Poor on Sumner

Poor on Sumner

Thomas Allen

    In 1877, Henry Varnum Poor (1812-1905) wrote Money and Its Laws: Embracing a History of Monetary Theories, and a History of the Currency of the United States. He was a financial analyst and founder of a company that evolved into Standard & Poor’s. Poor was a proponent of the real bills doctrine and the classical gold-coin standard and, thus, the quality theory of money. He gave little credence to the quantity theory of money — especially if credit money, such as bank notes, were convertible on demand in species. Also, he contended that the value of money depends on and is derived from the value of the material of which it is made and with paper money, its representation of such value.
    In the latter part of his book, he discusses leading monetary theorists from Aristotle (350 B.C.) to David A. Wells (1875). Most of the economists whom he discussed were proponents of the quantity theory of money. We will look at his discussion on William G. Sumner. My comments are in brackets. Referenced page numbers enclosed in parentheses are to Poor’s book.
    William G. Sumner (1840-1910) was a classical liberal American social scientist. He was a professor of political economics at Yale where he taught social sciences and held the first professorship in sociology in the United States. He supported free trade, free markets, and the gold standard and opposed imperialism. Among his many works are A History of American Currency (1874) and Problems in Political Economy (1883). Poor reviews the part of A History of American Currency that discusses the report of the Bullion Committee. [The British Parliament established the Bullion Committee to study returning to the gold standard after the Napoleonic wars and to make recommendations about how to return Britain to the gold standard.]
    Sumner claims that the report of the Bullion Committee “solved the whole subject of money” (p. 416). He declares that money does not flow from poorer agricultural regions to richer financial cities. To the contrary, it flows from the richer regions to the poorer regions (p. 416). As for the balance of trade, if it means “equilibrium,” then exports equal imports and trade regulates itself. If it means “remainder,” it is a myth (p. 417).
    Summarizing the doctrines of the Bullion Committee, Sumner writes:

        1. The value of an inconvertible currency depends on its amount relatively to the needs of the country for circulating medium (only to a very subordinate degree on the security on which it is based or the credit of the issuer).
        2. If gold is at a premium in paper, the paper is redundant and depreciated. The premium measures the depreciation.

    According to Sumner, for “a system of even nominal convertibility, the motives of speculation and of price fluctuations lie outside of the currency in industrial and commercial circumstances. Speculation . . . controls the amount of the currency” (p. 417). Whereas, “[o]n an inconvertible system, the amount of the currency controls speculation” (p. 417). Thus, if an inconvertible currency “is not redundant, its effect is slight; if it is very excessive, it ‘floats’ every thing, and becomes the controlling consideration” (p. 417). The quantity of inconvertible paper money determines its value and prices. [Uncertainty causes inconvertible legal-tender government notes to depreciate. The excessive issue of these notes, as Sumner and the quantity theory of money claim, is not the cause of their depreciation. However, an excess of issue can influence the value of these notes by affecting uncertainty. Uncertainties that affect the value of inconvertible government notes include (1) the uncertainty of when they will be paid or even if they will be a paid, (2) the ability of the government to pay, (3) the willingness of the government to pay, and (4) the kind of coin that will be used for payment. Inconvertible paper money is what the world has had ever since 1971. However, today, much of this uncertainty has been eliminated. Almost no one now believes that governments will ever pay their notes, i.e., redeem their notes in a commodity that has intrinsic value at that intrinsic value.] However, Sumner comments that the quantity of the U.S. notes is fixed. Therefore, the answer to its value lies in its adverse foreign exchange, i.e., outflows of gold. He asks, “Is it [the gold outflow] due to the balance of payments, or to some deterioration of the currency” (p. 418)? According to the Bullion Committee, with which Sumner agrees, “the balance of imports and exports never can move the exchanges, either above or below par, more than just enough to start a movement of bullion” (p. 418). Thus, “[o]n a specie system, any outflow of bullion would bring down prices, and immediately make a remittance of goods more profitable than one of bullion; and, if the exportation of bullion was artificially continued (as, for instance, to pay the expenses of a foreign war), it would reduce prices until a counter current would set in and restore the former relative distribution all the world over” (p. 418). Continuing, Sumner writes, “If, therefore, there is an outflow of gold, serious and long continued, accompanied by an unfavorable exchange, it is a sign that there is an inferior currency behind the gold, which is displacing it. The surplus of imports of goods above the exports of goods is nothing but the return payment for this export of gold, and is not a cause, but a consequence” (p. 418). To produce an influx of gold, the inferior currency, inconvertible notes, needs to be removed. If foreign exchanges are adverse, gold will be exported; this exportation of gold is an indication that the paper money is excessive. Thus, inconvertible paper money should be issued in such quantity to prevent the exportation of gold (pp. 418-419).
    Poor disagrees with Sumner’s notions on the balance of trade. Particularly, Poor disagrees with Sumner’s notion that if a country exports gold that it necessarily receives an equal value of merchandise. Or, if it imports gold, it exports an equal value of merchandise (p. 419).
    Poor illustrates his disagreement with an analogy:

Suppose an individual possessed of a thousand dollars in coin to expend it in the purchase of the necessaries of life even, his means are reduced in like ratio. If he would reinstate his former condition, he must forego future expenditures to an equal amount. So, if a person run into debt to his shopkeeper to the amount of a thousand dollars, if he would pay it, he must forego a like amount of his future earnings. His indebtedness until paid would very properly be termed a balance of trade against him. So with a nation (p. 419).

[Sumner is closer to the truth than Poor. An exchange is only made when both parties of the exchange believe that he is receiving greater value than he is giving up. Poor has a point if the long-run consequences are considered. However, the long run is considered when an exchange is made. Unfortunately, many people do an extremely poor job of considering long-run consequences, and some give it no weight.]
    Continuing, Poor writes:

If it [a country] import more in value of ordinary merchandise than it exports, its specie will have to go to make up the deficit. Now, no nation not producing gold can part with any considerable amount of it without causing embarrassment to its industries and trade; for the reason that that which it possessed and exported was a part of the machinery by which these were carried on. The tendency of the precious metals the world over is to distribute themselves according to the means and needs of those using them. If there be no movement in any direction, it is assumed that they are in proper equilibrium (p. 419).

    Furthermore, Poor remarks, “The export of a large amount of coin is usually due to a vicious paper currency, and such a currency is always attended with wasteful expenditure” (p. 420). [Perhaps, politicians ought to heed Poor’s wisdom here. Could trade imbalances be caused more by “a vicious paper currency” and “wasteful expenditures” than the shenanigans of foreign countries to give their domestic industries advantages in foreign and even domestic trade at the expense of their own citizens?] When a country exports gold, it becomes weaker, “for she has parted with that which is essential to her welfare, and must be reclaimed by future accumulations” (p. 420). [The development in the use of bills of exchange reduced the need to export gold. Moreover, the elimination of gold from the monetary systems of the world today makes the exportation of gold irrelevant — at least in theory. Now a country only exports the inconvertible paper money of another country or its own inconvertible paper money, which it can replace without having to import it. Furthermore, most countries would prefer never having to import any of their currency that has been exported, except to tax it.]
    Admitting that Sumner may be correct about inferior currency causing the outflow of gold, Poor asks, “may not the loss as well be described as an ‘unfavorable balance of trade’ as by any other term” (p. 420)? Then Poor remarks:

A nation that has parted with its coin, which has to be brought back again, would have been much better off had it never parted with it. That which has been received will never suffice to bring it back; and, if it would, the charges of transportation and interest would involve a large loss; so that, after all, “balance of trade” is a veritable fact, and always exists to a greater or less extent in commerce between nations, and must always exist until human affairs reach the accuracy and certainty of natural laws (p. 420).

    Next, Poor asks, “[W]hat is an ‘inferior currency’” (p. 420)? He answers, “One kind is the inconvertible notes of government, issued not for the purpose of loaning capital, but to supply the lack of it” (p. 420). About inconvertible governments notes, he writes, “The demand for merchandise must increase in ratio to its amount; for it is always superadded to the existing currencies. As such notes are always made legal tender, they not only drive coin out of the country, but keep it out till they are retired. Such a currency admits of no corrective by the laws of trade” (p. 420).
    “Another ‘inferior’ currency,” Poor writes, “is that issued by Banks, without a constituent” (p. 420). Initially, it acts like government notes in driving gold out of the country. However, since these bank notes are convertible to gold coin, banks must supply the gold to meet their redemption. As a result, “[t]hey must pay for the excess of imports over exports from their reserves” (p. 421). Poor writes:

It is impossible, however, for them [bankers] to tell whether all the bills discounted by them have their proper constituent: they can only determine the fact by the result. If they see gold beginning to move, they understand at once that improper bills have been discounted; that the currency has been issued in excess, and must so far be taken in by a reduction of their line of discounts. The movement of gold, therefore, is an indication of the state of the currency, as infallible as is that of the mercury of meteoric conditions (p. 421).

[Poor is describing the operation of the real bills doctrine correcting the overissue of bank notes and checkable deposits resulting from discounted faulty bills.]
    Sumner’s test of an ‘inferior currency’ differs greatly from what Poor has described. Sumner’s test is that of quantity; Poor’s is that of quality. To Sumner, a currency is not “inferior” if “its amount does not exceed that required by a country in its exchanges, even if it be not backed by a single dollar of coin” (p. 421). Thus, according to Sumner, “the value of money depends upon its quantity, not upon the provision made for its convertibility, [and] ‘are not matters of opinion, but of demonstration’” (p. 421). To this, Poor replies, “If so, then it is a matter of demonstration that one and one make four” (p. 421). Poor adds “that the real or estimated value of articles, whether they be merchandise or money, is their exchangeable value. To assume otherwise, would be to say that the exchangeable value of a piece of silver having the weight and insignia of a sovereign equals the value of a sovereign. Humanity is not yet brought to so low a pitch as this” (p. 421). [The sovereign is a gold coin that contains 0.23542 troy ounces, i.e., 113 grains of gold, which was the British pound from 1816 until Great Britain left the gold standard. A century after Poor wrote, humanity, or at least mainstream economists, had reached such a low level that they fell for the pitch that a piece of paper with the government’s seal on it was the same as gold.]
    Poor concludes his review of Sumner:

Even the Economists are by no means the simple race their theories would make them. In spite of the conclusions of the Bullion Committee, which, with Mr. Sumner, are the very acme of financial wisdom, he would be the last man to take a bank or government note without especial reference to the provision made for its discharge. If their creed were their law, a few days would suffice for the Economists to fool away whatever they possessed (pp. 421-422).

