Rist on Mollien’s Ideas About Bank Notes

Rist on Mollien’s Ideas About Bank Notes

Thomas Allen

    In 1938, Charles Rist  (1874-1955) wrote History of Monetary and Credit Theory from John Law to the Present Day (translated by Jane Degras, New York: Augustus M. Kelly Publishers, 1966) in which he reviews Count Mollien’s ideas about bank notes. Rist was a French economist, who was of the Banking School as opposed to the Currency School. [Under the gold standard, banking philosophies generally fell into either the banking school or the currency school. The banking school “holds that as long as a bank maintains the convertibility of its bank notes into specie (gold), for which it should keep ‘adequate’ reserves, it is impossible for it to over issue its bank notes against sound commercial paper with fixed short term (90 days or less) maturities.”[1] Its position is also called the “Banking Principle” or “Principle of Fullerton.” To the banking school, bank notes are merely circulating credit instruments. Although they can be exchanged for gold, they are not intended to be warehouse receipts for gold. The currency school “maintains that all . . . changes in the nation’s quantity of money should correspond precisely with changes in the nation’s holdings of monetary metal. . . .”[2] Its position is also called the “currency doctrine.” To the currency school, bank notes are merely warehouse receipts and, therefore, should be backed 100 percent by specie. To the banking school, bank notes are claims for new merchandise offered for sale in the markets. Under the currency school, bank notes are claims for gold. Under the currency school philosophy, an elastic currency does not exist; under the banking school, it does.] My comments are in brackets. Referenced page numbers enclosed in parentheses are to Rist’s book.
    Nicolas François, Count Mollien (1758-1850) was a French financier. He worked in the Ministry of Finance from 1774 to 1791 and went to England in 1796 and studied the Bank of England. In 1799, he return to France and again entered the Ministry of Finance. Napoleon frequently consulted him and made him a councillor of state in 1804. In 1814, he retired from public service. Later, he was appointed to the Chamber of Peers. His major writing, which contains his views on money and banking, is Mémoires d'un Ministre du Trésor Public, published in four volumes between 1780 and 1815.
    When Mollien returned to France, he was determined to revamp the French credit system using the English system as his model (p. 92). Mollien wanted to protect the Bank of France from the government, which “was always short of money and anxious to subordinate everything to its political ends” (p. 93). Also, he wanted to protect the bank from its managers, “who were too easily tempted to use it in their own interests” (p. 93).
    Mollien argued that “[a] banking issue should only discount good commercial paper” (p. 93). With the strict enforcement of this restriction, the bank would “avoid the requests of a government always in search of treasury advances, and the cash facilities which the bank directors might ask for their personal affairs” (p. 93). Moreover, “the bank should avoid all speculative paper, all ‘friendly accommodation,’ all ‘fraudulent paper’ or ‘collusive securities’ which do not represent real commercial transactions, and the payment of which is not guaranteed by ‘the share in real money with which each consumer should directly or indirectly furnish it’” (p. 93). Furthermore, the bank should fervently avoid treasury advances of the government because they do not arise out of the ordinary requirements of trade and would return to the bank for repayment (p. 93). That is, bank notes issued to the government for treasury bills are in excess of that needed for commerce, and would, thus, return to the bank for gold. [Today’s governments and banks avoid this problem by making bank notes inconvertible.]
    The essence of Mollien’s concept of the bank note was merely substituting one currency instrument for another already in existence. His concept is correct. When a bank note is issued against good short-term, self-liquidating paper, the bank note is merely substituted for another form of currency. Thus, he held that “[i]f notes are issued against sound bills of exchange, they only substitute a more convenient paper, with all the characteristics of money, for maturities created in the course of trade” (p. 94). His “idea that the note is merely a substitute for commercial money spontaneously created in the course of trade is correct” (p. 94). [Commercial money is short-term {less than 91 days} self-liquidating {the consumer pays the bill with his purchase} real bill of exchange {a bill that represents goods in the process of being sold to the final consumer}. Some economists reject the notion that bills of exchange are money; most of these economists accept bank notes as money like gold coin.]
    However, Mollien believed in the quantity theory of money. If too many bank notes are issued, they declined in value (p. 94). [Presumably, he believed that this is true even if all bank notes are issued against real bills of exchange and gold coin.]
    One significant difference between the Bank of England and the Bank of France as envisioned by Mollien was that the Bank of England held its gold reserves primarily for payments abroad. The Bank of France held its gold reserves primarily to redeem its bank notes (p. 95).
    In addition to bills of exchange that the bank had converted to bank notes, the bank also needed to maintain a reserve of gold coins for the redemption of its notes when redemption is demanded. However, its notes need not and should not be 100 percent backed by gold. Mollien writes:

But it would obviously be an exaggeration of caution to the point of absurdity to ask that the reserve of coin should be equal to the sum of the notes that a bank puts into circulation; if, in addition to the security for the bank-notes represented in the bills of exchange which the bank has discounted, it were to keep in its repositories a sum in coin equal to the notes, the bank's existence would be both impossible and useless, for it could only form this reserve by keeping in a state of stagnation at the very least the capital of its shareholders (p. 95).

He maintains, “The reserve of coin which a bank holds should therefore be measured against the number and the nature of the causes which can make repayments more frequent” (p. 95).
    Rist notes, “It did not occur to Mollien that the note is only a means of making the coin deposited beforehand in the bank circulate” (p. 96). Also, Mollien failed to consider the primary purpose of the gold reserve. "Whereas the gold reserve is the foundation on which the entire activity of the bank is created, Mollien considered it as a way of guaranteeing the convertibility of its notes” (p. 96).
    “Mollien considered notes useful because they economised the use of money” (p. 96). However, this idea conflicted with some of his other ideas. “He thought of the note as a substitute for bills held by the bank; but bills are an addition to metallic money; they are a commercial money spontaneously created to supplement the circulation of coin. In acting as a substitute for bills, notes play the same part as bills: they are an addition to, not a substitute for, the coin in circulation” (p. 96).
    Moreover, Mollien had difficulty in distinguishing between credit used as money and money itself. To him, bank notes were money like gold coin or inconvertible government notes. However, their issue was limited by the quantity of bills of exchange that they replaced (p. 96). [When a debt is paid with credit used as money, that credit money discharges the debt by passing it to another, the person or entity responsible or obligated for the credit money. The debt is not extinguished until the credit money is converted to something that is no one else obligation, such as gold or silver. Therefore, a bank note is credit money that discharges debt by passing it to the issuing bank. That debt is not extinguished until the bank retires the note by converting it to a commodity money like gold or silver.]

Endnotes
1. Percy L. Greaves, Jr., Understanding the Dollar Crisis (Belmont, Massachusetts: Western Islands, 1973), p. 8.

2. Ibid., p. 28.

Copyright © 2017 by Thomas Coley Allen.

More articles on money.

Does the Monetary Unit Determine the Value of Bullion?

Does the Monetary Unit Determine

the Value of Bullion?

