorists from Aristotle (350 B.C.) to David A. Wells (1875). Most of the economists whom he discussed were proponents of the quantity theory of money. We will look at his discussion on Henry Fawcett. My comments are in brackets. Referenced page numbers enclosed in parentheses are to Poor’s book.
    Henry Fawcett (1833-1884) was a British academic, statesman and economist. He was a professor of political science at the University of Cambridge, England. Among his works are Manual of Political Economy (1865), which Poor reviews, Democracy in America (1875), and Free Trade and Protectionism (1878).
    Fawcett writes, that “a bank-note, whether issued by a State establishment or by a private firm, is simply a convenient form for bringing into practical use the credit which may be possessed by the Bank. . . . A banker, therefore, whose credit is good can circulate a great number of his notes in his own neighborhood; his notes being willingly accepted by those to whom he is known. . . . It is manifestly to his advantage to issue notes” (p. 376). Using an example, he illustrates his statement. If £60,000 of bank notes are kept in circulation and if the banker keeps legal-tender reserves equal to £20,000, he has £40,000 at his disposal to invest. In England, the circulation of bank notes is placed under various restrictions. Fawcett investigates the effect on prices that the removal of these restrictions would have. “[T]he effect which would be produced entirely depends upon circumstances” (p. 376). If “there is no change in the population, or in the commercial condition of the country[,] . . . [and if] an increased issue of notes were added to the money circulation of the country, prices would manifestly rise; because there would be now more money in circulation to carry on the same amount of buying and selling which was previously conducted by a smaller amount of money” (p. 376). However, if “the additional notes which are issued simply cause a corresponding amount of bullion to be withdrawn from circulation, it is manifest that no effect is produced on prices” (p. 376). Continuing, Fawcett states:
[G]eneral prices depend upon the quantity of money in circulation compared with the wealth which is bought and sold with money, and also upon the frequency with which this wealth is bought and sold before it is consumed. If more wealth is produced, and an increased quantity of wealth is also bought and sold for money, general prices must decline, unless a large quantity of money is brought into circulation. . . . In fact, if there should be an increased production of wealth, if there should be more buying and selling, or if any other circumstance should occur the effect of which is to require the circulation of a larger amount of money, the value of money must rise; or, in other words, general prices must decline, unless an increased supply of money is forthcoming, so that a larger amount may be brought into circulation (p. 377).
    Next Fawcett discusses bills of exchange. If bills of exchange ceased to be used, then the money supply would have to be increased to replace the bills of exchange. Thus, “bills of exchange, in many classes of transactions, are a convenient and complete substitute for money” (p. 377). “Consequently, if it were not for bills of exchange, one of two things must happen: either the money in circulation must be increased, or the money already in circulation must become more valuable, since a greater amount of money will be required to carry on the trade and commerce of the country” (p. 377). Therefore, whether an increased issue of bills of exchange affects prices cannot be answered affirmatively or negatively. “All that can be said is this: if the buying and selling now carried on by bills of exchange were effected by money, then one of two things must occur, — either more money must be brought into circulation, or general price most decline” (pp. 377-378). Fawcett concludes, “The influence, however, which is exerted upon prices by bills of exchange is not due to any thing peculiar in the nature or form of a bill of exchange: it is not the bill which produces the influence, but the influence is produced by the credit which is given. The bill is not this credit; but is simply a testimony or record of its existence” (p. 378).
    Poor responds that Fawcett errs in his example. All £60,000 of notes would be returned for redemption within 60 to 90 days of the issue for gold coin or the equivalent to coin. Explaining how this would happen, Poor writes:
If the banker discounted bills representing merchandise, his notes would be returned to him by their makers in their payment. If he discounted those that would not be paid, then the notes issued would have to be presently taken in by him, by paying out a corresponding amount of his reserve. The debts created by their issue are to be discharged by their use, or by that of coin. Every note issued, therefore, must have a provision of an equal amount of capital for its discharge, and must be discharged by such provision. Its value depends upon its capacity of being discharged, of being retired from circulation. If it could never be discharged, it could have no value. Such is the law of all convertible currencies. Notes get into circulation upon the credit of the issuer; but it is always upon the assumption that means, their equivalent in value, are first provided for their redemption. Without such confidence, no one would take them. The basis of their circulation is not credit, but capital. Credit is but another word for confidence that such capital exists, and can always be had when wanted (p. 378).
    Poor continues, “The reserve is not held to meet such notes as occasionally return, such as are assumed to be issued in excess; for the reason that all will return within their appointed periods” (p. 379). Thus, “Mr. Fawcett wholly misconceived the law or nature of paper money” (p. 379). [Poor gives an excellent explanation of the operation of the real bills doctrine. If the principle of the real bills doctrine is adhered to, currency cannot be overissued. It ensures that the currency available to clear, buy, new goods entering the markets is sufficient to clear the market with little or no effect on prices. Here is where the advocates of Social Credit err. Under the real bills doctrine, new goods entering the markets produce the money needed to buy them, i.e., the bill of exchange. Without resorting to borrowing, it also provides the money to pay employees and suppliers before the goods are sold. Thus, the real bills doctrine is far superior to the Social Credit scheme, which requires the government to print and give government notes to the people to close the gap between national income and the gross domestic product. The real bills doctrine closes the perceived gap between the national income and gross domestic product more quickly, accurately, and precisely than does the Social Credit scheme. Moreover, unlike the Social Credit scheme, the real bills doctrine closes the gap without resorting to governmental force or making the people dependent on the government or leading them to believe that they are getting something for nothing. Unlike the Social Credit scheme, which requires about two years to deliver the money to the people necessary to close the gap that occurred two years earlier, the real bills doctrine does so within a few months at most. Furthermore, the real bills doctrine is far superior to the Social Credit scheme at getting the right amount of money at the right place and at the right time.]
    Moreover, according to Poor, Fawcett errs with “his statement that notes can be substituted, as currency, for a corresponding amount of gold; the saving to the country being in the amount of the substitution, ‘because notes, which are simply pieces of paper of no intrinsic value, perform with equal efficiency all the purposes which were previously fulfilled by the gold which is now supposed to be dispensed with’” (p. 379). Poor remarks:
Notes which are constantly being retired from circulation cannot take the place of gold which remains, as currency, unchanged and permanently in circulation. Whether convertible or not, they cannot perform, with equal efficiency, all the purposes which are fulfilled by gold. Their value is representative, not intrinsic; that of gold is intrinsic, not representative. Notes become valueless if their constituent become valueless; the value of gold depends upon nothing but itself (p. 379).
[With today’s paper fiat money, notes have replaced gold. That paper notes and their electronic equivalent “cannot perform, with equal efficiency, all the purposes which are fulfilled by gold” explains much of the monetary and economic problems that the world now faces.]
    In comparing gold with bank notes, Poor writes:
Gold can be used in the arts; notes cannot. Gold can discharge indebtedness to foreign countries; notes cannot. Gold can discharge balances arising in the domestic trade of a country; notes cannot. Gold can be held as reserves by the issuers of paper money, and by society, and for all time; notes cannot in either case, as they are necessarily speedily retired by the use, or disappearance from any cause, of their constituent. Notes are accepted within the country in which they are issued, by reason of their representative character. They can perform only one function of gold, — that of effecting domestic exchanges (p. 379).
[Poor fails to mention that gold, which is no one else’s obligation, can extinguish debt; notes cannot. Notes can only discharge debts by transferring them to another. Moreover, gold can transport value over millennia; notes cannot.]
    Also, according to Poor, Fawcett fails to see “that the less cannot include the greater. Paper discharges gold from use in one particular; but can no more be substituted for it in all the functions which the latter has to perform in the economy of society than a mere promise can be substituted for the performance, or sugar for iron” (p. 379). Poor adds, “Great advantages result from the use of paper money, and in ratio to its use, in the same way that great advantages result from the use of ships and railroad” (p. 380). [Trying to substitute completely paper for gold is the major flaw of modern-day economics and today’s monetary system that will cause their downfall. It is also the major and fatal flaw of all schemes of the fiat monetary reformers. Even worse, is the movement to reduce all money to electronic bytes, as they are even more nebulous and abstract than paper notes.]
    Next Poor comments on “Mr. Fawcett’s theory of the effect upon prices of credit in the form of paper money is singularly unphilosophic and inadequate. With him, the whole thing is a mere piece of mechanism: so much money, so much price; and the reverse. His conclusions are based upon assumptions wholly impossible in themselves” (p. 380). Contrary to Fawcett’s belief that doubling production and purchases while the amount of money remains the same will cause price to fall one-half, “production and consumption cannot be doubled, the amount of money remaining the same; both must, as a rule, proceed in ratio to the amount of money in circulation” (p. 380). Moreover, Poor adds, “Paper money is the symbol of merchandise: the one must be in ratio to the other, as the necessary condition of production and consumption” (p. 380).
    About Fawcett’s belief, Poor remarks:
He [Fawcett] might as well have assumed the commerce of a country to be doubled for the reason that the ships employed carried twice as much as they have the ability to carry. His statements and illustrations are nothing less than contradictions in terms. Credit in the form of money has an effect entirely different from that due to its quantity. ‘If,’ says Fawcett, in effect, ‘one would lift two pounds of merchandise with a one pound weight, he must double, or reduce one-half, the length of one arm of the scale.’ The true object of paper money is to raise the two pounds of merchandise without the employment of any weight whatever. So far as this can be done, can the cost of the operations of weighing be saved, and prices reduced in like ratio; and so far can the coin of a country be employed in the discharge of functions peculiar to itself, and which neither symbols nor paper money of any kind can discharge (p. 380).
        According to Poor, depending on Fawcett’s definition of currency, Fawcett may have erred in assuming that an increase in currency is followed by an increase in prices (pp. 380-381). If currency is capital or the representation of capital, then Fawcett is wrong because “prices must be in ratio to the amount of merchandise fitted for consumption, or in ratio to the perfection of the instruments for its distribution” (p. 381). However, if currency “be neither capital nor the representative of capital (merchandise); if it be that kind of currency which can be substituted for gold, like legal tender [notes],” (p. 381) then Fawcett is right because “an increase of such currency always tends to advance prices in being in excess of the means of consumption” (p. 381). [Although general prices fluctuated under the gold standard, they were much more stable than general prices have been under today’s paper fiat monetary system. {An ostensible goal of today’s monetary system used to be to maintain stable prices.} Under the gold standard, general prices trended upward for years and then downward for years; however, over a few decades, they remained fairly stable with perhaps a downward bias because of improved technology. Under today’s fiat paper monetary system, general prices have trended upward as the monetary unit loses purchasing power year after year.]
    About inconvertible currency [e.g., today’s currency], Poor writes, “People accept an inconvertible currency of government notes, as it will discharge their own debts existing at the time, by virtue of its being legal tender, and from a belief that it will speedily be redeemed by an equivalent in some form. If government be competent to issue it, it would have a high value for a time, even if it were believed that it would not be paid” (p. 384). [No one really believes that today’s currency will be paid, i.e., redeemed in gold or in anything else with intrinsic value.]
    According to Fawcett, a country can increase the issue of its currency without disturbing the finances of the country “if its issue were confined within reasonable limits” (p. 384). “If, for example, the United States, in the late civil war, had issued notes only in ratio to their increased necessity for money, the issue could have exerted no influence over prices” (p. 384). About U.S. notes issued during the war, Poor comments, “The demand for money, measured by the price of the notes issued, exceeded sixteen-fold the amount of previous expenditure” (p. 384). Then he asks, “how could the expenditures of a government be increased sixteen-fold, or even eightfold, without any increase of capital, or fund to draw upon, and prices remain at their old figures? It is the same as to say that a demand multiplied by one per cent equals a demand multiplied by eight or sixteen per cent” (p. 384). Continuing, Poor remarks, “If gold could have been supplied wherewith to meet all expenditures growing out of the war, prices would still have increased enormously, from the excess of demand over supply” (p. 384). About the rise of prices during the war, Poor writes, “Prices rose, therefore, in ratio to the demand; in other words, in ratio to the inflation of the currency” (pp. 384-385).
    In his concluding remarks about Fawcett, Poor writes:
If Mr. Fawcett had paused long enough to ask himself weather [sic] or not a sovereign to be received six months hence had the same value to the person who was to receive it as a sovereign in hand; or whether a government note having one year to run, without interest, equalled in value its note having the same time to run, bearing interest, — the answer, properly made, would have unlocked to him all the mysteries of money. Instead of this, he contented himself with a mild restatement of all the old dogmas, every one of which he accepted without reservation, and every one of which is exactly opposed to the principles upon which money is based. It must, however, be said in his favor, that his style is in agreeable contrast to the incoherent extravagance of Macleod and the fantastic nonsense of Bonamy Price (p. 385).