Copyright © 2017 by Thomas Coley Allen.

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Poor on Bowen

Poor on Bowen

Thomas Allen

    In 1877, Henry Varnum Poor (1812-1905) wrote Money and Its Laws: Embracing a History of Monetary Theories, and a History of the Currency of the United States. He was a financial analyst and founder of a company that evolved into Standard & Poor’s. Poor was a proponent of the real bills doctrine and the classical gold-coin standard and, thus, the quality theory of money. He gave little credence to the quantity theory of money — especially if credit money, such as bank notes, were convertible on demand in species. Also, he contended that the value of money depends on and is derived from the value of the material of which it is made and with paper money, its representation of such value.
    In the latter part of his book, he discusses leading monetary theorists from Aristotle (350 B.C.) to David A. Wells (1875). Most of the economists whom he discussed were proponents of the quantity theory of money. We will look at his discussion on Francis Bowen. My comments are in brackets. Referenced page numbers enclosed in parentheses are to Poor’s book.
    Francis Bowen (1811-1890) was an American philosopher, writer, and educationalist and a professor of political economy at Harvard University. Among his works are Lectures on Political Economy (1850), The Principles of Political Economy applied to the Condition, Resources and Institutions of the American People (1856), and American Political Economy (1870), which Poor reviews.
    Poor describes American Political Economy as “a feeble and garrulous restatement of Adam Smith, Stewart, Ricardo, Tooke, McCulloch, and Mill, to whose absurdities and errors an emphasis is given by no means to be found in the originals” (p. 409).
    Bowen writes “that money is merely a contrivance for diminishing the friction of exchange; and, though safe and convenient, it is also a very costly contrivance for this end” (p. 409). Money is part of a country’s wealth, but it is not capital. It does not yield profit or interest. Only the goods transferred by the means of money yield profit. Because money is not consumed, “it is not productive” (p. 409). Therefore, “[t]he specie which a merchant or a banker holds in store, to provide against daily calls or sudden emergencies, is the only unproductive portion of his capital: he is subject to a loss of interest on the whole amount thus retained” (p. 409). “The coin which a man keeps in his pocket does not, like his shoes or his hat, contribute to his comfort: it is a convenience to him only as it supplies immediate means for making small purchases or satisfying small demands” (p. 409).
    Poor replies

[C]oin has a great many functions beside “diminishing the friction of exchange.” It cannot be called unproductive so long as it can be loaned at interest, and is absolutely indispensable in the process of distribution, without which there can be no capital worthy the name. It would be just as proper to say that a wagon or railroad car was unproductive, for the reason that it did not produce the merchandise transported by it (pp. 409-410).

[Expressing the same sentiment, Hutt states, “The essences of all these services [of money] is availability. . . . [M]oney assets are not unemployed or resting when they are in our pockets, or in our tills, or in our banking accounts, but in pseudo-idleness, like a piano when it is not being played, or a fireman or a fire engine when there are no fires.”[1] In essence, Bowen is presenting the sterility-gold-coin argument against the gold standard.]
    About exchanges, Bowen writes, “Every exchange is a barter of a quantity of merchandise for a certain sum of money which is its equivalent” (p. 410). Because money is not consumed when it is exchanged, a community does not need as much money as there is merchandise; therefore, money is immediately ready for another purchase. Bowen declares:

The circulation of money and of merchandise bears some relation to the momentum spoken of in physical science, which is composed of the velocity multiplied by the mass; the momenta are equal, though the velocity should be increased tenfold, provided that the mass is but one tenth part as great. So, also, the momentum of wealth is its value multiplied by the rapidity of its circulation. As money circulates far more rapidly than merchandise, it is evident that (the number of exchanges on both sides being equal) there must necessarily be less value in the money than in the merchandise, and as much less as the circulation of the money is more rapid than that of the merchandise (p. 410).

    Next Bowen presents an algebraic equation to describe his concept: gs=mr, where g = quantity of goods on sale; s = number of times the goods are resold; m = quantity of money in circulation; r = number of purchases effected by each piece of money. [This equation is similar to Irvin Fisher’s equation: MV=PT, where M = the amount of money; V = the velocity of money; P = prices; T = the number of transactions. In The Value of Money, Benjamin Anderson explains in great detail the flaws of Fisher’s equation and the quantity theory of money.]
    With this equation, Bowen shows “that the value of money will be inversely as its quantity” (p. 411). [That is, as the quantity of money increases, its value decreases if everything else remains constant. By value, he seems to mean purchasing power.]
    Poor remarks that Bowen errs because “[m]omentum and effective value are identical terms. All kinds of merchandise, wealth being a generic term, obey the same law. Whatever value can be predicated of one kind, due to the rapidity of its circulation, can be of all other kinds” (p. 411).
    Continuing, if Bowen is correct, then according to Poor, “the great problem for society is to determine the degree of momentum that can be secured for its merchandise, as its wealth will be increased in like ratio” (p. 411). Then, using Bowen’s equation, Poor defines “g” to stand for the “goose” instead of “goods.” Next, he states:

Now, “the value of the goose is inversely as its quantity multiplied by the rapidity of its circulation.” Assuming the formula given to express the ordinary rapidity of circulation, or, what is equivalent, the momentum, and consequently, value of the goose; then, if its momentum, or value, be doubled, the formula has only to be altered; thus: — gs=2mr, or mr=gs/2. The goose has now a value twice greater than it had before (pp. 411-412).

According to Bowen’s equation, the value of the goose is inverse to its quantity. Therefore, using Bowen’s equation, if the quantity of the goose is reduced by half, the quantity of money doubles — assuming that demand remains the same. Thus, Poor notes:

If the crop of geese should be short, and it should be desirable to increase their momentum, or effective value, say tenfold, all that would have to be done would be to increase their rapidity of circulation to be expressed by the following change in Mr. Bowen’s formula; thus: — gs/10=mr, or 10mr=gs. When the last degree of momentum was secured, a wing or a leg of the goose would have a value equal to that of the whole bird. Society will be the gainer in an equal degree, by being able to devote to other purposes the land formerly dedicated to goose-culture.

Continuing, Poor writes:

Admitting the conclusiveness of his demonstration, it must be applicable to all kinds of merchandise; for, as has already been shown, money, after it has been spent, is as functus officio to its late owner as is the goose to its owner after it is eaten. If it be objected that the money is still in existence, and the goose is not, it may be replied: that the goose has indeed been eaten, but productively, to appear in new geese, or, in other kinds of merchandise; so that whoever uses the money the second time is still confronted by a new goose or its equivalent. If the goose or its equivalent do not reappear, then the money does not. Each responds, and with equal alacrity, to the call of the other (pp. 412-413).

    Bowen notes that a large portion of specie currency can be replaced with paper currency or other substitutes. However, “the total amount of the currency will remain just as before; the value of the paper and the precious metals, taken together, will be just what the specie alone would be if paper were not used” (p. 413). Wealth and commodities are estimated in the monetary unit, such as the dollar, “and it is by the aid of such estimates that all exchanges are made” (p. 413). “Thus, the idea of money aids us, when the reality is seldom employed” (p. 413). He asserts, “Money is even now only a hypothetical or abstract medium of exchange in all the larger transactions of commerce” (p. 413). Bowen anticipates “the time, in the progress of invention and the discovery of new expedients and facilities in commerce, when it will become so universally; when, at any rate, so costly and useless a realization of the idea as gold and silver coin will be entirely done away” (p. 413). [If Bowen had lived another 85 years, he would have witnessed his dream as gold and silver were no longer part of the monetary system. Also, he could have witnessed the economic disaster that the abandonment of gold and silver coin has brought.]
    Poor responds that Bowen is greatly mistaken:

Money is still, as many find to their cost, far more than a mere scale of valuation. The holders of property, when they sell it, still persist in demanding something more than “hypothetical or abstract media of exchange.” They may be very uncivilized and selfish to demand a quid pro quo in all transactions, and the laws which uphold them very barbarous; but these laws, nevertheless, have maintained their force since laws existed (pp. 413-414).

[Today, what passes for money is little more than an abstract counter, an abstract medium of exchange. It cannot extinguish debt as it is debt. At least mankind is no longer “uncivilized and selfish” as they no longer demand “quid pro quo.” They exchange goods and services for that which has no value in itself and does not represent value.]
    Bowen explains the difference between convertible bank currency and inconvertible paper money. Convertible currency cannot be overissued. If inconvertible paper money “could be kept precisely equal to what the amount of metallic currency would be in case there were no paper in circulation, then there would be no depreciation of the paper; nay, the paper might even command a premium over the coin, if the aggregate value of it were made less than what the coin would amount to, and if it were also possible to prevent the importation of specie.” (p. 414). [Bowen errs. Uncertainty causes inconvertible legal-tender government notes to depreciate. The excessive issue of these notes, as Bowen and the quantity theory of money claims, is not the cause of their depreciation. However, an excess of issue can influence the value of these notes by affecting uncertainty. Uncertainties that affect the value of inconvertible government notes include (1) the uncertainty of when they will be paid or even if they will be a paid, (2) the ability of the government to pay, (3) the willingness of the government to pay, and (4) the kind of coin that will be used for payment. S. McLean Hardy’s statistical study of the U.S. note between 1862 and 1873 shows that uncertainty, and not the quantity of notes, was the driving force behind the depreciation of U.S. notes.] Bowen adds, “Money acquires the power of exercising its functions, not from any intrinsic quality that it possesses, but solely from convention” (p. 414). [The economists whom Poor reviews needed to study the origins of money. They would have found that money acquired “the power of exercising its functions” not from convention, but solely from its intrinsic quality that it possesses. A good place to start is the works of Karl Menger and William. W. Carlile.] Continuing, Bowen writes, “The value of paper money, not depending at all upon its cost of production, is regulated solely by its quantity” (p. 414). [Thus, the quantity theory of money explains the value of money. However, the quantity theory of money seems to have failed to explain the downward trend in prices during the last three decades of the nineteenth century in the United States. Money supply more than doubled, yet general prices declined.] Then he remarks:

A certain determinable sum of money is needed in every nation to effect its current exchanges, and to maintain prices at an equilibrium with the average prices of commodities throughout the commercial world. Coin being banished, if the issue of paper money is less than this sum, the paper will be at a premium; if greater, it will be at a discount (pp. 414-415).

