Results of Israel’s and the United States’ War with Iran

Results of Israel’s and the United States’ War with Iran

Thomas Allen

Below are some dire prognostications resulting from Israel’s and the United States’ war with Iran.

Israel will cease owning Congress. More and more Representatives and Senators will turn against Israel or be voted out of office. Except for the Christian Zionists, Zionist Jews, the chicken hawks like Senator Graham, people who get rich off war, and dimwits, the American people do not want the United States to participate in this war. Additionally, as the number of Americans who have actually died and been wounded for Israel becomes public, Americans will become more vigorous in their opposition to the war and Israel.

After its defeat in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now Iran, the world will no longer see the United States as the world’s dominant military power. Most, if not all, of America’s military bases in the Middle East will be abandoned. (Eventually, all will be because of a lack of funds.)

Iran will eventually get its nuclear weapons. Also, Saudi Arabia and Turkey will acquire nuclear weapons.

Moreover, American global hegemony and Israeli Middle Eastern hegemony are dead. Also, British colonialism is finally finished. A multipolar world will return.

Furthermore, the petrodollar (the US dollar) will no longer be the world’s reserve currency. As a result, prices in the United States will rise sharply as foreign central banks unload their excess US dollars. These dollars have nowhere to go except to the United States to buy goods and services. 

Moreover, prices will soar globally. Because of the petroleum shortage that this war has created, the prices of fuel, food, plastic products, circuit boards (which need a special coating, most of which comes through the Straight of Hormuz), and most other products will soar. As the COVID shutdown caused prices to soar globally, so will the petroleum shortage caused by this war cause prices to soar globally. The United States get hit with not only prices rising because of the death of the petrodollar, but also because of prices rising as a result of the global petroleum shortage.

With the death of the petrodollar and the concomitant rising interest rates, the federal government will be forced to curtail its spending; demand for federal debt securities will drastically shrink. The United States will have to withdraw from its overseas bases and cease its imperialism. Most likely, America will become like Russia with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Lacking the resources for foreign interventionism, the federal government will have to focus on the legitimate needs and priorities of the United States. Lacking the funds to fight unnecessary wars to make the warmongers richer, far fewer Americans will die in war, such as the Iranian war to make Israel great.

The ruling elite and their lackeys and toadies will fight vigorously to retain their power, privileges, and influence to control the people and extract wealth from them. Unfortunately, like the common Russians when the Soviet Union collapsed, the average American will suffer greatly from the changes that the war with Iran is going to cause. Hopefully, they will not witness what happened in Russia when many miscreants, reprobates, and unscrupulous people, a disproportional number of whom were Jews, plundered what little wealth the people had.

Zionism will receive a fatal blow, which means that Christian Zionism will die. With the death of Israel (Israel may cease to exist as a Jewish country), the current end-time religious teachings will be abandoned as just another false doctrine. Televangelists will lose so many of their followers that most will go out of business, and evangelical pastors will lose many in their congregations for teaching a false doctrine.

One of Trump’s arguments for attacking Iran and embargoing its oil exports was to weaken China. Ironically, as a result of this war against Iran, China will replace the United States as the world’s dominant economic power for decades to come. 

Because of Trump’s unconstitutional war with Iran for Greater Israel, the Democrats will regain control of the federal government. Once in control, they will amplify the economic disaster caused by the war by reinstituting the green energy programs and the woke agenda and by again flooding the country with legal and illegal immigrants. Thus, they will hasten the death of America.

The United States are destined to go the way of the British Empire and Soviet Union. Zionism and Israel have already brought down three great empires: the British Empire, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union. Now, they are bringing down the American Empire. (See “The Results of Supporting Zionism and Israel” by Thomas Allen.)

As Gorbachev oversaw the collapse of the Soviet Union, so Trump is overseeing the collapse of the American empire.

Fortunately, I am a mediocre forecaster. Hopefully, most of these predictions will not come to pass — especially those related to the economy and the dollar and the Democrats regaining control of the federal government. Yet, the demise of the American empire and hegemony is highly desirable. Furthermore, reducing Israel to insignificance is also highly desirable.

References

Baldwin, Chuck. “The World We Knew Is Gone Forever!” April 16, 2026. https://chuckbaldwinlive.com/Articles/tabid/109/ID/5014/The-World-We-Knew-Is-Gone-Forever.aspx. Accessed April 17, 2026.

Barton, Philip. “Bomber Trump’s Folly.” March 30, 2026. https://timesofgold.com/2026/03/30/bomber-trumps-folly/. Accessed May 2, 2026. 

Copyright © 2026 by Thomas Allen.

More political articles.

Does the Monetary Unit Determine the Value of Bullion?

Does the Monetary Unit Determine

the Value of Bullion?