Copyright © 2017 by Thomas Coley Allen.

More money articles.

Wednesday, November 8, 2017

Usury

Usury
Thomas Allen

    Usury as used in this article means interest or fees charged on loans or loans on which interest or fees are charged and not just exorbitant interest or fees. Loans may be in money or other goods. Anti-usurers are opponents of usury.
    During the Middle Ages, moralists, the scholastics, claimed that charging interest on loans, usury, was immoral and, therefore, unlawful, although people devised convoluted ways to circumvent this prohibition against charging interest. Even today, some moralists maintain that charging interest on loans is immoral and should be prohibited. They based their argument against usury in part on the teachings of Aristotle and in part on the laws of Moses.
    Since the Reformation, primarily since Calvin, most moralists have ceased believing that charging interest on loans is immoral. (Some have accused Calvin of being a crypto-Jew or an agent of the Jews for justifying usury.)
    Moralists of the Middle Ages claim that if a lender charges interest on a loan, exacting hire for money lent, he is guilty of the sin of extortion. Modern moralists, as Dabney calls them, disagree. They hold that reasonable interest is as just as a reasonable hire for any work or instrument of work.
    Aristotle argued that usury was against nature, unnatural, and beneath the dignity of citizenship. To Aristotle, even the use of money, though necessary, was tainted and not worthy of study. Money, gold and silver, was sterile. (If money is sterile, why are people willing to pay to use it?) If one planted seeds in a chest of gold or silver coins, nothing would grow. (Planting seeds in a box of nebulous electronic money, which is what most of today’s money is, would prove even less fruitful. Nevertheless, if properly watered, seeds planted in a chest of coins will sprout, and these sprouts are eatable.) Moreover, a bag of coins stored for years does not increase by a single coin — thus, proving the barrenness of money. (Food stored for years will not increase in amount either, but unlike gold coins, the stored food will deteriorate and become worthless. Does this mean that food is barren?) Because the use of money was unnatural, usury was unnatural since it is an increase based on money. Only an increase in herds, farming, hunting, and war were natural. Thus, even trade and mechanical arts were unnatural. Money was something used by those involved in trade, and, therefore, its use was base and beneath the dignity of a citizen. Since trade for money was contrary to nature, so was usury on its use. To Aristotle, money was a mere medium of exchange and did not increase by passing from one person to another, so he saw no justification for interest. He never sought to discover why people paid interest and never developed a theory of interest.
    In Exodus 22:25, Moses declares, “If thou lend money to any of my people that is poor by thee, thou shalt not be to him as an usurer, neither shalt thou lay upon him usury.” In Deuteronomy 23:19, he declares, “Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother; usury of money, usury of victuals, usury of any thing that is lent upon usury.” Most who condemn usury today overlook Deuteronomy 23:20, which reads, “Unto a stranger thou mayest lend upon usury; but unto thy brother thou shalt not lend upon usury: that the Lord thy God may bless thee in all that thou settest thine hand to in the land whither thou goest to possess it.” Thus, the laws of Moses allowed charging interest on loans to strangers. The scholastics interpreted “stranger” to be anyone who was not a Christian. Consequently, a Christian could not charge interest on loans to another Christian.
    As the Church forbade Christians from lending Christians money at interest, it drove borrowers to the Jews for loans. As a result, the Church gave the Jews a virtual monopoly on lending money, which largely explains why today Jews dominate banking. (Hypocrite that it was [is], while condemning usury as a venal sin, the Papacy lent and borrowed at interest, although it called the interest “fees,” “gratuities,” etc. — anything but “interest” or “usury.” By the Reformation, the Papacy was allowing charitable loans, called contracts, to pay interest while it continued its prohibition against interest-bearing business loans. Businesses often used “insurance contracts,” which guaranteed the lender a fixed rate of return, otherwise known as interest, instead of a percentage of the profit.) When Christian lending to Christians at interest became acceptable, Christians no longer had to borrow from Jews.
    As Dabney explains, the modern moralists and the Middle Ages moralists, the scholastics, do not disagree on morals, but they do disagree on a merely economic question. They disagree on money being an effective force or influence in the production or creation of new value. Whereas the modern moralists argue that money is an effective force in the production or creation of new value, the scholastics argue that it is not. To the modernists, money is an exchangeable form of capital, and capital is the agent that creates new value. Thus, charging interest is not a moral issue; it is an economic issue.
    The modern moralists and the scholastics agree on the major premise, but they disagree on the minor premise. Both agree that if a person takes something from another for nothing, he is guilty of extortion — the major premise. For the scholastics, the minor premise is that money lent yields nothing in the creation of new value. Therefore, the inference is that charging interest is extortion. For modern moralists, the minor premise is that money lent is the capital that the borrower uses to create new values. Therefore, the inference is that when the lender receives interest on the money lent, he does not extort. As shown, the disagreement between the Middle Ages moralists and the modern moralists is with the minor premise, which is an economic issue and not a moral issue. Much of the opposition to usury, then and now, comes from confusing interest with physical production and associating interest with money. Interest does not have to be in money; it can be in other goods.
    Today, nearly all monetary loans are exchanges of credit. The borrower exchanges his credit for the lender’s credit, which is usually more readily acceptable by the public than is the borrower’s credit. The borrower gives the lender a note, usually written, but occasionally oral, promising to repay the lender the money or credit borrowed. In exchange for this promise, the lender gives the borrower the lender’s credit, although occasionally the lender will give his cash, which today is another form of credit, to the borrower. Today, the credit is lent as checkable deposits where the lender promises to pay all valid checks present against these deposits. (In the past, bank notes were commonly used. The lender promised to pay his notes, which were his credit instruments, when presented for payment.) For the use of the lender’s credit or cash, the lender charged a fee called interest.
    Meyer defines interest “as the price paid for the use of loanable funds. Loanable funds may be used either for purchase of consumer goods or as capital in the process of production.” Mund defines interest as “the price paid for the use of loanable funds (money or credit) which are to be repaid at a later date.”
    According to Menger, interest is the payment for “the exchange of one economic good (the use of capital) for another (money, for instance).” By opposing the charging of interest, anti-usurers hold that money either is not an economic good or, if it is, not worthy of payment. As interest is the payment for the use of capital, the opponents of usury must assume that the use of capital has no value. If it does have value, then why is paying for this value immoral? If it does have value, then the anti-usurers believe that the user of capital is entitled to steal that value. Why is not such theft immoral?
    According to Ely, “[i]nterest represents the difference in value between present and future goods.”  In effect, people who oppose usury claim that the future value of a good is the same as its present value. However, by charging interest, the claim is that a good today is worth more than the same good in the future. That is, an ounce of gold or a loaf of bread is worth more to its holder today than it will be ten years later. Interest represents that difference in value. According to the anti-usurers, an ounce of gold or a loaf of bread ten years from now is worth the same to the holder as it is today. Usury assumes risk over time; zero interest assumes no risk over time. Usury assumes that present enjoyment and satisfaction are greater than future enjoyment and satisfaction; zero interest assumes that future enjoyment and satisfaction are greater in the future than they are in the present. That is, usury assumes that most people prefer to have an automobile today than ten years later. However, anti-usurers believe that people have no time preference and have no more desire for an automobile today than ten years later. If they do and are willing to pay a premium, interest, for an automobile today rather than waiting ten years, they are sinning — just as viewers of pornography are as guilty, as the producers and dealers are, of sin. Likewise, anti-usurers believe that given a choice between receiving $100 today and $100 a year later, people will be indifferent to when they receive the $100. (Most people would probably prefer the $100 today to $101 a year later. However, a majority probably would prefer $200 a year later than $100 today. The $1 and $100 are interest paid for delayed satisfaction.) To the anti-usurers, present value and future value are equal, and, therefore, interest is not only immoral, it is not even needed.
    According, to Alchian and Allen, “Interest is the price of earlier availability, rather than later availability, of rights to use goods.” Whenever people evaluate and exchange present goods or money for future goods or money, interest is involved whether they realize it or not. Moreover, contrary to the implied, if not expressly stated, claim of the anti-usurers, present goods or money are more valuable than the same goods or money in the future. Interest represents the difference in the present and future value.