[For decades, every country has operated with a monetary system of inconvertible paper money completely divorced from gold. If Bowen is correct in that the managers of the inconvertible currency can maintain price stability, then the monetary system of every country is operated by either incompetents who lack the knowledge and ability to manage properly their monetary systems or criminals who are deliberately destroying the currencies of their countries. Fiat monetary reformers would argue that they are both. They are criminals transporting the country’s wealth to the rich and powerful by destroying the currency. They are ignorant incompetents for failing to follow the fiat money reformer’s scheme for issuing the currency. However, the fiat money reformers do not agree on the correct scheme to follow except that the government, which is controlled by the rich and powerful, should issue the currency. The fiat money reformers are probably correct in that the money managers are both incompetent and criminals. For that reason, the issuance and regulation of money should be taken from governments and their central banks and left to the markets. In monetary matters, the only action required by the government is to define the monetary unit as a specific weight of precious metal and to punish violations of contracts and acts of fraud.]
    In his concluding remarks about Bowen, Poor writes:

Were Mr. Bowen the only one to be affected by his opinions, they would be of very little consequence; but they become of the greatest importance when taught to young men about to enter the world of affairs, especially when they relate to a subject which concerns, more deeply almost than any other, the welfare of society. What would be thought of a professorship in a university that should still seek to establish the wonderful properties of the philosopher’s stone? The attempt would not be a whit more absurd than his teachings upon the subject of money. The thing chiefly to be regretted is, that there does not seem to be any way in which to rid the universities and the world of such nonsense. So far as money is concerned, all are Alchemists, all are believers in the philosopher's stone, all are intent upon its realization. The first step in the way of reform should be to abolish the “professorship of Political Economy,” not only in this, but in all institutions in which it is now pretended to be taught; and either abandon instruction in it altogether, or put its duties in commission. In the latter case, whatever was taught would at least have the merit of being as broad as the course of instruction would allow (p. 415).

Endnote

1. William Harold Hutt, Individual Freedom: Selected Works of William H. Hutt, editors Svetozar Pejovich and David Klingaman (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975), pp.207-209.

Copyright © 2017 by Thomas Coley Allen.

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Poor on Price

Poor on Price

Thomas Allen

    In 1877, Henry Varnum Poor (1812-1905) wrote Money and Its Laws: Embracing a History of Monetary Theories, and a History of the Currency of the United States. He was a financial analyst and founder of a company that evolved into Standard & Poor’s. Poor was a proponent of the real bills doctrine and the classical gold-coin standard and, thus, the quality theory of money. He gave little credence to the quantity theory of money — especially if credit money, such as bank notes, were convertible on demand in species. Also, he contended that the value of money depends on and is derived from the value of the material of which it is made and with paper money, its representation of such value.
    In the latter part of his book, he discusses leading monetary theorists from Aristotle (350 B.C.) to David A. Wells (1875). Most of the economists whom he discussed were proponents of the quantity theory of money. We will look at his discussion on Bonamy Price. My comments are in brackets. Referenced page numbers enclosed in parentheses are to Poor’s book.
    Bonamy Price (1807-1888) was an English political economist and a professor of political economy at the University of Oxford. Among his works are The Principles of Currency (1869), Currency and Banking (1876), Chapters on Practical Political Economy (1878). Poor reviews Principles of Currency.
    Price provides this profound observation:

It [political economy] never seems to make a final and permanent lodgement of any of its truths in the public mind. They float on a tide which often carries the vessel backward as fast as it progresses forward. The tendency to backslide seems to be incessant and irresistible, — not often from any fault of its own, or from want of ability and demonstrating power in its teachers, but from the strength of the adverse forces which every one of its conclusions is ceaselessly obliged to encounter. A centrifugal force is ever acting on some large section of society, — sometimes, even, on a whole population, — which makes it forget all that it has learned, and draws it back into the darkness of ignorance (p. 401).

[Ever since the abandonment of the gold standard accompanied by the real bills doctrine with World War I, mankind has been charging ever more swiftly into the “darkness of ignorance.”] In other sciences, once a truth is established, people do not return to the errors, fables, and falsehoods that it has corrected and replaced. For some reason, the political economist has difficulty in confirming his observations; about this issue, Price writes:

The reason of this difference of fortune does not consist in the certainty attached to the subject-matter of the one, and the inherent uncertainty of the other. Some of the positions reached by Political Economy attain the quality of demonstration; and yet they are denied or ignored as readily as if they were the hypothesis of an empiric. They are not argued against and refuted; no second trial is summoned to retest their value: they are simply passed over; and then the error which they were supposed to have dispelled resumes its possession of the public mind, just as if it were the infallible suggestion of instinct (p. 401).

    According to Price, the explanation for people continually returning to false economic principles “is to be found in the ceaseless action of selfishness, in the never-dying force of class and personal interests, in the steady and constant effort to promote private gains at the cost of the whole community” (p. 401). To Price,  promoting private gain at the cost of the whole community is just a manifestation of the mercantile theory. Price follows his explanation with a discussion on mercantilism (pp. 402-403).
    Poor strongly objects to Price attitude about merchants: “A reader of the Economists cannot fail to be struck with the hostility, not to say hatred, which all of them display toward merchants” (p. 404). Then Poor asks, “What is the reason of this hatred, with a sharper tooth even than that of the odium theologicum? — the practice of treating gold as wealth, and the highest form of wealth” (p. 407). Also, Poor expresses his low opinion of Adam Smith’s treatment of merchants. He writes, “Smith did his best to sustain his theory by sneers and flings at those who grew rich by its violation. He declared them to be a mean and selfish race, the abettors of the worst forms of monopoly, and the disturbers of the peace of the world” (p. 407). Then, Poor adds that “Price, in his grotesque way, attempts to paint them in still blacker colors” (p. 407). Moreover, Poor states that Price “admits that if the merchant, if the universal instinct of the race, is to be trusted, the teachings of Adam Smith, so far as they relate to money, are shams” (p. 407). Continuing, Poor writes:

The only refuge of the Economists is in crying that the science has been overborne by the selfishness of men of affairs. They cannot deny that these grow rich by pursuing methods precisely the opposite to those which they lay down. . . . The Economists fiercely reply that truth is sacrificed to mammon; but if it be the office of Political Economy to teach the method of wealth, why has not the man of millions the true method; and what need of going beyond his rules? As for the selfishness of the race, we fear that Political Economists have no prescription for its cure (pp. 407-408).

[If the merchant looks to the government to gain an advantage over others, he is a villain of society — and even more so are those in government who conspire with him to give him an advantage. {Governmental officials who seek to penalize merchants because they are merchants are also scoundrels.} However, if a merchant concentrates on providing the customer with goods and services of the highest quality at the lowest price instead of seeking governmentally protected advantage, then he is a great asset to the community.]
    Price rejects the notion that bills of exchange and checks represent money. Moreover, he declares that they are not money. They are “[o]rders to pay money, which can be legally enforced; title-deeds to money which lead directly to the obtaining of money. They are all warrants or evidences of debt” (p. 404). [Bills of exchange, checks, and even bank notes are forms of credit {credit money} and are not real money themselves. Price is correct in that they do not represent money, i.e., gold coin. However, they do represent the equivalent value of gold coin. That is a $10 bank note, or a check written for $10, represents the value of a $10 gold coin; it does not represent the $10 gold coin. Credit money is merely the promise to pay the value, i.e., the amount of gold, stated on the note, check, or bill. {Today, notes and checks are promises to pay some unknown nebulous abstraction. Moreover, it is a promise that the issuer has no intention of keeping.}]
    According to Price only a small amount of buying and selling is done with coin or bank notes. Most buying and selling and borrowing and lending are done with checks and bills, that is, it is done by exchanging debt (p. 405). [In today’s monetary system, all exchanges are made with debt. All “money” is credit. Therefore, the only way to extinguish debt is bankruptcy and reputation.]

Copyright © 2017 by Thomas Coley Allen.