Thomas Allen

    One of the debates that economists had during the era of the gold-coin standard[1] was whether the monetary value of the gold coin determined the value of gold bullion or gold bullion determined the value of the gold coin. Is the value of each unit of money determined by the value of the bullion in each unit? Or, is the value of bullion in each unit of money determined by the value of the monetary unit? In other words, is the monetary unit the independent variable, or is gold bullion the independent variable?[2]
    In his book Money (1882), George Weston argues that the value of bullion is determined by the value of coin, the monetary unit. The value of coin is determined by the quantity of coins and paper money. Weston is a proponent of the quantity theory of money. Other things being equal, the quantity of money fixes the value of the monetary unit, which he usually seems to mean its purchasing power. This is true not only for inconvertible fiat government paper notes, it is also true of full-weight gold coins and other types of money. According to him, governments can keep their government notes from deprecating by properly controlling their quantity. Moreover, he seems to prefer fiat paper government notes to full-weight gold coin. (A full-weight gold coin is a coin whose monetary value equals the value of its gold content.)
    Weston believes that a parity between full-weight coin and paper money can be permanently maintained by limiting the quantity of paper money. Moreover, he contends that controlling the quantity of paper money is more reliable than redeeming paper money in coin on demand, which he considers to be “hopelessly treacherous as it is costly and clumsy.” He adds that using the requirement to redeem bank notes in gold coin on demand to regulate the issue of bank notes is “false and fraudulent . . . and had proved itself in practice one of the worst scourges which has ever afflicted mankind.” Such a system causes the quantity of money to fluctuate too much. A superior system is to use the price of gold to regulate the issue of inconvertible paper money. Perhaps, he is correct, but no government has ever achieved the goal of maintaining parity or near parity of paper money with coin or bullion for more than a few years without redemption. Furthermore, rarely does a government use the price of gold to regulate the issue of inconvertible paper money. Such methodology is too restrictive and obviates the purpose of resorting to inconvertible paper money, which is to issue money based on politics and not on economics.
    Weston prefers a static supply of bank notes as the banking systems of England and most other European countries had where nearly all bank notes were backed by gold coin. A major problem with this static money supply is that to fit periods of high demand for notes, such as around Christmas, a large quantity of notes has to remain unused in vaults for most of the year. European countries overcame this inelasticity problem with checkable deposits, which Weston rejects as money. By expanding checkable deposits when demand was high and contracting them when demand was low, banks satisfied the markets’ monetary needs.
    Moreover, Weston believes that the law gives gold its value. Furthermore, the value of gold as merchandise is not an element constituting its value as money. This monetary value of gold can be regulated by varying the quantity of paper money in circulation. Increasing the quantity of paper money decreases the value of gold coin. Here he seems to confuse value with purchasing power. The two are different. Besides, increasing the quantity of paper money does not always lead to a decline in purchasing power of gold coin. In the United States, during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the purchasing power of gold coin rose while it was accompanied by a rising supply of paper money (some fiat like the U.S. note[3] and some not like national bank notes[4]) and legal-tender silver dollars.[5] However, fiat paper money and fiat silver dollars may have prevented prices from declining more than they did.
    Also, Weston seems to believe that gold and silver are not money (Murray Rothbard strongly disagrees; he declares that gold is money, whatever its form.) People desire them because of ease of converting them to money — presumably, he means coin and possibly bullion as reserves for paper money. However, gold bullion has been used as money, and not merely as backing for paper money, before and after coinage.
    According to him, civilized people today (1884) do not desire gold for ornamentation but solely for its use as money. If true, the manufacturing of gold jewelry would be an unprofitable undertaking.
    Weston claims that silver coin can be kept at parity with gold coin by limiting the quantity of silver coins. He cites several examples in Europe. Silver coins in the countries that he mentions were either subsidiary coins to gold coin or soon became subsidiary coins. These countries were on the gold standard, and their silver coins were convertible to gold either directly or indirectly. This convertibility — not their quantity — kept the monetary value of these coins at par with gold coin, although the silver content of these coins was worth less than the monetary value of the coin. (If the monetary value of a coin fixes the value of its bullion content as Weston contends, why did not the value of silver rise to match the monetary value of the silver coin?)
    Weston seems deceitful about subsidiary coins and uses them to support his contention that the metal content of a coin does not determine the value of the coin, but the value of the coin determines the value of its metal content. Subsidiary coins are token coins used for transactions so small that full-weight gold coins cannot be used without receiving change in token coins. Moreover, token coins can be redeemed in gold coin. If a subsidiary coin is to circulate, the value of its metal content has to be less than its monetary value or else it will be melted for its metal.
    Nevertheless, his comments on the European silver coins fit the silver dollar in the United States at that time. The silver dollar was fiat money whose quantity was fixed by Congress and the Secretary of the Treasury. According to Weston, it was kept at par with the gold dollar by limiting the quantity of silver dollars manufactured. Although the value of the metal content of the silver dollar was worth less than a dollar, Congress declared the silver dollar to have a legal-tender value of one dollar. Although the silver dollar could not be directly converted to gold, it could be converted indirectly to gold. One means of achieving this conversion was to deposit silver dollars in a bank and then withdraw the money in gold coin. This indirect conversion to gold kept the silver dollar at par with gold.
    Historical examples argue against Weston’s position. As shown below, the value of bullion controls the value of the coin, and not the monetary value stamped on the coin.
    In 1985, Congress authorized the minting of a one-ounce gold coin with a legal tender value of $50 and a one-ounce silver coin with a legal tender value of $1. This action occurred 14 years after gold had ceased having any formal part of the world’s monetary systems. Likewise, it occurred decades after silver had any formal part of the world’s monetary system except as subsidiary coins, which use ended in the mid-1960s.
    If the monetary value of gold coin determined the value of its gold bullion content, which was $327 at end of 1985, then the gold coin should have pulled the value, price, of bullion down to $50 per ounce. Instead of the coin pulling the value of bullion down, bullion raised the value of the coin up. Likewise, silver bullion in the one-ounce $1 silver coin raised the value of the coin instead of the silver coin pulling the value of bullion down to $1 per ounce.
    Under the  Bretton Woods system, the US government guaranteed the US dollar to have the value of one thirty-fifth of an ounce of gold and exchanged one ounce of gold at the rate of $35 per ounce when a foreign government or its central bank redeemed its dollars. During the 1960s, the value, price, of gold bullion rose above $35 per ounce. If Weston were correct in that the value of the monetary unit determines the value of bullion, such a dichotomy could not have occurred. The price of gold could not have risen above $35 per ounce. As a result of the divergence between the monetary unit and bullion, the Bretton Woods system was abandoned in 1971.
    The same effect occurred in Weston’s day when Congress authorized the issuance of government notes called US notes and nicknamed greenbacks. Soon after issuance, the $10 US note began trading at a discount to the $10 gold coin. Although the magnitude of the discount varied, the US note did not exchange at par with gold coin until it became redeemable in gold. If the monetary unit determines the value of bullion, then the $10 US note should have remained at par with the $10 gold coin. Moreover, if the monetary unit determined the value of bullion, then subsidiary silver coins should have remained in circulation. They did not. For several years subsidiary silver coins ceased circulating because their value as bullion exceeded their value as money.
    According to Weston, the value of the dollar is determined by the quantity of coin and paper money. As S. McLean Hardy’s statistical study shows, during the War, the value of the dollar had more to do with Confederate victories and defeats than with its quantity. Confidence, not quantity, gives inconvertible paper money its value, although its quantity affects confidence. Convertibility gives paper money its value whatever its quantity.
    Weston does acknowledge that paper money can depreciate against gold coin and cause gold coins to cease circulating. How can this be if the value of money determines the value of gold bullion in the coin? How can the value of the bullion content of a $10 gold coin rise above the $10 monetary value stamped on the coin, if the monetary value of the coin determines the value of its bullion content? The experience that he witnessed with the US note proves that the value of the monetary unit does not fix the value of its bullion content.
    Centuries before the first precious metal coin was ever minted, people bought and sold goods and services with gold and silver bullion. Genesis 23:16 records such an event when Abraham bought a burial plot for his deceased wife by weighing out silver.
    More proof that a coin’s bullion content governs its monetary value is that well-worn coins exchange by their weight rather than by the monetary value stamped on them unless the law prohibits such discounting. In which case, the law is often ignored by refusing to accept the worn coin in trade at its full monetary value. (Unfortunately, creditors often had to accept worn coins in payment of debt.) Some countries under the gold standard allowed by law exchanges of well-worn coins by weight rather than by tale. Even in some countries that prohibited such discounting guaranteed the full-weight of their coins by exchanging new full-weight coins for worn coins.
    Weston asserts that suspension of the gold standard, i.e., the suspension of convertibility of paper money, in one country adds to the number of gold coins in other countries. The resumption of the gold standard, i.e., returning to convertibility of paper money in gold coin, draws gold coins from other countries. He ignores the large sink of hoarded coins, gold bullion, jewelry, ornamentation, plate, and other gold products that can absorb the excess gold under suspension and can return it under resumption. Thus, according to him, the abandonment of the gold standard in one major commercial country causes the value of gold in other countries to fall. Resumption of the gold standard causes the value gold in other countries to rise.
    When a country suspends species payments, Weston claims that its coins flow to other countries and reduce the value of money, and by that, the value of gold, in these countries. If so, the effect is only temporary. The value of gold as bullion and in coin is nearly equal worldwide. Moreover, the global quantity of gold available for monetary use is so massive compared with what may flee one country that the effect of the fleeing gold would be small or even insignificant. Weston would counter that this new supply of gold is sufficient to lower its value worldwide.
