Milton on the Son of God – Part 3

Milton on the Son of God – Part 3

Thomas Allen

[Editor’s note:  Page numbers enclosed in parentheses are references to Milton on the Son of God and the Holy Spirit from His Treatise on Christian Doctrine by John Milton. The author’s comments are enclosed in brackets.]

      Some Trinitarians claim that according to some passages, “Christ is God; now if the Father be the only true God, Christ is not the true God; but if he be not the true God, he must be a false God” (p. 58). To this assertion, Milton replies “that the conclusion is too hastily drawn; for it may be that he is not ‘he that is true,’ either because he is only the image of him that is true, or because he uniformly declares himself to be inferior to him that is true. We are not obliged to say of Christ what the Scriptures do not say” (pp. 58-59). The Scriptures do not call Christ true God. Moreover, “he is not to be called a false God, to whom, as to his beloved Son, he that is the true God has communicated his divine power and glory” (p. 59).
      Trinitarians use Philippians 2:6 (“who being in the form of God”) to support their doctrine. Milton replies:

But this no more proves him to be God than the phrase which follows — “took upon him the form of a servant” — proves that he was really a servant, as the sacred writers nowhere use the word “form” for actual being. But if it be contended that “the form of God” is here taken in a philosophical sense for the essential form, this consequence cannot be avoided, that when Christ laid aside the form, he laid aside also the substance and the efficiency of God; a doctrine against which they protest, and with justice (p. 59).

According to Milton, “‘To be in the form of God,’ . . . seems to be synonymous with being in the image of God; which is often predicated of Christ, even as man is also said, though in a much lower sense, to be the image of God, that is, by creation” (p. 59).
      About Trinitarian gymnastics with the Scriptures, Milton writes:

It is singular, however, that those who maintain the Father and the Son to be one in essence, should revert from the gospel to the times of the law, as if they would make a fruitless attempt to illustrate light by darkness. They say that the Son is not only called God, but also Jehovah, as appears from a comparison of several passages in both testaments. Now Jehovah is the one supreme God; therefore the Son and the Father are one in essence (p. 61).

Further, Milton notes that the name of Jehovah is applied to angels when they represent his divine presence and speak his words. In support, he cites numerous verses (pp. 61-65).
      Then, citing several passages, he illustrates the absurdity of assuming that when one name is mentioned twice in the same sentence that the name is applied to two persons (pp. 65-66).
      Next, he discusses Exodus chapter 23 and 33 where God sends an angle to guide the Israelites. The angel addresses the Israelites as though he was Jehovah — he is called Jehovah. If the Israelites understood the angel to be Jehovah:

it follows that they must have conceived either that there were two Jehovahs, or that Jehovah and the angel were one in essence; which no rational person will affirm to have been their belief. . . . If the people had believed that Jehovah and that angel were one in essence, equal in divinity and glory, why did they mourn, and desire that Jehovah should go up before them, notwithstanding his anger, rather than the angel? . . . If, on the contrary, they did not consider the angel as Jehovah, they must necessarily have understood that he bore the name of Jehovah in the sense in which I suppose him to have borne it, wherein there is nothing either absurd or histrionic (pp 67-68).

      Some Trinitarians argue that this angel was Christ himself — citing 1 Corinthians 10:9 as support (p. 67). Therefore, he was Jehovah. Milton replies, if this angel had been Christ, he would have acted as a moderator and mediator (p. 68). He adds that “whether Christ, or some angel different from the preceding, the very words of Jehovah himself show that he was neither one with Jehovah, nor co-equal, for the Israelites are commanded to hear his voice, not on the authority of his own name, but because the name of Jehovah was in him” (p. 68). Continuing, he remarks, “[If] the angel was Christ, this proves no more than that Christ was an angel, according to their interpretation of Gen. xlviii. 16, ‘the angel which redeemed me from all evil’; and Isa. Ixiii. 9, ‘the angel of his presence saved them’” (p. 68).
      Next, Milton cites several passages from Revelations that he interprets as supporting his Christology (p. 70). Then he comments on the difficulties that they have caused some Trinitarians. For example, one Trinitarian accused the Arians of transposing and confusing some of the verses in the last chapter of Revelations; thus, he rearranged these verses to support his Trinity Doctrine (p. 70). Milton notes that action would have been unnecessary if this Trinitarian had observed that throughout the Old Testament, “angels are accustomed to assume the name and person, and the very words of God and Jehovah, as their own; and that occasionally an angel represents the person and the very words of God, without taking the name either of Jehovah or God, but only in the character of an angel, or even of a man” (p. 71) — for example, Judges 2:1.  About this issue, Milton writes:

But according to divines the name of Jehovah signifies two things, either the nature of God, or the completion of his word and promises. If it signify the nature, and therefore the person of God, why should not he who is invested with his person and presence, be also invested with the name which represents them? If it signify the completion of his word and promises, why should not he, to whom words suitable to God alone are so frequently attributed, be permitted also to assume the name of Jehovah, whereby the completion of these words and promises is represented? Or if that name be so acceptable to God, that he has always chosen to consider it as sacred and peculiar to himself alone, why has he uniformly disused it in the New Testament, which contains the most important fulfilment of his prophecies; retaining only the name of the Lord, which had always been common to him with angels and men? If, lastly, any name whatever can be so pleasing to God, why has he exhibited himself to us in the gospel without any proper name at all (pp. 71-72)?

[Some ancient manuscripts of Matthew do contain the name Jehovah, Yahweh.]
      Continuing, Milton discusses Isaiah 8:13, 14 along with 1 Peter 2:7, 8, Zachariah 11:13, 12:10 along with Acts 2:33 and John 19:37, and Malachi 3:1 to illustrate that Jehovah’s messenger is at times called “Jehovah” (pp. 72-75). Concluding, he adds, “That the name and presence of God is used to imply his vicarious power and might resident in the Son, is proved by another prophecy concerning John the Baptist, Isa. xl. 3, ‘the voice of him that crieth in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of Jehovah; make straight in the desert a highway for our God’”(pp. 75-76).
      Milton states “that the Son himself professes to have received from the Father, not only the name of God and of Jehovah, but all that pertains to his own being —  that is to say, his individuality, his existence itself, his attributes, his works, his divine honours; to which doctrine the apostles also, subsequent to Christ, bear their testimony” (p. 76). Then he cites John 3:35, 8:3, and Matthew 11:27 to support this conclusion.
      Next, he comments on Trinitarians using the two natures of Christ to “evade any arguments that may be brought against them. What Scripture says of the Son generally, they apply, as suits their purpose, in a partial and restricted sense; at one time to the Son of God, at another to the Son of Man — now to the Mediator in his divine, now in his human capacity, and now again in his union of both natures” (p. 77). [According to Trinitarians, Christ is 100 percent man and 100 percent God with no commingling of the two natures.] However, “the Son himself says expressly, ‘the Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into his hand,’ John iii. 35 — namely, because ‘he loveth him,’ not because he hath begotten him — and he hath given all things to him as ‘the Son,’ not as Mediator only” (p. 77).
      If Christ’s Deity had remained what it was before he became the mediator as Trinitarians claim, then “why does he ask and receive everything from the Father, and not from himself? If all things come from the Father, why is it necessary (as they maintain it to be) for the mediatorial office, that he should be the true and supreme God” (pp. 77-78). Therefore, all things that the Father gives the Son are the Father’s gifts to the Son (p. 78). In support, Milton cites John 16:15, Acts 17: 9, 10, Isaiah 9:6 (evidence that he receives his name from the Father), Philippians 2:9, Hebrews 1:4, and Ephesians 1:20, 21 (pp. 78-79).
    About the names given the son, Milton writes, “We need be under no concern, however, respecting the name, seeing that the Son receives his very being in like manner from the Father. John vii. 29, ‘I am from him.’ The same thing is implied John i. 1, ‘in the beginning’” (p. 79).
      About John 1:1, Milton notes:

[T]he notion of his eternity is here excluded not only by the decree, . . . but by the name of Son, and by the phrases — “this day have I begotten thee,” and “I will be to him a father.” Besides, the word “beginning” can only here mean “before the foundation of the world,” according to John xvii. 5, as is evident from Col. i. 15-17, “the first born of every creature: for by him were all things created that are in heaven, and that are in earth, etc., and he is before all things, and by him all things consist” (p. 79).