Thomas Allen

    One of the debates that economists had during the era of the gold-coin standard[1] was whether the monetary value of the gold coin determined the value of gold bullion or gold bullion determined the value of the gold coin. Is the value of each unit of money determined by the value of the bullion in each unit? Or, is the value of bullion in each unit of money determined by the value of the monetary unit? In other words, is the monetary unit the independent variable, or is gold bullion the independent variable?[2]
    In his book Money (1882), George Weston argues that the value of bullion is determined by the value of coin, the monetary unit. The value of coin is determined by the quantity of coins and paper money. Weston is a proponent of the quantity theory of money. Other things being equal, the quantity of money fixes the value of the monetary unit, which he usually seems to mean its purchasing power. This is true not only for inconvertible fiat government paper notes, it is also true of full-weight gold coins and other types of money. According to him, governments can keep their government notes from deprecating by properly controlling their quantity. Moreover, he seems to prefer fiat paper government notes to full-weight gold coin. (A full-weight gold coin is a coin whose monetary value equals the value of its gold content.)
    Weston believes that a parity between full-weight coin and paper money can be permanently maintained by limiting the quantity of paper money. Moreover, he contends that controlling the quantity of paper money is more reliable than redeeming paper money in coin on demand, which he considers to be “hopelessly treacherous as it is costly and clumsy.” He adds that using the requirement to redeem bank notes in gold coin on demand to regulate the issue of bank notes is “false and fraudulent . . . and had proved itself in practice one of the worst scourges which has ever afflicted mankind.” Such a system causes the quantity of money to fluctuate too much. A superior system is to use the price of gold to regulate the issue of inconvertible paper money. Perhaps, he is correct, but no government has ever achieved the goal of maintaining parity or near parity of paper money with coin or bullion for more than a few years without redemption. Furthermore, rarely does a government use the price of gold to regulate the issue of inconvertible paper money. Such methodology is too restrictive and obviates the purpose of resorting to inconvertible paper money, which is to issue money based on politics and not on economics.
    Weston prefers a static supply of bank notes as the banking systems of England and most other European countries had where nearly all bank notes were backed by gold coin. A major problem with this static money supply is that to fit periods of high demand for notes, such as around Christmas, a large quantity of notes has to remain unused in vaults for most of the year. European countries overcame this inelasticity problem with checkable deposits, which Weston rejects as money. By expanding checkable deposits when demand was high and contracting them when demand was low, banks satisfied the markets’ monetary needs.
    Moreover, Weston believes that the law gives gold its value. Furthermore, the value of gold as merchandise is not an element constituting its value as money. This monetary value of gold can be regulated by varying the quantity of paper money in circulation. Increasing the quantity of paper money decreases the value of gold coin. Here he seems to confuse value with purchasing power. The two are different. Besides, increasing the quantity of paper money does not always lead to a decline in purchasing power of gold coin. In the United States, during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the purchasing power of gold coin rose while it was accompanied by a rising supply of paper money (some fiat like the U.S. note[3] and some not like national bank notes[4]) and legal-tender silver dollars.[5] However, fiat paper money and fiat silver dollars may have prevented prices from declining more than they did.
    Also, Weston seems to believe that gold and silver are not money (Murray Rothbard strongly disagrees; he declares that gold is money, whatever its form.) People desire them because of ease of converting them to money — presumably, he means coin and possibly bullion as reserves for paper money. However, gold bullion has been used as money, and not merely as backing for paper money, before and after coinage.
    According to him, civilized people today (1884) do not desire gold for ornamentation but solely for its use as money. If true, the manufacturing of gold jewelry would be an unprofitable undertaking.
    Weston claims that silver coin can be kept at parity with gold coin by limiting the quantity of silver coins. He cites several examples in Europe. Silver coins in the countries that he mentions were either subsidiary coins to gold coin or soon became subsidiary coins. These countries were on the gold standard, and their silver coins were convertible to gold either directly or indirectly. This convertibility — not their quantity — kept the monetary value of these coins at par with gold coin, although the silver content of these coins was worth less than the monetary value of the coin. (If the monetary value of a coin fixes the value of its bullion content as Weston contends, why did not the value of silver rise to match the monetary value of the silver coin?)
    Weston seems deceitful about subsidiary coins and uses them to support his contention that the metal content of a coin does not determine the value of the coin, but the value of the coin determines the value of its metal content. Subsidiary coins are token coins used for transactions so small that full-weight gold coins cannot be used without receiving change in token coins. Moreover, token coins can be redeemed in gold coin. If a subsidiary coin is to circulate, the value of its metal content has to be less than its monetary value or else it will be melted for its metal.
    Nevertheless, his comments on the European silver coins fit the silver dollar in the United States at that time. The silver dollar was fiat money whose quantity was fixed by Congress and the Secretary of the Treasury. According to Weston, it was kept at par with the gold dollar by limiting the quantity of silver dollars manufactured. Although the value of the metal content of the silver dollar was worth less than a dollar, Congress declared the silver dollar to have a legal-tender value of one dollar. Although the silver dollar could not be directly converted to gold, it could be converted indirectly to gold. One means of achieving this conversion was to deposit silver dollars in a bank and then withdraw the money in gold coin. This indirect conversion to gold kept the silver dollar at par with gold.
    Historical examples argue against Weston’s position. As shown below, the value of bullion controls the value of the coin, and not the monetary value stamped on the coin.
    In 1985, Congress authorized the minting of a one-ounce gold coin with a legal tender value of $50 and a one-ounce silver coin with a legal tender value of $1. This action occurred 14 years after gold had ceased having any formal part of the world’s monetary systems. Likewise, it occurred decades after silver had any formal part of the world’s monetary system except as subsidiary coins, which use ended in the mid-1960s.
    If the monetary value of gold coin determined the value of its gold bullion content, which was $327 at end of 1985, then the gold coin should have pulled the value, price, of bullion down to $50 per ounce. Instead of the coin pulling the value of bullion down, bullion raised the value of the coin up. Likewise, silver bullion in the one-ounce $1 silver coin raised the value of the coin instead of the silver coin pulling the value of bullion down to $1 per ounce.
    Under the  Bretton Woods system, the US government guaranteed the US dollar to have the value of one thirty-fifth of an ounce of gold and exchanged one ounce of gold at the rate of $35 per ounce when a foreign government or its central bank redeemed its dollars. During the 1960s, the value, price, of gold bullion rose above $35 per ounce. If Weston were correct in that the value of the monetary unit determines the value of bullion, such a dichotomy could not have occurred. The price of gold could not have risen above $35 per ounce. As a result of the divergence between the monetary unit and bullion, the Bretton Woods system was abandoned in 1971.
    The same effect occurred in Weston’s day when Congress authorized the issuance of government notes called US notes and nicknamed greenbacks. Soon after issuance, the $10 US note began trading at a discount to the $10 gold coin. Although the magnitude of the discount varied, the US note did not exchange at par with gold coin until it became redeemable in gold. If the monetary unit determines the value of bullion, then the $10 US note should have remained at par with the $10 gold coin. Moreover, if the monetary unit determined the value of bullion, then subsidiary silver coins should have remained in circulation. They did not. For several years subsidiary silver coins ceased circulating because their value as bullion exceeded their value as money.
    According to Weston, the value of the dollar is determined by the quantity of coin and paper money. As S. McLean Hardy’s statistical study shows, during the War, the value of the dollar had more to do with Confederate victories and defeats than with its quantity. Confidence, not quantity, gives inconvertible paper money its value, although its quantity affects confidence. Convertibility gives paper money its value whatever its quantity.
    Weston does acknowledge that paper money can depreciate against gold coin and cause gold coins to cease circulating. How can this be if the value of money determines the value of gold bullion in the coin? How can the value of the bullion content of a $10 gold coin rise above the $10 monetary value stamped on the coin, if the monetary value of the coin determines the value of its bullion content? The experience that he witnessed with the US note proves that the value of the monetary unit does not fix the value of its bullion content.
    Centuries before the first precious metal coin was ever minted, people bought and sold goods and services with gold and silver bullion. Genesis 23:16 records such an event when Abraham bought a burial plot for his deceased wife by weighing out silver.
    More proof that a coin’s bullion content governs its monetary value is that well-worn coins exchange by their weight rather than by the monetary value stamped on them unless the law prohibits such discounting. In which case, the law is often ignored by refusing to accept the worn coin in trade at its full monetary value. (Unfortunately, creditors often had to accept worn coins in payment of debt.) Some countries under the gold standard allowed by law exchanges of well-worn coins by weight rather than by tale. Even in some countries that prohibited such discounting guaranteed the full-weight of their coins by exchanging new full-weight coins for worn coins.
    Weston asserts that suspension of the gold standard, i.e., the suspension of convertibility of paper money, in one country adds to the number of gold coins in other countries. The resumption of the gold standard, i.e., returning to convertibility of paper money in gold coin, draws gold coins from other countries. He ignores the large sink of hoarded coins, gold bullion, jewelry, ornamentation, plate, and other gold products that can absorb the excess gold under suspension and can return it under resumption. Thus, according to him, the abandonment of the gold standard in one major commercial country causes the value of gold in other countries to fall. Resumption of the gold standard causes the value gold in other countries to rise.
    When a country suspends species payments, Weston claims that its coins flow to other countries and reduce the value of money, and by that, the value of gold, in these countries. If so, the effect is only temporary. The value of gold as bullion and in coin is nearly equal worldwide. Moreover, the global quantity of gold available for monetary use is so massive compared with what may flee one country that the effect of the fleeing gold would be small or even insignificant. Weston would counter that this new supply of gold is sufficient to lower its value worldwide.