    If Weston is correct in that whatever gold that flees a country that has suspended the gold standard flows into the monetary system of other countries, only a small part will end up in circulating gold coins. Most will go to banks as deposits and become the basis for credit expansion. Most of the money created by this expansion will be as checkable deposits while some will be as bank notes. This credit expansion is what causes monetary inflation and the resulting rising prices. Its contraction results in deflation and decline in prices. However, many problems associated with credit expansion can be avoided by using sound banking practices (not fractional reserve banking practices, which allows multiple parties to use the same money simultaneously). Sound banking practices include not borrowing short and lending long and backing all checkable deposits 100 percent with full-weight coin or commercial money.[6] (Commercial money is a real bill of exchange that is self-liquidating usually within 90 days or less; it can only function under a commodity standard like the gold standard.)
    The decline in purchasing power, Weston contends, results from a reduction in demand for gold as coin when the gold standard is suspended. However, he claims that the loss in purchasing power results from a loss of the value of gold coin. The reverse occurs when the gold standard is resumed and paper money is again convertible in gold. Purchasing power of coin and paper increases because the value of gold increases. He ignores the quality of money theory, which explains the fall and rise of money’s purchasing power, which he calls value. When the gold standard is suspended, low-quality inconvertible paper money, which has less value and purchasing power than gold, replaces gold coin. When the gold standard is resumed, a high-quality money, gold coin and paper money convertible in gold, replaces low-quality inconvertible paper money.
    Moreover, he seems to credit the rise and fall in prices mostly on changes in the supply and demand for monetary gold. He sees the changes in prices being caused by changes in the value of gold. He ignores changes in credit money, except bank notes, which he considers to be real money and not credit money,[7] have much more effect on prices than changes in the supply of gold.
    Weston fails to explain how the monetary unit gets its initial value. Under the gold standard, the monetary unit gets its value from gold. The monetary unit is defined as a specific weight of gold and the monetary unit has the value of that weight of gold. For example, the Gold Standard Act of 1900 defined the dollar as 23.22 grains of gold. Therefore, the dollar had the value of 23.22 grains of gold. This is more proof that the monetary unit derives its value from its metal content as the value of bullion precedes the monetary unit.
    This notion Weston rejects. He claims that the value of the monetary unit, the dollar, gives the 23.22 grains of gold its value. The dollar may give 23.22 grains of gold its price, but it does not give the gold its value. Value and prices are not the same things. Value is subjective; price is objective. Moreover, not everything that has value, has a price; for example, love of one’s mate and children has great value but no price.
    An example of the difference between price and value is that, under the gold standard, when a person buys a shirt for $10, the shirt has the value of 232.2 grains of gold and a price of $10. (Today, when one buys a shirt with a $10 federal reserve note, what is the value of the shirt? Without defining the dollar in terms of itself, which is a poor and unsatisfactory definition that should be unacceptable and not used, such as the value of the dollar is a dollar’s worth of goods, no one can definitively define the value of the dollar.)
    Before any commodity became money, a medium of exchange, it had to have value independently of its monetary use. Its monetary use adds to its value as a commodity, but does not create it. Weston acknowledges that gold had value as ornamentation, etc. before being coined, and its uses as coin add to that value and even gives gold its highest actual value. If true, no gold coin would ever be melted for use as ornamentation, for the highest value of gold is that in the form of a coin. However, as gold coins were often melted for their gold and that gold was used for other purposes, gold as coin is not always its highest use.
    Moreover, Weston is unclear about how paper money gets its value other than the government limiting its quantity. How this limitation initially gives paper money, especially inconvertible paper money, its initial value, he does not explain. Convertible paper money derives its value from the gold that it represents. Inconvertible paper money derives its value from the gold coin that it replaces. Quantity has nothing to do with this initial value.
    In his argument to prove that coin fixes the value of bullion, Weston shows that government can easily manipulate their monetary systems and the purchasing power of their money — usually to the detriment of the people. However, he fails to identify or to describe a governmentally manipulated monetary system that works better than, or even as well as, the gold-coin standard accompanied by a well-functioning credit system, although as an example, he offers Brazil, which used the price of gold as an index to regulate its fiat paper money supply.
     Under the gold-coin standard, the government does not regulate the quantity of gold coins produced. However, it often intervenes to restrict the quantity of bank notes issued, although such intervention is not necessary and probably undesirable as it can distort the markets. Market forces decide the quantity of gold coins minted and gold coins melted. When the government does not intervene, and to some extent, even when it does, market forces regulate the quantity of bank notes issued.
    Whether bank notes and government notes[8] are convertible or inconvertible to full-weight gold coin, Weston argues that they are money in their own right. They are real money and are not merely forms of credit money. True, they are used as a medium of exchange. Also, when they are inconvertible, they nearly always become the unit of account, especially if the government makes them legal tender. However, real money like full-weight gold or silver coin performs one monetary duty that these notes cannot perform. That is, full-weight coin not only discharges debt, it also extinguishes debt because it is no one else’s liability. Bank notes and government notes can only discharge debt. They do so by passing the obligation to another, which is ultimately the person or entity responsible for the note.[9] For example, the US government is the responsible party for today’s federal reserve note. Contrary to Weston’s assertion, bank notes and government notes are not real money; they are credit money and cannot extinguish debt.
    Weston rejects the notion that bills of changes and checkable deposits are money. According to him, they do not have the effect as bank notes and do not increase the quantity of money. Today, as checkable deposits far exceed bank notes as money in industrialized countries, most monetary disturbances like inflation comes from changes in checkable deposits than fluctuation in bank notes.
    Therefore, Weston’s quantity theory of money ignores commercial money, real bills of exchange, as part of the quantity of money. Like bank notes, commercial money is a form of credit money that can be used to purchase goods and discharge debts. Unlike bank notes, commercial money has a specific life, usually 90 days or less, before it expires. Commercial money often exceeds bank notes in quantity and even exceeds the quantity of coins and paper money. If the quantity of money is the sole determinant of the value of money, other things being equal, as Weston asserts, or even the primary determinant, then how can he ignore commercial money? Nevertheless, Weston rejects the notion that bills of exchange are money and, therefore, need no consideration as part of the quantity of money or any quantity of money theory.
    Likewise, Weston’s quantity theory of money also ignores checkable deposits, checkbook money, as part of the quantity of money. Like bank notes, checkable deposits are a form of credit money that can be used to purchase goods and discharge debt. Unlike bank notes, which can pass through many hands before returning to a bank, checks usually pass through only one or two hands before returning to a bank. The major difference between a bank note and checkbook money is that a bank note is an order drawn on a bank to transfer gold from the bank’s account to the bearer and a check is an order to transfer gold from the drawer’s account to bearer. In Weston’s time (1884), in the United States, checkable deposits exceeded bank notes and coin in purchasing goods and discharging debt. He acknowledges that checks are used for most transactions. Moreover, under fractional reserve banking, which was practiced in his day as it is today, checkable deposits exceed species, commercial money and in Britain bank notes and in the United States silver dollars and US notes held by the bank; thus, they exceed what Weston considers real money. Any quality of money theory that ignores checkable deposits is a highly deficient theory. Nevertheless, Weston rejects the notion that checkable deposits are money and, therefore, need no consideration as part of the quantity of money or any quantity of money theory.
    A bank note is merely a check that a bank writes on itself. (Under the system advocated by Weston as modeled after the British system after 1844, this is not the case. Under the British system, what were called bank notes were similar to gold certificates issued in the United States. Whereas gold certificates were fully backed by gold, a fraction of the British notes was backed by nontradable government securities. Like gold certificates, they were warehouse receipts promising to pay the bearer in gold. Unlike US gold certificates, which were not legal tender, British notes were legal tender. Although Weston implies that making bank notes legal tender makes them real money, he seems to accept gold certificates as real money though they were not legal tender.) A bank note, even if it is merely a warehouse receipt, is a credit instrument because it is someone else’s liability. Weston rejects the notion that bank notes are credit instruments: a check that the issuer writes on itself to pay the bearer money, i.e., gold coin. To him, bank notes are money in their own right and are not promises to pay money, i.e., gold coin.
    An interesting note cited by Weston is that John Stuart Mills mused that under the right conditions, deposits and checks might replace currencies altogether. Weston thought that such a replacement was absurd. However, today, most countries are moving to eliminate currency and to force people to use bank deposits and checks, preferably with debit cards instead of paper checks. If this happens, the quantity of money, according to Weston’s theory, goes to zero: Money would cease to exist by his definition of money. Then what would fix the value of gold bullion?
    Weston displays inordinate confidence in the government to manage the country’s monetary system. As the history of the last 100 years shows, governments are highly incompetent in managing their monetary systems if the objective is to avoid inflation, hyperinflation, panics, depressions, recessions, and other economic and monetary disturbances and disasters. If the objective is to transfer wealth and power from the common people to the rich and powerful, they has been highly successful.
    When his quantity theory of money fails, Weston has an out, which is “everything else being equal.” When it fails, it is because “everything else is not equal.”
    In conclusion, Weston argues that the value of gold bullion does not control the value of gold coin or paper money kept at par with it. To the contrary, the opposite is true: The maximum value of gold bullion fluctuates with and is regulated by the value of gold coin and paper money at parity with gold coin. Moreover, the value of the monetary unit depends, other things being equal, on the quantity of monetary units, both coin and paper money.
    Weston errs when he claims that the value of the monetary unit gives gold bullion its value. To the contrary, the value of gold bullion gives the monetary unit its value. The value of gold preceded its use as money, and its use as money preceded its use as coin. Weston confuses value with price. The monetary unit gives gold its price, which is objective, but it does not give gold its value, which is subjective.