    Interest is merely a result of people preferring something sooner rather than later. Why is paying for the expression and consideration of this preference a sin? It must be a sin because the moralist anti-usurers want to prohibit usury in the name of morality.
    Rothbard states that “present money is worth more than present expectation of the same amount of future money” — the law of time preference. That is, the future always exchanges at a discount to the present. This discount is the interest that bridges the time preference. Anti-usurers reject the law of time preference, and if it does exist, it is a sin.
    North gives a similar definition: Interest “is the discount we apply to future goods as against present goods.” Moreover, “[i]t is not a uniquely monetary phenomenon.”
    Anti-usurers argue that the future and future goods do not need to be discounted. Thus, they imply that the future is known; people do not live in an uncertain world. Furthermore, they assume that all people will live long enough to enjoy the future; therefore, people do not have to discount the future, i.e., charge interest.
    As interest gives time economic value, the anti-usurers must maintain that time has, or should have, no economic value. An item will have the same value a year or a century from now as it has today. In spite of the assertions of the anti-usurers, time is a scarce economic resource that needs to be economized. (People are not God, who exists outside time; they are prisoners of time.)
    As North notes, “Time is mankind’s only absolutely irreplaceable environmental resource.” Time is the foundation of all economic planning, and interest is the expression of this foundation. Anti-usurers must maintain that either time is irrelevant to economic planning or, if it is relevant, it has no value.
    In the name of morality, anti-usurers would deny compensation, interest, to anyone who saves his money, a present good, and makes it available to entrepreneurs to produce future goods. According to the anti-usurers, this service of capital, saving, to provide an advance in time, as Rothbard calls it, should be without charge; it should be free. To charge for this service is extortion.
    Usury rewards the farsighted and prudent — people who anticipate their future wants and needs and save for them. Anti-usurers want to reward the spendthrift — the impulsive who must have immediate gratification. The anti-usurers would have the prudent to lend to the spendthrift at no charge.
    Interest is payment for the use of capital. Anti-usurers have no problem with paying wages to managers and workers for their labor. Most would not deprive the entrepreneur or owner of his profit for organizing and superintending, either directly or indirectly through managers, the operation of his business. However, they would deprive the capitalist, who may even be a lowly worker via his meager savings or retirement account, of any return on the use of his capital. Thus, the entrepreneur deserves a return on his entrepreneurship; the manager deserves a return on his management; the worker deserves a return on his labor; yet the capitalist does not deserve a return on his capital.
    Besides covering the cost of time preference, part of the interest covers the cost of administrative expenses of transferring money from one person to another. Opponents of usury assume that this cost is either negligible or at least not worthy of compensation. Another part of the interest covers the cost of risk. Most anti-usurers assume that all loans are risk-free. The few who realize that loans do involve risk to the lender believe that such risk should not be compensated. Why would anyone want to risk his money at no cost, zero interest, and give up the present enjoyment and satisfaction that it can bring so that another can satisfy his desires, either in consumption or production, today?
    As Mises notes, when the natural or ordinary interest is zero, no consumption occurs even into eternity. High-interest rates show that people want to consume in the present and near term. Low-interest rates show that people are willing to wait longer to enjoy consumption. At zero interest, which is what the anti-usurers demand, present consumption ceases, and everyone’s labor and resources go toward future consumption. Thus, people would starve as they invest all their labor and resources in capital goods. Do anti-usurers expect lenders to be so future-oriented that they will choose death over usury?
    Hunger prevents the natural rate of interest from becoming zero. If food is available, people will eventually eat it before they starve. Thus, the present value of food will eventually exceed its future value, which means people start applying an interest rate to saving their food for future use, and consuming it in the present.
    Therefore, anti-usurers have to resort to the coercive power of the government to suppress interest to zero. As contradictory as it seems, if the government forces interest to zero, as the anti-usurers want it to do, people will consume their capital. As a result, future goods will become more scarce and eventually cease to exist. Again, people will starve because they have consumed their “seed corn.” The few who survive would return to the hunter-gatherer stage of humanity. Thus, when the government outlaws usury, it forces people to become extremely present-oriented.
    Is starvation what the anti-usurers want? If they succeed in outlawing all interest, starvation is what they will get.
     High interest rates occur when people are present-oriented; they have a high time preference. Low interest rates occur when people are future-oriented; they have a low time preference. Future-oriented people value future income and satisfaction more than present-oriented people value them. Generally, future-oriented people and societies are much wealthier and more advanced than are present-oriented people and societies. The burden of time is much higher for present-oriented people and societies than it is for future-oriented people and societies.
    Anti-usurers seem to prefer present orientation to future orientation. They seem to prefer people consuming everything as quickly as possible to prevent delaying satisfaction, for that implies interest. However, as they demand zero interest, they seem to want to convert everyone to an extremely future-oriented person, who consumes nothing in the present.
    Everything, and every action, carries an interest rate whether noticed or not. Interest guides people in their consumption. Even the farmer uses interest when he decides how much of his crop to consume now and how much to save for planting next season.
    Likewise, when a shipwrecked sailor rations his water consumption, he is employing time preference, interest. By weighing immediately quenching his thirst against quenching his thirst in the future, he is employing time preference, which interest represents.
    Today, many opponents of usury oppose charging interest on loans for immoral reasons rather than moral reasons. They merely want to use other people’s capital, money, to satisfy immediately their consumptive desires without any cost to themselves. With a forced zero-interest loan, the borrower is taking something, the use of another’s capital to save time, from another, the lender, for nothing, which the moralists consider extortion.
    Morally, one may be obliged to lend to a destitute Christian in dire need of the necessities of life at no interest (Exodus 22:25) and perhaps without the thought of repayment. (Actually, today with governments stealing the wealth of the productive and giving it to the poor to provide not only the necessities of life but also many luxuries, no need really exists to lend to the poor and needy.) However, he should ensure that money lent goes for necessities and not for frivolous consumption or pleasure. (Perhaps a better solution is to give the person in need the necessities needed and allow the recipient to pay for them later when he can. [One should never lend any more money to any friend, relative, or acquaintance than he is willing to give them as a gift because he is not likely to be repaid.]) Nevertheless, no one is morally obliged to lend money interest-free to invest in a business, to speculate, or to satisfy consumptive desires.
    Likewise, loans to Christian churches, Christian schools, and Christian charities should be interest-free. But, then, why not just donate the funds?
    In a highly Christianized society, interest rates will be low, but not zero. They are low because Christians are, or should be, future-oriented. As noted above, future orientation causes interest rates to be low.
    Anti-usurers need to decide if they want a future-oriented society in which the wealth of mankind will continue to climb or a present-oriented society in which wealth declines toward the hunter-gatherer level. If they want a future-oriented society with increasing wealth, they need to cease insisting on zero interest, outlawing usury. If they insist on zero interest, outlawing usury, they will create a present-oriented society with declining wealth for all. As Christianity is future-oriented and outlawing usury is present-oriented, the anti-usurers are promoting an unchristian society.
    As the above discussion shows, usury, the payment for time, is essential to life. Without usury, civilization would not and could not exist. Without usury, mankind would only exist in a hunter-gatherer society. Moreover, anti-usurers promote a highly contradictory and impossible society: They want people to be extremely present-oriented, have a high time preference, and extremely future-oriented, have a low time preference, simultaneously. Anti-usurers are nothing more than promoters of “something for nothing.” In short, anti-usurers prefer lower-class living, present orientation, to higher-class living, future orientation.