    If Weston is correct in that whatever gold that flees a country that has suspended the gold standard flows into the monetary system of other countries, only a small part will end up in circulating gold coins. Most will go to banks as deposits and become the basis for credit expansion. Most of the money created by this expansion will be as checkable deposits while some will be as bank notes. This credit expansion is what causes monetary inflation and the resulting rising prices. Its contraction results in deflation and decline in prices. However, many problems associated with credit expansion can be avoided by using sound banking practices (not fractional reserve banking practices, which allows multiple parties to use the same money simultaneously). Sound banking practices include not borrowing short and lending long and backing all checkable deposits 100 percent with full-weight coin or commercial money.[6] (Commercial money is a real bill of exchange that is self-liquidating usually within 90 days or less; it can only function under a commodity standard like the gold standard.)
    The decline in purchasing power, Weston contends, results from a reduction in demand for gold as coin when the gold standard is suspended. However, he claims that the loss in purchasing power results from a loss of the value of gold coin. The reverse occurs when the gold standard is resumed and paper money is again convertible in gold. Purchasing power of coin and paper increases because the value of gold increases. He ignores the quality of money theory, which explains the fall and rise of money’s purchasing power, which he calls value. When the gold standard is suspended, low-quality inconvertible paper money, which has less value and purchasing power than gold, replaces gold coin. When the gold standard is resumed, a high-quality money, gold coin and paper money convertible in gold, replaces low-quality inconvertible paper money.
    Moreover, he seems to credit the rise and fall in prices mostly on changes in the supply and demand for monetary gold. He sees the changes in prices being caused by changes in the value of gold. He ignores changes in credit money, except bank notes, which he considers to be real money and not credit money,[7] have much more effect on prices than changes in the supply of gold.
    Weston fails to explain how the monetary unit gets its initial value. Under the gold standard, the monetary unit gets its value from gold. The monetary unit is defined as a specific weight of gold and the monetary unit has the value of that weight of gold. For example, the Gold Standard Act of 1900 defined the dollar as 23.22 grains of gold. Therefore, the dollar had the value of 23.22 grains of gold. This is more proof that the monetary unit derives its value from its metal content as the value of bullion precedes the monetary unit.
    This notion Weston rejects. He claims that the value of the monetary unit, the dollar, gives the 23.22 grains of gold its value. The dollar may give 23.22 grains of gold its price, but it does not give the gold its value. Value and prices are not the same things. Value is subjective; price is objective. Moreover, not everything that has value, has a price; for example, love of one’s mate and children has great value but no price.
    An example of the difference between price and value is that, under the gold standard, when a person buys a shirt for $10, the shirt has the value of 232.2 grains of gold and a price of $10. (Today, when one buys a shirt with a $10 federal reserve note, what is the value of the shirt? Without defining the dollar in terms of itself, which is a poor and unsatisfactory definition that should be unacceptable and not used, such as the value of the dollar is a dollar’s worth of goods, no one can definitively define the value of the dollar.)
    Before any commodity became money, a medium of exchange, it had to have value independently of its monetary use. Its monetary use adds to its value as a commodity, but does not create it. Weston acknowledges that gold had value as ornamentation, etc. before being coined, and its uses as coin add to that value and even gives gold its highest actual value. If true, no gold coin would ever be melted for use as ornamentation, for the highest value of gold is that in the form of a coin. However, as gold coins were often melted for their gold and that gold was used for other purposes, gold as coin is not always its highest use.
    Moreover, Weston is unclear about how paper money gets its value other than the government limiting its quantity. How this limitation initially gives paper money, especially inconvertible paper money, its initial value, he does not explain. Convertible paper money derives its value from the gold that it represents. Inconvertible paper money derives its value from the gold coin that it replaces. Quantity has nothing to do with this initial value.
    In his argument to prove that coin fixes the value of bullion, Weston shows that government can easily manipulate their monetary systems and the purchasing power of their money — usually to the detriment of the people. However, he fails to identify or to describe a governmentally manipulated monetary system that works better than, or even as well as, the gold-coin standard accompanied by a well-functioning credit system, although as an example, he offers Brazil, which used the price of gold as an index to regulate its fiat paper money supply.
     Under the gold-coin standard, the government does not regulate the quantity of gold coins produced. However, it often intervenes to restrict the quantity of bank notes issued, although such intervention is not necessary and probably undesirable as it can distort the markets. Market forces decide the quantity of gold coins minted and gold coins melted. When the government does not intervene, and to some extent, even when it does, market forces regulate the quantity of bank notes issued.
    Whether bank notes and government notes[8] are convertible or inconvertible to full-weight gold coin, Weston argues that they are money in their own right. They are real money and are not merely forms of credit money. True, they are used as a medium of exchange. Also, when they are inconvertible, they nearly always become the unit of account, especially if the government makes them legal tender. However, real money like full-weight gold or silver coin performs one monetary duty that these notes cannot perform. That is, full-weight coin not only discharges debt, it also extinguishes debt because it is no one else’s liability. Bank notes and government notes can only discharge debt. They do so by passing the obligation to another, which is ultimately the person or entity responsible for the note.[9] For example, the US government is the responsible party for today’s federal reserve note. Contrary to Weston’s assertion, bank notes and government notes are not real money; they are credit money and cannot extinguish debt.
    Weston rejects the notion that bills of changes and checkable deposits are money. According to him, they do not have the effect as bank notes and do not increase the quantity of money. Today, as checkable deposits far exceed bank notes as money in industrialized countries, most monetary disturbances like inflation comes from changes in checkable deposits than fluctuation in bank notes.
    Therefore, Weston’s quantity theory of money ignores commercial money, real bills of exchange, as part of the quantity of money. Like bank notes, commercial money is a form of credit money that can be used to purchase goods and discharge debts. Unlike bank notes, commercial money has a specific life, usually 90 days or less, before it expires. Commercial money often exceeds bank notes in quantity and even exceeds the quantity of coins and paper money. If the quantity of money is the sole determinant of the value of money, other things being equal, as Weston asserts, or even the primary determinant, then how can he ignore commercial money? Nevertheless, Weston rejects the notion that bills of exchange are money and, therefore, need no consideration as part of the quantity of money or any quantity of money theory.
    Likewise, Weston’s quantity theory of money also ignores checkable deposits, checkbook money, as part of the quantity of money. Like bank notes, checkable deposits are a form of credit money that can be used to purchase goods and discharge debt. Unlike bank notes, which can pass through many hands before returning to a bank, checks usually pass through only one or two hands before returning to a bank. The major difference between a bank note and checkbook money is that a bank note is an order drawn on a bank to transfer gold from the bank’s account to the bearer and a check is an order to transfer gold from the drawer’s account to bearer. In Weston’s time (1884), in the United States, checkable deposits exceeded bank notes and coin in purchasing goods and discharging debt. He acknowledges that checks are used for most transactions. Moreover, under fractional reserve banking, which was practiced in his day as it is today, checkable deposits exceed species, commercial money and in Britain bank notes and in the United States silver dollars and US notes held by the bank; thus, they exceed what Weston considers real money. Any quality of money theory that ignores checkable deposits is a highly deficient theory. Nevertheless, Weston rejects the notion that checkable deposits are money and, therefore, need no consideration as part of the quantity of money or any quantity of money theory.
    A bank note is merely a check that a bank writes on itself. (Under the system advocated by Weston as modeled after the British system after 1844, this is not the case. Under the British system, what were called bank notes were similar to gold certificates issued in the United States. Whereas gold certificates were fully backed by gold, a fraction of the British notes was backed by nontradable government securities. Like gold certificates, they were warehouse receipts promising to pay the bearer in gold. Unlike US gold certificates, which were not legal tender, British notes were legal tender. Although Weston implies that making bank notes legal tender makes them real money, he seems to accept gold certificates as real money though they were not legal tender.) A bank note, even if it is merely a warehouse receipt, is a credit instrument because it is someone else’s liability. Weston rejects the notion that bank notes are credit instruments: a check that the issuer writes on itself to pay the bearer money, i.e., gold coin. To him, bank notes are money in their own right and are not promises to pay money, i.e., gold coin.
    An interesting note cited by Weston is that John Stuart Mills mused that under the right conditions, deposits and checks might replace currencies altogether. Weston thought that such a replacement was absurd. However, today, most countries are moving to eliminate currency and to force people to use bank deposits and checks, preferably with debit cards instead of paper checks. If this happens, the quantity of money, according to Weston’s theory, goes to zero: Money would cease to exist by his definition of money. Then what would fix the value of gold bullion?
    Weston displays inordinate confidence in the government to manage the country’s monetary system. As the history of the last 100 years shows, governments are highly incompetent in managing their monetary systems if the objective is to avoid inflation, hyperinflation, panics, depressions, recessions, and other economic and monetary disturbances and disasters. If the objective is to transfer wealth and power from the common people to the rich and powerful, they has been highly successful.
    When his quantity theory of money fails, Weston has an out, which is “everything else being equal.” When it fails, it is because “everything else is not equal.”
    In conclusion, Weston argues that the value of gold bullion does not control the value of gold coin or paper money kept at par with it. To the contrary, the opposite is true: The maximum value of gold bullion fluctuates with and is regulated by the value of gold coin and paper money at parity with gold coin. Moreover, the value of the monetary unit depends, other things being equal, on the quantity of monetary units, both coin and paper money.
    Weston errs when he claims that the value of the monetary unit gives gold bullion its value. To the contrary, the value of gold bullion gives the monetary unit its value. The value of gold preceded its use as money, and its use as money preceded its use as coin. Weston confuses value with price. The monetary unit gives gold its price, which is objective, but it does not give gold its value, which is subjective.