Endnotes:
1. See “What is the Gold Standard” by Thomas Allen.

2. See “Is the Price of Gold Fixed Under the Gold Standard” by Thomas Allen.

3. See “The U.S. Note, 1862-1879" by Thomas Allen.

4. See “National Banking System” by Thomas Allen.

5.  See “The Silver Dollar 1873-1900" by Thomas Allen.

6. See “Real Bills Doctrine” by Thomas Allen.

7. See “Differences Between Real Money and Fiat Money” by Thomas Allen.

8. See "Difference Between Bank Notes and Government Notes" by Thomas Allen.

9. See “Extinguishing Debt” by Thomas Allen.

Copyright © 2017 by Thomas Coley Allen.

For more articles on money.

Does Money Measure Value and Store Value?

Does Money Measure Value and Store Value?

Thomas Allen

    In Money (1878), Francis Walker discusses his concept of money. He identifies what he considers the basic functions of money: a medium of exchange (it facilitates exchanges), a common denominator (this function should not be confused with money as a measure of value), and a standard for deferred payments (it is a standard of value for paying debt). Walker rejects two functions of money that most economists hold: money as a measure of value and money as a store of value. At least before the demise of money’s connection to gold in 1971, most economists disagree with Walker on these two functions.

Measure of Value
    Under the gold standard, when an economist claims that gold is a measure of value, he means that the value of goods and services are compared with the value of a specific weight and fineness of gold. This comparison results in the price of the good or service. For example, between 1837 and 1934, the US dollar was defined as 23.22 grains of fine (pure) gold or 25.80 grains of standard gold, which was 90 percent pure. Thus, a theater ticket that cost $10 had the same value as 232.2 grains of gold.
    According to Walker, when most economists are describing money as a measure of value, they are really describing it as a common denominator. Although some use the two terms interchangeably, they are really two different things. Moreover, “they have no necessary relation to each other.”
    Walker defines the value of money the way that adherents of inconvertible paper money define the value of money. That is, the value of a gold coin is the value of what it can purchase. According to Walker, the value of a gold coin is determined by its use as a medium of exchange and is independent of its gold content. (Presumably, if the gold content of a gold coin were doubled or halved, its purchasing power would not change. Even Walker and the opponents of gold know that this is absurd.) To most adherents of the gold standard, the value of a gold coin is the value of the material of which it is made, although some of them argued against this notion by claiming that the quantity of gold coins was the primary determinant their value. Others, such as George Weston, argue that the value of the gold coin determines the value of its metal content, and the value of the gold coin is determined by the supply of metallic and paper money. To illustrate the difference between the two, today, the value of the dollar is the value of a dollar’s worth of goods. Between 1837 and 1934, the value of a dollar was the value of 23.22 grains of gold. The latter definition is superior to the former because it defines the value of the dollar independently of itself. The former defines the value of the dollar in terms of itself.
    Walker argues that when values are measured, they may be expressed relatively to each other as a scale of numbers. Perceiving money as providing a scale of value instead of a measure of value, was not original with Walker. Dugald Stewart had earlier argued this notion. Like Stewart, Walker seems to believe that gold is the best form or type of money. Yet, if his argument that money does not measure value, but merely provides a scale for relative values is correct, then the material of which the money is made is irrelevant. Like Stewart, Walker does not consider money as capital but as an aid in enumeration and arithmetic. Many economists, especially today, and even in the nineteenth century, concur with Walker and Stewart. Thus, for example, if item A has a value of 1 and item B, of 5, then item B is worth 5 times more than A.
    He notes that advocates of Ideal Money, which is inconvertible paper money, maintain that money merely provides a common denominator by which the relative values of various goods can be compared. Advocates of Real Money, which is full-weight metallic coin either gold or silver, maintain that money provides a common measure of value to which various goods are compared and measured. (Ironically, while supporting the adherents of Ideal Money on money being merely a numeric that compares but measures nothing, he abhors inconvertible paper money.)
    Instead of money measuring value, Walker argues that money merely provides a common denominator. If money is merely a numeric, as today’s money essentially is, although it does measure value, albeit poorly, what purpose do such apparent units of measure as the dollar, pound, franc, mark, or peso, serve? Walker does not say. If money merely provides a common denominator, then the coin or paper note would only need a number stamped on it. Adding “dollar,” “pound,” “franc,” “mark,” or “peso” is superfluous and can be confusing (misleading one to believe that value is being measured). Why make a $10 gold coin twice the size of a $5 gold coin and a $20 gold coin twice the size of a $10 gold coin, if the coin does not measure value? Why not just use paper money with numbers and no units printed on them? Yet Walker abhors inconvertible paper money.
    Following the lead of Prof. Rogers, Walker compares measuring value to measuring distances. If the distance between A and B is 1 and the distance between B and C is 10, then the distance between B and C is ten times greater than the distance between A and B. However, one does not know if the distance is in zeptometers (an extremely short distance) or in zettameters (an extremely long distance). Without a unit of measure, one does not know whether the distances are short or long. Moreover, a unit of measure is needed to ensure that the relative values are understood correctly. Thus, the distance between A and B compared with B and C is much greater than it appears if the distance between A and B is in zeptometers and B and C is in zettameters. Instead of the relative distance between B and C being ten times greater than A and B, it is 10 to the 43rd power greater (an enormous number). (Another example of the inadequacy of relative comparisons occurs with corporate profits. Corporation X has a 100 percent increase in profit compared with the previous year, while corporation Y has only a 1 percent increase in profit. In relative terms, corporation X appears to have a greater profit. However, when absolute profits are considered, a different story is revealed. Corporation X had a profit of $1 the previous year and $2 this year; thus, it had an increase in profit of 100 percent. Corporation Y had a profit of $1 billion last year and $1.01 billion this year, which is an increase in profit of 1 percent. Of the two which did the best?)
    When comparing values, a measure of value, that is a unit of value, is also needed. For example, the US dollar had a value of 23.22 grains of gold and the British pound had a value of 113 grains of gold. Thus, the value of the British pound was about 4.86 times greater than the value of the US dollar. One needs to know whether prices are being compared in dollars or pounds or both. The relative values may be the same, but the absolute values may not be. For example, if item X costs £2 and item Y costs £1, then item X costs twice as much as item Y. If item A costs $2 and item B costs $1, then item A costs twice as much as item B. Although both X and A have twice the value of Y and B respectively, X is worth 4.86 times A and 9.72 times B. Thus, more than a common denominator is needed to estimate value or even to measure relative differences. A unit of measure, i.e., a unit of value, is also needed. Furthermore, that unit of value must have value in and of itself.
    As shown above, when distance or value is being compared, more than a numeric value is needed. Moreover, that unit of measure must possess what is being measured.
    Walker does admit that to measure value, a value must be used. Nevertheless, that value can be relative and expressed as a pure number without reference to any common value. He states, “Value is a relation. Relations may be expressed, but not measured.” He illustrates this with distance by claiming that the relationship between a furlong and a mile cannot be measured but can only be expressed as 8 to 1. (By definition, a mile equals eight furlongs. However, as discussed above, if no units of measure are attached to the relative numbers, one has no clue about the distances being expressed.)
    Furthermore, Walker uses seigniorage as an argument that money does not measure value. Because of seigniorage, the monetary value stamped on the coin exceeds the value of its metal content. This is true. Seigniorage may cause the coin to be overvalued domestically, but not necessarily so. If the seigniorage is too high, coins will exchange based on the value of their metal content and not based on the monetary value stamped on them — even if such exchanges are illegal. Nevertheless, the seigniorage premium disappears once the coin leaves the country of issue. Outside the country of issue, its purchasing power is that of its metal content and not that which is stamped on it.
    Unlike Walker, most economists argue that to measure and compare values of various items, these items have to be compared with a common item, which under the gold standard is a specific weight and fineness of gold. Moreover, this standard to which items are compared has to have value in and of itself, which is often called “intrinsic value.” Walker argues that money cannot measure value because unlike the yardstick or meterstick, its value is not fixed, even for a gold coin. (Even the definition of the meter has changed several times since it was first invented. Therefore, the measure of distance has changed over time, although minutely.) It varies with time, place, and circumstances. This is true. Being subjective, value is not constant — not even for money regardless of the material of which it is made. Moreover, relative values vary with time, place, and circumstances. Yet nothing cannot measure something as Walker seems to argue. If it could, unitless numbers on paper could serve as money as well as full-weight gold coin. Moreover, paper money would be much cheaper to manufacture. However, Walker presents a convincing argument that inconvertible paper money is vastly inferior to gold coin. (Nevertheless, he uses inconvertible paper money to argue against the notion that money can measure value and has to have value in and of itself to do so.)

Store of Value
    Most economists who support the gold standard assert that one of the important functions of money is to serve as a store of value. Some even claim that this is the most important function of money.
    Contrary to the assertion of these economists, Walker argues that money does not serve as a store of value. About this function of money, or more correctly, lack of it, he agrees with the proponents of inconvertible paper money.
    The store of value is closely related to the measure of value. If money does not and cannot measure value, it need not store value. However, if money is the measure of value, then it needs to be able to store value so that it can measure value. That is, money has to have value in and of itself to measure value. Value can only be measured against value and with value.
    Walker identifies money serving as the standard for deferred payments as an important function of money; that is, money serves as the payment for debt. Why would anyone give up something of value, whatever is lent, in exchange for payments of no value? To function as payment for debt, money has to be able to transfer value through time and often through space. Even inconvertible paper money transfers value through time to a highly limited degree.
    Furthermore, money functioning as a medium of exchange implies that money is a store of value. It must store value so that it can carry value from its receipt to its expenditure so that little or no value is lost. Also, why would anyone sell his goods or labor in exchange for that which has no value? Evidently, Walker believes that people are willing to make such exchanges. Contrary to Walker’s belief, money’s function as a medium of exchange cannot be separated from its function as a store of value. This is true not only for full-weight metallic coin but also for inconvertible paper money. (Generally, losing value over time at various rates, inconvertible paper money stores value poorly and becomes a poor medium of exchange.)
    Moreover, Walker states, “When a commodity comes to serve as a store of value, it ceases to be money.” Gold in hoards, treasures, plate, and ornamentation is not money. (At the other extreme is Murray Rothbard, who claims that gold is money whatever its form.) Walker is unclear whether gold coins held in reserves by banks for payment of their notes and checkable deposits are money. Based on his argument, bank reserves should not be considered money.
    On the other hand, being a good economist, he asserts that gold’s ability to be used as a store of value is an important attribute that qualifies it as money. Is this not confusing? Gold stores value, but once it is coined and used to buy something or pay a debt, it ceases to store value. However, if the recipient puts the coin in his pocket and does not spend it for a year, i.e., hoards it, it ceases being money and becomes a store of value. (This is akin to the gold-is-sterile argument against the gold standard.)
    To add to the confusion of gold being either money or ornamentation, i.e., a store of value, Walker describes the use of gold as jewelry, such as ring-money worn as rings or necklaces, being used as money. Presumably, when the owner was wearing the ring-money on his finger, it was a store of value, but not money. However, when he took the ring off and bought an item with it, the gold ring ceased storing value and became money. (How long does a gold coin have to remain in one’s purse before it ceases being money and becomes a store of value? Walker does not say.)
    In summary, Walker argues that money does not measure value; it merely serves a common denominator by which the values of various goods and services are compared. Furthermore, money does not and cannot store value, although the material of which it is made can often store value. On these two points, most economists who support the gold standard disagree. However, most economists who support inconvertible paper money agree with Walker.

Copyright © 2017 by Thomas Coley Allen.

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Poor on Sumner

Poor on Sumner

Thomas Allen

    In 1877, Henry Varnum Poor (1812-1905) wrote Money and Its Laws: Embracing a History of Monetary Theories, and a History of the Currency of the United States. He was a financial analyst and founder of a company that evolved into Standard & Poor’s. Poor was a proponent of the real bills doctrine and the classical gold-coin standard and, thus, the quality theory of money. He gave little credence to the quantity theory of money — especially if credit money, such as bank notes, were convertible on demand in species. Also, he contended that the value of money depends on and is derived from the value of the material of which it is made and with paper money, its representation of such value.
    In the latter part of his book, he discusses leading monetary theorists from Aristotle (350 B.C.) to David A. Wells (1875). Most of the economists whom he discussed were proponents of the quantity theory of money. We will look at his discussion on William G. Sumner. My comments are in brackets. Referenced page numbers enclosed in parentheses are to Poor’s book.
    William G. Sumner (1840-1910) was a classical liberal American social scientist. He was a professor of political economics at Yale where he taught social sciences and held the first professorship in sociology in the United States. He supported free trade, free markets, and the gold standard and opposed imperialism. Among his many works are A History of American Currency (1874) and Problems in Political Economy (1883). Poor reviews the part of A History of American Currency that discusses the report of the Bullion Committee. [The British Parliament established the Bullion Committee to study returning to the gold standard after the Napoleonic wars and to make recommendations about how to return Britain to the gold standard.]
    Sumner claims that the report of the Bullion Committee “solved the whole subject of money” (p. 416). He declares that money does not flow from poorer agricultural regions to richer financial cities. To the contrary, it flows from the richer regions to the poorer regions (p. 416). As for the balance of trade, if it means “equilibrium,” then exports equal imports and trade regulates itself. If it means “remainder,” it is a myth (p. 417).
    Summarizing the doctrines of the Bullion Committee, Sumner writes:

        1. The value of an inconvertible currency depends on its amount relatively to the needs of the country for circulating medium (only to a very subordinate degree on the security on which it is based or the credit of the issuer).
        2. If gold is at a premium in paper, the paper is redundant and depreciated. The premium measures the depreciation.