References
Alchian, Armen A. and William R. Allen. University Economics: Elements of Inquiry. 3rd edition. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1972.

Allen, Thomas. “Questions for the Anti-Usurers.” Franklinton, North Carolina: TC Allen Company, 2010.

Dabney, R.L. The Practical Philosophy. Harrisonburg, Virginia: Sprinkle Publications, 1897.

Elliott, Calvin. Usury: A Scriptural, Ethical and Economic View. Frankston, Texas: TGS Publishers, 1902, 2008.

Ely, Richard T. An Introduction to Political Economy. New and revised edition. New York, New York: Eaton & Mains, 1901.

Jordan, James B. The Law of the Covenant: An Exposition of Exodus 21-23. Tyler, Texas: Institute for Christian Economics, 1984.

Laughlin, J. Laurence. The Elements of Political Economy. New York, New York: American Book Co., 1882.

Menger, Carl. Principles of Economics. Translators James Dingwall and Bert F. Hoselitz. New York, New York: New York University Press, 1976.

Meyers, Albert L. Elements of Modern Economics. 4th edition. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956.

Mises, Ludwig von. Human Action: A Treatise on Economics. 3rd revised edition. Chicago, Illinois: Henry Regnery Co., 1963.

Mund, Earl E. “Interest.” In Economic Principles and Problems. Editor Walter E. Spahr. Fourth edition. Vol. II. New York, New York: Rinehart & Co., Inc.: 1940.

Nicholson, J. Shield. “Usury.” Encyclopedia Britannica. 9th edition. The R. S. Peale Reprint. Chicago, Illinois: R.S. Peale & Co. XXIV, 17-19.

North, Gary. The Dominion Covenant: Genesis. An Economic Commentary on the Bible. Volume 1. Tyler, Texas: Institute for Christian Economics, 1982.

North, Gary. Moses and Pharaoh: Dominion Religion Versus Power Religion. Tyler, Texas: Institute for Christian Economics, 1985.

North, Gary. Tools of Dominion: The Case Laws of Exodus. Tyler, Texas: Institute for Christian Economics, 1990.

Polleit, Thorsten. “The ‘Natural Interest Rate’ Is Always Positive and Cannot Be Negative.” March 21, 2015. https://mises.org/library/natural-interest-rate-always-positive-and-cannot-be-negative. May 14, 2017,

Poor, Henry Varnum. Money and Its Laws: Embracing a History of Monetary Theories, and a History of the Currencies of the United States. Reprint. New York, New York: H.V. and H.W. Poor, 1877.

Rothbard, Murray N. Man, Economy and State: A Treatise on Economic Principles. 2 volumes. Los Angeles, California: Nash Publishing, 1970.

Tenebrarum, Pater. “The Consequences of Imposing Negative Interest Rates.” November 21, 2014. http://www.acting-man.com/?p=34365.  May 14, 2017.

Copyright © 2017 by Thomas Coley Allen.

More articles on economics.

Friday, March 26, 2010

Analysis of Richard Cook’s Monetary Reforms Part III

Analysis of Richard Cook’s Monetary Reforms as Presented in We Hold These Truths
Part III

Thomas Allen


This paper is Part III of my analysis of Richard C. Cook’s monetary reforms as presented in his book We Hold These Truths: The Hope of Monetary Reform (Tendril Press, 2008–2009). His words and my paraphrases or summaries of his words, I have italicized. My commentary is in roman letters. I have provided references to pages in his book and have enclosed them in parentheses.

Mr. Cook claims “that the program would free mankind from the control of the monetary elite which has unjustly usurped the fruits of the labor of society” (p. 67). It does do that. However, it does so by putting them under the control of the political elite, who will then unjustly usurp the fruits of the labor of society. Mr. Cook’s program does not set the people free. It merely changes their master, who in reality is probably the same elite.

Mr. Cook expresses his underlying fascist tendencies when he suggests that the government is a better regulator of the economy than are the markets (p. 81), which he seems to hold in utter contempt. Mr. Cook errs when he claims that the attitude of deregulation and letting the markets regulate the economy instead of the government began in the Reagan administration (p. 81). Keeping the government out of the economy was the general attitude until the progressive Wilson administration. The major exceptions were federal subsidies of infrastructure, such as canals and railroads, and protective tariffs, which lead to Southern secession. If President Reagan and the following presidents truly believed in nongovernmental intervention, why did the Code of Federal Regulation grow, not only unabated but often at an accelerated rate?

Mr. Cook asks, “But if market-based economics is so wonderful, why do we have stagnating employee incomes, rapidly increasing control of wealth by the very rich, a middle class in decline, growing poverty collapse of our manufacturing job base, a bursting housing bubble, resurgent commodity inflation, shaky stock prices, trillion dollar war in the Middle East financed by runaway deficit spending, and capital markets dominated by predatory equity and hedge funds” (p. 82)? The answer is that we have a heavily governmentally manipulated market as Mr. Cook advocates. The problems that Mr. Cook identifies are the results of the conflict between the government trying to control the markets and the markets trying to free themselves from that control. Many of these problems result from the government creating and protecting a banking cartel. These problems will not go away if Mr. Cook’s program is adopted. They will become worse as he advocates evermore governmental control of the economy.

Mr. Cook condemns the ever-growing debt in the United States and blames it on the markets (p. 82). His solution is not to reduce debt. It is to replace one form of debt with another. He would deny this because he fails or refuses to see government notes as a noninterest-bearing, nonrepayable form of debt. As it is never paid down, his debt always grows.