Endnotes:
1. See “What is the Gold Standard” by Thomas Allen.

2. See “Is the Price of Gold Fixed Under the Gold Standard” by Thomas Allen.

3. See “The U.S. Note, 1862-1879" by Thomas Allen.

4. See “National Banking System” by Thomas Allen.

5.  See “The Silver Dollar 1873-1900" by Thomas Allen.

6. See “Real Bills Doctrine” by Thomas Allen.

7. See “Differences Between Real Money and Fiat Money” by Thomas Allen.

8. See "Difference Between Bank Notes and Government Notes" by Thomas Allen.

9. See “Extinguishing Debt” by Thomas Allen.

Copyright © 2017 by Thomas Coley Allen.

For more articles on money.

Poor on Gilbart

Poor on Gilbart

Thomas Allen

    In 1877, Henry Varnum Poor (1812-1905) wrote Money and Its Laws: Embracing a History of Monetary Theories, and a History of the Currency of the United States. He was a financial analyst and founder of a company that evolved into Standard & Poor’s. Poor was a proponent of the real bills doctrine and the classical gold-coin standard and, thus, the quality theory of money. He gave little credence to the quantity theory of money — especially if credit money, such as bank notes, were convertible on demand in species. Also, he contended that the value of money depends on and is derived from the value of the material of which it is made and with paper money, its representation of such value.
    In the latter part of his book, he discusses leading monetary theorists from Aristotle (350 B.C.) to David A. Wells (1875). Most of the economists whom he discussed were proponents of the quantity theory of money. We will look at his discussion on James Gilbart. My comments are in brackets. Referenced page numbers enclosed in parentheses are to Poor’s book.
    James W. Gilbart (1794–1863) was an English banker and author. Among his works is Practical Treatise on Banking (1827), The History and Principles of Banking (1834), and Principles and Practice of Banking (1873), which is an abridged and combined edition of 1827 and 1834 books. Poor reviews Principles and Practices of Banking.
    About Gilbart, Poor writes, “Gilbart was a striking instance of a voluminous writer upon money, without any proper comprehension of its nature and laws. . . . As a Political Economist, he belonged to the school of Tooke and Mill, in holding that the convertible notes of no other Bank than that of the Bank of England could influence prices or the rates of exchange” (p. 368).
    Gilbart writes, “The bankers in issuing their notes do not make any reference to the quantity of gold in the country; but they make reference to their ability to discharge these notes when retained to them for payment” (p. 368). He argues that banks cannot issue bank notes in excess. However, if a bank has a monopoly on issuing bank notes and issues notes for gold, then an inflow of gold could lead to a large issue of notes, which could lead to speculation. When many banks are issuing notes, these notes are quickly returned to the issuing bank by other banks for redemption. When only one bank issues notes, those notes are only returned for gold when gold is needed for foreign exchange (pp. 368-369). [Thus, it is easier for a central bank with a monopoly on issuing bank notes to overissue notes than it is for competing banks to overissue notes.] According to Gilbart, paying interest on deposits also prevents the excessive issuance of notes by encouraging notes to be deposited. The criteria used by the Bank of England to issue notes causes prices to rise and reduce interest. (The criteria are issuing notes against gold bullion and to purchase Exchequer bills and government stock.) However, “if notes are issued merely to pay for transactions that have previously taken place, and are drawn out by the operations of trade, those notes will have no such effect” (p. 369).
    Poor summaries Gilbart’s explanation for the inability of private banks and bankers to overissue their notes: “1st, from their constant retirement ‘by the interchange by the Banks with each other of their different notes and checks, once or twice a week;’ and, 2d, for the reason that, by allowing interest on deposits, ‘all the surplus circulation is called in, and lodged with the Banks’” (p. 370). Poor does not believe that retiring notes by exchanges among banks reduces excess notes. [Poor errs somewhat. If bank notes increase in response to increased production as represented by buying real bills of exchange, then bank exchanges will remove currency and prevent excess. However, he has a point if bank notes are issued to buy financial bills like government treasury bills or to finance a speculative venture. These notes are more than what is needed to clear consumer goods from the markets. Therefore, they are inflationary as Poor describes. A major disagreement that Poor has with Gilbart is that Gilbart believes that the Law of Reflux is sufficient to regulate bank credit money and prevent its excessive quantity. {The Law of Reflux claims that banks cannot overissue bank credit money, bank notes and checkbook money, because any overissued currency quickly returns to the issuing bank for redemption.} Poor does not believe that it is sufficient. He believes that more is needed, such as adherence to the real bills doctrine.]
    Poor refutes Gilbart by noting, “An inflation may take place to a very large extent where exchanges are daily made, and where the Banks are on a specie basis, provided the issuers are all actuated by similar sentiments and move in a similar direction” (p. 370). [Most bankers prefer a centralized banking system, as countries now have, because it ensures that all bankers move in a similar direction. With a decentralized banking system, bankers usually vary greatly in their sentiment and move in various direction.]
    Poor argues that bank notes or checkable deposits used by a country bank for speculation, to buy government securities, or to finance businesses affect prices and interest as bank notes issued by the Bank of England to buy Exchequer bills (p. 371). “Once in the market, they perform precisely the same functions, and are subject to precisely the same laws. They are equally promises to pay coin on demand; and must be equally discharged within similar periods, by the payment of coin or its equivalent” (p. 371). [If the country bank’s loan of bank notes or checkable deposits comes from the bank’s capital or from savings deposits, then these notes and deposits should not have the same effect as the central bank issuing notes to buy government bills. The country bank has not added any additional currency, but it has merely transferred currency from one person to another. The central bank has added additional currency.]
    Poor remarks that since bank notes and checkable deposits issued by private banks far exceed those issued by the Bank of England, their effect must likewise be much greater. He writes, “It is certain that the former [private banks] do exert a much greater influence over prices and the rates of exchange, in ratio to their amount, than the latter [the Bank of England]; for the reason that they have a much more intimate connection than those of the Bank [of England] with the foreign commerce of the country, and are usually made upon securities, as a class, inferior to those which the rules of the Bank allow it to take” (p. 372).
    Poor summaries Gilbart’s comments before the Committee of 1840-41 about the actions that he would recommend for the Bank of England to follow in the event of war: “Mr. Gilbart, in the event of a war, would suspend specie payments, — would demonetize gold and silver, as a means of retaining them in the country” (p. 373). About Gilbart’s recommendation, Poor remarks, “He would cut off the handle of your axe, and render it useless, so as to prevent an enemy from striking off your head. But how was the enemy to get hold of the handle? By paying the price both for that and the axe. If he paid the price, he might thereby put in the hands of the owner that wherewith to defend himself far better than with the axe” (p. 373). He continues, “But if the gold of a country at war be demonetized, the enemy or some other nation will be sure to get it, not in exchange for powder and ball, but for wines and silks, — for that which, instead of arming and furnishing it for the fight, would inevitably tend to its emasculation, to the destruction of all patriotism and manhood” (p. 373). Moreover, Poor writes, “The effect of a war is always to turn the exchanges of a country engaged in it in its favor, for the reason that every one orders home the proceeds of his exports in coin, in order to have in hand that upon which he can certainly rely, should the event prove unfavorable, should domestic order be disturbed, or the wonted industries of the country fail” (p. 373). [This is not exactly true — especially if the prospect for one’s country winning the war is slim. If a person has the means, he may want to leave some of his wealth in a neutral country if he has to flee.] Poor notes that when Lincoln’s war to suppress Southern independence broke out gold and goods flowed into the United States. At the end of 1861, specie payments were suspended, and U.S. notes, greenbacks, were first issued in February 1862. After the suspension, exports far exceeded imports for the remainder of the war. [Some, perhaps most, of this difference is accounted for by the high tariff that the Republican Congress imposed. This tariff was the primary reason for the secession of the States of the Deep South.] Poor concludes his remarks about Lincoln’s war:

If legal-tender notes had not been issued, the United States would have laid all the world under tribute. The fast impulse of a people when they find themselves about to be plunged into a war is to forego every article that does not rank among the necessities of life. Their silver and gold are the first things they place beyond the reach of harm. Foreigners cannot get them, unless they pay more than they are worth. This they will not do, for the reason that they can get them of nations at peace, for their worth. The position of the United States, so far as its currency was concerned, was impregnable, but for its voluntary demonetization (p. 374).

The United States “lost their gold as soon as it could be taken away from them by lavish and wasteful expenditure” (p. 374). Poor is convinced that “[t]he civil war in the United States would have been ended in half the time, and at half the cost, but for demonetizing their coin” (p. 374).
    Gilbart states that banking capital is employed in discounting bills. According to him, when a bank of circulation [a bank that issues bank notes against bills] buys a bill, it increases the amount of money by the amount purchased. [This statement not exactly true as the bill of exchange can itself function as money in discharging debt and other financial obligations. However, other bills, such as treasury bills and bills of accommodations, seldom function as currency.] Gilbart claims that if a bank of deposit buys a bill, it does not increase “at all the amount of money in the country; but it will have put into motion . . . [money] that would otherwise have been idle” (p. 375). [This statement may or may not be true. If a bank buys the bill with money from its capital or from savings, then it is true. If it buys the bill by creating checkable deposits, it is not true. Checkable deposits are functionally the same as bank notes.] In both cases, Gilbart argues, the effects of bank notes issued by the bank of issue and the effects of checkable deposits created by private banks are the same. If notes issued by the bank of issue can cause high prices, overtrading, and speculation, so can checkable deposits created by private banks.
    Poor responds that the two differ in that one bank’s capital is in a form proper for loans [this comment applies to banks of deposit] and in the other “no capital whatever is created or provided” (p. 375) [this comment applies to the central bank of issue]. He writes, “To say that notes, without the least provision for their redemption, are the equivalent of deposits, which may be wholly in the form of coin or of notes representing coin, is to say that fiction equals reality, and shadow substance” (p. 375). Issuing bank notes without anything to support them may well result in problems for the bank while lending “the capital made up of deposits might prove most advantageous to all parties to the loan” (p. 375).
    Poor concludes, “Mr. Gilbart, undoubtedly, possessed a capacity of intuitively measuring the person who wanted to borrow his money; but he was wholly out of his sphere when he undertook to write upon its laws” (p. 375).

Copyright © 2017 by Thomas Coley Allen.

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Poor and Rist on Tooke

Poor and Rist on Tooke

Thomas Allen

    This article presents two views, Poor's and Rist's, on Thomas Tooke. Thomas Tooke (1774-1858) was an English merchant, economist, and historian of prices. He wrote History of Prices and of the State of the Circulation during the Years 1793–1856 (1838-1857) in six volumes and Enquiry into the Currency Principle (1844). Unlike most of the people whom Poor reviews, Tooke is not an ardent supporter of the Quantity Theory of Money. He considers the quantity of money, i.e.,  circulating purchasing media, to be mostly irrelevant.