[Milton believes that the son created the heavens and the earth. This is also a commonly held belief of Trinitarians. Some unitarians disagree with Milton on this point.]
      About the Son being eternal, Milton remarks, “Him who was begotten from all eternity the Father cannot have begotten, for what was made from all eternity was never in the act of being made; him whom the Father begat from all eternity he still begets; he whom he still begets is not yet begotten, and therefore is not yet a Son; for an action which has no beginning can have no completion” (p. 80). Moreover, “it seems to be altogether impossible that the Son should be either begotten or born from all eternity. If he is the Son, either he must have been originally in the Father, and have proceeded from him, or he must always have been as he is now, separate from the Father, self-existent and independent” (p. 80).  He adds, “If he was originally in the Father, but now exists separately, he has undergone a certain change at some time or other, and is therefore mutable. If he always existed separately from, and independently of, the Father, how is he from the Father, how begotten, how the Son, how separate in subsistence, unless he be also separate in essence (p. 80)?”
      According to Milton, and contrary to Trinitarians, “the Father and the Son differ in essence” (p. 81). Both reason and the Scriptures support this conclusion. Milton writes a lengthy explanation for why they cannot have the same essences (pp. 81-83).
      Next, he comments on the existence of the Son: The Son derives his existence from the Father. In support, he cites John 5:26, 6:57, and Hebrews 1:8, 11, 12 (p. 83).
      About the Son being omnipresent, Milton remarks that “if the Father has given all things to the Son, even his very being and life, he has also given him to be wherever he is” (p. 83). [The Son is not truly omnipresent. A truly omnipresent being cannot move. There is no place where he can move because he is already there. Moreover, if he leaves a place, he is no longer omnipresent because there is a place where he is not. The Son ascended into heaven and will some day descend from heaven — thus, the Son moves from one place to another.] He argues that the apparent omnipresence of Jesus in John 1:48 (“before that Philip called . . . I saw thee”) cannot be used to prove that the Son is of the same essence as the father (pp. 83-84). Likewise, Matthew 18:20 (“there am I in the midst of them”) and 28:20 (“I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world”) do not assert absolute omnipresence (p. 84). [Omnipresence is being everywhere simultaneously. Being many places at once is not omnipresence. For example, a radio broadcast is in many places at once, but it is not omnipresent; it is not everywhere simultaneously.]
      Next, Milton discusses omniscience and cites many verses that purport that Jesus is omniscient (pp. 84-85). Then Milton notes that the Son did not know all things absolutely and cites several verses showing his lack of omniscience (p. 85). [According to Trinitarians, when Jesus appears to be omniscience, for example, John 21:11 {“thou knowest all things”}, he is acting in his divine nature. When he lacks knowledge, as when he did not know when the time of the destruction of the temple or when he would return and the end of the age would occur {Mark 13:32}, he is acting in his human nature. However, according to Revelation 1:1, Jesus is not omniscient; God has to give him the revelation. This occurred after the Son had shed his human body and could no longer be acting in his human nature.]
      Mostly by citing verses, Milton discusses the Son’s authority; his authority comes from the Father (pp. 86-87).
      Whatever omnipotence that he had, he had because all his power came from the Father (p. 87). To support this conclusion, Milton cites several verses. About the Son’s apparent omnipotence, Milton observed that “the nature of these works, although divine, was such, that angels were not precluded from performing similar miracles at the same time and in the same place where Christ himself abode daily” (p. 87) — for example, John 5:4 (“an angel went down at a certain season into the pool”). Moreover, the disciple performed the same works.
      Again citing Scripture, Milton discusses other gifts that Jesus received from the Father. They include the power of conversion (pp. 87-88), creation (pp. 88-89), remission of sins (p. 89), preservation (p. 90), renovation (pp. 90-91), conferring gifts (p. 91), mediatorial, i.e., his passion (pp. 90-91), resuscitation from death (p. 93), future judicial advent (p. 93), divine honors (p. 93), baptism in his name (p. 94), belief in him (pp. 94-96), and judgment (p. 99).
      About the passion, Milton asks, “How then can the Son be considered co-essential and co-equal with the Father (p. 92)?” About Jesus’ exclamation on the cross — “My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?” — he asks, “He whom the Son, himself God, addresses as God, must be the Father — why then did the Son call upon the Father (p. 92)?” Milton’s answer is that because “he felt even his divine nature insufficient to support him under the pains of death” (p. 92).
      Remarking further on Philippians 2:6, he notes that the Son’s possession of the divine gifts that the Father gave him was not robbery. Milton continues, “[I]f this passage imply his co-equality with the Father, it rather refutes than proves his unity of essence; since equality cannot exist but between two or more essences” (p. 100). He adds:

Further, the phrases “he did not think it” — “he made himself of no reputation” (literally, “he emptied himself”) appear inapplicable to the supreme God, For to think is nothing else than to entertain an opinion, which cannot be properly said of God. Nor can the infinite God be said to empty himself, any more than to contradict himself; for infinity and emptiness are opposite terms. But since he emptied himself of that form of God in which he had previously existed, if the form of God is to be taken for the essence of the Deity itself, it would prove him to have emptied himself of that essence, which is impossible (p. 100).

      Lastly, Milton proves that the Father is greater than the Son. For Jesus said, “My Father is greater than all” (John 10:29) and “my Father is greater than I” (John 14:28). Trinitarians respond “that Christ is speaking of his human nature” (p. 100). However, Milton doubts that “his disciples understand him as speaking merely of his human nature” (p. 100). He writes:

If therefore he said this, not of his human nature only (for that the Father was greater than he in his human nature could not admit of a doubt), but in the sense in which he himself wished his followers to conceive of him both as God and man, it ought undoubtedly to be understood as if he had said, My Father is greater than I, whatsoever I am, both in my human and divine nature; otherwise the speaker would not have been he in whom they believed, and instead of teaching them, he would only have been imposing upon them with an equivocation. He must therefore have intended to compare the nature with the person, not the nature of God the Father with the nature of the Son (p. 101).

He cites several verses to support his conclusion that the Father is greater than the Son (pp. 101-105).
      As shown above, Milton presents a unitarian argument akin to that of the Arians and the Jehovah’s Witnesses. All three believe in a preexisting Son, i.e., the Son existed before his conception. They believe that the Son has a beginning and, therefore, is not eternal. Further, they believe that the Father is the supreme God, the only true God, Jehovah of the Old Testament, and that God is one in person. Moreover, Milton was in agreement with most orthodox Christians from the mid-second century to early fourth century; they believed in a preexisting Son who was not eternal and who was subordinate to the Father. [Milton is unclear about whether Jesus was perfect man of a rational soul and the preexisting Son of a rational soul both occupying the same body without confusion of substances similar to the Trinitarian and Valentinian belief or Jesus was a human shell or sentient body with the preexisting Son providing the rational soul or mind similar to the Apollinarian belief or some other model.]