Mr. Cook is convinced that banks derive their power from free-market ideology (p. 84). They do not. They derive their power from governments. Governments gave them this power through the creation and maintenance of central banking and governmental regulations. (Central banks are not creatures of the markets. They are creatures of governments. The markets did create them. Governments did. Markets have never created a central bank.) The last thing that most bankers want to do is to operate in a free market. If they had to operate in a truly free market, they would lose the power that Mr. Cook ascribes to them. (President Bush’s bailout of the banks was Mr. Cook’s governmental intervention and not the markets operating. President Roosevelt’s suspension of the bankers’ obligation to redeem their notes in gold as they had contracted to do was Mr. Cook’s governmental intervention and not the markets operating.)

Like most fiat monetary reforms, Mr. Cook fondly quotes Benjamin Franklin’s admiration of paper money (p. 89). Franklin admired paper money because he made a small fortune printing it. By the time of the U.S. Constitution’s adoption, he had seen the destructive effects of governmentally issued paper money, i.e., governmentally issued credit. By then he had lost much of his enthusiasm for paper money. Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine, James Madison, and most of the founding fathers abhorred paper money. This hostility toward paper money appears in the U.S. Constitution where Congress was stripped of the power to emit bills of credit, i.e., to issue paper money, that the Articles of Confederation granted it. (Thus, Mr. Cook’s program requiring the U.S. government to issue paper money and its electronic equivalent is unconstitutional in spite of what any court may declare.)

Mr. Cook shows his ignorance of monetary history when he writes, “Because the colonial notes were spent directly into circulation not issued by a central bank through lending at interest, they did not inflate” (p. 90). Colonial notes were highly inflationary.[1]

Mr. Cook notes that by 1811 when the charter of the First Bank of the United States expired, state-chartered banks “had begun to issue paper money through fractional reserve banking” (p. 94). He also notes that lending was “confined mainly to commercial transactions under the ‘real bills’ doctrine” (p. 94). Some points of clarification are needed. First, under the real bills doctrine, banks do not really lend when they buy a real bill of exchange. Real bills are commercial money. They can be and were used to discharge debt. When a bank buys a real bill, it merely converts commercial money (the real bill) to bank money (bank notes and checkbook money). Second, the discount rate (the difference between what one pays for a real bill and its value at maturity) is not an interest rate. Savers determine rates. Consumers determine discount rates. (This does not mean that governments do not intervene to fix rates. When governments fix rates, they create excesses or shortages.)

Like most fiat monetary reformers, Mr. Cook expresses admiration for President Lincoln (pp. 96-97). Does he admire Lincoln because he did more than any other president to destroy the U.S. Constitution? He does admire Lincoln’s issuance of the unconstitutional greenback (p. 96) to fight his war to destroy the Constitution.

Like nearly all monetary economists, be they hard-money folks or easy-money folks, Mr. Cook claims that “silver was demonetized by the Coinage Act of 1873” (p. 97). This is not exactly true. This Act did not demonetized silver. It ended the silver standard. Silver continued to be used in subsidiary coins (dimes, quarters, and halves). Between 1878 and 1900, silver as silver dollars was used as fiat money. Congress and the Secretary of the Treasury instead of the markets decided the quantity to issue. Moreover, the value of silver in a silver dollar was less than a dollar. In 1900 with the Gold Standard Act, silver dollars became subsidiary coins for gold.

Mr. Cook is probably correct when he claims that the Coinage Act of 1873 “was in line with a worldwide banker-sponsored shift toward a gold standard” (p. 97). The elimination of the silver standard was necessary to eliminate the gold standard, which occurred in 1933.

Mr. Cook errs when he writes, “In creating it [the Federal Reserve System], Congress ceded its constitutional authority over the nation’s monetary system to the private financiers” (p. 98). With the Federal Reserve Act, Congress did create a banking cartel, but it has no constitutional authority to do so. The Constitution grants Congress no authority to act as a bank. Therefore, it can give no entity such authority. Just as importantly, the Constitution grants Congress no authority over the country’s monetary system. Its only authorities on monetary matters are defining the monetary unit and coining all the gold and silver presented to the mint for coinage. Thus, it ceded none of its constitutional authority. What it ceded was the authority that it had usurped.

Originally, the Act prohibited the Federal Reserve from buying treasury securities and using treasury securities as collateral for note issuance. When World War I broke out, the Federal Reserve and the U.S. government ignored this prohibition. The Federal Reserve bought treasury securities (p. 98). Later, Congress legitimized this illegal activity.

Again, Mr. Cook harps on deregulation and its destructive effects (p. 103). Again, I ask, “If we have had all this deregulation, why has the Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) continued to grow at an accelerated rate?” (When I first began working with the CFR in the early 1970s, I worked with one or two volumes. When I last worked with the CFR in 2007, I was working with 20 volumes. If all the material incorporated by reference were included, several hundred volumes would be needed. So much for deregulation.) Deregulation is not the cause of America’s financial and economic problems. A lack of deregulation is the cause. At the root of America’s economic problem is excessive regulation.

Mr. Cook blames much of the financial and economic problems of the country on “monetarism” and the resulting erratic expansion and contraction of the money supply (pp. 102-104, 171-172). Mr. Cook’s understanding of monetarism differs significantly from mine. According to Milton Friedman, the father of monetarism, the money supply should grow at a known steady rate year after year with no regard for interest rates, unemployment, governmental budgetary needs, or anything else. Friedman’s concept differs greatly from Mr. Cook’s description. Like Mr. Cook, I have no use for the monetarist approach to regulating the money supply.

Mr. Cook declares that credit creation should be “through our constitutional system whereby Congress is authorized to create money and regulate its value” (p. 128). The Constitution does not authorize Congress to create money. It authorizes Congress to coin money. To coin money and to create money are entirely two different things. Money cannot be coined until it is created. Mr. Cook despises market-created gold and silver money. They can be and have been used as money without being coined. Coining makes their use easier. The Constitution recognizes this fact. Under the Constitution, if no private person brought any gold or silver to the mint, there would be no coins. If the U.S. government undertook to coin gold and silver on its own account, it would first have to steal the gold or silver from someone. (Between 1878 and 1900, it did mint silver dollars on its own account. It could do so because it could buy silver with gold and the silver coins minted contained less silver than the monetary value of the coin.)

Mr. Cook argues that the federal government should control credit instead of private bankers (p. 128). Except for authorizing Congress to borrow money, the Constitution does not authorize the U.S. government to become involved with credit. If Mr. Cook wants a constitutional system that removes the control of credit from bankers and international financiers, he should advocate the true real bills doctrine and concomitant gold and silver standards. Such a monetary and credit system can operate without banks although not as efficiently. However, they make the control of credit private by putting it directly in the hands of the people. (Mr. Cook does not trust the people with the control of credit. The government, which he entrusts with the control of credit, is not and can never be the people.) Moreover, they also greatly restrict governmental monetary adventurism. They would prevent governmental control of credit, the establishment of Social Credit, and its concomitant fiat money. They are a greater threat to Mr. Cook’s proposal than the current system. His proposal is only a major modification of the current system. The gold and silver standards with the real bills doctrine is a replacement.

Mr. Cook remarks that “under the regime of the world’s all-powerful central banking systems, money is brought into existence only as debt-bearing loans” (p. 145). This may be true today, but it has not always been true. Before President Roosevelt stole the people’s gold, money came into the system whenever a gold smelter cast an ingot of gold and certified its weight and purity.

Thieves like Roosevelt, whom Mr. Cook admires although he was a frontman for the big bankers, whom Mr. Cook despises, are the type of people that Mr. Cook wants to entrust with managing the country’s monetary. A banker like Morgan is despicable, selfish, and greedy when he is a banker. However, if he were to become a politician or a governmental bureaucrat like the head of the Bank of England, he suddenly becomes an altruistic and honorable person of probity and integrity. Although Mr. Cook distrusts bankers, he seems to trust politicians and bureaucrats implicitly.

However, Mr. Cook distrusts governmental officials to manage the current economy or even doubts that they can (p. 146). Yet he not only wants these people to manage the economy under his system, but he advocates that they do. They have to because his program calls on them actively to manage the monetary system and, by that, the economy.