Poor on Tooke
    In 1877, Henry Varnum Poor (1812-1905) wrote Money and Its Laws: Embracing a History of Monetary Theories, and a History of the Currency of the United States. He was a financial analyst and founder of a company that evolved into Standard & Poor’s. Poor was a proponent of the real bills doctrine and the classical gold-coin standard and, thus, the quality theory of money. He gave little credence to the quantity theory of money — especially if credit money, such as bank notes, were convertible on demand in species. Also, he contended that the value of money depends on and is derived from the value of the material of which it is made and with paper money, its representation of such value.
    In the latter part of his book, he discusses leading monetary theorists from Aristotle (350 B.C.) to David A. Wells (1875). Most of the economists whom he discussed were proponents of the quantity theory of money. My comments are in brackets. Referenced page numbers enclosed in parentheses are to Poor’s book.
    Tooke sought to prove “that a rise in prices always precedes, and causes an increase of money, in whatever form” (p. 313). Poor states that Tooke’s claim is like saying “that a rise of water in rivers always precedes and is the cause of rainfall.” [In other words, Poor asserts, to the extent that changes in the money supply relate to prices, that a rise in general prices follows an increase in money supply while Tooke asserts that it precedes an increase money supply. Both include all forms of credit money as part of the money supply.]
    Tooke believes that no variation in the quantity of the circulating medium affects prices. He believes “that the amount of the circulating medium, is the effect, and not the cause, of variations in prices” (p. 314). Because people have more money to spend does not mean that they will spend it. He maintains that as long as paper money is convertible to gold on demand, increasing the quantity of paper money will not affect the prices of commodities. Thus, convertible paper money cannot affect prices under any condition (pp. 314-316). [Tooke appears not to distinguish between paper money issued to discount real bills and paper money issued to discount fictitious bills like accommodation bills or financial bills like government bills. The former has little or no affect on prices whereas the latter often cause prices to rise, i.e., causes the currency to depreciate.]
    Following Adam Smith, Tooke believes that paper money is merely a substitute for gold coin. For each unit of paper money in circulation, a unit of gold coin is removed from circulation. Any excess paper money would be redeemed in gold coin. Thus, paper money is a substitute for coin and is not in addition to gold coin. [Under the real bills doctrine, paper money is not a substitute for gold coin, but is in addition to gold coin. However, if excessive paper money is issued, the excess is quickly redeemed for coin. As shown below, Rist disagrees with Poor on this interpretation of Tooke.]
    According to Tooke’s argument, convertible paper money cannot affect prices. Moreover, “[n]either could a government inconvertible paper currency affect prices, so long as it was not in excess of the wants of those using it in their exchanges” (p. 216). Also, Tooke maintains that “[v]alue was no necessary attribute of [paper money or gold coin]” (p. 316).
    Poor objects to Tooke’s claim that money, i.e., gold coin, has no value per se. Poor states, “Whatever is to serve as money, in the last resort, must always possess uniformity of value, not only for months and years, but for ages” (p. 316). [Whatever serves as money needs to be able to transport value not only through space but also through time. Before a material becomes money, it must be able to transport value through time and space or represent something that can transport value through time and space. To do that, it has to have value in itself.]
    According to Tooke, prices “depend upon cost, and the ability, not the will, of the public to consume” (p. 317). Poor remarks, “The public are able to consume a thousand things they will not” (p. 317). [As value is subjective and price reflects value, a person must have the will to consume before he consumes. Also, once he decides to consume, he must have the ability to consume. Poor is much closer to the truth on this issue than Tooke.]
    According to Poor, Tooke fails to understand “that it is possible for prices to fall enormously, even when it [money] is greatly inflated” (p. 317). Poor continues:

The effect of an inflation is to advance prices, from an increase of the instruments of expenditure, and from its tendency to excite speculation, which may be carried to such a pitch as to seize and attempt to hold all the food, for example, upon the market. In such case, it not unfrequently happens that the public can be supplied from other sources, or that, from the excessive rates charged by holders, consumption will be so much reduced that those who attempted to control prices find themselves unable to carry their purchases, and are forced to throw them upon the market; in consequence of which, prices may for a time be far below what they would have been under a metallic currency (p. 317).

    [In the United States, the decades following Lincoln’s war to prevent Southern independence, general prices trended downward although the money supply was inflated. First, it was inflated with U.S. notes; then it was inflated with silver dollars. Although this inflation did not result in a rise in general prices, it did distort the economy and lead to the depression of the 1870s and the depression of the 1890s. Moreover, technological advances were driving prices down faster than the inflation could push them up.]
    Tooke’s notion that prices are “wholly independent of the quantity of the circulating medium” (p. 317) comes from observations of events occurring when the Bank of England had suspended redemption of its notes. About Tooke’s notion, Poor writes in his concluding remarks on Tooke:

He might as well have attempted to prove that indulgence in liquor had no tendency to elevate one, from the exhaustion or syncope resulting from its excessive use. So, under an inflation of the currency, prices may fall in much greater ratio than the inflation, from the decreased cost of production, or from the falling off, from any cause, of the demand. None of these causes or influences were properly considered by him. He sought to erect a science from an observation of certain phenomena, without sufficient reference to their cause or law. It is as useless, however, to attempt to reason with him as it was with the philosopher in the tale of “Rasselas.” It was, probably, from an examination or an attempted examination of his works, that Mr. Gladstone declared the study of money to be a fruitful cause of insanity (p. 317).

    [In recent decades, the money supply in the United States, Japan, Europe, and other countries have been highly inflated. Yet none of the developed countries have experienced a rise in general prices of the magnitude that one would expect if the Quantity Theory of Money were correct.
    Whereas Poor is more focused on the real bills doctrine than on the Law of Reflux, Tooke focuses on the Law of Reflux and mostly ignores the real bills doctrine. {The Law of Reflux claims that banks cannot overissue bank credit money, bank notes and checkbook money, because any over issued currency quickly returns to the issuing bank for redemption. The Law of Reflux pertains to the liability side of a bank’s balance sheet while the real bills doctrine pertains to its asset side. Although the real bills doctrine depends on the Law of Reflux, the Law of Reflux does not depend on the real bills doctrine. That is, the Law of Reflux can operate when financial papers like government bills and commercial papers other than real bills of exchanges like accommodation bills are discounted. The Law of Reflux functions under the gold standard where excess credit money can be exchanged for gold, which extinguishes the credit money. However, it does not function under today’s fiat money standard where one form of credit money can only be exchanged for another form of credit money.} As shown below, Rist is more in agreement with Tooke than is Poor. However, Rist places more importance on the real bills doctrine than does Tooke.]

Rist on Tooke
    In 1938, Charles Rist  (1874-1955) wrote History of Monetary and Credit Theory from John Law to the Present Day (translated by Jane Degras, New York: Augustus M. Kelly Publishers: 1966) in which he reviews several economists including Tooke. Rist was a French economist, who was of the Banking School as opposed to the Currency School. [Under the gold standard, banking philosophies generally fell into either the banking school or the currency school. The banking school “holds that as long as a bank maintains the convertibility of its bank notes into specie (gold), for which it should keep ‘adequate’ reserves, it is impossible for it to over issue its bank notes against sound commercial paper with fixed short term (90 days or less) maturities.”[1] Its position is also called the “Banking Principle” or “Principle of Fullerton.” To the banking school, bank notes are merely circulating credit instruments. Although they can be exchanged for gold, they are not intended to be warehouse receipts for gold. The currency school “maintains that all . . . changes in the nation’s quantity of money should correspond precisely with changes in the nation’s holdings of monetary metal. . . .”[2] Its position is also called the “currency doctrine.” To the currency school, bank notes are merely warehouse receipts and, therefore, should be backed 100 percent by specie. To the banking school, bank notes are claims for new merchandise offered for sale in the markets. Under the currency school, bank notes are claims for gold. Under the currency school philosophy, an elastic currency does not exist; under the banking school, it does.] Rist’s opinion of Tooke differs somewhat from Poor’s. My comments are in brackets. Referenced page numbers enclosed in parentheses are to Rist’s book.
    As an opponent of devaluation, Tooke supports making bank notes convertible to gold at the same rate that existed before suspension during the Napoleonic wars. Devaluation hurts the working class (pp. 184-185). [However, devaluation benefits debtors, most of whom are speculators, governments, and people living beyond their means, as it allows them to pay their debts with less gold.]
    Tooke does not believe that the fall of prices and the concomitant economic sluggishness resulted from returning to the gold standard at prewar parity (p. 185). About the fall in prices, Rist notes:

In all probability, the output of the gold and silver mines being what it was, the increase in the volume of goods produced would in itself have been enough, once the war was over, to bring prices down. . . . [T]he very high level to which prices in England and on the continent had been raised by the war and by paper money could not be maintained once the increase in the quantity of paper issued, which had been continuous up till then, was interrupted by the return to gold. The normal lowering of prices which would in any case have followed from a greater output of goods while the volume of currency remained the same, was intensified in England by the rise in the gold value of the pound sterling. . . . [T]he scarcity of gold was made responsible for what was in fact the obvious result of war and inflation (pp. 185-186).