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Poor on Jevons

Poor on Jevons

Thomas Allen

    In 1877, Henry Varnum Poor (1812-1905) wrote Money and Its Laws: Embracing a History of Monetary Theories, and a History of the Currency of the United States. He was a financial analyst and founder of a company that evolved into Standard & Poor’s. Poor was a proponent of the real bills doctrine and the classical gold-coin standard and, thus, the quality theory of money. He gave little credence to the quantity theory of money — especially if credit money, such as bank notes, were convertible on demand in species. Also, he contends that the value of money depends on and is derived from the value of the material of which it is made and with paper money, its representation of such value.
    In the latter part of his book, he discusses leading monetary theorists from Aristotle (350 B.C.) to David A. Wells (1875). Most of the economists whom he discussed were proponents of the quantity theory of money.
    William Stanley Jevons (1835-1882) was a British economist and mathematician. He developed the theory of marginal utility, i.e., utility determines value. Among his works are The Theory of Political Economy (1871), Money and the Mechanism of Exchange (1875), which Poor uses for much of his critique, and Principles of Economics (1905). We will look at his discussion on Jevons. My comments are in brackets. Referenced page numbers enclosed in parentheses are to Poor’s book.
    Jevons states that countries use gold and silver coins because they greatly facilitate trade. In time, people discover that token base-metal coins and paper money of nominal value pass as signs of the ownership of gold and silver coins. Over time, people become so accustomed to paper currency that it ceases to represent gold and silver coins and becomes money in its own right. Thus, paper currency can continue to circulate even after the metal that it represents is removed. [This phenomenon is witnessed today throughout the world as paper currency ceased representing gold and silver in the years following World War I.] Jevons points to Scotland and Norway as examples where paper currency circulated and gold coin did not. Paper promising to pay in gold was preferred to gold coin (pp. 384-385).
    Jevons does acknowledge that unlike gold coins, paper currency “will not circulate beyond the boundaries of the district or country where it is legally current and habitually employed” (p. 386). [This is not exactly true in today’s world where every country has paper fiat money. Paper money, such as the U.S. dollar, that is considered relatively strong, i.e., loses purchasing power more slowly compared with a local currency, will circulate in a country with a weak currency, i.e., loses purchasing power more quickly.]
    Jevons notes that under the gold standard when paper money of one country is exchanged in another country for that country’s money, this paper money becomes an obligation of the issuing country that has to be paid in gold (p. 384).  When a country’s paper money is inconvertible domestically, it must still be redeemed in gold to foreigners to maintain the value of the paper money. If it is not, the county will have too much money in circulation, and its paper money will depreciate against gold (p. 386). [This is the quantity theory of money at work.]
    Poor responds that “all convertible currencies . . . are regularly retired within periods of, say ninety days from their issue” (p. 386). [This is the real bills doctrine at work.] He continues, “It does happen that large amounts of paper money get into circulation, having no more value than worthless bits of leather or paper; but they get into circulation for the reason that it is always believed that a metallic basis of value underlies them. If they have no such basis, those who take them are deceived” (p. 386). [This true only with the silver or gold standard, which existed at the time Jevons and Poor wrote. It is not true today as none of today’s paper money has an underlying gold or silver basis of value. However, arguably, people are still being deceived as the value of today’s money depends almost entirely on confidence, which is highly fickle.]
    To Jevons’ example of the notes of Scottish banks, Poor replies “that they rested on a basis of metals, or upon that which would produce metals” (p. 368).
    Poor also condemns Jevons assumption “that worthless bits of paper — the basis of metal being wholly removed — circulated by the same law as that which controls the circulation of coin, or that which was convertible on demand into coin” (pp. 386-387) and “has exactly the same capacity for driving out standard money that light or depreciated coins possess” (p. 387). Poor asserts, “Convertible paper money exerts no such tendency; on the contrary, its tendency is to bring metallic money into the country to form the basis of its issue. The two are equal in value, and move harmoniously side by side” (p. 387).
    As for debased coins, they drive “out standard coin, only for the reason that it has the same competency in the payment of debts; and, of two equally competent instruments, the less costly will be preferred” (p. 387). When a debased coin is demonetized, it passes at its real value and not its denominational value. That is, it passes based on the weight of gold or silver that it contains and not by the value stamped on the coin.
    Jevons writes, “The State may either take the issue of representative money into its own hands, as it takes the coining of money; or it may allow private individuals, or semi-public companies and corporations, to undertake the work under more or less strict legislative control” (p. 387). Poor asks, “What would the money of a State represent? A beggared treasury and a parcel of ignorant and listless officials. No State money issued as currency ever represented any thing else” (pp. 387-388). [Like most of the founding fathers, Poor was not fond of governmentally issued paper money. He wrote Resumption and the Silver Question condemning the U.S. notes. However, he erred in his prediction about the U.S. note. If gold only backed half the U.S. notes in circulation, he thought that the value of a $10 U.S. note would only be worth $5 in gold. He was proved wrong as U.S. notes exchanged at par when they became convertible in gold, although gold backed only about one-third of the U.S. notes.]
    Jevons writes:

Assuming an inconvertible paper currency to be issued, and to be entirely in the hands of government, many of the evils of such a system might be avoided, if the issue were limited or reduced the moment that the price of gold in paper rose above par. As long as the notes, and the gold coin which they pretend to represent, circulate on a footing of equality, they are as good as if convertible (p. 388).

    Poor concedes that this is true. Then he asks what happens if the holder of a gold coin refuses to exchange it for an equal amount of inconvertible paper money (p. 388). [When the U.S. government issued U.S. notes, an inconvertible legal-tender paper currency, gold coins were allowed to circulate alongside U.S. notes. U.S. notes quickly fell in value relative to gold and did not exchange at par with gold coin until they became convertible in gold on demand.]
    Jevons believed that inconvertible paper money can maintain its full value if its quantity is carefully limited (p. 389). Poor doubts that any inconvertible paper money can retain its full value for long.
    Jevons considered the issue of notes more analogous to the government “function of coinage than to the ordinary commercial operating of drawing bills” (p. 390). Thus, the government or “its agents acting under the strictest legislative control” (pp. 390-391) should be the sole issuers of paper money. [Poor does not mention Jevons position on checkable deposits. Now most economists consider checkable deposits to be functionally equivalent to bank notes, which Jevons believes should be either a government monopoly or a governmentally granted monopolistic privilege of the central bank. As checkable deposits are equivalent to bank notes, then under Jevons’ scheme, the government should hold all checking accounts or its strictly controlled agent should. {For more on Jevons’ view of checkable deposit, see below.}]
    In summary, Jevons is a proponent of the quantity theory of money. The quantity of money determines its purchasing power. Even inconvertible paper money can maintain par with gold if its quantity is properly controlled. Moreover, he advocates the government monopolizing the issue of paper money.
    [In Money and the Mechanism of Exchange, Jevons has a chapter titled “The Quantity of Money Needed by a Nation.” He concludes “that the only method of regulating the amount of the currency is to leave it at perfect freedom to regulate itself.”[1] Such a conclusion fits well with the gold standard accompanied by the real bills doctrine where no bank has a monopoly on issuing notes and bank notes are not legal tender and are converted to gold coin on demand. However, it seems to conflict with Jevons’ advocacy of monopolizing the issue of notes and of the government strictly controlling the quantity of notes issued. He remarks that the quantity of money, gold coins and paper notes representing gold coins, cannot and should not be regulated, but it should be allowed to fluctuate to meet the changes of commerce. However, the government should strictly regulate the quantity of paper notes. Under his strict regulation, paper notes are fully backed by gold with no restriction placed on the quantity of gold exchanged for paper notes.
    Jevons either disregards or rejects the regulation of bank notes pursuant to the real bills doctrine as Poor advocates. Under the real bills doctrine, bank notes are not fully backed by gold. However, they are fully backed by gold or bills of exchange, commercial money, which mature in gold coin in the near future. The real bills doctrine automatically expands and contracts the quantity of money to match the needs of commerce.
    Unlike the real bills doctrine where real bills of exchange function as money in discharging debt, Jevons’ system seems to prohibit such use of bills of exchange. However, he acknowledges that bills of exchange do serve as money to a limited degree. His system limits the quantity of money to the quantity of gold available for use as money. It only offers the market the choice of using gold coin or paper notes representing gold coin for exchanges. Under the real bills doctrine, the quantity of paper notes is limited more by commercial activity than by the quantity of gold. Gold serves as the regulator of the quantity of notes issued.
    Jevons views checks as a credit clearing system that balances debts against each other, such that money is never touched. Apparently, unlike most economists today and many then, he does not consider checks to be functionally the same as paper notes. Nevertheless, they are. Both are credit money representing gold coin. Both can discharge debt, but neither can extinguish debt. Furthermore, both are orders to transfer gold from one person to another. The major difference between the two is that a note may pass through many hands before it is returned for redemption or cancellation of debt while a check usually passes through one or two hands before it is returned for redemption or cancellation of debt.
    Under Jevons’ system, the total quantity of money cannot expand or contract rapidly enough to accommodate commerce satisfactorily. If enough monetary gold is available to serve the needs of commerce under his system during periods of high demand for money, then gold is diverted from financing capital to serving as circulating media and too much money, i.e., monetary gold, exists for periods of low demand for money. Thus, the result is a rise in price during times of high demand for money and a fall in prices during the times of low demand for money. However, this situation does not exist under the real bills doctrine. Under the real bills doctrine, the money supply can expand rapidly to match rising demands for money. Moreover, it can contract rapidly when the demand for money slackens. Thus, the quantity of money increases and decreases quickly and automatically to satisfy the needs of commerce. The real bills doctrine, which Poor promotes, is superior to the system promoted by Jevons.]

Endnote
1. W. Stanley Jevons, Money and the Mechanism of Exchange (New York, New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1896), p. 340.

Copyright © 2016 by Thomas Coley Allen.

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Poor on Fawcett

Poor on Fawcett

Thomas Allen

    In 1877, Henry Varnum Poor (1812-1905) wrote Money and Its Laws: Embracing a History of Monetary Theories, and a History of the Currency of the United States. He was a financial analyst and founder of a company that evolved into Standard & Poor’s. Poor was a proponent of the real bills doctrine and the classical gold-coin standard and, thus, the quality theory of money. He gave little credence to the quantity theory of money — especially if credit money, such as bank notes, were convertible on demand in species. Also, he contended that the value of money depends on and is derived from the value of the material of which it is made and with paper money, its representation of such value.
    In the latter part of his book, he discusses leading monetary theorists from Aristotle (350 B.C.) to David A. Wells (1875). Most of the economists whom he discussed were proponents of the quantity theory of money. We will look at his discussion on Henry Fawcett. My comments are in brackets. Referenced page numbers enclosed in parentheses are to Poor’s book.
    Henry Fawcett (1833-1884) was a British academic, statesman and economist. He was a professor of political science at the University of Cambridge, England. Among his works are Manual of Political Economy (1865), which Poor reviews, Democracy in America (1875), and Free Trade and Protectionism (1878).
    Fawcett writes, that “a bank-note, whether issued by a State establishment or by a private firm, is simply a convenient form for bringing into practical use the credit which may be possessed by the Bank. . . . A banker, therefore, whose credit is good can circulate a great number of his notes in his own neighborhood; his notes being willingly accepted by those to whom he is known. . . . It is manifestly to his advantage to issue notes” (p. 376). Using an example, he illustrates his statement. If £60,000 of bank notes are kept in circulation and if the banker keeps legal-tender reserves equal to £20,000, he has £40,000 at his disposal to invest. In England, the circulation of bank notes is placed under various restrictions. Fawcett investigates the effect on prices that the removal of these restrictions would have. “[T]he effect which would be produced entirely depends upon circumstances” (p. 376). If “there is no change in the population, or in the commercial condition of the country[,] . . . [and if] an increased issue of notes were added to the money circulation of the country, prices would manifestly rise; because there would be now more money in circulation to carry on the same amount of buying and selling which was previously conducted by a smaller amount of money” (p. 376). However, if “the additional notes which are issued simply cause a corresponding amount of bullion to be withdrawn from circulation, it is manifest that no effect is produced on prices” (p. 376). Continuing, Fawcett states:

[G]eneral prices depend upon the quantity of money in circulation compared with the wealth which is bought and sold with money, and also upon the frequency with which this wealth is bought and sold before it is consumed. If more wealth is produced, and an increased quantity of wealth is also bought and sold for money, general prices must decline, unless a large quantity of money is brought into circulation. . . . In fact, if there should be an increased production of wealth, if there should be more buying and selling, or if any other circumstance should occur the effect of which is to require the circulation of a larger amount of money, the value of money must rise; or, in other words, general prices must decline, unless an increased supply of money is forthcoming, so that a larger amount may be brought into circulation (p. 377).