Mr. Cook is correct when he writes, “The fundamental objectives of monetary policy should be to secure a healthy producing economy and provide for sufficient individual income” (p. 148). His proposal fails to achieve this goal. Contrary to his assertion, it is highly inflationary. He also advocates heavy governmental intervention in the economy, which retards economic growth. Mr. Cook displays a strong distrust of freedom.

Mr. Cook is a strong advocate of a guaranteed income (pp. 9, 148). People should be guaranteed a minimum standard of living even if they produce nothing and are as parasitic as bankers and speculators. To give someone a guaranteed income, the wealth has to be forcibly taken from someone else. If an individual forcibly takes another person’s wealth even to give to a third party, he would be called a thief and punished as such. However, if he is shrewd, he steals through the government. Not only does he then get away with his theft, but he is also considered the victim who deserves what he gets—and more. Mr. Cook conceals this theft with his printing press money and its electronic equivalent. He also cuts everyone in on the deal by giving everyone a bribe. Although he would deny it, he is transferring wealth from producers to nonproducers by depreciating the money.

Mr. Cook believes that everyone in the country has a claim to what everyone else produces (p. 148). Yet this philosophy of “from each according to his production to each according to his need” is not communism. Again, Mr. Cook conceals his communistic scheme with printing press money and its electronic equivalent.

Mr. Cook not only wants the U.S. government to guarantee every American a minimum income, but he wants governments of rich countries through the United Nations to guarantee everyone in the world a minimum income (p. 158). (Mr. Cook appears to be a strong supporter of the U.N. [p. 174].) He is a firm believer in using governments to plunder producers for the benefit of nonproducers. Producers are to be the slaves of nonproducers. He really does support a parasitic society—only the parasites are no longer bankers and speculators.

Mr. Cook is right when he writes, “The U.S. and world economies are on the brink of collapse due to the lunacy of the financial system, not because we can’t produce enough. Contrary to so many doomsayers, the mature world economy is capable of providing a decent living for everyone on the planet” (p. 149). Yet he fails to connect a declining standard of living with fiat money. As the monetary system has moved farther from the gold standard, the standard of living for the common man has declined at an increasing pace. Only sound money and minimum governmental oversight can unleash this productive power that will significantly raise the standard of living especially for the poor. Mr. Cook offers neither. On the contrary, he offers an unsound monetary system and massive governmental intrusion.

Mr. Cook refuses to realize that the gold standard, especially when accompanied by the silver standard, protects the common man from bankers and governments by limiting their power over him. Consequently, bankers and governments have been hostile toward the gold standard. Mr. Cook sees the danger of the bankers and wants to protect the common man from them. However, he does not seem to see the greater danger of government—at least not under his system although he vaguely sees it under the current system. This ignorance or deliberate blindness is unexplainable unless he is so blinded by his system, which demands the subordination of the common man to the government, that he refuses to see it.

Mr. Cook contents that his recommendations are based on economic ethics (p. 153). The ethics underlying his proposed system are the same as those underlying the current system. They are fraud and force. Both force loans on the people in the form of irredeemable legal tender paper money. They deceive people into believing that they can get something for nothing. In both systems, money is created out of nothing.

Mr. Cook is correct in that “human morality should be the common denominator and essential element in making economic policy decisions” (p. 153). Unfortunately, his proposal is no more moral than the current system. He believes that a gang of thugs acting as the government has the right to take someone’s property without his consent. He does object to much of this taking under the current system, but he demands such taking under his system. He seems to object to “might makes right” (p. 154). Yet his system relies on this principle.

Mr. Cook is a firm believer in command and control. The government telling (commanding) markets what to do solves financial and economic problems. Mr. Cook distrusts liberty. Freedom and markets cannot be trusted to solve financial and economic problems.

Mr. Cook seems to believe that self-interest governmental bureaucrats acting under the facade of “charity, compassion, or service to mankind” (p. 154) can better direct production and services of the economy than the profit motive. Profit sends a clear signal to entrepreneurs informing them what the people want and when and where they want it. What do nonrisk-taking bureaucrats use to guide themselves in providing for the people? Gut feelings? Personal basis? Mr. Cook’s desires?

What happens when people use their money in a way that Mr. Cook finds objectionable, such as speculation? Does the government outlaw arbitrarily objectionable spending?

Mr. Cook objects to war (pp. 155, 191-192). Yet his scheme makes financing war easy. Under his system, the government can fight wars with printing press money. It need not finance them with taxes or borrowing. Only gold and silver have been much of an impediment to war. Because they make war so difficult, governments quickly abandon them when they want to fight a war of any significance.

Mr. Cook disagrees with the notion “that money is, or should be, a thing of value in-and-of itself, or that this value is created by ‘market forces’” (p. 178). Commodity money, like gold coins, has value as money because the material of which it is made has value in and of itself, i.e., has value because of its nonmonetary use. Supply and demand give fiat money value, which originally comes from its connection with commodity money. The only other mechanism that gives money value is to fix the price of everything in the economy in terms of the monetary unit. How does Mr. Cook propose that money receive its value?

Mr. Cook claims “that money serves its socially-beneficial purposes only when it is regarded as an instrument of law and an economic medium-of-exchange and when it is regulated by a government which can responsibly direct its benefits to the welfare of all citizens” (p. 179). Apparently, before a governmental edict decreed a certain item to be the medium of exchange, i.e., money, money served no socially-beneficial purpose. If the markets decide what is to be used as money, money can serve no socially-beneficial purposes. Or at least its socially-beneficial purposes are severely limited. (To Mr. Cook, money’s socially-beneficial purposes seem to be the welfare state with socialized healthcare and education.)

Markets easily and efficiently create money and credit when and where it is needed and in the quantity needed. Mr. Cook would have the government regulate money by always increasing its supply regardless of demand. The government would create and issue money to cover most of its operating expenses, to subsidize prices, and to fill the perceived gap between national income and gross domestic product.

Like most fiat monetary reformers, Mr. Cook believes that the Constitution authorizes Congress to print and issue money (p. 179). It does not. The writers of the Constitution thought that they had denied Congress the power to print money when they removed the provision in the draft that authorized Congress to emit bills of credit.

As he states, the Supreme Court did declare that the Constitution authorized the printing and issuance of greenbacks (p. 179). However, the first time that the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of the greenback, it ruled that it was unconstitutional. Only after President Grant did his version of packing the Court did the Supreme Court rule that the greenback was constitutional. What this ruling shows is that when given a choice between political expediency and personal bias verse original intent, the Court nearly always chooses political expediency and personal bias over original intent. This preference is the root of nearly all of the economic problems of the United States. If courts had followed the wording and intent of the Constitution, the Federal Reserve would not exist. Neither would the U.S. government’s micromanagement of the economy and the welfare state.

Mr. Cook claims that “fractional reserve banking under a privately-owned central bank is not ordained by our Constitution” (p. 179). He is correct. However, based on his premise that the Constitution is highly elastic and that it gives Congress the authority to control and regulate money, the Federal Reserve is constitutional. Congress chose to control and regulate money through “fractional reserve banking under a privately owned central bank.” The Constitution does not prohibit Congress from delegating its powers to private entities or using them to exercise its powers.

Mr. Cook claims that the current system forces people into ruinous debt (p. 179). On the private level, no one is forced to borrow. The way to avoid ruinous debt is not to borrow. Those who run the government can force ruinous debt on taxpayers through their extravagant spending. However, if the people want to avoid this ruinous debt they can vote people into office who adamantly oppose the welfare-warfare state. Mr. Cook’s scheme does not eliminate ruinous debt. It merely changes its form to noninterest-bearing, nonrepayable debt.

Mr. Cook is correct about the Federal Reserve’s incompetence and inability to manage the country’s money properly and to influence the economy appropriately (pp. 183ff). Yet he believes that politicians and bureaucrats are fully competent and able to manage the country’s money and economy. Unlike the Federal Reserve, the government can at least dictate how individuals are to spend their money and what economic activities are to be undertaken. Did not the Soviet Union and Mao’s China do this?

Endnote

1. Thomas Allen, "Massachusetts Notes: The Perfect Money" (Franklinton, N.C.: TC Allen Co., 2009).



Copyright © 2009 by Thomas Coley Allen.

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Monday, March 15, 2010

Analysis of Richard Cook’s Monetary Reforms Part II

Analysis of Richard Cook’s Monetary Reforms as Presented in We Hold These Truths
Part II
Thomas Allen


This paper is Part II of my analysis of Richard C. Cook’s monetary reforms as presented in his book We Hold These Truths: The Hope of Monetary Reform (Tendril Press, 2008–2009). His words and my paraphrases or summaries of his words, I have italicized. My commentary is in roman letters. I have provided references to pages in his book and have enclosed them in parentheses.