    Tooke distinguishes between paper money and bank notes. Paper money is money in the proper sense of the word. Bank notes are instruments of bank credit. Moreover, bank notes should not be treated differently from checks and bills of exchange. All three are credit instruments and have the same character. Also, in the full meaning of the word, none are money (p. 187).
    Whereas Ricardo considers only the supply of paper money to explain the rise in prices when bank notes are not convertible to gold, Tooke considers both the supply of and the demand for currency (p. 187). Demand depends on the conditions of the markets and fluctuates accordingly (pp. 188-189). Fluctuation in foreign demand for the British pound has an immediate effect on domestic prices. Thus, the rise in prices is affected by “expansion of the home demand for goods due to successive increases in the amount of paper money put into circulation, and a rise in the price of goods imported due to the depreciation of the paper money on the foreign exchange market” (p. 189).
    Rist compares Tooke with Ricardo on the rise in prices under a paper money standard: “Tooke contends that the rise in English prices during the Napoleonic wars was to a large extent the effect of the depreciation of sterling on the exchange, whereas Ricardo regards that depreciation merely as a repercussion of the preceding rise in the prices of English goods” (p. 190).
    Tooke contends “that in fact that part of the rise in English prices above the rise due to exchange depreciation was the result of an excessive issue of paper money” (p. 190). However, he also believes that exchange depreciation is closely connected with the increased quantity of paper money (p. 191).
    Ricardo argues that “the only way to bring the pound back to par was to reduce the note circulation” (p. 193). However, the pound was brought back to parity with gold not by reducing the quantity of notes in circulation, but through improvements on foreign exchanges, which Tooke noted (pp. 193-194).
    Whereas Ricardo treats convertible bank notes as equivalent to paper money, Tooke notices a great deal of difference between the two. Also, Ricardo distinguishes bank notes from other credit instruments (checkable deposits and bills of exchange) while Tooke considers them the same (p. 196).
    To Tooke forced paper currency, such as the pound during the Napoleonic wars and the U.S. note until 1879, is money. Legal-tender paper money “is issued to meet the requirements and cover the expenditure of the State, it represents a final income (that is to say, not subject to repayment) for those individuals who come into possession of it, increasing their purchasing power, thus increasing their demand for goods and making prices rise. In brief, paper money acts on prices in the same way as metallic money does” (p. 197). [Examples are the U.S. note between 1862 and 1879 and the federal reserve note after 1933 domestically and after 1971 on foreign exchanges.]
    On the other hand, convertible bank notes “are credit instruments. They are only issued as advances. Far from being incorporated in the currency, they are bound to return to the bank which has issued them when the advances are repaid” (p. 197).
    Bank notes can “affect prices only provisionally, for in order to repay the advances a sum exactly equal to those advances has to be taken from the final income. An advance from the bank enables the borrower to spend to-day an income which he will in fact receive only later, but he will not spend that income since it will be used to repay the advance” (p. 198). Thus, “[b]ank-notes are claims on a defined quantity of gold. Paper money is a means of payment whose purchasing power over goods (or gold) is fixed on the market according to variations in supply and demand. It is a legal claim, and it is only the law which gives it the power to settle debts” (p. 199). [Legal-tender paper money settles a debt by passing that debt to another. However, being an obligation of the issuer, it can never extinguish debt. On the other hand, gold coin is no one’s obligation and can, therefore, extinguish debt.]
    Not only does convertibility limit the quantity of notes issued [and checkbook money], it also “gives notes legal and economic qualities which paper money does not possess, and which are independent of quantity” (p. 200).
    Unlike Ricardo, Tooke does not consider bank notes identical to metallic money, gold or silver coin. To Tooke, money is more than a medium of exchange or a common denomination of value; “it is the ‘subject of contracts for future payment,’ and ‘it is in this latter capacity that the fixity of a standard is most essential’” (pp. 200-201). “[T]the value of the convertible bank-note is derived precisely from its connexion with the metallic standard” (p. 201). Although a paper money standard is a standard, it is, however, a poor standard because it has nothing to guarantee stability (p. 201).
    Rist summarizes Tooke’s conclusion on the identity of bank notes and checkable deposits:

        1.  Since all credit instruments are essentially the same, it is absurd to put bank-notes in a class apart. If credit has been granted in excessive quantities, the situation cannot be remedied merely by limiting the number of bank-notes issued, as the Currency School argued, it is necessary to deal with credit as a whole.
        2.  The banks’ creation of credit, in all its forms, and particularly in the form of bank-notes, takes place only because the public demand credit. Banks cannot create notes at will, any more than they can create deposits. They are only created if the public demand them. That is why it is impossible to get out of a crisis by creating paper. Whereas paper money is created by the government at will in order to meet expenditure which cannot be covered by its ordinary revenue, credit instruments are created only in response to public demand. The State creates paper money at will but cannot withdraw it from circulation, the banks do not create credit instruments at will, but can withdraw them by ceasing to renew credits (p 213.).

    According to Tooke, financial crises result from the abuse of credit (p. 214). Preventing the abuse of credit is necessary to prevent financial crises. “[T]he abuse of credit is the result of the ‘spirit of speculation’” (p. 214). Moreover, “[c]redit does not give rise to speculation, but follows it; credit is always the response to a demand, and this demand is itself the result of a given economic situation” (p. 214). [The beginning of the twenty-first century bears witness to speculation abusing credit — the housing bubble for example.]
    Tooke identifies two primary price movements: (1) speculative price movements and (2) permanent or fundamental price movements (p. 215). Speculative price movements “originate not in an expansion of credit, but in a favourable price situation in certain commodity markets” (p. 215). As a result, credit expands in response to the demand for speculation. Thus, the boom begins.
    According to Tooke, “1, . . . speculation originates in the situation of the commercial or industrial market, and not in an increase in the note circulation; 2, that the steady expansion of credit is an effect, and not a cause of this speculation, for there is no expansion of credit without the demand for it; 3, that the contraction in the currency which follows a crisis is the consequence and not the cause of the slump” (p. 215).
    An economic slump (panic, depression, or recession) occurs when the income (wages, interest, dividends, profits, etc.) of consumers fails to keep up with rising prices of commodities. As a result, commodity prices must drop, which leads to an economic crisis. Prices decline to the level of the income of consumers, i.e., consumers can again afford to buy (pp. 216-217). [The world has been witnessing such an event with the collapse of the prices of real estate and commodities beginning in 2008.] Thus, according to Tooke, the aggregate of money income devoted to consumption limits the aggregate of money prices. [The Social Credits advocates hold a similar view. They believe that economic slumps result from the people lacking the money to buy the goods that have been produced. Their solution is to have the government or its central bank to print enough money, either physically or electronically, for the people to buy the excess goods and give it directly to the people.]
    Tooke does not deny that the influx of gold or the creation of paper money affects prices. However, other things also affect prices (pp. 219-220). For example, speculation can lead to an increase in the velocity of money, which can affect prices (p. 220). Also, affecting prices are the balance of trade, the capital markets, and the state of credit (p. 222).
    Rist summaries Tooke’s observation on interest:

    1.    A low discount rate cannot by itself stimulate the price level;
    2.    A low discount rate can affect prices on the stock exchange without having any effect on commodity markets.   

[Tooke’s observation is seen in lowering of interest rate following the 2008 crisis. Stock markets have trended upward while commodity prices have trended downward.]
    For a fall in interest to stimulate the economy, it has to “‘coincide with a tendency from other causes, to a speculative rise of prices, and with the opening of new fields for enterprise’” (p. 223). Otherwise, any action undertaking by the central bank to stimulate the circulation of money will not affect prices (p. 223). Nevertheless, “a low rate of interest may foster and support a rise which began from other causes. ‘If there exist grounds for speculation in goods, a coincident facility of credit may, but will not necessarily, extend the range of it.’ . . .[A] low rate of interest is at the bottom of all cases of ‘overtrading’ and ‘overbanking’” (p. 223). (“Overbanking” means “advances, either on insufficient or inconvertible securities, or in too large a proportion to the liabilities” [p. 214, fn].)
    “Tooke maintained that the raising of the discount rate, coupled with a strong cash position, would enable the Bank of England to mitigate the effects of a crisis and to prevent it from developing. Mere limitation of notes will only make the crisis more acute, for it is the function of notes to provide additional temporary currency in times of crisis, which will make it possible to avoid bankruptcies and collapses” (p. 228).
    [Poor is a proponent of elasticity in the credit system. There seems to be less difference between Poor and Tooke than Poor claims. Tooke’s explanations are closer to the truth than Poor credits him.
    As shown above, Poor’s view of Tooke’s works differs significantly from Rist’s. Poor’s views Tooke unfavorably while Rist views him favorably.]

End Notes

1. Percy L. Greaves, Jr.,Understanding the Dollar Crisis (Belmont, Massachusetts: Western Islands, 1973), p. 8.

2. Ibid., p. 28.

Copyright © 2016 by Thomas Coley Allen. 