    Next Fawcett discusses bills of exchange. If bills of exchange ceased to be used, then the money supply would have to be increased to replace the bills of exchange. Thus, “bills of exchange, in many classes of transactions, are a convenient and complete substitute for money” (p. 377). “Consequently, if it were not for bills of exchange, one of two things must happen: either the money in circulation must be increased, or the money already in circulation must become more valuable, since a greater amount of money will be required to carry on the trade and commerce of the country” (p. 377). Therefore, whether an increased issue of bills of exchange affects prices cannot be answered affirmatively or negatively. “All that can be said is this: if the buying and selling now carried on by bills of exchange were effected by money, then one of two things must occur, — either more money must be brought into circulation, or general price most decline” (pp. 377-378). Fawcett concludes, “The influence, however, which is exerted upon prices by bills of exchange is not due to any thing peculiar in the nature or form of a bill of exchange: it is not the bill which produces the influence, but the influence is produced by the credit which is given. The bill is not this credit; but is simply a testimony or record of its existence” (p. 378).
    Poor responds that Fawcett errs in his example. All £60,000 of notes would be returned for redemption within 60 to 90 days of the issue for gold coin or the equivalent to coin. Explaining how this would happen, Poor writes:

If the banker discounted bills representing merchandise, his notes would be returned to him by their makers in their payment. If he discounted those that would not be paid, then the notes issued would have to be presently taken in by him, by paying out a corresponding amount of his reserve. The debts created by their issue are to be discharged by their use, or by that of coin. Every note issued, therefore, must have a provision of an equal amount of capital for its discharge, and must be discharged by such provision. Its value depends upon its capacity of being discharged, of being retired from circulation. If it could never be discharged, it could have no value. Such is the law of all convertible currencies. Notes get into circulation upon the credit of the issuer; but it is always upon the assumption that means, their equivalent in value, are first provided for their redemption. Without such confidence, no one would take them. The basis of their circulation is not credit, but capital. Credit is but another word for confidence that such capital exists, and can always be had when wanted (p. 378).

    Poor continues, “The reserve is not held to meet such notes as occasionally return, such as are assumed to be issued in excess; for the reason that all will return within their appointed periods” (p. 379). Thus, “Mr. Fawcett wholly misconceived the law or nature of paper money” (p. 379). [Poor gives an excellent explanation of the operation of the real bills doctrine. If the principle of the real bills doctrine is adhered to, currency cannot be overissued. It ensures that the currency available to clear, buy, new goods entering the markets is sufficient to clear the market with little or no effect on prices. Here is where the advocates of Social Credit err. Under the real bills doctrine, new goods entering the markets produce the money needed to buy them, i.e., the bill of exchange. Without resorting to borrowing, it also provides the money to pay employees and suppliers before the goods are sold. Thus, the real bills doctrine is far superior to the Social Credit scheme, which requires the government to print and give government notes to the people to close the gap between national income and the gross domestic product. The real bills doctrine closes the perceived gap between the national income and gross domestic product more quickly, accurately, and precisely than does the Social Credit scheme. Moreover, unlike the Social Credit scheme, the real bills doctrine closes the gap without resorting to governmental force or making the people dependent on the government or leading them to believe that they are getting something for nothing. Unlike the Social Credit scheme, which requires about two years to deliver the money to the people necessary to close the gap that occurred two years earlier, the real bills doctrine does so within a few months at most. Furthermore, the real bills doctrine is far superior to the Social Credit scheme at getting the right amount of money at the right place and at the right time.]
    Moreover, according to Poor, Fawcett errs with “his statement that notes can be substituted, as currency, for a corresponding amount of gold; the saving to the country being in the amount of the substitution, ‘because notes, which are simply pieces of paper of no intrinsic value, perform with equal efficiency all the purposes which were previously fulfilled by the gold which is now supposed to be dispensed with’” (p. 379). Poor remarks:

Notes which are constantly being retired from circulation cannot take the place of gold which remains, as currency, unchanged and permanently in circulation. Whether convertible or not, they cannot perform, with equal efficiency, all the purposes which are fulfilled by gold. Their value is representative, not intrinsic; that of gold is intrinsic, not representative. Notes become valueless if their constituent become valueless; the value of gold depends upon nothing but itself (p. 379).

[With today’s paper fiat money, notes have replaced gold. That paper notes and their electronic equivalent “cannot perform, with equal efficiency, all the purposes which are fulfilled by gold” explains much of the monetary and economic problems that the world now faces.]
    In comparing gold with bank notes, Poor writes:

Gold can be used in the arts; notes cannot. Gold can discharge indebtedness to foreign countries; notes cannot. Gold can discharge balances arising in the domestic trade of a country; notes cannot. Gold can be held as reserves by the issuers of paper money, and by society, and for all time; notes cannot in either case, as they are necessarily speedily retired by the use, or disappearance from any cause, of their constituent. Notes are accepted within the country in which they are issued, by reason of their representative character. They can perform only one function of gold, — that of effecting domestic exchanges (p. 379).

[Poor fails to mention that gold, which is no one else’s obligation, can extinguish debt; notes cannot. Notes can only discharge debts by transferring them to another. Moreover, gold can transport value over millennia; notes cannot.]
    Also, according to Poor, Fawcett fails to see “that the less cannot include the greater. Paper discharges gold from use in one particular; but can no more be substituted for it in all the functions which the latter has to perform in the economy of society than a mere promise can be substituted for the performance, or sugar for iron” (p. 379). Poor adds, “Great advantages result from the use of paper money, and in ratio to its use, in the same way that great advantages result from the use of ships and railroad” (p. 380). [Trying to substitute completely paper for gold is the major flaw of modern-day economics and today’s monetary system that will cause their downfall. It is also the major and fatal flaw of all schemes of the fiat monetary reformers. Even worse, is the movement to reduce all money to electronic bytes, as they are even more nebulous and abstract than paper notes.]
    Next Poor comments on “Mr. Fawcett’s theory of the effect upon prices of credit in the form of paper money is singularly unphilosophic and inadequate. With him, the whole thing is a mere piece of mechanism: so much money, so much price; and the reverse. His conclusions are based upon assumptions wholly impossible in themselves” (p. 380). Contrary to Fawcett’s belief that doubling production and purchases while the amount of money remains the same will cause price to fall one-half, “production and consumption cannot be doubled, the amount of money remaining the same; both must, as a rule, proceed in ratio to the amount of money in circulation” (p. 380). Moreover, Poor adds, “Paper money is the symbol of merchandise: the one must be in ratio to the other, as the necessary condition of production and consumption” (p. 380).
    About Fawcett’s belief, Poor remarks:

He [Fawcett] might as well have assumed the commerce of a country to be doubled for the reason that the ships employed carried twice as much as they have the ability to carry. His statements and illustrations are nothing less than contradictions in terms. Credit in the form of money has an effect entirely different from that due to its quantity. ‘If,’ says Fawcett, in effect, ‘one would lift two pounds of merchandise with a one pound weight, he must double, or reduce one-half, the length of one arm of the scale.’ The true object of paper money is to raise the two pounds of merchandise without the employment of any weight whatever. So far as this can be done, can the cost of the operations of weighing be saved, and prices reduced in like ratio; and so far can the coin of a country be employed in the discharge of functions peculiar to itself, and which neither symbols nor paper money of any kind can discharge (p. 380).

        According to Poor, depending on Fawcett’s definition of currency, Fawcett may have erred in assuming that an increase in currency is followed by an increase in prices (pp. 380-381). If currency is capital or the representation of capital, then Fawcett is wrong because “prices must be in ratio to the amount of merchandise fitted for consumption, or in ratio to the perfection of the instruments for its distribution” (p. 381). However, if currency “be neither capital nor the representative of capital (merchandise); if it be that kind of currency which can be substituted for gold, like legal tender [notes],” (p. 381) then Fawcett is right because “an increase of such currency always tends to advance prices in being in excess of the means of consumption” (p. 381). [Although general prices fluctuated under the gold standard, they were much more stable than general prices have been under today’s paper fiat monetary system. {An ostensible goal of today’s monetary system used to be to maintain stable prices.} Under the gold standard, general prices trended upward for years and then downward for years; however, over a few decades, they remained fairly stable with perhaps a downward bias because of improved technology. Under today’s fiat paper monetary system, general prices have trended upward as the monetary unit loses purchasing power year after year.]
    About inconvertible currency [e.g., today’s currency], Poor writes, “People accept an inconvertible currency of government notes, as it will discharge their own debts existing at the time, by virtue of its being legal tender, and from a belief that it will speedily be redeemed by an equivalent in some form. If government be competent to issue it, it would have a high value for a time, even if it were believed that it would not be paid” (p. 384). [No one really believes that today’s currency will be paid, i.e., redeemed in gold or in anything else with intrinsic value.]
    According to Fawcett, a country can increase the issue of its currency without disturbing the finances of the country “if its issue were confined within reasonable limits” (p. 384). “If, for example, the United States, in the late civil war, had issued notes only in ratio to their increased necessity for money, the issue could have exerted no influence over prices” (p. 384). About U.S. notes issued during the war, Poor comments, “The demand for money, measured by the price of the notes issued, exceeded sixteen-fold the amount of previous expenditure” (p. 384). Then he asks, “how could the expenditures of a government be increased sixteen-fold, or even eightfold, without any increase of capital, or fund to draw upon, and prices remain at their old figures? It is the same as to say that a demand multiplied by one per cent equals a demand multiplied by eight or sixteen per cent” (p. 384). Continuing, Poor remarks, “If gold could have been supplied wherewith to meet all expenditures growing out of the war, prices would still have increased enormously, from the excess of demand over supply” (p. 384). About the rise of prices during the war, Poor writes, “Prices rose, therefore, in ratio to the demand; in other words, in ratio to the inflation of the currency” (pp. 384-385).
    In his concluding remarks about Fawcett, Poor writes:

If Mr. Fawcett had paused long enough to ask himself weather [sic] or not a sovereign to be received six months hence had the same value to the person who was to receive it as a sovereign in hand; or whether a government note having one year to run, without interest, equalled in value its note having the same time to run, bearing interest, — the answer, properly made, would have unlocked to him all the mysteries of money. Instead of this, he contented himself with a mild restatement of all the old dogmas, every one of which he accepted without reservation, and every one of which is exactly opposed to the principles upon which money is based. It must, however, be said in his favor, that his style is in agreeable contrast to the incoherent extravagance of Macleod and the fantastic nonsense of Bonamy Price (p. 385).