    According to Sumner, for “a system of even nominal convertibility, the motives of speculation and of price fluctuations lie outside of the currency in industrial and commercial circumstances. Speculation . . . controls the amount of the currency” (p. 417). Whereas, “[o]n an inconvertible system, the amount of the currency controls speculation” (p. 417). Thus, if an inconvertible currency “is not redundant, its effect is slight; if it is very excessive, it ‘floats’ every thing, and becomes the controlling consideration” (p. 417). The quantity of inconvertible paper money determines its value and prices. [Uncertainty causes inconvertible legal-tender government notes to depreciate. The excessive issue of these notes, as Sumner and the quantity theory of money claim, is not the cause of their depreciation. However, an excess of issue can influence the value of these notes by affecting uncertainty. Uncertainties that affect the value of inconvertible government notes include (1) the uncertainty of when they will be paid or even if they will be a paid, (2) the ability of the government to pay, (3) the willingness of the government to pay, and (4) the kind of coin that will be used for payment. Inconvertible paper money is what the world has had ever since 1971. However, today, much of this uncertainty has been eliminated. Almost no one now believes that governments will ever pay their notes, i.e., redeem their notes in a commodity that has intrinsic value at that intrinsic value.] However, Sumner comments that the quantity of the U.S. notes is fixed. Therefore, the answer to its value lies in its adverse foreign exchange, i.e., outflows of gold. He asks, “Is it [the gold outflow] due to the balance of payments, or to some deterioration of the currency” (p. 418)? According to the Bullion Committee, with which Sumner agrees, “the balance of imports and exports never can move the exchanges, either above or below par, more than just enough to start a movement of bullion” (p. 418). Thus, “[o]n a specie system, any outflow of bullion would bring down prices, and immediately make a remittance of goods more profitable than one of bullion; and, if the exportation of bullion was artificially continued (as, for instance, to pay the expenses of a foreign war), it would reduce prices until a counter current would set in and restore the former relative distribution all the world over” (p. 418). Continuing, Sumner writes, “If, therefore, there is an outflow of gold, serious and long continued, accompanied by an unfavorable exchange, it is a sign that there is an inferior currency behind the gold, which is displacing it. The surplus of imports of goods above the exports of goods is nothing but the return payment for this export of gold, and is not a cause, but a consequence” (p. 418). To produce an influx of gold, the inferior currency, inconvertible notes, needs to be removed. If foreign exchanges are adverse, gold will be exported; this exportation of gold is an indication that the paper money is excessive. Thus, inconvertible paper money should be issued in such quantity to prevent the exportation of gold (pp. 418-419).
    Poor disagrees with Sumner’s notions on the balance of trade. Particularly, Poor disagrees with Sumner’s notion that if a country exports gold that it necessarily receives an equal value of merchandise. Or, if it imports gold, it exports an equal value of merchandise (p. 419).
    Poor illustrates his disagreement with an analogy:

Suppose an individual possessed of a thousand dollars in coin to expend it in the purchase of the necessaries of life even, his means are reduced in like ratio. If he would reinstate his former condition, he must forego future expenditures to an equal amount. So, if a person run into debt to his shopkeeper to the amount of a thousand dollars, if he would pay it, he must forego a like amount of his future earnings. His indebtedness until paid would very properly be termed a balance of trade against him. So with a nation (p. 419).

[Sumner is closer to the truth than Poor. An exchange is only made when both parties of the exchange believe that he is receiving greater value than he is giving up. Poor has a point if the long-run consequences are considered. However, the long run is considered when an exchange is made. Unfortunately, many people do an extremely poor job of considering long-run consequences, and some give it no weight.]
    Continuing, Poor writes:

If it [a country] import more in value of ordinary merchandise than it exports, its specie will have to go to make up the deficit. Now, no nation not producing gold can part with any considerable amount of it without causing embarrassment to its industries and trade; for the reason that that which it possessed and exported was a part of the machinery by which these were carried on. The tendency of the precious metals the world over is to distribute themselves according to the means and needs of those using them. If there be no movement in any direction, it is assumed that they are in proper equilibrium (p. 419).

    Furthermore, Poor remarks, “The export of a large amount of coin is usually due to a vicious paper currency, and such a currency is always attended with wasteful expenditure” (p. 420). [Perhaps, politicians ought to heed Poor’s wisdom here. Could trade imbalances be caused more by “a vicious paper currency” and “wasteful expenditures” than the shenanigans of foreign countries to give their domestic industries advantages in foreign and even domestic trade at the expense of their own citizens?] When a country exports gold, it becomes weaker, “for she has parted with that which is essential to her welfare, and must be reclaimed by future accumulations” (p. 420). [The development in the use of bills of exchange reduced the need to export gold. Moreover, the elimination of gold from the monetary systems of the world today makes the exportation of gold irrelevant — at least in theory. Now a country only exports the inconvertible paper money of another country or its own inconvertible paper money, which it can replace without having to import it. Furthermore, most countries would prefer never having to import any of their currency that has been exported, except to tax it.]
    Admitting that Sumner may be correct about inferior currency causing the outflow of gold, Poor asks, “may not the loss as well be described as an ‘unfavorable balance of trade’ as by any other term” (p. 420)? Then Poor remarks:

A nation that has parted with its coin, which has to be brought back again, would have been much better off had it never parted with it. That which has been received will never suffice to bring it back; and, if it would, the charges of transportation and interest would involve a large loss; so that, after all, “balance of trade” is a veritable fact, and always exists to a greater or less extent in commerce between nations, and must always exist until human affairs reach the accuracy and certainty of natural laws (p. 420).

    Next, Poor asks, “[W]hat is an ‘inferior currency’” (p. 420)? He answers, “One kind is the inconvertible notes of government, issued not for the purpose of loaning capital, but to supply the lack of it” (p. 420). About inconvertible governments notes, he writes, “The demand for merchandise must increase in ratio to its amount; for it is always superadded to the existing currencies. As such notes are always made legal tender, they not only drive coin out of the country, but keep it out till they are retired. Such a currency admits of no corrective by the laws of trade” (p. 420).
    “Another ‘inferior’ currency,” Poor writes, “is that issued by Banks, without a constituent” (p. 420). Initially, it acts like government notes in driving gold out of the country. However, since these bank notes are convertible to gold coin, banks must supply the gold to meet their redemption. As a result, “[t]hey must pay for the excess of imports over exports from their reserves” (p. 421). Poor writes:

It is impossible, however, for them [bankers] to tell whether all the bills discounted by them have their proper constituent: they can only determine the fact by the result. If they see gold beginning to move, they understand at once that improper bills have been discounted; that the currency has been issued in excess, and must so far be taken in by a reduction of their line of discounts. The movement of gold, therefore, is an indication of the state of the currency, as infallible as is that of the mercury of meteoric conditions (p. 421).

[Poor is describing the operation of the real bills doctrine correcting the overissue of bank notes and checkable deposits resulting from discounted faulty bills.]
    Sumner’s test of an ‘inferior currency’ differs greatly from what Poor has described. Sumner’s test is that of quantity; Poor’s is that of quality. To Sumner, a currency is not “inferior” if “its amount does not exceed that required by a country in its exchanges, even if it be not backed by a single dollar of coin” (p. 421). Thus, according to Sumner, “the value of money depends upon its quantity, not upon the provision made for its convertibility, [and] ‘are not matters of opinion, but of demonstration’” (p. 421). To this, Poor replies, “If so, then it is a matter of demonstration that one and one make four” (p. 421). Poor adds “that the real or estimated value of articles, whether they be merchandise or money, is their exchangeable value. To assume otherwise, would be to say that the exchangeable value of a piece of silver having the weight and insignia of a sovereign equals the value of a sovereign. Humanity is not yet brought to so low a pitch as this” (p. 421). [The sovereign is a gold coin that contains 0.23542 troy ounces, i.e., 113 grains of gold, which was the British pound from 1816 until Great Britain left the gold standard. A century after Poor wrote, humanity, or at least mainstream economists, had reached such a low level that they fell for the pitch that a piece of paper with the government’s seal on it was the same as gold.]
    Poor concludes his review of Sumner:

Even the Economists are by no means the simple race their theories would make them. In spite of the conclusions of the Bullion Committee, which, with Mr. Sumner, are the very acme of financial wisdom, he would be the last man to take a bank or government note without especial reference to the provision made for its discharge. If their creed were their law, a few days would suffice for the Economists to fool away whatever they possessed (pp. 421-422).

Copyright © 2017 by Thomas Coley Allen.