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Discounting Accommodation Bills

Discounting Accommodation Bills

Thomas Allen

    Some proponents of the real bills doctrine and many opponents of the real bills doctrine present accommodation bills as legitimate bills for discounting. Some do so out of ignorance. Others do so to disparage the real bills doctrine.
    An accommodation bill is essentially a promissory note where the borrower secures accommodation from a bank on his own note, single name paper, or on an endorsed note of his customer, double name paper. Whereas real bills of exchange represent past transactions, accommodation bills represent future transactions. With a real bill of exchange, goods are in the process of being purchased or have been purchased. With an accommodation bill, the goods are not in the process of being purchased; they are to be purchased in the future.
    A real bill of exchange provides for its own payment; it is self-liquidating. When the retailer sells the merchandise represented by the bill of exchange, the retailer receives the gold necessary to pay the bill. Thus, a real bill of exchange is self-liquidating.
    An accommodation bill is not self-liquidating. As it represents goods not yet produced, whatever the accommodation bill represents does not provide the gold necessary to pay it.
    Discounting accommodation bills leads to inflation, i.e., more bank credit money (bank notes and checkbook money) enters the community than new goods. This inflation is eventually followed by an economic contraction.
    Discounting a real bill of exchange leads to a smooth operating economy. Credit money represents goods in the process of being sold, i.e., the goods represented by the bill of exchange, and provides the money to purchase the new merchandise. It also provides the funds to pay workers before the goods are sold without resorting to borrowing. As this credit money is removed when the merchandise is sold, it does not lead to inflation or economic contraction.
    The following example illustrates the difference between discounting a bill of exchange and an accommodation bill. New products of a community are being produced and consumed at the rate of £100,000,000. The value of these products is represented by bank notes and checkbook money via the discounting of bills of exchange. As far as currency is concerned, business would remain in a normal healthy condition.
    To this example, let’s add the assumption that banks want to maintain a 20 percent reserve in gold coins. That is, bank reserves equal £20,000,000. Furthermore, let’s assume that some smooth-talking pettifoggers convince bankers to discount their accommodation bills equal to £10,000,000. Now the community has £110,000,000 of credit money with which to buy £100,000,000 of goods. We also assume no lost in confidence.
    The result is inflation and a rise in prices. As the community was producing only £100,000,000 in products, much of the new demand will be met by increasing imports to absorb the additional £10,000,000. Gold would be used to pay for the imports as the foreign sellers have no need of the community’s credit money. The remainder of new demand would cause additional unsustainable domestic production.
    Having consumed the money for the accommodation bills, the drafters, the pettifoggers, would have nothing with which to pay the bills when they mature. Thus, the holders of the bank credit money created by the accommodation bills become creditors of the banks of the amount of £10,000,000 when the bills mature. Thus, the outstanding credit money would be presented to the banks for gold.
    If the banks had maintained their 20 percent reserve ratio, they would have £22,000,000 in gold backing their outstanding credit money issued to buy bills of exchanges and accommodation bills. If the excess credit money created by discounting the accommodation bills were redeemed, bank reserves would fall to £12,000,000. Thus, banks have to reduce new discounting to £60,000,000 to maintain a 20-percent ratio. Instead of being able to discount £100,000,000 in bills of exchange as the community requires, they could only discount £60,000,000.
    As a result of discounting accommodation bills, the quantity of credit money drops from £110,000,000 to £60,000,000. Economic stagnation quickly follows and bank runs become highly likely. As the banks lack the means, gold, to pay all their outstanding notes and checking account moneys, bankruptcy and suspension of payment results — all from discounting non-self-liquidating bills.
    As the above overly simplified example shows, banks should only discount self-liquidating bills, real bills of exchange, with bank credit money. Otherwise, economic disaster can, and often does, occurs.

Copyright © 2015, 2017 by Thomas Coley Allen.

The Silver Dollar 1873–1900 – Part 4

Gold Standard Act and Conclusion
Thomas Allen

[Editor’s note: Footnotes in the original are omitted.]

Gold Standard Act
With the enactment of the Gold Standard Act, the monetary system of the United States was formerly and clearly placed on the gold standard in 1900. This law declared that the gold dollar was the standard unit of value. It required the Secretary of the Treasury to maintain parity of all forms of money, which included the silver dollar and silver certificate. It provided for the redemption of U.S. notes and Treasury notes of 1890 in gold only and prohibited their reissue except in exchange for gold. Thus, it converted these Treasury notes, which had been used to buy silver, into government notes redeemable in gold. The law provided for silver certificates in small denominations to replace gradually the Treasury notes of 1890. Silver certificates were restricted to $10 and smaller. Also, it authorized the issuance of gold certificates, but unlike U.S. notes and gold coins, they were not made legal tender.

Although the Act did not affect the legal-tender status of the silver dollar (it remained full legal tender), it implied that by now the silver dollar had been reduced to credit money, a subsidiary coin for gold. It was no longer money in its own right. It had ceased being fiat money. The Secretary of the Treasury had to maintain the value of the silver dollar to equal a dollar in gold. He had to redeem silver dollars in gold if necessary to maintain parity.

As White notes, the silver dollar made an expensive fiat money.[1] However, it did limit the government’s ability to inflate much more than paper fiat money if the government decided not to maintain parity with gold. Its intrinsic value would be reached much sooner than paper. With silver, the government could only cut the value (purchasing power) of the currency by 25 to 50 percent. With paper, it could reduce the value to zero. At least the silver dollar gave the people some protection that the greenback never could.

Conclusion
Friedman and Schwartz sum up the silver dollar era:

The fear that silver would produce an inflation sufficient to force the United States off the gold standard made it necessary to have a severe deflation in order to stay on the gold standard. In retrospect, it seems clear that either acceptance of a silver standard at an early stage or an early commitment to gold would have been preferable to the uneasy compromise that was maintained, with the uncertainty about the ultimate outcome and the consequent wide fluctuations to which the currency was subjected.[2]

Although the last three decades of the nineteenth century were deflationary, this era was one of the greatest periods of economic growth for the United States.

A highly important question remains to be answered: Why did the gold value of silver decline so much after 1873?

Friedman and Schwartz assert that the supply of and demand for silver explains its decline, “The reasons for the price decline seem fairly clear: on the supply side, rich new mines were opened in the American West, and there was a world wide increase in productivity; on the demand side, a number of European countries shifted from a silver or bimetallic to a gold standard and sharply reduced their monetary use of silver.”[3]

The monometallists, advocates of the single gold standard of this era, claim that the increase in the supply of silver caused its fall in value. However, the fall in value began before the world’s silver stock had greatly increased. Moreover, gold production was much greater than that of silver. To which the monometallists reply that the fall resulted from an anticipation of an increase in supply.

Even today, the supply argument seems weak. In recent years (decades), the increase in the supply of gold has been greater than that of silver. During this time, the demand for silver seems to have been much higher as its usage has been higher. Yet the value of silver generally lags that of gold.

Laughlin opines that the abundance of gold caused silver to lose value relative to gold.[4] With the discovery of gold in America, enough gold became available to supplant silver coins. People preferred gold to silver because it had more value per unit weight. As the demand for gold grew, so did its value. As the demand for silver fell, so did its value. Moreover, the supply of silver began increasing after 1872.

The bimetallists, advocates of the silver-gold system with a legally fixed exchange rate between the two, claim that “demonetization” caused silver’s fall in value. They point to Germany ending the free coinage of silver in 1871, which glutted the market with silver. This action forced France and the other members of the Latin Union to abandon the silver standard, i.e., to end the free coinage of silver. The United States ended the free coinage of silver in 1873. During the 1870s other European countries ended their silver standards or bimetallic silver-gold system and adopted the monometallic gold standard. To the bimetallists, ending the free coinage of silver and by that discontinuing the use of silver as standard money caused its decline in value.

One result of discarding the silver standard was an increase in demand for gold coins. This increased demand for gold coins would account for some of the decline in the value of silver in terms of gold. Not only were countries replacing the silver standard with the gold standard, but they were also replacing fiat paper monetary standards with the gold standard.

Friedman and Schwartz opine that if the United States had reverted to the silver standard, the deflation of the 1880s and ’90s would have been avoided or at least moderated. Inflation would not have occurred. Prices would have remained stable.

The abandonment of the silver standard around the world reduced the demand for silver. As countries moved onto the gold standard, the demand for gold increased. Thus, the value of silver was pushed down and that of gold was pushed up.