Mr. Cook admits that “a strong, functioning economy is required” for his system to work (p. 37). However, he fails to explain adequately how a strong, functioning economy will continue when people are paid whether they are productive or not.

He is correct in that people need leisure time to pursue spiritual, intellectual, and family activities (p. 37). (As not many people will pursue these activities, especially the first two, is the government going to force its wards to pursue these activities?) They should be relieved of perpetual grueling toil (p. 37). However, his scheme does not achieve these goals in the end. Like all collective schemes, it leads to economic stagnation and decline.

Mr. Cook advocates shifting much of credit creation from banks to the U.S. government. The U.S. government needs to lend more. More governmental lending supports “the concept that credit should really be viewed as a publicly-regulated utility . . . ” (p. 39). First, nowhere does the U.S. Constitution authorize the U.S. government to lend money or credit to anyone. Furthermore, the U.S. government will breed more corruption as it lends more. Loans will be used to pay and play political favorites. Second, if credit is a public utility and should be regulated as one, no one could lend to friends or relatives without the approval of some governmental bureaucrat. (Most likely, such loans below a specific amount would be exempted from case-by-case approval. However, such exemption is itself a bureaucratic approval that can be revoked.)

Mr. Cook supports the American Monetary Institute’s recommendations of a Monetary Control Board in the Department of the Treasury setting and overseeing monetary targets and other proposals of the American Monetary Institute (pp. 39, 55, 65, 109, 159, 262). Since Mr. Cook’s system demands injections of money into the economy to fund most of the government and to fill the “gap,” the Monetary Control Board seems superfluous. Its only purpose seems to be justifying ever-increasing governmental expenditures. As I have discussed in detail the American Monetary Institute’s proposal in “Analysis of the American Monetary Institute’s American Monetary Act,”[1] I will not go into any depth on its highly flawed despotic scheme. However, it is a good match for Mr. Cook’s proposal.

Mr. Cook presents the now-defunct Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) and Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) as examples of public credit. He recommends creating programs like these to lend at below-market interest rates to state and local governments for infrastructure projects (p. 39). Thus, he wants to make the states ever more dependent on and subservient to the U.S. government. A major cause of the political and economic problems in this country has been the subordination of the creators (the states) to the created (the U.S. government). Today, nearly all political power has been usurped and concentrated in Washington. The states can do little more than what the U.S. government allows them to do. Mr. Cook’s scheme completes this consolidation.

He also supports the U.S. government lending at below-market interest rates to banks money for banks to lend at some low rate to consumers, students, and small businesses (p. 40). According to Mr. Cook, when the Federal Reserve, which was created by and exists at the pleasure of the U.S. government, makes low interest rate loans, it distorts the economy, creates inflation, and causes all sorts of havoc. However, when the U.S. government does the same thing through another agency that it has established, it causes none of these problems. At least that is what Mr. Cook would have us to believe. It must be who gets the interest. No, it cannot be that because all the interest earned by the Federal Reserve above its operating costs goes to the U.S. Treasury. What is the difference, Mr. Cook?

Mr. Cook describes the current system with fractional reserve banking—creating money out of nothing (pp. 53ff). He remarks “that because borrowed money pays for labor, commodities, rent, etc., it becomes part of the prices that are eventually charged for goods and services. However, when the money goes back to the bank to cancel a loan, that purchasing power disappears” (p. 54). Labor, rent, etc. may become part of the price, but they do not determine the price. To the contrary, the price that the marginal buyer is willing to pay determines the cost of the product or service inputs. Furthermore, Mr. Cook condemns removing money (purchasing power) from the economy once its work is done. Apparently, once money, purchasing power, enters the economy, it should remain there forever. As noted above, this is highly inflationary.

Mr. Cook seems to believe in a “firm law of prices.” Prices do not move to meet the available purchasing media. Once the seller sets his price, it remains fixed. On the other hand, Mr. Cook seems to agree that prices rise and fall as the purchasing medium is inflated or deflated. Yet for some reason, prices do not want to adjust to meet the income, purchasing power, available for purchases. This lack of adjustment is an essential part of Social Credit. Mr. Cook seems to explain this firm law of prices with cost (p. 61). Because of the costs associated with production, prices cannot decline. What he and most other people fail to realize is that costs do not determine prices. Prices determine costs. The actual selling prices of the final products determine all the costs going into producing these products.

Mr. Cook states “the real purpose of money . . . is to serve as a ticket for the purchase by people of articles they need to survive or otherwise desire to utilize once the demand for survival has been met” (p. 55). No, it is not. The real purpose of money is to serve as a ticket for those who have produced to represent their contribution to what they have produced. Then they can exchange these tickets for things that they need and want.

Mr. Cook is correct when he remarks that the financial system does work “against what should be the real purpose of money” (p. 55). However, the real purpose is not what he claims.

Mr. Cook is hostile toward the notion that money is or should be a commodity. Money should not have value in and of itself. Gold and silver money have no intrinsic value (p. 55). If money has no value in and of itself or is not descended from money that did, how does one know the value of the money?

Whether or not gold and silver have intrinsic value is debatable even in hard money circles. If by intrinsic value, Mr. Cook means that gold and silver have no absolute value in and of themselves, independent of human thought, he is right. Neither gold nor silver nor anything else has such value. When people say that gold and silver have intrinsic value, they usually mean that they have value in and of themselves. That is, they have value in their monetary use because they have value in their nonmonetary use. The reason that federal reserve notes have value is that the dollar used to be a definite weight of gold and that the federal reserve notes were once redeemable in gold on demand. If Mr. Cook’s new notes have value, it will be because they are related to federal reserve notes, which were once related to gold.

Mr. Cook is correct when he states “money is anything that a willing buyer and a willing seller agree to exchange for something else” (p. 55). However, no sane person is going to trade a useful product for a worthless piece of paper or an electric blip. That paper or its electronic equivalent can only have value if it is or once was related to something that had value in and of itself.

Under today’s system, people accept federal reserve notes primarily because of legal tender laws. They have to accept them for payment of debt. Mr. Cook gives no hint that legal tender laws should be repealed. Without them, people would soon refuse to accept his money—except for their National Dividend stipend that cost them nothing to accept other than their independence and freedom. If no one was forced to accept his money, it would lose its value as it has no intrinsic value.

Mr. Cook errs when he writes that “unless there are goods and services available and for sale, gold and silver are totally useless” (p. 56). No, they are not. They are highly useful even if not used as money. Their nonmonetary uses are what gave them value that enabled them to be used for money. Today, neither is used as a medium of exchange, yet both are highly valuable. Mr. Cook could not have written and published his book with the equipment that he used without them.

Mr. Cook recites the old myth that gold and silver have no value because “you can’t eat them, live in them, or wear them” (p. 56). One cannot eat, live in, or wear electronic blips, which will be the form of most, if not all, of Mr. Cook’s credits. One can eat, live in, and wear gold and silver. Both are taken orally to treat certain ailments. A house can be built with gold and silver bricks. It would be expensive and highly energy inefficient, but it can be done. (I forgot. Gold and silver have no value, so any house built with them will literally be cheaper than dirt.) Clothes can be and have been made with them.

If Mr. Cook believes that gold and silver have no value whereas his electronic blips do, he should go to some poverty-stricken country like Haiti and find out which one really has value. He will have no problem spending his gold or silver coin. He will have extreme difficulty finding anyone willing to sell him something for his electronic blip.

Furthermore, if gold has no value, why do governments expend many more resources guarding their hoards of gold than they expend guarding any vault filled with paper currency? If gold and silver have no value, why do people expend their time and resources looking for, mining, and refining gold and silver?

Mr. Cook asks, “So by what right do the bankers bind the economy in such a straightjacket of debt” (p. 56)? They have the right because the U.S. government gave it to them through excessive governmental intervention. (This is the same government that Mr. Cook advocates giving even more power.) It did so through the establishment of the Federal Reserve System, excessive regulation of banking, legal tender laws, and other economic intervention. (Under the gold standard, the government allowed abusive fractional reserve banking by allowing bankers to violate their contract to redeem their notes on demand if enough banks could not do so. It should have imprisoned these bankers for fraud and failure to keep their contracts.) Mr. Cook does not object to excessive governmental intervention in the economy. His objection concerns where and how it is used. Mr. Cook even recognizes that governmentally granted privileges, i.e., licenses and regulatory requirements, e.g., minimum capital requirements, contribute to this problem (pp. 56-57).