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Poor on Jevons

Poor on Jevons

Thomas Allen

    In 1877, Henry Varnum Poor (1812-1905) wrote Money and Its Laws: Embracing a History of Monetary Theories, and a History of the Currency of the United States. He was a financial analyst and founder of a company that evolved into Standard & Poor’s. Poor was a proponent of the real bills doctrine and the classical gold-coin standard and, thus, the quality theory of money. He gave little credence to the quantity theory of money — especially if credit money, such as bank notes, were convertible on demand in species. Also, he contends that the value of money depends on and is derived from the value of the material of which it is made and with paper money, its representation of such value.
    In the latter part of his book, he discusses leading monetary theorists from Aristotle (350 B.C.) to David A. Wells (1875). Most of the economists whom he discussed were proponents of the quantity theory of money.
    William Stanley Jevons (1835-1882) was a British economist and mathematician. He developed the theory of marginal utility, i.e., utility determines value. Among his works are The Theory of Political Economy (1871), Money and the Mechanism of Exchange (1875), which Poor uses for much of his critique, and Principles of Economics (1905). We will look at his discussion on Jevons. My comments are in brackets. Referenced page numbers enclosed in parentheses are to Poor’s book.
    Jevons states that countries use gold and silver coins because they greatly facilitate trade. In time, people discover that token base-metal coins and paper money of nominal value pass as signs of the ownership of gold and silver coins. Over time, people become so accustomed to paper currency that it ceases to represent gold and silver coins and becomes money in its own right. Thus, paper currency can continue to circulate even after the metal that it represents is removed. [This phenomenon is witnessed today throughout the world as paper currency ceased representing gold and silver in the years following World War I.] Jevons points to Scotland and Norway as examples where paper currency circulated and gold coin did not. Paper promising to pay in gold was preferred to gold coin (pp. 384-385).
    Jevons does acknowledge that unlike gold coins, paper currency “will not circulate beyond the boundaries of the district or country where it is legally current and habitually employed” (p. 386). [This is not exactly true in today’s world where every country has paper fiat money. Paper money, such as the U.S. dollar, that is considered relatively strong, i.e., loses purchasing power more slowly compared with a local currency, will circulate in a country with a weak currency, i.e., loses purchasing power more quickly.]
    Jevons notes that under the gold standard when paper money of one country is exchanged in another country for that country’s money, this paper money becomes an obligation of the issuing country that has to be paid in gold (p. 384).  When a country’s paper money is inconvertible domestically, it must still be redeemed in gold to foreigners to maintain the value of the paper money. If it is not, the county will have too much money in circulation, and its paper money will depreciate against gold (p. 386). [This is the quantity theory of money at work.]
    Poor responds that “all convertible currencies . . . are regularly retired within periods of, say ninety days from their issue” (p. 386). [This is the real bills doctrine at work.] He continues, “It does happen that large amounts of paper money get into circulation, having no more value than worthless bits of leather or paper; but they get into circulation for the reason that it is always believed that a metallic basis of value underlies them. If they have no such basis, those who take them are deceived” (p. 386). [This true only with the silver or gold standard, which existed at the time Jevons and Poor wrote. It is not true today as none of today’s paper money has an underlying gold or silver basis of value. However, arguably, people are still being deceived as the value of today’s money depends almost entirely on confidence, which is highly fickle.]
    To Jevons’ example of the notes of Scottish banks, Poor replies “that they rested on a basis of metals, or upon that which would produce metals” (p. 368).
    Poor also condemns Jevons assumption “that worthless bits of paper — the basis of metal being wholly removed — circulated by the same law as that which controls the circulation of coin, or that which was convertible on demand into coin” (pp. 386-387) and “has exactly the same capacity for driving out standard money that light or depreciated coins possess” (p. 387). Poor asserts, “Convertible paper money exerts no such tendency; on the contrary, its tendency is to bring metallic money into the country to form the basis of its issue. The two are equal in value, and move harmoniously side by side” (p. 387).
    As for debased coins, they drive “out standard coin, only for the reason that it has the same competency in the payment of debts; and, of two equally competent instruments, the less costly will be preferred” (p. 387). When a debased coin is demonetized, it passes at its real value and not its denominational value. That is, it passes based on the weight of gold or silver that it contains and not by the value stamped on the coin.
    Jevons writes, “The State may either take the issue of representative money into its own hands, as it takes the coining of money; or it may allow private individuals, or semi-public companies and corporations, to undertake the work under more or less strict legislative control” (p. 387). Poor asks, “What would the money of a State represent? A beggared treasury and a parcel of ignorant and listless officials. No State money issued as currency ever represented any thing else” (pp. 387-388). [Like most of the founding fathers, Poor was not fond of governmentally issued paper money. He wrote Resumption and the Silver Question condemning the U.S. notes. However, he erred in his prediction about the U.S. note. If gold only backed half the U.S. notes in circulation, he thought that the value of a $10 U.S. note would only be worth $5 in gold. He was proved wrong as U.S. notes exchanged at par when they became convertible in gold, although gold backed only about one-third of the U.S. notes.]
    Jevons writes:

Assuming an inconvertible paper currency to be issued, and to be entirely in the hands of government, many of the evils of such a system might be avoided, if the issue were limited or reduced the moment that the price of gold in paper rose above par. As long as the notes, and the gold coin which they pretend to represent, circulate on a footing of equality, they are as good as if convertible (p. 388).

    Poor concedes that this is true. Then he asks what happens if the holder of a gold coin refuses to exchange it for an equal amount of inconvertible paper money (p. 388). [When the U.S. government issued U.S. notes, an inconvertible legal-tender paper currency, gold coins were allowed to circulate alongside U.S. notes. U.S. notes quickly fell in value relative to gold and did not exchange at par with gold coin until they became convertible in gold on demand.]
    Jevons believed that inconvertible paper money can maintain its full value if its quantity is carefully limited (p. 389). Poor doubts that any inconvertible paper money can retain its full value for long.
    Jevons considered the issue of notes more analogous to the government “function of coinage than to the ordinary commercial operating of drawing bills” (p. 390). Thus, the government or “its agents acting under the strictest legislative control” (pp. 390-391) should be the sole issuers of paper money. [Poor does not mention Jevons position on checkable deposits. Now most economists consider checkable deposits to be functionally equivalent to bank notes, which Jevons believes should be either a government monopoly or a governmentally granted monopolistic privilege of the central bank. As checkable deposits are equivalent to bank notes, then under Jevons’ scheme, the government should hold all checking accounts or its strictly controlled agent should. {For more on Jevons’ view of checkable deposit, see below.}]
    In summary, Jevons is a proponent of the quantity theory of money. The quantity of money determines its purchasing power. Even inconvertible paper money can maintain par with gold if its quantity is properly controlled. Moreover, he advocates the government monopolizing the issue of paper money.
    [In Money and the Mechanism of Exchange, Jevons has a chapter titled “The Quantity of Money Needed by a Nation.” He concludes “that the only method of regulating the amount of the currency is to leave it at perfect freedom to regulate itself.”[1] Such a conclusion fits well with the gold standard accompanied by the real bills doctrine where no bank has a monopoly on issuing notes and bank notes are not legal tender and are converted to gold coin on demand. However, it seems to conflict with Jevons’ advocacy of monopolizing the issue of notes and of the government strictly controlling the quantity of notes issued. He remarks that the quantity of money, gold coins and paper notes representing gold coins, cannot and should not be regulated, but it should be allowed to fluctuate to meet the changes of commerce. However, the government should strictly regulate the quantity of paper notes. Under his strict regulation, paper notes are fully backed by gold with no restriction placed on the quantity of gold exchanged for paper notes.
    Jevons either disregards or rejects the regulation of bank notes pursuant to the real bills doctrine as Poor advocates. Under the real bills doctrine, bank notes are not fully backed by gold. However, they are fully backed by gold or bills of exchange, commercial money, which mature in gold coin in the near future. The real bills doctrine automatically expands and contracts the quantity of money to match the needs of commerce.
    Unlike the real bills doctrine where real bills of exchange function as money in discharging debt, Jevons’ system seems to prohibit such use of bills of exchange. However, he acknowledges that bills of exchange do serve as money to a limited degree. His system limits the quantity of money to the quantity of gold available for use as money. It only offers the market the choice of using gold coin or paper notes representing gold coin for exchanges. Under the real bills doctrine, the quantity of paper notes is limited more by commercial activity than by the quantity of gold. Gold serves as the regulator of the quantity of notes issued.
    Jevons views checks as a credit clearing system that balances debts against each other, such that money is never touched. Apparently, unlike most economists today and many then, he does not consider checks to be functionally the same as paper notes. Nevertheless, they are. Both are credit money representing gold coin. Both can discharge debt, but neither can extinguish debt. Furthermore, both are orders to transfer gold from one person to another. The major difference between the two is that a note may pass through many hands before it is returned for redemption or cancellation of debt while a check usually passes through one or two hands before it is returned for redemption or cancellation of debt.
    Under Jevons’ system, the total quantity of money cannot expand or contract rapidly enough to accommodate commerce satisfactorily. If enough monetary gold is available to serve the needs of commerce under his system during periods of high demand for money, then gold is diverted from financing capital to serving as circulating media and too much money, i.e., monetary gold, exists for periods of low demand for money. Thus, the result is a rise in price during times of high demand for money and a fall in prices during the times of low demand for money. However, this situation does not exist under the real bills doctrine. Under the real bills doctrine, the money supply can expand rapidly to match rising demands for money. Moreover, it can contract rapidly when the demand for money slackens. Thus, the quantity of money increases and decreases quickly and automatically to satisfy the needs of commerce. The real bills doctrine, which Poor promotes, is superior to the system promoted by Jevons.]

Endnote
1. W. Stanley Jevons, Money and the Mechanism of Exchange (New York, New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1896), p. 340.

Copyright © 2016 by Thomas Coley Allen.