Copyright © 2018 by Thomas Coley Allen.

Part 2

More religious articles.

Milton on the Son of God – Part 2

Milton on the Son of God – Part 2

Thomas Allen

[Editor’s note:  Page numbers enclosed in parentheses are references to Milton on the Son of God and the Holy Spirit from His Treatise on Christian Doctrine by John Milton. The author’s comments are enclosed in brackets.]

    Not only does the Trinity Doctrine lack scriptural support, it also is lacking in reason. The “alternative therefore must be adopted, namely, that if God be one God, and that one God be the Father, and if notwithstanding the Son be also called God, the Son must have received the name and nature of Deity from God the Father, in conformity with his decree and will, after the manner stated before” (p. 25).
    Milton notes that Trinitarians insist “that wherever the name of God is attributed to the Father alone, it should be understood . . . to signify the three persons, or the whole essence of the Trinity, not the single person of the Father” (p. 27). He continues:

This is on many accounts a ridiculous distinction and invented solely for the purpose of supporting their peculiar opinion; although in reality, instead of supporting it, it will be found to be dependent on it, and therefore if the opinion itself be invalidated, for which purpose a simple denial is sufficient, the futile distinction falls to the ground at the same time. For the fact is, not merely that the distinction is a futile one, but that it is no distinction at all; it is a mere verbal quibble, founded on the use of synonymous words, and cunningly dressed up in terms borrowed from the Greek to dazzle the eyes of novices (p. 27).

He adds that “since essence and hypostasis mean the same thing, . . . [then] there can be no real difference of meaning between the adverbs essentially and substantially (hypostatice), which are derived from them” (p.27). Consequently, if  “the name of God be attributed to the Father alone essentially, it must also be attributed to the Father alone substantially” (p. 27). “If . . . the Son, who has his own proper hypostasis, have not also his own proper essence, but the essence of the Father, he becomes on their hypothesis either no ens [a real thing, entity] at all, or the same ens with the Father; which strikes at the very foundation of the Christian religion” (p. 28).
    According to the Trinity doctrine, “wherever the Son attributes Deity to the Father alone, and as to one greater than himself, he must be understood to speak in his human character, or as mediator” (p. 29). [This is a fantastic doctrine that prevents Jesus from being able to deny that he is God. Every statement that he makes or action that he takes that shows that he is not Deity can be rejected because it is merely Jesus speaking or acting in his human character and not in his divine character.] Milton concedes this concept to the Trinitarian “[w]herever the context and the fact itself require this interpretation” (p. 29). However, “it can never be inferred from hence that he is one God with the Father” (p. 29).
    Continuing, Milton remarks that “simultaneous mention is made of the Father and the Son, that name [God] is uniformly ascribed to the Father alone” (p. 29) with a few exceptions. Then he cites several verses to support his claim (pp. 29-30).
    Milton writes, “The Son likewise teaches that the attributes of divinity belong to the Father alone, to the exclusion even of himself” (p. 31). For example, in Matthew 24:36 and Mark 13:32, Jesus declares that only the Father is omniscient and that he (Jesus) lacks the divine trait of omniscience. [Trinitarians claim that Jesus’ human character is not omniscient, but his divine character is.]
    According to Milton, “after the hypostatical union of two natures in one person [the union of the divine nature and human nature in Jesus such that, according to the Trinitarian Doctrine, Jesus is simultaneously 100 percent man and 100 percent Deity with no confusion of substance], it follows that whatever Christ says of himself, he says not as the possessor of either nature separately, but with reference to the whole of his character, and in his entire person, except where he himself makes a distinction” (p. 32). He adds, “Those who divide this hypostatical union at their own  discretion, strip the discourses and answers of Christ of all their sincerity; they represent everything as ambiguous and uncertain, as true and false at the same time; it is not Christ that speaks, but some unknown substitute, sometimes one, and sometimes another” (pp. 32-33).
    Moreover, Jesus’ will is independent of the Father, for in Matthew 26:39, Jesus says “not as I will, but as thou [the Father] wilt.” Milton comments, “Now it is manifest that those who have not the same will, cannot have the same essence” (p. 33). Then he cites several verses to show that the Father and Son do not have “in a numerical sense, the same intelligence or will” (p. 33): Matthew 24:36, Mark 13:32, and John 6:38.
    After referencing several prayers of Jesus to God the Father, Milton asks, “If these prayers be uttered only in his human capacity, which is the common explanation, why does he petition these things from the Father alone instead of from himself, if he were God? Or rather, supposing him to be at once man and the supreme God, why does he ask at all for what was in his own power (p. 34)?”
    According to Jesus, “there is none good but one, that is God” (Matthew 19:17). To this statement, Milton remarks “that he did not choose to be considered essentially the same with that one God; for otherwise this would only have been disclaiming the credit of goodness in one character, for the purpose of assuming it in another” (p. 34).
    Milton notes that “Christ assigns every attribute of the Deity to the Father alone. The apostles uniformly speak in a similar manner” (p. 35). He cites several verses as examples. Furthermore, many verses declare that the Father alone raised the Son from the dead (pp. 35-37).
    Next, Milton notes that “the Son uniformly pays worship and reverence to the Father alone, so he teaches us to follow the same practice” (p. 37). Thus, divine honors are owed to the Father. In support, he cites several verses (pp. 37-41).
    Trinitarians argue “that the Son is sometimes called God, and even Jehovah; and that all the attributes of the Deity are assigned to him likewise in many passages both of the Old and New Testament” (p. 41). Milton replies “that where the Father and the Son are mentioned together, the name, attributes, and works of the Deity, as well as divine honours, are always assigned to the one and only God the Father” (p. 41). Then he proceeds to demonstrate “that whenever the same properties are assigned to the Son, it is in such a manner as to make it easily intelligible that they ought all primarily and properly to be attributed to the Father alone” (p. 41).
    He notes that the name or title of “God” is occasionally given to angels and men. Angels are called gods in Psalm 97:7, 9 and Judges 6:22, 13:21, 22. The title “God” is attributed to angels when they appear as Jehovah’s representatives (God spoke through them). Examples are Genesis 21:17, 18 and 22:11, 12, 15, 16. In Exodus 22:28, judges are called gods “because they occupy the place of God to a certain degree in the administration of judgment” (p. 46). Moreover, the children of Israel are called gods in Psalm 82:6. Also, the house of David is called God in Zechariah 12:8, and Moses is called God in Exodus 4:16 and 7:1.
    One error that some Trinitarians make is to construe “Elohim,” the Hebrew word for God, incorrectly. Although Elohim is plural in number, it is singular in meaning. These Trinitarians assert that Elohim “is intended to intimate a plurality of persons in unity of essence” (p. 43). [Although this interpretation of Elohim was once a popular argument used by Trinitarians to support the Trinity Doctrine, few use it today. Most Trinitarians now admit that nothing in the Old Testament supports the doctrine of a triune God. However, it does consistently and emphatically support the doctrine of a unipersonal God.] Milton remarks that “if there be any significance at all in this peculiarity, the word must imply as many gods as it does persons” (p. 43).
    Continuing, Milton notes that the Son “was entitled to the name of God both in the capacity of a messenger and of a judge” (p. 46). In John 10:34-36, Jesus used this argument “when the Jews accused him of blasphemy because he made himself God” (p. 46).
    By identifying the Word as the Son, Trinitarians use John 1:1 to support their doctrine of the eternal Son. Milton responds that the verse does not say “from everlasting, but ‘in the beginning.’ ‘The Word’ — therefore the Word was audible” (p. 47). Since God cannot be seen or heard (John 5:37), the “Word therefore is not of the same essence with God” (p. 47). That the Word was with God does not necessarily mean that “he [or it as some unitarians would say] is one in essence with him with whom he was” (p. 47).
    Milton argues that John should be allowed to interpret what he means by the Word in John 1:1. In Revelations 19:13, John writes that “‘his name is called the Word of God’ — that is, of the one God: he himself is a distinct person. If therefore he be a distinct person, he is distinct from God, who is unity. How then is he himself also God? By the same right as he enjoys the title of the Word, or of the only begotten Son, namely, by the will of the one God” (pp 47-48).
    Continuing to John 1:2, Milton comments that the second verse “enforces what the apostle wished we should principally observe, not that he was in the beginning God, but in the beginning with God; that he might show him to be God only by proximity and love, not in essence” (p. 48). Unlike the Trinitarian explanation of John 1:1-2, this explanation is consistent with the remainder of John’s gospel.
    A favorite passage that Trinitarians use to prove the Trinity Doctrine is John 20:28, where Thomas says to Jesus, “My Lord and my God.” In response, Milton writes, “He [Thomas] must have an immoderate share of credulity who attempts to elicit a new confession of faith, unknown to the rest of the disciples, from this abrupt exclamation of the apostle, who invokes in his surprise not only Christ his own Lord, but the God of his ancestors, namely, God the Father” (p. 48). Yet, shortly before meeting Thomas, Jesus had declared, “I ascend unto my God and your God’ [John 20:17]. Now the God of God cannot be essentially one with him whose God he is. On whose word therefore can we ground our faith with most security; on that of Christ, whose doctrine is clear, or of Thomas, a new disciple, first incredulous, then suddenly breaking out into an abrupt exclamation in an ecstasy of wonder, if indeed he really called Christ his God? . . . [Nor] is it credible that he should have so quickly understood the hypostatic union of that person whose resurrection he had just before disbelieved” (pp. 48-49).
    Some Trinitarians claim that the lack of Jesus correcting Thomas in his remarks proves the Deity of Jesus, i.e., Jesus is God Himself, the second person of the triune God. Contrariwise, Milton argues that the lack of correction proves that Jesus is not a person of a triune God (pp. 49-50).
    Also, Matthew 1:23 (“they shall call his name Immanuel, which being interpreted is, God with us”) “does not prove that he [Jesus] whom they were so to call should necessarily be God but only a messenger from God” (p. 50).
    About Acts 16: 31, 34 (“believe on the Lord Jesus Christ . . . and he rejoiced, believing in God with all his house”), Milton remarks that “it does not follow from hence that Christ is God, since the apostles have never distinctly pointed out Christ as the ultimate object of faith; but these are merely the words of the historian, expressing briefly what the apostles doubtless inculcated in a more detailed manner — faith in God the Father through Christ” (p. 51).
    About Romans 9:5 (“who is over all, God blessed for ever”), he notes that some early church fathers omit “God” when quoting this passage. Moreover, the way translators punctuate this passage can give it different meanings. Milton concludes that “supposing that the words are spoken of the Son; they have nothing to do with his essence, but only intimate that divine honour is communicated to the Son by the Father, and particularly that he is called God” (p. 52). Continuing, he writes:

 But, it is said, the same words which were spoken of the Father, Rom. i. 25, “the Creator, who is blessed for ever. Amen,” are here repeated of the Son; therefore the Son is equal to the Father. If there be any force in this reasoning, it will rather prove that the Son is greater than the Father; for according to the ninth chapter, he is “over all,” which, however, they remind us, ought to be understood in the same sense as John iii. 31, 32, “he that cometh from above, is above all; he that Cometh from heaven is above all” (p. 52).

However, Milton adds that Christ “came not of himself, but was sent from the Father, and was obedient to him” (pp. 52-53). Moreover, Christ “never could have become a mediator, nor could he have been sent from God, or have been obedient to him, unless he had been inferior to God and the Father as to his nature. Therefore also after he shall have laid aside his functions as mediator, whatever may be his greatness, or whatever it may previously have been, he must be subject to God and the Father” (p. 53).
    As for 1 Timothy 3:16 (“God was manifest in the flesh”), many early manuscripts omit “God” [as do many translations since the King James]. However, Milton concedes that “when the context is duly examined, that the whole passage must be understood of God the Father in conjunction with the Son. For it is not Christ who is “the great mystery of godliness,” but God the Father in Christ” (p. 54). To support his conclusion, he cites Colossians 2:2 and 2 Corinthians 5:18, 19. Continuing, he writes, “‘was manifest in the flesh’ — namely, in the Son, his own image; in any other way he is invisible: nor did Christ come to manifest himself, but his Father, John xiv. 8, 9” (p. 54). (For more justifications of Milton’s conclusion, see pages 54-55).
    Next, Milton comments on Titus 2:13 (“the glorious appearing of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ”) in some detail and about various translations. He concludes that:

what is proposed to us as an object of belief, especially in a matter involving a primary article of faith, ought not to be an inference forced and extorted from passages relating to an entirely different subject, in which the readings are sometimes various, and the sense doubtful — nor hunted out by careful research from among articles and particles — nor elicited by dint of ingenuity, like the answers of an oracle, from sentences of dark or equivocal meaning — but should be susceptible of abundant proof from the clearest sources (p. 56).

[This advice Trinitarians ignore because the clearest passages support Unitarianism.]
    Then, Milton comments on 1 John 5:20 (“We know that the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding, that we may know him that is true, and we are in him that is true, (even) in his Son Jesus Christ: this is the true God, and eternal life”). Trinitarians use the second part of this verse to support their doctrine of a triune God. However, when the verse as a whole is considered, it does not support the Trinity Doctrine.
    Milton also comments on Hebrews 1:8 (p. 50), Acts 20:58 (p. 51), 1 John 3:16 (pp. 56-57), Jude 4 (pp. 59-58), Psalm 68:17-19, and Ephesians 4:5-8 (pp. 60-61).

Copyright © 2018 by Thomas Coley Allen.

Part 1, Part 3

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Milton on the Son of God – Part 1