If the United States had gone onto the silver standard, they would have abated much of the value change between the two metals. While reducing the demand for gold, they would have increased the demand for silver. If the United States were on the silver standard, other countries then on the silver standard might have remained on the silver standard instead of converting to the gold standard. Increasing the monetary demand for silver and decreasing it for gold would have greatly lessened the rise in the value of gold and the fall in the gold value of silver. Thus, the deflation during this era would have been significantly diminished if not eliminated.[5]

Although silver ceased to be used as standard money in most countries (China and some Latin American countries being notable exceptions), it was still used in subsidiary coins in most countries and as fiat money in the United States. If merely ending the use of silver as standard money caused its fall in value, why did gold soar in value (in terms of standard fiat currencies) when its last legal connection to money was severed in 1971? Whatever explanation used to explain silver decline in value after 1873 needs to be able to explain gold's rise in value after 1971.

(Charles Rist offers this explanation for why silver’s value declined and gold’s value rose when their free coinage ended. When the free coinage of silver ended, people replaced silver with gold. Gold adequately performed all the basic functions of money. Silver was not needed to perform any of these functions. Therefore, the monetary demand for silver declined. As demand fell, so did its value. When the free coinage of gold ended, people replaced gold with irredeemable paper money. Irredeemable paper money does not perform all the basic functions of money. As it nearly always depreciates in value, it fails as a store of value. Gold continued to perform a monetary function as a store of value. Therefore, a monetary demand for gold remained after its free coinage ended. Thus, when gold replaced silver, it fulfilled all of silver’s monetary functions. When irredeemable paper money replaced gold, it failed to fulfill all of gold’s monetary functions.[6])

The pro-silver folks are not the sole blame for the deleterious effects of the silver dollar. For the most part, they did not want fiat silver money. They wanted commodity silver money. They wanted to open the mint to the free coinage of silver.

Most of the blame belongs to the pro-gold and anti silver folks. To thwart the pro-silver folks’ attempt to allow the free coinage of silver, the pro-gold faction compromised. These compromises resulted in the Bland-Allison Act and the Sherman Act. Thus, the pro-gold folks were mostly responsible for the detrimental effects of fiat silver money between 1878 and 1900.

Politics prevented them from completely abandoning silver as legal tender. Allowing the free coinage of silver at the then-legal ratio of 16 to 1 would have reverted the country to the silver standard. Ardently, they opposed the silver standard; they wanted the gold standard that most of the world was on or moving toward.

Instead of compromising by making silver fiat money, the pro-gold should have compromised by allowing the free coinage of silver and raising the legal ratio above the market ratio. That would have preserved the gold standard until the legal ratio fell below the market ratio. However, when amendments were offered to change the ratio, they were voted down. Even better than changing the ratio, would have been to eliminate it. Elimination of the ratio was never seriously considered.

Many politicians of this era suffered from the same false delusion that has inflicted politicians throughout the ages. The ancient myth that the king’s (Congress’) edict gives money its value enthralled many of these politicians. Congress’ decree could force both gold and silver coins to circulate together at the current ratio of 16 to 1. After all, Congress had declared them to have an equal value at this ratio.

Not all politicians suffered from this superstition. Many knew that free coinage of silver at the current legal ratio of 16 to 1 would cause overvalued silver to circulate and send gold into hiding or to Europe. Most inflationists and pro-gold folks knew this outcome. It is this outcome that the inflationists wanted. It is this outcome that the pro-gold folks did not want.

In Open Mints and Free Banking, William Brough gave the best solution to the silver problem. His solution was to eliminate the legal exchange ratio and open the mint to the free coinage of silver. Thus, the mint would coin all gold and silver brought to it for coinage. Eliminating the ratio and allowing the free coinage of silver would have allowed the people themselves to decide how many silver coins and gold coins that they wanted. Both coins could have circulated together without either driving the other out of circulation. Both could have circulated side-by-side without the inflation and following depression caused by the Treasury notes of 1890. If Congress had adopted Brough’s recommendation, it would have eliminated most of the problems associated with silver in between 1878 and 1900. The most likely outcome would have been silver coins being used for day-to-day retail buying and selling and for wages. Gold would have been used for the export-import business, large purchases and investments, and long-term savings. The drain on the Treasury’s gold would have been significantly lessened. As no legal exchange rate existed between gold and silver, Gresham’s Law would not have been at work converting overvalued silver into gold for export as occurred under the Bland-Allison Act and especially under the Sherman Act. The money supply would have more closely matched the actual needs of the people.

Four other changes were also desirable. First, U.S. notes, greenbacks, should have been permanently removed from circulation as they were redeemed for gold or paid into the Treasury. Second, bank notes should have been issued based on and backed by real bills of exchange instead of U.S. governmental securities. Third, the U.S. government should have ceased issuing gold and silver certificates and should have retired those redeemed. Banks and other private institutions should have assumed the task of issuing gold and silver certificates. Fourth, all legal tender laws should have been repealed.

An argument used by the silverites was that the U.S. government should not discriminate against either metal. As long as it had a legal ratio, it would always discriminate against the undervalued metal in favor of the overvalued metal. At 16 to 1, silver was overvalued and gold was undervalued. At this ratio, silver coins would have quickly replaced gold coins in circulation. If the silverites really wanted to eliminate discrimination, they should have supported the elimination of the legal exchange ratio. Then the markets would have decided how many coins of each metal were needed. As they wanted to maintain the ratio of 16 to 1, they wanted the U.S. government to discriminate against gold. If the silverites wanted silver money for the sake of having silver money, they would have accepted an offer to eliminate the legal ratio. If it were currency depreciation that they wanted, they would have rejected the offer. As the offer seems never to have been made, we may never know for sure their preference. However, based on their comments and actions, they probably would have rejected the offer.

According to Rothbard, the silver movement destroyed the hard money, limited government, laissez-faire political party, the Democratic party of Jefferson, Jackson, and Cleveland.[7] It ushered in an era, which continues to this day, of statist control of both the Republican and Democratic parties. Until 1896, the Democratic party stood for limited government with minimal governmental intervention in economic and social affairs. For the Democrats, remaking man was not a function of government.

The Republican party was the party of the progressives, pietists, and Hamiltonians (advocates of central banking, governmental protection and promotion of big business, and protective tariffs). It sought to use government to mold man into perfection. It was the party of the greenback and inflation, prohibition of liquor, the public school system to remake mankind, blue laws, Protestantization of Catholics, and high tariffs. “. . . the Republicans glorified in calling themselves throughout this period [i.e., last half of the nineteenth century] ‘the party of great moral ideals,’ while the Democrats declared themselves to be ‘the party of personal liberty.’”[8]

After Cleveland won in a landslide in 1892 and the Democrats captured both houses of Congress, the Republican party had to remake itself or remain a minority party. It remade itself. It abandoned the prohibitionists, modified its immigration policy, and moved toward the center away from its extreme pietism.

Meanwhile, the Democratic party began to fractionalize. Pietism had come into the party in the South with a call for prohibition. In the West where the silver mines were, the Democrats adopted a pro-silver stance. Moreover, people blamed Cleveland for the Panic of 1893 although it resulted from the actions of the Republican Harrison administration. Seeing that the hard-money laissez-faire Cleveland faction was weak, the pietist faction in the South and the silverites in the West united under William Jennings Bryan to gain control of the Democratic party. Thus, the progressives, pietists, and Hamiltonians gained complete control of the Democratic party, which was once the party of liberty, and have never since loosened their grip.

J.P. Morgan and other financiers through Henry Cabot Lodge offered to support the Republican party if it supported the gold standard, which was Cleveland’s basic economic issue. Otherwise, they would support Bryan. William McKinley accepted the deal, and the Republican party abandoned its traditional easy money policy.

The pietist-silverite takeover of the Democratic party caused many Democrats to sit out the election. Others voted for McKinley. Since the election of McKinley, both parties and all presidents have been statists and progressives in varying degrees. Voter turnout has trended down ever since.

The most devastating and long-lasting effect of the silver dollar fiat money was the utter destruction of a party of liberty in the United States. Since 1896, no party advocating laissez-faire economics, limited government, personal responsibility, and personal liberty has won the presidency or taken control of either house of Congress. Only a few such candidates have won congressional elections. State governors and legislatures have not fared any better.

[Editor’s note: The appendix, which contained eight tables of monetary statistics, and the list of references are omitted.]

Endnotes
1. Horace White, Money and Banking (Boston, Massachusetts: Ginn & Company, 1896), p. 204.

2. Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 133-134.

3. Ibid., p. 114.

4. J. Laurence Laughlin, The Elements of Political Economy (New York, New York: American Book Co., 1887), p. 311.

5. Friedman and Schwartz, p. 134.

6. Charles Rist, The Triumph of Gold, trans. Philip Cortney (New York, N.Y.: Philosophical Library, 1961, pp. 122-124, 151-153.

7. Murray N. Rothbard, A History of Money and Banking in the United States: The Colonial Era to World War II (Auburn, Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2005), pp. 175-179.

8. Ibid., p. 174.

Copyright © 2010 by Thomas Coley Allen.

Part 3

More articles on money.