Copyright © 2017 by Thomas Coley Allen.

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Poor on Gilbart

Poor on Gilbart

Thomas Allen

    In 1877, Henry Varnum Poor (1812-1905) wrote Money and Its Laws: Embracing a History of Monetary Theories, and a History of the Currency of the United States. He was a financial analyst and founder of a company that evolved into Standard & Poor’s. Poor was a proponent of the real bills doctrine and the classical gold-coin standard and, thus, the quality theory of money. He gave little credence to the quantity theory of money — especially if credit money, such as bank notes, were convertible on demand in species. Also, he contended that the value of money depends on and is derived from the value of the material of which it is made and with paper money, its representation of such value.
    In the latter part of his book, he discusses leading monetary theorists from Aristotle (350 B.C.) to David A. Wells (1875). Most of the economists whom he discussed were proponents of the quantity theory of money. We will look at his discussion on James Gilbart. My comments are in brackets. Referenced page numbers enclosed in parentheses are to Poor’s book.
    James W. Gilbart (1794–1863) was an English banker and author. Among his works is Practical Treatise on Banking (1827), The History and Principles of Banking (1834), and Principles and Practice of Banking (1873), which is an abridged and combined edition of 1827 and 1834 books. Poor reviews Principles and Practices of Banking.
    About Gilbart, Poor writes, “Gilbart was a striking instance of a voluminous writer upon money, without any proper comprehension of its nature and laws. . . . As a Political Economist, he belonged to the school of Tooke and Mill, in holding that the convertible notes of no other Bank than that of the Bank of England could influence prices or the rates of exchange” (p. 368).
    Gilbart writes, “The bankers in issuing their notes do not make any reference to the quantity of gold in the country; but they make reference to their ability to discharge these notes when retained to them for payment” (p. 368). He argues that banks cannot issue bank notes in excess. However, if a bank has a monopoly on issuing bank notes and issues notes for gold, then an inflow of gold could lead to a large issue of notes, which could lead to speculation. When many banks are issuing notes, these notes are quickly returned to the issuing bank by other banks for redemption. When only one bank issues notes, those notes are only returned for gold when gold is needed for foreign exchange (pp. 368-369). [Thus, it is easier for a central bank with a monopoly on issuing bank notes to overissue notes than it is for competing banks to overissue notes.] According to Gilbart, paying interest on deposits also prevents the excessive issuance of notes by encouraging notes to be deposited. The criteria used by the Bank of England to issue notes causes prices to rise and reduce interest. (The criteria are issuing notes against gold bullion and to purchase Exchequer bills and government stock.) However, “if notes are issued merely to pay for transactions that have previously taken place, and are drawn out by the operations of trade, those notes will have no such effect” (p. 369).
    Poor summaries Gilbart’s explanation for the inability of private banks and bankers to overissue their notes: “1st, from their constant retirement ‘by the interchange by the Banks with each other of their different notes and checks, once or twice a week;’ and, 2d, for the reason that, by allowing interest on deposits, ‘all the surplus circulation is called in, and lodged with the Banks’” (p. 370). Poor does not believe that retiring notes by exchanges among banks reduces excess notes. [Poor errs somewhat. If bank notes increase in response to increased production as represented by buying real bills of exchange, then bank exchanges will remove currency and prevent excess. However, he has a point if bank notes are issued to buy financial bills like government treasury bills or to finance a speculative venture. These notes are more than what is needed to clear consumer goods from the markets. Therefore, they are inflationary as Poor describes. A major disagreement that Poor has with Gilbart is that Gilbart believes that the Law of Reflux is sufficient to regulate bank credit money and prevent its excessive quantity. {The Law of Reflux claims that banks cannot overissue bank credit money, bank notes and checkbook money, because any overissued currency quickly returns to the issuing bank for redemption.} Poor does not believe that it is sufficient. He believes that more is needed, such as adherence to the real bills doctrine.]
    Poor refutes Gilbart by noting, “An inflation may take place to a very large extent where exchanges are daily made, and where the Banks are on a specie basis, provided the issuers are all actuated by similar sentiments and move in a similar direction” (p. 370). [Most bankers prefer a centralized banking system, as countries now have, because it ensures that all bankers move in a similar direction. With a decentralized banking system, bankers usually vary greatly in their sentiment and move in various direction.]
    Poor argues that bank notes or checkable deposits used by a country bank for speculation, to buy government securities, or to finance businesses affect prices and interest as bank notes issued by the Bank of England to buy Exchequer bills (p. 371). “Once in the market, they perform precisely the same functions, and are subject to precisely the same laws. They are equally promises to pay coin on demand; and must be equally discharged within similar periods, by the payment of coin or its equivalent” (p. 371). [If the country bank’s loan of bank notes or checkable deposits comes from the bank’s capital or from savings deposits, then these notes and deposits should not have the same effect as the central bank issuing notes to buy government bills. The country bank has not added any additional currency, but it has merely transferred currency from one person to another. The central bank has added additional currency.]
    Poor remarks that since bank notes and checkable deposits issued by private banks far exceed those issued by the Bank of England, their effect must likewise be much greater. He writes, “It is certain that the former [private banks] do exert a much greater influence over prices and the rates of exchange, in ratio to their amount, than the latter [the Bank of England]; for the reason that they have a much more intimate connection than those of the Bank [of England] with the foreign commerce of the country, and are usually made upon securities, as a class, inferior to those which the rules of the Bank allow it to take” (p. 372).
    Poor summaries Gilbart’s comments before the Committee of 1840-41 about the actions that he would recommend for the Bank of England to follow in the event of war: “Mr. Gilbart, in the event of a war, would suspend specie payments, — would demonetize gold and silver, as a means of retaining them in the country” (p. 373). About Gilbart’s recommendation, Poor remarks, “He would cut off the handle of your axe, and render it useless, so as to prevent an enemy from striking off your head. But how was the enemy to get hold of the handle? By paying the price both for that and the axe. If he paid the price, he might thereby put in the hands of the owner that wherewith to defend himself far better than with the axe” (p. 373). He continues, “But if the gold of a country at war be demonetized, the enemy or some other nation will be sure to get it, not in exchange for powder and ball, but for wines and silks, — for that which, instead of arming and furnishing it for the fight, would inevitably tend to its emasculation, to the destruction of all patriotism and manhood” (p. 373). Moreover, Poor writes, “The effect of a war is always to turn the exchanges of a country engaged in it in its favor, for the reason that every one orders home the proceeds of his exports in coin, in order to have in hand that upon which he can certainly rely, should the event prove unfavorable, should domestic order be disturbed, or the wonted industries of the country fail” (p. 373). [This is not exactly true — especially if the prospect for one’s country winning the war is slim. If a person has the means, he may want to leave some of his wealth in a neutral country if he has to flee.] Poor notes that when Lincoln’s war to suppress Southern independence broke out gold and goods flowed into the United States. At the end of 1861, specie payments were suspended, and U.S. notes, greenbacks, were first issued in February 1862. After the suspension, exports far exceeded imports for the remainder of the war. [Some, perhaps most, of this difference is accounted for by the high tariff that the Republican Congress imposed. This tariff was the primary reason for the secession of the States of the Deep South.] Poor concludes his remarks about Lincoln’s war:

If legal-tender notes had not been issued, the United States would have laid all the world under tribute. The fast impulse of a people when they find themselves about to be plunged into a war is to forego every article that does not rank among the necessities of life. Their silver and gold are the first things they place beyond the reach of harm. Foreigners cannot get them, unless they pay more than they are worth. This they will not do, for the reason that they can get them of nations at peace, for their worth. The position of the United States, so far as its currency was concerned, was impregnable, but for its voluntary demonetization (p. 374).

The United States “lost their gold as soon as it could be taken away from them by lavish and wasteful expenditure” (p. 374). Poor is convinced that “[t]he civil war in the United States would have been ended in half the time, and at half the cost, but for demonetizing their coin” (p. 374).
    Gilbart states that banking capital is employed in discounting bills. According to him, when a bank of circulation [a bank that issues bank notes against bills] buys a bill, it increases the amount of money by the amount purchased. [This statement not exactly true as the bill of exchange can itself function as money in discharging debt and other financial obligations. However, other bills, such as treasury bills and bills of accommodations, seldom function as currency.] Gilbart claims that if a bank of deposit buys a bill, it does not increase “at all the amount of money in the country; but it will have put into motion . . . [money] that would otherwise have been idle” (p. 375). [This statement may or may not be true. If a bank buys the bill with money from its capital or from savings, then it is true. If it buys the bill by creating checkable deposits, it is not true. Checkable deposits are functionally the same as bank notes.] In both cases, Gilbart argues, the effects of bank notes issued by the bank of issue and the effects of checkable deposits created by private banks are the same. If notes issued by the bank of issue can cause high prices, overtrading, and speculation, so can checkable deposits created by private banks.
    Poor responds that the two differ in that one bank’s capital is in a form proper for loans [this comment applies to banks of deposit] and in the other “no capital whatever is created or provided” (p. 375) [this comment applies to the central bank of issue]. He writes, “To say that notes, without the least provision for their redemption, are the equivalent of deposits, which may be wholly in the form of coin or of notes representing coin, is to say that fiction equals reality, and shadow substance” (p. 375). Issuing bank notes without anything to support them may well result in problems for the bank while lending “the capital made up of deposits might prove most advantageous to all parties to the loan” (p. 375).
    Poor concludes, “Mr. Gilbart, undoubtedly, possessed a capacity of intuitively measuring the person who wanted to borrow his money; but he was wholly out of his sphere when he undertook to write upon its laws” (p. 375).