Milton on the Son of God – Part 1

Thomas Allen

    John Milton (1608–1674), who is best known as the author of Paradise Lost, believed in an unipersonal God instead of the triune God of three persons or gods in one God of today’s orthodox Christianity. Thus, Jesus is the Son of God and not God the Son. The following summaries Milton’s view of Christ Jesus, the Son of God, as presented in Milton on the Son of God and the Holy Spirit from His Treatise on Christian Doctrine (London, England: British & Foreign Unitarian Association, 1908). About 150 years would pass before Milton’s essay was published. Page numbers enclosed in parentheses are to the book referenced above. My comments are enclosed in brackets.
    Milton notes that according to the Catholic Church, the Trinity Doctrine cannot be “proved from any passage of Scripture” (p. 1). [At least Catholics are more honest than Protestants.]
    His notion that Christ Jesus is not the second person of a triune God, Milton derives from the Scriptures and the Scriptures alone. [The Trinity Doctrine relies heavily on Greek philosophy, primarily that of Plato and his followers.] For him, the Scriptures alone are “the rule of faith” (p. 1).
    First, Milton discusses generation, “whereby God, in pursuance of his decree, has begotten his only Son” (p. 3). “Generation must be an external efficiency, since the Father and Son are different persons” (p. 3), which the Trinitarians acknowledge. Whereas Milton argues that the Son has a beginning, Trinitarians argue that he is “generated from all eternity” (p. 3).
    Milton notes that “the Father be said in Scripture to have begotten the Son in a double sense, the one literal, with reference to the production of the Son, the other metaphorical, with reference to his exaltation” (p. 4). However, many Trinitarians “have applied the passages which allude to the exaltation and mediatorial functions of Christ as proof of his generation from all eternity” (p. 4). Nevertheless, they claim “that it is impossible to find a single text in all Scripture to prove the eternal generation of the Son” (p. 4).
    Citing John 1:1-3, John 17:5, Colossians 1:15, 16, 18, Revelations 3:14, 1 Corinthians 8:6, and Hebrews 1:2, 5:10, Milton believes “the Son existed in the beginning, under the name of the logos or word, and was the first of the whole creation, by whom afterwards all other things were made both in heaven and earth” (p. 4). Milton states,  “All these passages prove the existence of the Son before the world was made, but they conclude nothing respecting his generation from all eternity” (p. 5). [Milton’s Christology is similar to that of the Arians and the Jehovah’s Witnesses, both of whom claim that the Son is God’s first creation. Contrary to this notion is that of Unitarians who believe that the Son first existed outside the mind of God when God begot him in the womb of Mary.]
    Citing verses concerning Christ’s “resuscitation from the dead, or to his unction to the mediatorial office” (p. 5), Milton concludes “that however the generation of the Son may have taken place, it arose from no natural necessity, as is generally contended, but was no less owing to the decree and will of the Father than his priesthood or kingly power, or his resuscitation from the dead” (pp. 6-7). Moreover, Jesus is called the Son of God “because he had no other Father besides God[:] . . . ‘God was his Father,’ John v. 18” (p. 7). God created Adam from dust and, therefore, was Adam’s creator. However, God is “properly the Father of the Son made of his own substance” (p. 7). [Trinitarians agree with him about the Son being the same substance as the Father.] He continues, “Yet it does not follow from hence that the Son is co-essential with the Father, for then the title of Son would be least of all applicable to him, since he who is properly the Son is not coeval with the Father, much less of the same numerical essence, otherwise the Father and the Son would be one person; nor did the Father beget him from any natural necessity, but of his own free will — a mode more perfect and more agreeable to the paternal dignity” (p. 7). He concludes that “the Son was begotten of the Father in consequence of his decree, and therefore within the limits of time, for the decree itself must have been anterior to the execution of the decree, as is sufficiently clear from the insertion of the word ‘to-day’” (p. 8).
    Citing several verses (John 1:14, 18, 3:16, 18, and 1 John 4:9) where the Son is called “only begotten,” Milton comments, “Yet he is not called one with the Father in essence, inasmuch as he was visible to sight, and given by the Father, by whom also he was sent, and from whom he proceeded; but he enjoys the title of only begotten by way of superiority, as distinguished from many others who are also said to have been born of God. . . . But since throughout the Scriptures the Son is never said to be begotten, except, as above, in a metaphorical sense, it seems probable that he is called only begotten principally because he is the one mediator between God and man” (p. 9).
    Next, he cites several verses (Romans 8:29, Colossians 1:15, 18, Hebrews 1:6, and Revelations 3:14) that refer to the Son as the “first born.” All these “passages preclude the idea of his co-essentiality with the Father, and of his generation from all eternity” (p. 9). [Some Unitarians disagree with Milton on his notion of the preexisting Son. According to some Unitarians, the Son existed in God’s mind as part of his foreordained plan. He did not really come into existence until his miraculous conception.]
    Milton notes that “since to generate another who had no previous existence, is to give him being, and that if God generate by a physical necessity, he can generate nothing but a co-equal Deity, which would be inconsistent with self-existence, an essential attribute of Divinity” (p. 10). Then, he inquires into “how or in what sense God the Father can have begotten the Son” (p. 10). After reviewing the Scriptures, he concludes “that God of his own will created, or generated, or produced the Son before all things, endued with the divine nature, as in the fulness of time he miraculously begat him in his human nature of the Virgin Mary” (p. 10). Moreover, “God imparted to the Son as much as he pleased of the divine nature, nay, of the divine substance itself, care being taken not to confound the substance with the whole essence, which would imply, that the Father had given to the Son what he retained numerically the same himself; which would be a contradiction of terms instead of a mode of generation” (p. 11).
    About the few verses that call the Son, God, which lead to the Trinitarian absurdity of trying to make two to be one, Milton remarks that Trinitarians could have avoided “such violence to reason” (p, 11) if they had paid attention to the Scriptures. Then he cites Psalm 82:6 where God calls the children of Israel gods and John 10:35. [Also, Moses is called God in Exodus 4:16 and 7:1. See below where Milton discusses this issue further.]
    According to the Scriptures, “there is in reality but one true independent and supreme God” (p. 13). Furthermore, “human reason and the common language of mankind, and the Jews, the people of God, have always considered him as one person only” (p. 13). Milton turns to the Scriptures to identify who this God is.
    Since Jesus, the only begotten Son, is in the bosom of the Father (John 1:18), he should know who is God. According to Jesus’ testimony, the Father is the one true God. This testimony is given in Mark 12:28, 29, and 32: “‘Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord’ or as it is in the Hebrew, ‘Jehovah our God is one Jehovah’” (p. 14). This conversation between Jesus and the scribe shows that the “unity of God is intended his oneness of person” (p. 15). John 8:41, 54 proves that God is the Father: “[W]e have one Father, even God. . . . [I]t is my Father that honoureth me; of whom ye say that he is your God.” For more proof, Milton cites John 17:3 (“this is life eternal, that they might know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent”) and John 20:17 (“I ascend unto my Father and your Father; and to my God and your God”). Therefore, if “the Father be the God of Christ, and the same be our God, and if there be none other God but one, there can be no God beside the Father” (p. 16).
    Moreover, Paul, like Jesus, teaches that there is but one God, the Father. [Paul does not teach a triune God or that the Father is one person in God and Jesus is another person in God, yet both are one God.] To support his argument (p. 16), Milton cites 1 Corinthians 8:4-6 (“there is none other God but one . . . there is but one God the Father”). As only one God exists, then not only are all other essences excluded, but all other persons are excluded (p. 16). In the above-cited passage, Paul clearly distinguishes Jesus Christ from God, who is the Father. Referring to 1 Corinthians 8:4-6, Milton adds that if a different causation “of whom all things” applies to God the Father and “by whom are all things” applies to Christ the Son, then“if a difference of causation prove a difference of essence, he [Christ] is distinguished also in essence” (p. 16). He adds, “Besides, since a numerical difference originates in difference of essence, those who are two numerically, must be also two essentially” (p. 17).
    Milton argues that when the Scriptures declare that all things are by Christ, “it must be understood of a secondary and delegated power” (p. 18).
    Referencing Ephesians 4:4-6, Milton argues that “there is one Spirit, and one Lord; but the Father is one, and therefore God is one in the same sense as the remaining objects of which unity is predicated, that is, numerically one, and therefore one also in person” (p. 19). Then, he cites 1 Timothy 2:5 (“there is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus”). He states that “the mediator, though not purely human, is purposely named man, by the title derived from his inferior nature, lest he should be thought equal to the Father, or the same God, the argument distinctly and expressly referring to one God” (p. 19). Rhetorically, he asks “how anyone can be a mediator to himself on his own behalf” (p. 19). [Some Unitarians would strongly object with Milton about Jesus not being purely human. If he were not purely human, he could not have been tempted as humans {Hebrews 2:18 and 4:15} are, suffered like them, or died like them, etc. He was like a man in all respects {Hebrews 2:17}. However, Jesus was a uniquely special man in that he was a special messenger of God the Father with a divine mission whose authority came directly from God the Father. He is the one and only Son of God, who has a unique and intimate relationship with God. Moreover, he was filled with the spirit of God. Unfortunately, Milton could not wean himself from the Greek philosophy that had infected Christianity and that underlies the Trinity Doctrine. Thus, he literally interprets passages that suggest that the Son really existed before his conception. Yet, he does not literally interpret passages that declare the Son to be a real man — fully human like every other human but without sin. Consequently, for him as for Trinitarians, the Son is man but not a man. A preexisting spirit incarnated in a human body may become man, but he cannot become a man. One can only become a man if his beginning is with conception — unless all humans preexist spiritually and are incarnated in a human body, which is a concept that nearly all Christians reject — Origen and those who believe in reincarnation being exceptions.]
    Next, he quotes Romans 5:10 (“we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son”). He remarks, “To whatever God we were reconciled, if he be one God, he cannot be the God by whom we are reconciled, inasmuch as that God is another person; for if he be one and the same, he must be a mediator between himself and us, and reconcile us to himself by himself; which is an insurmountable difficulty” (pp. 19-20). [Moreover, how can an immortal, eternal God die? Trinitarians would argue that only the human nature of Jesus died; his divine nature did not. Then many of these same Trinitarians would declare that mankind could not be saved except by the death of God.]
    Milton notes “that the Father alone is a self-existent God, and that a being which is not self-existent cannot be God” (p. 20). This is so evident that no explanation should be required. Then, he remarks:

[I]t is wonderful with what futile subtleties, or rather with what juggling artifices, certain individuals have endeavoured to elude or obscure the plain meaning of these passages; leaving no stone unturned, recurring to every shift, attempting every means, as if their object were not to preach the pure and unadulterated truth of the gospel to the poor and simple, but rather by dint of vehemence and obstinacy to sustain some absurd paradox from falling, by the treacherous aid of sophisms and verbal distinctions, borrowed from the barbarous ignorance of the schools (p. 20).

[Thus, he lambastes Trinitarians.]
    Trinitarians interpret John 10:30 (“I and my Father are one”) to mean that the Son and the Father are one in essence. Milton answers, “Two things may be called one in more than one way” (p. 21). In the previous verse (John 10:29), Jesus said that his Father was greater than all. In John 10:34-36, Jesus denies making himself God. About John 10:36, Milton writes, “This must be spoken of two persons not only not co-essential, but not coequal” (p. 21).
    Moreover, by failing to mention the Holy Spirit, John 10:30 fails to support the Trinity Doctrine. “[T]he Son and the Father without the Spirit are not one in essence” (p. 22) — so argue Trinitarians.
    How are the Son and Father one? “[T]hey are one, inasmuch as they speak and act with unanimity” (p. 22). Jesus said, “believe the works; that ye may know and believe that the Father is in me, and I in him” (John 10:38) and “the words that I speak unto you, I speak not of myself, but the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works” (John 14:10). Thus, when Jesus says that “I and my Father are one,” he means one in “intimacy of communion” (p. 22). He does not mean the unity of essence. He “declares himself to be one with the Father in the same manner as we are one with him — that is, not in essence, but in love, in communion, in agreement, in charity, in spirit, in glory” (p. 22). In support of this conclusion, he cites John 14:20, 21 and 17:21-23.

Copyright © 2018 by Thomas Coley Allen.

Part 2

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Did Jesus Lie?

Did Jesus Lie?

Thomas Allen

    In Chapter 7 of John, the King James Versions (KJV) reads:

(2) Now the Jew's feast of tabernacles was at hand. (3) His brethren therefore said unto him, Depart hence, and go into Judaea, that thy disciples also may see the works that thou doest. . . . (8) [Jesus said,] Go ye up unto this feast: I go not up yet unto this feast: for my time is not yet full come. . . . (10) But when his brethren were gone up, then went he also up unto the feast, not openly, but as it were in secret.

Most older translations and newer King James translations and many other modern translations read like the KJV, with “yet” in verse eight.
    The American Standard Version (ASV) reads:

(2) Now the feast of the Jews, the feast of tabernacles, was at hand. (3) His brethren therefore said unto him, Depart hence, and go into Judaea, that thy disciples also may behold thy works which thou doest. . . . (8) [Jesus said,] Go ye up unto the feast: I go not up unto this feast; because my time is not yet fulfilled. . . . (10) But when his brethren were gone up unto the feast, then went he also up, not publicly, but as it were in secret.

Some modern translations read like the ASV, without “yet” in verse eight. Older Greek manuscripts omit “yet.”
    As shown by the above quotations, Jesus is conversing with his brethren just before the feast of tabernacles. His brethren urge him to go to Judea and publicly show himself and display his works. In the ASV, Jesus replies that he will not go to the feast. Later, he goes to the feast. Consequently, he appears to have lied as he said that he was not going to the feast but later went to the feast.
    Most likely the original reads like the ASV: That is, Jesus was not going to the feast. The version of John that Porphyry (234 – 305) and Jerome (347 – 420) used read like the ASV and not like the KJV.
    Apparently, some later copyist avoided this ostensible lie by changing the sentence to read as it reads in the KJV, i.e., Jesus replied that he would not yet go to the feast.
    Porphyry’s explanation of Jesus’ apparent lie is that he was fickle and inconsistent. He blames Jesus’ fickleness on the weakness of his human nature.
    Jerome claims that Jesus avoided the truth because of his temptable human nature. Moreover, Jesus lied in the interest of prudence and utility. For Jerome, Jesus’ lying was an act of mendacity and excusable as a weakness of the flesh. The doctrine of Jesus’ absolute sinlessness argues against Jerome.
    Nathaniel Lardner (1684 – 1768) argues that Jesus always intended to go to the feast, but not as soon or as publicly as his brethren wanted him to go. That is, he spoke of delaying his journey but not to go to the feast at all. Lardner’s explanation leaves Jesus open to the charge of lying because his brethren could not know his real intentions and merely understood his words as spoken. Either Jesus changed his mind as Porphyry claims or he deceived his brethren.
    According to Henry Alford (1810 – 1871), both the “not going to the feast” and “not yet going to the feast” give the same sense. Because Jesus used the verb “going” in the present tense, he meant “I am not at present going up.” Thus, his argument depends on violating a common law of language: using the present tense to refer to a future event. When the present tense is used to refer to a future event, it is usually an event unalterably determined. When Jesus said, “I go not up,” his brethren understood him to mean that he did not intend to go up — consequently, Alford’s argument fails. (Alford argues that if Jesus did not intend to go, he would have used the future tense.)
    Charles John Ellicott (1819–1905) rejects Alford’s argument. Also, he rejects the notion that Jesus stated his intention and later changed his mind. Ellicott argues that Jesus read the thoughts of the inquirer and answered his thoughts, the question that he wanted to ask instead of the question that he actually asked orally. The question asked implied a worldly, self-seeking spirit. It is the question of the inquirer's thought that Jesus answered and not the one actually vocalized. Thus, he did not intend to go to the feast as his brethren wanted him to: publicly. However, he went, but not in the sense understood by his brethren, who understood his answer literally and not spiritually. The flaw of Elliot’s explanation is that it presents Jesus as deliberately deceiving his brethren. He understood the question asked, but he answered not that question, but a different question.
    Levi Paine (1837 – 1902) gets around the problem of Jesus appearing to lie by placing the Gospel According to St. John as written in the mid second century A.D. Thus, the apostle John did not write the gospel named after him. Whoever wrote John presents the words in John 7:8 as spoken by Jesus, although he may never have said them. If Jesus never really said “I go not up,” then he did not lie.
    In a lecture on lying, Pastor Peter J. Peters (1946 – 2011) claims that Jesus did lie. If I recall correctly, he explanation for Jesus lying was security — preventing injury to himself and possibly others by the Jews. (The theme of his lecture is that at times lying is appropriate for Christians. For example, if a gang of governmental officials comes to a Christian household seeking to carry away the children for the pleasures of their pedophiliac overlords, who want the children to satisfy their sexual deviations culminating in torturing the children to death, should a Christian be truthful and obey the government per Roman 13 by surrendering the children to the government or should they conceal the children and lie about their location?)
    Everett Harrison (1902-1999) states that Jesus could not go to Jerusalem simply to gain popularity as the brethren wanted him to do. When he said that he was not going, he meant that he “was not going on the terms suggested by his brothers.” “He would go in his own time and way.” Harrison’s explanation suffers the same flaws as Lardner and Ellicott’s. Based on his answer that he was not going to the feast, the brethren understood that he was not going at all. Consequently, he deceived them.
    Alan E. Brooke (1863–1939) believes that Jesus changed his mind and decided to go after the brethren had departed. Thus, his excuse is similar to Porphyry’s.
    Floyd Filson (1896–1980) states that which reading is original is uncertain. In any event, Jesus did not go for the full length of the feast.
    W.K. Clarke (1879-1968) notes that the version without “yet” is preferred to the version with “yet.” He argues that Jesus did not go with the brethren because the time for his public entry into Jerusalem had not arrived. As true as this is, from the perspective of the brethren, he had lied to them.
    J.R. Dumaler remarks that many authorities omit “yet.” However, even if “yet” is omitted, it is understood to be there. Thus, he avoids Jesus lying. His argument suffers the same flaws as Alford’s.
    Robert Wilkins comments that the omission of “yet” is major. Without “yet,” Jesus seems to have lied.
    Did Jesus lie? In Matthew 7:7, he says, “ Ask, and it shall be given you.” In John 14:14, he promises, “If ye shall ask [me] anything in my name, that will I do.” Apply these promises, and you will have your answer.