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America’s Adulteration of the Gold Standard

America’s Adulteration of the Gold Standard

Thomas Allen

    Between 1879, when the United States returned to the gold standard, and 1914, when World War I began, was the peak of the gold-coin standard. However, a pure gold coin standard did not exist. Perhaps the United States had the most adulterated gold standard among the major countries. The United States adulterated the gold standard with various forms of fiat money.
    In 1789, Congress adopted a silver standard with a bimetallic silver-gold system. It defined the dollar as 371.25 grains of fine silver. It fixed the silver-to-gold exchange rate at 15 to 1 (the value of 15 ounces of silver equaled the value of 1 ounce of gold).  This ratio overvalued silver relative to gold. Thus, gold coins did not circulate.
    To encourage the circulation of gold coins, Congress changed the silver-to-gold ratio from 15 to 1 to 16 to 1 in 1834. It did so by reducing the weight of gold in a dollar to 23.20 grains of fine gold from 24.75 grains. Three years later it changed the weight of gold in the dollar to 23.22 grains of fine gold. (Thus, a $10 gold coin with 232.2 grains of fine gold was equivalent as legal tender to 10 silver-dollar coins with a total of 3721.5 grains of fine silver.) These changes placed the United States on a de facto gold standard. As the dollar continued to be defined as 371.25 grains of silver, the United States remained on a de jure silver standard. (They remained of a de jure silver standard until 1900 when Congress changed the definition of the dollar to 23.22 grains of fine gold.)
    In 1837, Congress changed the gold content of the dollar to 23.22 grains. It remained at this weight until 1933 when the United States abandoned the gold standard.
    In 1863, Congress enacted the National Banking Act. A key part of the Act was requiring banks charted under the Act to secure their bank notes with U.S. government bonds. (Later bank notes of State-chartered banks were taxed out of existence.) Thus, the Act guaranteed a market for U.S. government bonds. As a result, bank notes represented U.S. government bonds instead of the gold value of goods on which real bills of exchange were drawn — the real bills doctrine. Bank notes did not increase or decrease in response to the market demand for them pursuant to the real bills doctrine. They increased and decreased in response to the expansion and contraction of U.S. government debt. (As hard as it is now to believe, there were times when the U.S. government’s debt actually decreased.)
    The first major adulteration came in 1862 when Congress authorized the issue of legal-tender government notes, called U.S. notes and nicknamed greenbacks. These notes immediately became undervalued relative to gold. Thus, the United States quickly converted to the U.S. note standard.  (The West Coast remained on the gold coin standard. In the East, gold traded at a premium to U.S. notes. In the West, U.S. notes were discounted against gold.)
    After reducing the quantity of U.S. notes during the late 1860s and early 1870s, Congress fixed the quantity of U.S. notes at $346,681,000. It required the Secretary of the Treasury to maintain this level.
    Pursuant to an 1875 law, U.S. notes became redeemable at par with gold on January 1, 1979. In anticipation of redemption, the U.S. government acquired enough gold to back about a third of the U.S. notes.
    After U.S. notes became redeemable in gold, U.S. notes remained a fiat currency for two reasons. First, the government instead of the markets determined the quantity issued. Second, they were never fully backed by gold.
    The next major adulteration came in the form of the silver dollar. With the Coinage Act of 1873, Congress ended the free coinage of silver. (This Act became known as the Crime of  ’73.) Ending the free coinage of silver ended bimetallism in the United States. However, under the Act, silver dollars continued to be full legal tender in unlimited amounts. (No rational person would have used silver dollars to pay a debt when this law was enacted. Then the silver content of a silver dollar was worth more than a dollar in gold, which was worth more than a U.S. note dollar.)
    Soon after the enactment of this law, the value of silver began to fall relative to gold. Thus, if the free coinage of silver had remained, the United States would have returned to the silver standard.
    Because of the fall in the value of silver, the sliver mining interest, greenbackers (people who wanted the country to remain on the irredeemable U.S. note standard), populists (most of whom came out of the greenbackers), and debtors agitated for the free coinage of silver at the 16 to 1 ratio. In response, Congress passed the Bland-Allison Act in 1878.
    The Bland-Allison Act ordered the Secretary of the Treasury to buy silver bullion and coin it into silver dollars. It declared the silver dollars legal tender. Moreover, they were not directly redeemable in gold. It required the Secretary to buy between $2 million and $4 million of silver bullion each month for coinage.
    Although each of these silver dollars contained 371.25 grains of silver, they were fiat money — albeit expensive fiat money. Instead of the markets deciding the quantity of silver dollars to issue, Congress and the Secretary of the Treasury decided. Furthermore, the monetary value of a silver dollar exceeded the value of its silver content. Unlike silver dollars coined under free coinage, these silver dollars were the property of the U.S. government. (Silver dollars coined under free coinage were the property of the person presenting the silver bullion for coinage.)
    In 1890, Congress revised the Bland-Allison Act with the Sherman Act, also called the Silver Purchasing Act of 1890. The Sherman Act created a new fiat money: legal-tender Treasury notes of 1890. It ordered the Secretary of the Treasury to buy 4.5 million ounces of silver bullion each month at the market price with Treasury notes until silver reached $1.29 per ounce. This was the price at which 16 ounces of silver had the same value as 1 ounce of gold, i.e., the 16 to 1 ratio. The purchased bullion was coined into silver dollars as necessary to redeem the Treasury notes. However, the Secretary had the discretion to redeem them in gold. In 1893, Congress repealed the silver purchasing provision of the Sherman Act and by that the issue of Treasury notes.
    With the enactment of the Gold Standard Act in 1900, Congress placed the United States formally and clearly on the gold standard. It defined the dollar as 23.22 grains of gold. It required the redemption of U.S. notes and Treasury notes of 1890 in gold only. Thus, it converted Treasury notes into government notes redeemable in gold. Treasury notes were to be replaced gradually with silver certificates. As silver dollars became convertible in gold on demand, the Act made the silver dollar a subsidiary coin like dimes, quarters, and half-dollars. However, silver dollars remained full legal tender. However, even with the enactment of the Gold Standard Act, the silver dollar because of its legal-tender status remained a fiat currency along with the U.S. note.
    The monetary system of the United States began as a bimetallic silver-gold system with the dollar defined as 371.25 grains of silver. Between 1862 and 1879, the United States were on the fiat U.S. note monetary standard. As long as the United States remained on the gold standard, the U.S. note and the silver dollar adulterated the gold standard. The United States never operated on a pure gold coin standard.

Copyright © 2015 by Thomas Coley Allen.

Paper Money and the Gold Standard

Paper Money and the Gold Standard

Thomas Allen

    Many people who are hostile toward the gold standard assert or imply that all purchases have to be made with gold coins or perhaps gold bars under the gold standard. Paper money, checks, and electronic transfers are not used. Some suggest that they would be prohibited. Some hold this view out of ignorance; others, out of hatred of gold as money. Unfortunately, even some proponents of the gold standard seem to hold this view.
    To the contrary, paper money and checks were used during the era of the gold standard. More purchases were made with paper money, checks, and token coins than with gold coins. When the gold standard returns, many more purchases will be made with paper money, checks, token coins, and electronic transfers than with gold coins.
    The primary purpose of gold coins is to keep everyone honest. It prevents an unsustainable expansion of credit. Redemption of paper money (bank notes, government notes, checkable deposits) on demand keeps credit under control and smooths the business cycle.
    Under the gold standard, people, especially business people, often deposed gold coins in checking accounts. Others exchanged their gold coins for paper money because paper money was more convenient to carry.
    A check under the gold standard is an order to the bank to transfer gold from the account on which it is drawn to the bearer of the check. A bank note is essentially a check that a bank draws on itself. It is an order to the issuing bank to pay the bearer of the note the amount of gold stated on the note when redeemed.
    The major problem with bank notes and checkable deposits is that banks can over issue them. It can do so either deliberately or accidentally. For example, when a bank buys treasury bills with bank notes or checkable deposits in excess of its unencumbered gold deposits, it is deliberately over issuing. When it converts a real bill of exchange to bank notes or checkable deposits and the person on whom the bill is drawn and the endorser of the bill go bankrupt, it inadvertently over issued (this lost should be covered by gold reserves set aside for this purpose).
    Thus, as banks do today, banks under the gold standard can, often did, practice unsound banking — borrowing short and lending long. Also, when banks use the same money (gold) for multiple loans, it is practicing unsound banking. However, unlike the current fiat monetary system that enables unsound banking to be used for an extended time, the gold standard ends such practices fairly quickly with bank runs — the conversion of bank credit money (bank notes and checkable deposits) into gold.

Copyright © 2016 by Thomas Coley Allen.