Copyright © 2017 by Thomas Coley Allen.

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Poor on Macleod

Poor on Macleod

Thomas Allen

    In 1877, Henry Varnum Poor (1812-1905) wrote Money and Its Laws: Embracing a History of Monetary Theories, and a History of the Currency of the United States. He was a financial analyst and founder of a company that evolved into Standard & Poor’s. Poor was a proponent of the real bills doctrine and the classical gold-coin standard and, thus, the quality theory of money. He gave little credence to the quantity theory of money — especially if credit money, such as bank notes, were convertible on demand in species. Also, he contended that the value of money depends on and is derived from the value of the material of which it is made and with paper money, its representation of such value.
    In the latter part of his book, he discusses leading monetary theorists from Aristotle (350 B.C.) to David A. Wells (1875). Most of the economists whom he discussed were proponents of the quantity theory of money. We will look at his discussion on Henry D. Macleod. My comments are in brackets. Referenced page numbers enclosed in parentheses are to Poor’s book.
    Henry D. Macleod (1821-1902) was a Scottish economist. Among his works are Theory and Practice of Banking (1856), Elements of Political Economy (1858), A Dictionary of Political Economy (1859), Principles of Economist Philosophy (1873), and The Theory of Credit (1889). He is credited with coining the term “Gresham’s Law.” Poor reviews Macleod monetary theory presented in Theory and Practice of Banking.
    About Macleod, Poor comments that he “has erected a vast system, measured by the number of pages devoted to it, the fundamental principle of which is that gold and silver serve as money by reason of being representative of debt; that paper serves as such by reason of being the representative of transferable debt; and that whatever represents transferable debt is currency, — paper money” (p. 383). [Today, debt is money with no involvement of gold and silver. In today’s monetary system, money would cease to exist without debt. Under the gold standard, money would continue to exist as gold coin if all debt disappeared. {Some fiat money reformers would argue that government notes are not debt instruments. But they are albeit noninterest-bearing and nonpayable debt. They cannot extinguish debt; they can only transfer debt from one person to another, and eventually the government ends up with the country’s debt as government notes are its obligations.}]
    Macleod claims that the notion “that money represents commodities, and that paper currency may be based upon commodities” (p. 363) is a “stupendous fallacy” and a delusion. “Money does not represent commodities at all, but only debt; or services due, which have not yet received their equivalent in commodities” (p. 364). [This is a strange notion. In its origin, money did not represent a commodity, because it was a commodity, much less debt. In the ancient world, money was never thought of as representing debt. Credit and debt were not common and even abhorred. To discourage debt, much of the ancient world outlawed charging interest on loans.] Moreover, he claims that the quantity of money that a person has “is just the quantity of debt services due to him” (p. 364). Also, “the quantity of money a nation possesses is simply the quantity of accumulated industry it possesses over and above all commodities; but they have no relation to each other” (p. 364). Money “represents that portion of a man’s industry which is reserved for future use” (p. 364). He states that “the value of money depends upon its relations to what it represents, namely, debt, and not to commodities” (p. 364). Furthermore, he declares, “If money or currency increases faster than debt or services due, it immediately causes a diminution of its value. If debt increases faster than money or currency, then the value of money is raised” (p. 364). [Macleod errs with this statement. Raising prices nearly always results in a monetary regime of government notes and legal-tender bank notes, which are functionally the same as government notes. As such notes themselves are debt, debts are always increasing faster than money or currency. According to Macleod, the value of money, by which Macleod seems to mean the purchasing power of money, should rise, i.e., general prices should fall.] According to Macleod, John Law erred in basing his paper money on a commodity, land, instead of debt. Macleod writes, “Where there is no debt, there can be no currency” (p. 364). [As mentioned above, in the ancient world and even when Macleod wrote, many people used a currency that did not involve or represent debt. When people bought by shaving silver from a silver bar to buy goods priced in the weight of silver, as some people did in the nineteenth century, they were using a currency that neither involved nor represented debt. This seems to conflict with Macleod’s concept of money.] He also disagrees with the concept of bankers issuing bank notes on good bills, real bills of exchange (p. 365). Continuing, Macleod writes:

[T]hat the only true foundation of a paper currency is that substance which is the legal or the universally accepted representative of DEBT. . . . [A]mong all civilized nations, gold or silver bullion is the acknowledged representative of debt. Consequently, gold or silver bullion is the only true basis of a paper currency. Among all civilized nations, the weight of bullion is the acknowledged measure of value; and, consequently, bullion is the only true basis of the “promises to pay” (p. 365).

He continues:

[I]t is not as a commodity that bullion is the basis of a paper currency, but as the substance which is the accepted representative of debt. . . . Bullion, then, as the symbol of debt, is not only the sole proper basis of a paper currency, but is the only true regulator of its amount. As all paper currency is a “promise to pay” gold or silver bullion at some definite time, it is quite evident that the “promises to pay” floating in a nation must bear some proportion in quantity to the actual quantity of the bullion (pp. 365-366).

    Macleod claims that a yard of broadcloth or a Dutch cheese could represent debt and be the measure of value as well as gold (p. 365). Poor response to this notion as:

flippant and incoherent nonsense, swollen into two spacious volumes, when Dr. Schliemann shall have dug up at Troas or Mycenae Dutch cheeses perfectly fresh and sweet, and bearing upon their surfaces the dimples in the exact form and shape in which they were impressed by the tiny fingers of the pretty Dutch milkmaids three thousand years ago. Till then the habit or prejudice of mankind in assuming gold, as money, to be capital instead of debt, will be considered as resulting not from accident, but from law (p. 366).

    Next Macleod discusses inconvertible paper currency. If paper money ceases to be convertible into gold or silver, the paper money will establish a new standard that replaces the gold or silver standard (p. 367). [This occurred with the U.S. note when it was not convertible into gold.] The only way for an inconvertible paper currency to remain at par with gold is to limit its quantity. [Even reducing the quantity of U.S. notes could not keep it at par with gold. Only making U.S. notes convertible into gold on demand kept them at par with gold.] By limiting its quantity, he means, “devising some means whereby a greater quantity of it shall not be issued than if it were convertible into gold” (p. 367). If more than this is issued, the paper currency will trade at a discount to gold (p. 367). [Even with a fixed quantity several years before U.S. note became convertible into gold, they always traded at a discount to gold. Basically, what Macleod is proposing is using the price of gold as an index for regulating the quantity of paper currency.]
    About Macleod’s concept on inconvertible paper currency, Poor writes:

This is only the old story over again, that value is not necessary to the circulation of a government or inconvertible currency; that, no matter how worthless it may be, it will circulate at the value of coin, if it do not exceed the amount of convertible paper which would have circulated in its place, or if its quantity do not exceed the wants of the community in its exchanges (p. 368).

Copyright © 2017 by Thomas Coley Allen.

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Poor on McCulloch

Poor on McCulloch

Thomas Allen

    In 1877, Henry Varnum Poor (1812-1905) wrote Money and Its Laws: Embracing a History of Monetary Theories, and a History of the Currency of the United States. He was a financial analyst and founder of a company that evolved into Standard & Poor’s. Poor was a proponent of the real bills doctrine and the classical gold-coin standard and, thus, the quality theory of money. He gave little credence to the quantity theory of money — especially if credit money, such as bank notes, were convertible on demand in species. Also, he contended that the value of money depends on and is derived from the value of the material of which it is made and with paper money, its representation of such value.
    In the latter part of his book, he discusses leading monetary theorists from Aristotle (350 B.C.) to David A. Wells (1875). Most of the economists whom he discussed were proponents of the quantity theory of money. We will look at his discussion on John R. McCulloch. My comments are in brackets. Referenced page numbers enclosed in parentheses are to Poor’s book.
    John R. McCulloch (1789-1864) was a Scottish economist, author, and editor. He was a professor of political economy at the University of London. Among his works are Principles of Political Economy (1825), Principles, Practice and History of Commerce (1831), and A Description Statistical Accounts of the British Empire (1837). Poor reviews McCulloch’s notes to his edited work of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nation (1828).
    Poor introduces his review of McCulloch with:

Fully accepting the doctrines of [Adam] Smith, and the wide distinction which he made between the qualities of the precious metals which fit them for money and those which determine their value in exchange, he proceeds to consider the laws by which their value is determined when their movement is perfectly free; and those by which they are affected when artificial restraint is imposed upon it (p. 318).