References
Brookes, A.E. “John.” A Commentary on the Bible. Editor Arthur S. Peake. New York, New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, n.d.

Clarke, W.K. Lowther, editor. Concise Bible Commentary. New York, New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1953.

Dummelow, J.R., editor.  A Commentary on the Holy Bible. New York, New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1909, 1936.

Filson, Floyd V. The Gospel According to John. Editor Balmer H. Kelly. The Layman’s Bible Commentary. Volume 19. Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1970.

Harrison, Everett F. “John.” The Wycliffe Bible Commentary. Editors Charles F. Pfeiffer and Everett F. Harrison. Chicago, Illinois: Moody Press, 1962.

Paine, Levi Leonard. The Ethnic Trinities and Their Relations to the Christian Trinity: A Chapter in the Comparative History of Religion. Boston, Massachuttes: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1901.

Wilkin, Robert N. “John.” The Grace New Testament Commentary. Editor Robert N. Wilkin. Vol.  1. Denton, Texas: Grace Evangelical Society, 2010.

Copyright © 2018 by Thomas Coley Allen.

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Mencken on the Failure of Puritanism

Mencken on the Failure of Puritanism

Thomas Allen

    In 1926, H. L. Mencken (1880-1956) wrote Notes on Democracy in which he expressed his views on democracy and related issues. He was a journalist, satirist, and critic and a libertarian and one of the leaders of the Old Right. In his book, he describes the failure of Puritanism, pages 177-186. Below is an overview of his discussion on the failure of Puritanism; my comments are in brackets.
    Mencken describes the action of Puritanism as follows: “Under the pressure of fanaticism, and with the mob complacently applauding the show, democratic law tends more and more to be grounded upon the maxim that every citizen is, by nature, a traitor, a libertine, and a scoundrel. In order to dissuade him from his evil-doing the police power is extended until it surpasses anything ever heard of in the oriental monarchies of antiquity.” [For example, ever more things said by a White, especially a White male, and even more so by a White Southern male, that might possibly hurt the feelings of a supersensitive person who is searching for someone to hurt his/her/its feelings is proscribed. If such words do not result in a jail sentence, as often happens in Europe, they certainly lead to expulsion from school and a loss of employment.] As a result, “it is almost a literal fact that the citizen has no rights that the police are bound to respect.” [One can hardly imagine Mencken’s disgust of the power that the police now have in America’s emerging police state where the police can often arrest a person for resisting arrest when the police have not charged the person with any crime.] Mencken continues, “These awful powers, of course, are not exercised against all citizens. The man of influence with the reigning politicians, the supporter of the prevailing delusions, and the adept hypocrite — these are seldom molested.” [Hillary Clinton is an excellent example of one who is not molested; she is shielded.] “But the man who finds himself in an unpopular minority is at the mercy of the Polizei [police], and the easiest way to get into such a minority is to speak out boldly for the Bill of Rights.” [One needs only to listen to talk radio, especially on shortwave and the Internet, to discover many people whom the government has victimized for speaking for the Bill of Rights. Also, many judges deny the defense appealing to the Bill of Rights.]
    The procedure operates as follows: “First an unpopular man is singled out for persecution, and then a diligent search is made, with the police and prosecuting officers and even the courts co-operating, for a law that he can be accused of breaking. The enormous multiplicity of sumptuary and inquisitorial statutes makes this quest easy. The prisoner begins his progress through the mill of justice under a vague accusation of disorderly conduct or disturbing the peace; he ends charged with crimes that carry staggering penalties.” [One cynical commentator claims that between the time the average person gets out of bed and eats breakfast, he has already committed five felonies. During the day, the average person probably commits several felonies and dozens of misdemeanors and even more civil infractions without knowing that he has committed a crime. The government has made a criminal of everyone, which makes imprisoning everyone who becomes a nuisance legally easy. To increase the likelihood of people violating a law, laws are often written to contradict other laws. Thus, by obey one law, the person has to disobey another law.] Making criminals of people “for merely thinking unpopular thoughts,” as many Puritans[, Yankees,] want to do today, is not new. Mencken comments on laws that outlawed unpopular thoughts. He writes, “Once he is accused of such heresy, the subsequent proceedings take on the character of a lynching. His constitutional rights are swept away as of no validity, and all the ancient rules of the Common Law — for example, those against double jeopardy and hearsay are suspended in order to fetch him. Many of the newer statutes actually suspend these safeguards formally, and though they are to that extent plainly unconstitutional, the higher courts have not interfered with their execution.” [This situation that Mencken abhors has gotten infinitely worse since he wrote. For example, double jeopardy appears in the application of many civil rights laws. If a White person is found not guilty of a crime against a Black person, then the U.S. government may file charges against the White person for violating the Black person’s civil rights. The White person is being charged with committing a crime of which he has been found innocent by merely changing the name of the crime.] He cites the Volstead Act as an example of a law that “destroys the constitutional right to a jury trial, and in its administration the constitutional prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures and the rule against double jeopardy.” [The Volstead Act was the law that enforced the Eighteenth Amendment, the Prohibition Amendment. Much of the legislation enacted by Congress since 9-11 voids the Bill of Rights.] He continues, “The mob is always in favour of the prosecution, for the prosecution is giving the show. In the face of its applause, very few American judges have the courage to enforce the constitutional guarantees — and still fewer prosecuting attorneys.” [This explains the lack of popular support for the people who are persecuted and prosecuted for standing up for liberty and the inalienable rights guaranteed by the Constitution.]
    Furthermore, “a prosecuting attorney’s success depends very largely upon his ferocity. American practice permits him an extravagance of attack that would land him in jail, and perhaps even in a lunatic asylum, in any other country, and the more passionately he indulges in it the more certain becomes his promotion to higher office, including the judicial.” Judges who had previously been prosecuting attorneys “seem to be generally convinced that any man accused of crime is ipso facto guilty, and that if he is known to harbour political heresies he is guilty of a sort of blasphemy when he mentions his constitutional rights.” [An early television judge showed such bias and prejudice. Whenever someone appeared before him whom he thought was a “racist,” that person lost his case even if the evidence overwhelmingly supported his cause.]
    Mencken notes, “This doctrine that a man who stands in contempt of the prevailing idealogy has no rights under the law is so thoroughly democratic that in the United States it is seldom questioned, save by romantic fanatics, robbed of their wits by an uncritical reading of the Fathers.” [Mencken’s observation may be true of a true lover of liberty, a libertist, but it is not true of others. However, courts have gone out of their way to ensure that the rights of Communists and their allies who want to abolish all real liberties and convert the United States to totalitarianism are protected.]
    Next, Mencken remarks, “It is difficult, indeed, for democracy to reconcile itself to what may be called common decency. By this common decency I mean the habit, in the individual, of viewing with tolerance and charity the acts and ideas of other individuals — the habit which makes a man a reliable friend, a generous opponent, and a good citizen.” [One of the most amusing ironies in America today is that the people who preach tolerance and yell the loudest that we must all be tolerant are the most intolerant people in the country. What would one expect from a Puritan Yankee, to use a tautology?] Then Mencken adds, “The democrat, despite his strong opinion to the contrary, is seldom a good citizen. . . .His eagerness to bring all his fellow-citizens, and especially all those who are superior to him, into accord with his own dull and docile way of thinking, and to force it upon them when they resist, leads him inevitably into acts of unfairness, oppression and dishonour which, if all men were alike guilty of them, would quickly break down that mutual trust and confidence upon which the very structure of civilized society rests. Where democratic man is so firmly in possession of his theoretical rights that resistance to him is hopeless, as it is in large areas of the United States, he actually produces this disaster.” [Can one say “California?”] For “any well-informed and self-respecting man” living in such a community is almost impossible. Not accepting “the democratic epistemology and the Puritan ethic” of such communities, he is harassed until he flees.
    Continuing, Mencken explains the uneasiness in American life: “This irreconcilable antagonism between democratic Puritanism and common decency is probably responsible for the uneasiness and unhappiness that are so marked in American life, despite the great material prosperity of the United States. Theoretically, the American people should be happier than any other; actually, they are probably the least happy in Christendom. The trouble with them is that they do not trust one another — and without mutual trust there can be no ease, and no genuine happiness.” [Multiculturalism and multiracialism, both of which the Yankee has forced on the country, cause much of this distrust and the resulting unhappiness. As European countries have become more multicultural and multiracial, they too are suffering from distrust and the resulting unhappiness and uneasiness. People in monoracial and monocultural countries are more trusting of one another and, therefore, happier.] Mencken concludes, “The thing that makes life charming is not money, but the society of our fellow-men, and the thing that draws us toward our fellow-men is not admiration for their inner virtues, their hard striving to live according to the light that is in them, but admiration for their outer graces and decencies — in brief, confidence that they will always act generously and understandingly in their intercourse with us. We must trust men before we may enjoy them.” Then he remarks that “it is impossible to put any such trust in a Puritan. With the best intentions in the world he cannot rid himself of the delusion that his duty to save us from our sins — i.e., from the non-Puritanical acts that we delight in — is paramount to his duty to let us be happy in our own way. Thus he is unable to be tolerant, and with tolerance goes magnanimity. A Puritan cannot be magnanimous. He is constitutionally unable to grasp the notion that it is better to be decent than to be steadfast, or even than to be just.” Furthermore, the democrat “is simply a Puritan doubly damned.” [Mencken seems not to realize that “Puritan” and “Yankee” are synonymous. That is, a Puritan is a Yankee and a Yankee is a Puritan. Hillary Clinton is an excellent contemporary example of a Puritan Yankee.]