Mr. Cook insists that money in and of itself has no value. Credit gives money its value. “Without the credit potential of a producing economy, money has no value” (p. 57). If Mr. Cook is correct, then the ancients bought and sold with valueless money. How absurd! Perhaps the most common monetary standard was the cattle standard. People bought and sold based on the value of cattle. Cattle were their purchasing power. According to Mr. Cook, these cattle had no value because the ancients had not developed an economy based on credit. Again, how absurd. People would not have used cattle in exchanges if they had no value in and of themselves. They certainly did not used cattle because of credit as most never used credit, and many would have considered such a notion ridiculous.

Mr. Cook’s concept of “credit” differs from most. To him, “credit” is the economic potential of the economy (p. 58). Money is the measure of credit (pp.58-59).

Mr. Cook believes that the government should control money. Naively, he believes that those who really control the government will control the money for the benefit of the people as a whole (pp. 59-62). That is, those who really control the government will put aside their selfish desires and act altruistically for the betterment of the people. If they would do this, they would be doing it now. History offers only a few examples of such altruism. On the contrary, those who control the government act to serve their own desires and often to the detriment of the people as a whole. Even if those who control the money under Mr. Cook’s system were purely altruistic with no selfish motivation, they would fail in their job because they are not omniscient. To provide the right amount of money, they have to know everyone’s demand preference for money, which is constantly changing, at every moment in time. No committee or individual can ever achieve this no matter how brilliant they are or how much data they have.

Mr. Cook insists that money, and therefore, credit, should be public property and not private property (p. 59). Thus, any money that a person has in his pocket belongs to the government. Since all credit is public property, i.e., it belongs to and is owned by the government, all National Dividend credit given to a person really belongs to and is owned by the government. Therefore, whatever a person buys with money and credit, which are the property of the government, must belong to the government as its property has been used to get the goods and services. Furthermore, everyone loses ownership, and by that control, of his own credit. As noted above, whenever a person borrows money from a bank, he is lending the bank his credit. Under Mr. Cook’s system, this credit now belongs to the government and not the borrower. And Mr. Cook insists that is not socialism (p. 59)! Under his system, the government surreptitiously ends up owning everything.

The founding fathers did not conceive of money and credit being public property. They were to be private property. The monetary system that they devised ensured that the money, gold and silver coins, would be private property. Then all the credit based on this money would remain private property.

Mr. Cook claims that the productive capacity of the country is credit and that credit should be publicly owned, i.e., governmentally owned, utility (p. 58). Yet he insists that this be not socialism. Under socialism, the government owns the means of production or regulates them so heavily that it is tantamount to ownership. The means of production are part of the productive capacity of the country. If the government owns the credit and if credit is the productive capacity of the country, then the government owns the productive capacity. If it owns the productive capacity, it owns the means of production. Is that not socialism?

Mr. Cook states, “It is essential to realize that the central government of a sovereign nation has the right, the ability, and the responsibility to introduce ALL new credit into existence. This is totally different from having the central bank ‘print money’ . . .” (p. 62). Since the Bank of England became a part of the British government in 1946, Great Britain should be an economic paradise instead of the economic disaster that it is. Since 1946 all the money and credit issued by the British central bank, which is an agency of the British government, have been the property of the British government. The British government has been managing the money and credit of Great Britain. Yet Great Britain is financially and economically worse off than the United States. If Mr. Cook is right, Great Britain should be much better off than the United States. It is much closer to Mr. Cook’s system than the United States. The only thing really lacking in the British system is periodically sending everyone a big check to bridge the national income-GDP gap.

Mr. Cook would counter, “Sovereign creation of credit should not be based on debt. It is and should be based on direct lending or spending of money into circulation by the government itself” (p. 63). Where this has been tried, the results have been disastrous and highly inflationary. Massachusetts did this in the first half of the eighteenth.[2] France did it in the 1790s.[3] Both experiments were failures. Whereas these schemes failed, Mr. Cook believes his will succeed by injecting more money into the economy and giving the government more control of the economy through its absolute monopolistic control of credit.

Mr. Cook claims that “it is the job of government to bring that money to where it is needed” (p. 63). How does the government know where it is needed? It has to be omniscient to know. The founding fathers knew that no government is omniscient, and it certainly should not have the power to attempt to obtain such knowledge. Therefore, they left the allocation of money and credit in the hands of the people—the only place it can be if the people are to be free.

Mr. Cook gives an outline of the principles guiding his system. The Social Credit concept discussed above is a key principle (pp. 63-64). They are a mixture of government-private partnerships. Some things are left to private initiative, and some, to government command. In reality, the government decides. In short, Mr. Cook promotes a form of fascism.

While retaining the welfare portion of the welfare-warfare state, he discards the warfare part (p. 64). Welfare and warfare go together like husband and wife in the Biblical sense: They are one flesh. One cannot for long be separated from the other. The exhilarating rush of power that the welfare state gives those who control the government will force it to lust for total power by adding the warfare state. If Mr. Cook wants to abandon the warfare state, he must also abandon the welfare state. Yet he cannot because his system depends on the welfare state mentality.

Mr. Cook advocates spending “sufficient credit into existence to supply the basic operating expenses of government at all levels without recourse to either taxes or borrowing” (p. 65). Then he provides three examples: colonial paper money, the Continental, and the greenback (p. 65). All three of the examples were highly inflationary and highly destructive to the common man’s wealth. They enriched speculators, whom Mr. Cook disdains, and the politically connected. Mr. Cook’s proposal would have the same results. Only his will be more inflationary and destructive. Like them, his new money has no relationship to new goods being offered for sale. Moreover, unlike them, his system makes no pretense of removing excess money. Apparently, he believes that under his scheme, excess money is impossible. (The U.S. note or greenback did not meet the fate of the colonial money and the Continental because Congress ceased issuing more of them and actually reduced the amount in circulation. Furthermore, it set up a mechanism to redeem them in gold. None of these are part of Mr. Cook’s scheme.) Mr. Cook does allow for the collection of some user fees(p. 65), which does nothing to remove any excess.
Unlike some fiat money reformers, Mr. Cook correctly sees that these three types of money were a form of credit money (p. 65). What he does not acknowledge is that they were interest-free, nonrepayable forced loans (although U.S. notes offered payment to the holder between 1879 and 1933).

Mr. Cook proposes a National Dividend program divided into two parts. “One would be a cash stipend paid to all citizens which would also serve the purpose of eliminating poverty by providing everyone with a basic income guarantee. The remainder of the National Dividend would consist or an overall pricing subsidy, whereby a designated proportion of all purchases, including home building expenses, would be rebated to consumers” (pp. 65-66). Mr. Cook does not explain what will prevent people who are paid whether they work or not from following the historical experience of not working. He also fails to explain why his consumption subsidies, especially when people are paid not to produce, will not lead to shortages. His program increases demand while it decreases supply.

He also sets aside part of the National Dividend to give to all citizens upon reaching the age of 18 to use for higher education, trade school, or business investment (p. 66). Is the government going to force them to undertake one of these endeavors? What happens if a person does not want to undertake one of these activities? If the government does not give him the money, it has withheld part of the National Dividend with presumably disastrous consequences. Will the government allow the students to spend their time at college parties? How will it stop it? It cannot demand the students to return the money because that would remove part of the National Dividend. The only solution is for the government to micromanage student activity at college. Giving people money for business investments presents the same problem. Risk-aversion bureaucrats must micromanage the business investments to prevent them from being spent in undesirable ways from the government’s perspective.

Mr. Cook is correct when he states that his program will not create a Utopia (p. 66). It has to have a highly intrusive government just to collect the data needed to compute the National Dividend accurately. He asserts that his program does not relieve mankind of the need to work, etc. (pp. 66-67). Perhaps, but it certainly reduces their incentive to do so.

Endnotes
1. Thomas Allen, "Analysis of the American Monetary Institute’s American Monetary Act" (Franklinton, N.C.: TC Allen Co., 2009).

2. Thomas Allen, "Massachusetts Notes: The Perfect Money" (Franklinton, N.C.: TC Allen Co., 2009).

3. Thomas Allen, "Assignat: The Nearly Perfect Money" (Franklinton, N.C.: TC Allen Co., 2009).

Copyright © 2010 by Thomas Coley Allen.

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