    McCulloch states that under free competition, the value of gold and silver depend on the cost of their production. The prices of commodities, i.e., their value measured in money, vary with their cost of production, supply and demand, and the cost of gold and silver to which they are compared (p. 318). When the supply of gold and silver is restricted, the supply of money is limited. He writes, “Whenever the supply of money is limited, its value varies in inverse ratio to its quantity as compared with the quantity of commodities brought to market, or with the business it has to perform” (p. 318). For that reason, if the supply of commodities doubles while the amount of currency remains the same, their price would be reduced by half. On the other hand, if the supply of commodities were reduced by half and the amount of currency remains constants, their price would double (pp. 318-319). Thus, money is merely a ticket or counter used to compute the value of property, and in transforming it from one to another. [McCulloch seems to confuse value with price. The two are different. Price measures value, but it is not value. Furthermore, some items, e.g., air, patriotism, and religious beliefs, have great value, but are not priced.] He claims “that a debased currency may, by first reducing, and then limiting its quantity, be made to circulate at the value it would bear were the power to supply it unrestricted, and were it of the legal weight and fineness; and, by still further limiting its quantity, it may be made to pass at any higher value” (p. 319). [History shows that when governments debase their currency, prices rise even if the supply is limited, which it seldom is.] He believes that nonconvertible paper money can be given a higher value than an equivalently denominated gold coin if its supply is sufficiently limited. A half-sovereign coin can be made to do the work (number of exchanges) as a one-sovereign coin if all one-sovereign coins were replaced by half-sovereign coins and no new coins were minted. [He means replacing each one-sovereign coin with a one-half-sovereign coin. He does not mean replacing each sovereign coin with two half- sovereign coins.] The same quantity of commodities would now be exchanged for the same number of coins. [This conclusion is highly unlikely. When exchanges were made under the gold standard, they were based on the gold content of the coin and not the number of coins. People compared the value of the product to the value of the gold content of the coin and not to the coin itself. Most likely, what would happen if half-sovereigns replaced all one-sovereigns, dealers who sold their products for one sovereign would now sell them for two half-sovereigns. Cutting the money supply in half as in McCulloch’s example would significantly hamper commerce and, by that, production.] He offers no example where what he suggests would happen has ever happened. McCulloch maintains that the value of inconvertible paper currency “depend[s] on the proportion which its amount bears to the commodities brought to market, or to the demand; and wherever a currency of this kind, or a limited gold currency, is in circulation, the common opinion that the price of commodities depends wholly on the proportion between them and the supply of money is quite correct” (pp. 319-320). However, “with a freely supplied currency consisting of gold and silver, . . . fluctuations in the supply and demand of such currency have no permanent influence over its value. This is determined by the cost of its production” (p. 320). [In The Value of Money, Anderson argues that the cost of production determining gold’s value is incorrect. He asserts that the “value of money is a quality of money, that quality which money shares with other forms of wealth, which lies behind, and causally explains, the exchange relations into which money enters.” “Value {of money} is prior to exchange. Value is not to be denned as ‘power in exchange.’” According to Anderson, the social value theory best explains the value of money: “the social value theory is the only way of giving a psychological explanation to the demand-curve, and a marginal value explanation of marginal demand-price.” Thus, the value of money derives from the value of the commodity of which it is made and from its services as money. The value of the commodity as money is combined with the value of the commodity in its non-monetary use. Like all other commodities, and everything else, the value of the monetary metal and of its use as money is psychological. Anderson concludes, “The physical weight in gold, which itself is an object of social value, is commonly the immediate basis of the value of the dollar to-day, but money may get its primary value from other sources than valuable bullion. Given this primary value, the dollar may get an enhancement in that value from the services which it performs in the social technology of adjustment.”]
    Poor retorts:

Mr. McCulloch might as well have assumed a particular county of England to be fenced off by a wall so high that only a small amount of vital air could get into it; and that, in such case, the right to breathe would sell at an enormous price; and have inferred, therefrom, that, should the amount of money be limited, its price would rise in like ratio. One illustration is as pertinent, or rather as impertinent, as the other (p. 320).

    Poor continues, “Whoever gets gold, gets it to spend. There may be quarrels between those who dig and those who rule as to who shall enjoy the product; but, whatever the result, it would immediately go into circulation” (p. 320). [Today, the rulers have resolved the quarrel by driving gold from the monetary system. They have given themselves absolute control of the monetary system. Contrary to the claims of most orthodox fiat money proponents and probably all fiat money reformers, the Federal Reserve is not an independent agency independent of the government and does as it pleases. It is just the junior partner in the scam to pillage the American people. The government is the senior partner. It created the Federal Reserve; the Federal Reserve did not create the government. It exists at the pleasure of the government, which may abolish the Federal Reserve anytime. Working together, the government and the Federal Reserve can confuse the people by blaming the other for the country’s economic problems although both are guilty.]
    Poor notes that in another work of McCulloch, McCulloch claims that controlling the movement of precious metals is impossible for governments (p. 320). Poor writes:

His illustrations, however, are in keeping with those of the school to which he belonged, which is always assuming impossible instances as a means of setting forth its conclusions and beliefs. It is the way of children, not the method of men of full stature. Neither the production nor possession of the precious metals can be monopolized. Their value everywhere, under all conditions (allowing for the influence of accidental circumstances), is measured by their cost (pp. 320-321).

[Governments may not be able to prevent the movement of gold, but they can greatly hamper its movement. For example, with few exceptions, the U.S. government prohibited Americans owning gold between 1933 and 1974.]
    Commenting on McCulloch’s belief that if the currency’s quantity is strictly limited, a debased currency can function as well as full-weight coin, Poor remarks that Locke had proven more than a century earlier, that a debased coin will not function as well as a full-weight coin. About the period of recoinage of English money in 1696 when Locke made his argument, Poor writes:

For a time, the amount of coin in circulation, or currency of all kinds, equaled hardly a tithe of that required for the exchanges of the country. These, for a considerable period, had to be made by means of credit or barter. Yet the necessity which then existed for a “circulating medium” did not exert the slightest influence in raising the value of the debased coins. The value of each was measured by the cost of the metal that each contained. Had their value risen greatly above their cost, supplies would immediately have flowed in from other countries. If tickets or counters were all that were wanted, these could easily have been provided, as McCulloch suggests, by cutting the pieces in circulation into a sufficient number of parts. It was capital, not counters, that was wanted, and relief came only when that was supplied (p. 320).

    Poor continues:

But even admitting that, by reducing the amount of metal in coins, their value might be maintained from the necessity of their use, there was still an important link wanting to connect his premise with his conclusion. Gold gets into circulation by means of its value. It circulates at its value. If its amount were permanently decreased, its value would increase. This is palpable enough; but how is that which is valueless in itself to get into the category of values (p. 322)?

[This is the question that others also ask: How can that which has no value itself and is not the representation of value measure value?]
    Poor asks how can something that has little or no value get into circulation in the first place? He answers that McCulloch would claim that some medium of exchange is needed and people agree that this worthless thing would be their medium of exchange. To this answer, Poor replies, “[I]t is useless to reply to such assumptions as these. They are the dreams or vagaries of persons bereft of all sense in reference to the subjects to which they relate, and who, unfortunately, are wholly impervious to reason” (p. 322).
    Commenting on bank notes, McCulloch writes:

Notes not legal tender, and payable on demand, or at some stipulated period, are not paper money, though they serve the same purposes during the time they continue to circulate. The value of such notes is wholly derived from the confidence placed in the ability of the issuers to retire them when presented for payment, or when they become due. Whenever, therefore, this confidence ceases, their circulation necessarily ceases also (p. 322).

    About paper money, i.e., government notes, McCulloch states that “confidence in the solvency of the issuers exercises the smallest influence over the value of paper money” (p. 322). Paper money is legal tender and not legally convertible into gold or anything else. “It circulates because it is made legal tender, and because the use of a circulating medium is indispensable; and its value, supposing the demand to be constant, is, in all cases, precisely as the quantity in circulation” (p. 322). He believes that the issuer of inconvertible paper money can maintain par with gold or silver without difficulty (pp. 322-321). To maintain a constant price of gold, all that the issuer needs to do is to decrease or increase the quantity of paper money. [This is the recommendation of some supply-side economist in recent years.]
    Poor questions McCulloch’s assumption that “an inconvertible government note of the nominal value of an ounce of gold, to be of equal value, and exchangeable therefor” (p. 323). Moreover, Poor comments that according to McCulloch, inconvertible government notes circulate “not from any value it possessed, but from the necessity for its use as a ticket or counter of exchange” (p. 324). Furthermore, according to McCulloch, such money need not be made legal tender (p. 324). Poor wonders how such money would ever get into circulation and who would accept it (p. 324). Also, how would the excess be retired? [The government can get its notes into circulation by printing them and paying them to its employees, welfare recipients, and suppliers. It can further encourage the circulation of its notes by requiring them in payment of taxes and making them legal tender at the debtor’s option for payment of debts. In theory, the excess could be removed by having tax receipts to exceed expenditures enough to retire the excess — when was the last time that happened?]
    McCulloch proposes eliminating precious metal, either as bullion or coin, as money because of the excessive cost. Paper should be substituted for metal. Thus, paper would replace gold as the reserves held by banks (pp. 324-325). [In the United States between 1862 and 1879, U.S. government notes replaced gold largely as reserves for banks. Today, all bank reserves are in paper and its electronic equivalent, which is even cheaper than paper.]
    If McCulloch’s proposals were implemented, Poor sarcastically remarks, “The monetary millennium would then dawn on the world” (p. 325). [If McCulloch had lived another hundred years, he could see the results of his monetary millennium. His monetary millennium arrived in 1971 when the world divorced itself completely from gold and substituted entirely a paper and electronic monetary system in its place.]
    In response to McCulloch’s proposal, Poor writes:

But what does every one seek in exchanging that which he possesses? To better his condition; to get something which will be more valuable to him than that with which he parts; in order to have that which, when he wishes to use it, will bring to him the greatest possible amount of values in other forms. Gold and silver, therefore, are always demanded in exchange, for the reason that they are values in their highest forms. The whole effort of mankind is to convert its industries and products into such values, or into that which shall produce them; and which, till its possession be demanded, is drawing interest in kind for the benefit of the party entitled to it. The whole effort of nature is in the same direction, — to convert lesser into greater values (p. 325).

Then Poor remarks that McCulloch “would invert all this order, by converting whatever a person has to sell, not into the most valuable, but into the least valuable form” (p. 325).
    In his concluding remarks on McCulloch, Poor writes, “Nothing can be more disgraceful in a man like him, — Professor of Political Economy in the university of a city which, commercially, is the very eye of the world, and standing at the very apex of his school, — than the ignorance and assurance he displayed” (p. 327).

Endnotes
1. B.M. Anderson, The Value of Money (New York: The Macmillian Co., 1917), pp. 8-9).

2. Ibid., p. 9.

3. Ibid., p. 42.

4. Ibid., p. 591.


Copyright © 2017 by Thomas Coley Allen.

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