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Poor on Huskisson

Poor on Huskisson

Thomas Allen

    In 1877, Henry Varnum Poor (1812-1905) wrote Money and Its Laws: Embracing a History of Monetary Theories, and a History of the Currency of the United States. He was a financial analyst and founder of a company that evolved into Standard & Poor’s. Poor was a proponent of the real bills doctrine and the classical gold-coin standard and, thus, the quality theory of money. He gave little credence to the quantity theory of money — especially if credit money, such as bank notes, were convertible on demand in species. Also, he contended that the value of money depends on and is derived from the value of the material of which it is made and with paper money, its representation of such value.
    In the latter part of his book, he discusses leading monetary theorists from Aristotle (350 B.C.) to David A. Wells (1875). Most of the economists whom he discussed were proponents of the quantity theory of money. We will look at his discussion on William Huskisson. My comments are in brackets. Referenced page numbers enclosed in parentheses are to Poor’s book.
    William Huskisson (1770-1830) was a British statesman, financier, and member of Parliament. He wrote “Question Concerning the Depreciation of Our Currency” (1810), which Poor reviews. Huskisson wrote his pamphlet during the Napoleonic wars when the English pound was not convertible into gold or silver. His and Poor’s comments reflect this condition.
    Huskisson states that in the popular sense, money is often considered to have only purely arbitrary and conventional value. Sometimes, it is defined as “the representation of all other commodities, and sometimes as the common measure of them” (p. 216). He concludes that these definitions are incomplete “because they are equally applicable to every description of currency, whether consisting of the precious metal, of paper, or of any other article” (p. 216). Huskisson continues, “It is of the essence of money to possess intrinsic value” (p. 216). Moreover, “The quality of representing commodities does not necessarily imply intrinsic value; because that quality may be given either by confidence or by authority. The quality of being a common measure does not necessarily imply intrinsic value” (p. 216). He adds, “Money, or a given quantity of gold or silver, is not only the common measure and common representative of all other commodities, but also the common and universal equivalent” (p. 216). Although paper currency has no intrinsic value, promissory notes in whatever form and from whatever source can represent value. “It does so, in as much as it is an undertaking to pay, in money, the sum for which it is issued” (p. 216) “The money, or coin of a country, is so much of its capital. Paper currency is no part of the capital of a country: it is so much circulating credit” (p. 216). Huskisson adds, “Whoever buys, gives, whoever sells, receives, such a quantity of pure gold or silver as is equivalent to the article bought or sold; or, if he gives or receives paper instead of money, he gives or receives that which is valuable only as it stipulates the payment of a given quantity of gold or silver” (pp. 216-217). Paper money remains at par with gold if it is convertible to gold coin. Both money (gold coin) and paper promissory money (bank notes) “are common measures and representatives of the value of all commodities. But money alone is the universal equivalent; paper currency is the representative of that money” (p. 217). He identifies two types of paper currency: “the one resting upon confidence, the other upon authority” (p. 217). Paper currency resting upon confidence is circulating credit. Bank notes are of this type of currency. Paper currency resting upon authority is paper money [government notes and bank notes made legal tender by the government] are of this type of currency (p. 217). [Huskisson was a Bullionist. That is, he believed that paper money ought to be a warehouse receipt for gold. For each dollar, pound, or franc of paper money in circulation, there ought to be a dollar, pound, or franc of gold stored in a vault to back that paper money.]
    Poor objects to Huskisson’s notion that confidence or authority can give quality to representing commodities. Poor remarks, “That a person believes that a note which he takes represents commodities does not make it the representative of them, any more than the belief of the Alchemists made the baser metals in combination the representatives of gold, into which they so long sought to convert them. If confidence would create values, the silliest dunce would be the Croesus of the race” (p. 217).
    Some people believe that if the government can declare the length of the foot or meter for measuring distance, it can declare that a bank note [or a government note] can measure value: “Intrinsic value is no more necessary in one case than in the other” (p. 217). To this belief, Poor replies that owners of land would not accept for their sales the instruments by which their acres are measured. To them, a surveyor’s chain is only worth its value as scrap metal. “When men buy and sell, they exchange, or intend to exchange, articles possessing equal values” (p. 217). [Actually, exchanges only take place when both parties perceive that they are receiving something of greater value to themselves than what they are giving up.]
    Poor continues citing Huskisson. According to Huskisson, if a country’s circulating currency consists exclusively of gold and if the quantity of gold in that country doubles while the quantity of gold and the demand for it remained the same in all other countries, then the value of gold in such country would fall. This loss of value would appear as a rise in the prices of all commodities. However, since gold is much cheaper in the country in which its quantity has increased, it would be bought and exported to other countries until its value is again equal in all parts of the world (p. 218). If a country’s circulating currency consists of both gold and paper and if a paper currency were doubled while the quantity gold remains the same, prices will rise. The value of gold as a commodity will rise in price and in the same proportion as other commodities; that is, its value compared with other commodities will remain the same. Such an increase in paper currency causes the exportation of gold coin because gold’s value as currency remains the same while its price in that currency has increased, i.e., the gold content of the coin is worth more than the denomination stamped on the coin. This exportation decreases the currency in circulation and thus supports the value of the currency remaining. Thus, “[a]n excess of paper has, in the first instance, the same effect upon prices as an excess of the precious metals, to the same amount, would have, in any particular country. But it does not admit of the same relief: it cannot right itself by exportation” (p. 218).
    Huskisson identifies two ways that the currency of a country can be depreciated:

        1. If its standard coin contain less of gold or silver than it is certified to contain. In that case, the paper, as representing the coin, is also depreciated, and precisely in the same degree as the coin.
        2. If the standard coin being of full weight, and the paper which represents that standard coin, and is, or purports to be, exchangeable for it, is not exchangeable, at the same time, for so large a quantity of gold or silver as is contained in the coin which it represents. In that case, the coin, though undiminished in value, must, as part of the currency, partake of the depreciation of the whole (p. 218).

    Poor remarks that if the currency of a country consists of gold coin and paper and if the two were equal in value, then the paper must be symbolic. Contrary to Huskisson assumption, a doubling of the currency would not be inflationary.  Poor writes:

Prices would, in reference to money, remain unchanged. So long as gold and paper possessed the same value, an increase, or, rather, an inflation, of the currency, would not inflate or increase the price of gold bullion, — gold as merchandise, — while it might increase the value of all other kinds of merchandise, for the very good reason that gold cannot rise in value in reference to itself; that is, a sovereign after the inflation would purchase the same amount of bullion as before” (p. 219).

    Moreover, Poor remarks, “So long as coin would purchase no more than an equal nominal amount of paper, gold would have no more tendency to go abroad than before such increase. Indeed, its tendency would be inward to provide adequate reserves for the increase of paper” (p. 219).
    He continues, “If adequate provision, either in merchandise or coin, were not made for its [paper currency’s] redemption, it [paper currency] would become depreciated: it would not be exchangeable for an equal quantity of gold, nor would it command an equal amount of merchandise with gold, no matter whether it rested upon confidence or authority” (p. 219). Moreover, he adds, “The value of gold would not be influenced in any degree by the amount or value of the paper outstanding” (p. 219).
    According to Poor, if paper currency rests on authority and was issued in large amounts, “it would, in great measure, drive the coin previously in circulation out of the country. But this fact would not tend, in any degree, to raise the value of the currency ‘resting on authority’” (p. 220). Furthermore, contrary to Huskisson’s assertion, “[t]he exportation of coin would tend to reduce the value of such currency, instead of raising it, by rendering it all the more difficult to resume, from the impoverishment of the people, which would be measured by the amount of gold — capital — that had been drawn from them” (p. 220). [Also, the government has no power to create value on which the currency must rest except to declare the monetary unit to be a specific weight of a commodity, such as gold or silver, to which paper currency is convertible on demand. Many proponents of fiat paper money do believe that government fiat can actually give value to that which has no value.]
    According to Poor, Huskisson believes that paper currency resisting on confidence or authority is equal to gold as a measure of value. A decline in the value of paper currency brings down equally the value of gold, “for the reason that one competent measure of value must be equal in potency or effect to any other competent measure” (p. 220). However, the opposite is true. Poor writes “that the paper money of the country, though declared to have a value equal to that of an equal nominal amount of gold, did not possess such value; that the values of the two, though equally supported by authority, had no necessary relation the one to the other; and that their wide divergence was well calculated to excite the most profound alarm” (p. 220).
    Poor concludes,

He [Huskisson] could not go into the market to make any purchase, without having thrust into his hand two scales of prices, — one in paper, the other in gold; yet, in the face of all this, he was so tied to tradition as to assert that money resting upon authority — the assignats of France and the Revolutionary Currency of the United States — was as competent a measure of values as gold and silver (pp. 220-221).

    [Many fiat money reformers believe that the Continental and assignat failed because the government did not follow the right scheme in issuing them. Also, the flaws of today’s paper monetary system, including its electronic equivalent, result from following the doctrines of Keynes and Friedman instead of the scheme that the fiat money reformers promote, who disagree with each other on the proper scheme. Examples of these schemes are:
    – the Social Credit scheme, which requires the government to give the people enough money to  fill the gap between national income and gross domestic product (GDP);
    – the American Monetary Institute’s scheme, which has the government creating and issuing government notes directly without banks {v. “Analysis of the American Institute’s American Monetary Act” by Thomas Allen};
    – Richard Cook’s scheme, which is a combination of the Social Credit scheme and the American Monetary Institute’s scheme {v. “Analysis of Richard Cook’s Monetary Reforms as Presented in We Hold These Truths” by Thomas Allen};
    – the Money Reform Act scheme, which promotes the government issuing government notes and an end to banks converting loans to money {v. “Analysis of the Monetary Reform Act” by Thomas Allen};
    – Arnold Leese’s scheme, which is a fascist monetary scheme {v. “Analysis of Money No Mystery” by Thomas Allen};
    – Byron Dale’s scheme, which has the government printing and spending government notes to finance the construction and maintenance of roads {v. “Analysis of Byron Dale’s Monetary Reforms as Presented in Bashed by the Bankers” by Thomas Allen};
    – Charles Norburn’s scheme, which has the government creating and spending government notes into circulation and an end to issuing interest-bearing government securities {v. “Analysis of Charles Norburn’s Monetary Reforms as Presented in Honest Money” by Thomas Allen};
    – the Foundation to Restore and Educated Electorate scheme, which is similar to Norburn’s scheme {v. “Comparison of Three Monetary Systems” by Thomas Allen};
    – Gertrude Coogan’s scheme, which has a trusteeship answerable to Congress issuing government notes to match productiveness and to maintain stable general prices {v. Reconstruction of America’s Monetary and Banking System: A Return to Constitutional Money by Thomas Allen, pp. 232-233};
    – Silas Adams’ scheme, which has the government owning most of the country by buying all bonds, promissory notes, and other debt securities and corporate stock and other securities with government notes {v. Reconstruction of America’s Monetary and Banking System: A Return to Constitutional Money by Thomas Allen, pp. 233-235};
    – K.S. Kenan’s scheme, which reduces the Federal Reserve mostly to a clearing house for banks and makes the Department of the Treasury responsible for issuing the country’s currency and replacing all interest-bearing U.S. securities with non-interest-bearing government notes {v. Reconstruction of America’s Monetary and Banking System: A Return to Constitutional Money by Thomas Allen, pp. 235-238}.
For fiat money reformers, the problem is not fiat money itself; the problem is how the fiat money system is administrated.]

Copyright © 2016 by Thomas Coley Allen.

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