Copyright © 2017 by Thomas Coley Allen.

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Does the Monetary Unit Determine the Value of Bullion?

Does the Monetary Unit Determine

the Value of Bullion?

Thomas Allen

    One of the debates that economists had during the era of the gold-coin standard[1] was whether the monetary value of the gold coin determined the value of gold bullion or gold bullion determined the value of the gold coin. Is the value of each unit of money determined by the value of the bullion in each unit? Or, is the value of bullion in each unit of money determined by the value of the monetary unit? In other words, is the monetary unit the independent variable, or is gold bullion the independent variable?[2]
    In his book Money (1882), George Weston argues that the value of bullion is determined by the value of coin, the monetary unit. The value of coin is determined by the quantity of coins and paper money. Weston is a proponent of the quantity theory of money. Other things being equal, the quantity of money fixes the value of the monetary unit, which he usually seems to mean its purchasing power. This is true not only for inconvertible fiat government paper notes, it is also true of full-weight gold coins and other types of money. According to him, governments can keep their government notes from deprecating by properly controlling their quantity. Moreover, he seems to prefer fiat paper government notes to full-weight gold coin. (A full-weight gold coin is a coin whose monetary value equals the value of its gold content.)
    Weston believes that a parity between full-weight coin and paper money can be permanently maintained by limiting the quantity of paper money. Moreover, he contends that controlling the quantity of paper money is more reliable than redeeming paper money in coin on demand, which he considers to be “hopelessly treacherous as it is costly and clumsy.” He adds that using the requirement to redeem bank notes in gold coin on demand to regulate the issue of bank notes is “false and fraudulent . . . and had proved itself in practice one of the worst scourges which has ever afflicted mankind.” Such a system causes the quantity of money to fluctuate too much. A superior system is to use the price of gold to regulate the issue of inconvertible paper money. Perhaps, he is correct, but no government has ever achieved the goal of maintaining parity or near parity of paper money with coin or bullion for more than a few years without redemption. Furthermore, rarely does a government use the price of gold to regulate the issue of inconvertible paper money. Such methodology is too restrictive and obviates the purpose of resorting to inconvertible paper money, which is to issue money based on politics and not on economics.
    Weston prefers a static supply of bank notes as the banking systems of England and most other European countries had where nearly all bank notes were backed by gold coin. A major problem with this static money supply is that to fit periods of high demand for notes, such as around Christmas, a large quantity of notes has to remain unused in vaults for most of the year. European countries overcame this inelasticity problem with checkable deposits, which Weston rejects as money. By expanding checkable deposits when demand was high and contracting them when demand was low, banks satisfied the markets’ monetary needs.
    Moreover, Weston believes that the law gives gold its value. Furthermore, the value of gold as merchandise is not an element constituting its value as money. This monetary value of gold can be regulated by varying the quantity of paper money in circulation. Increasing the quantity of paper money decreases the value of gold coin. Here he seems to confuse value with purchasing power. The two are different. Besides, increasing the quantity of paper money does not always lead to a decline in purchasing power of gold coin. In the United States, during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the purchasing power of gold coin rose while it was accompanied by a rising supply of paper money (some fiat like the U.S. note[3] and some not like national bank notes[4]) and legal-tender silver dollars.[5] However, fiat paper money and fiat silver dollars may have prevented prices from declining more than they did.
    Also, Weston seems to believe that gold and silver are not money (Murray Rothbard strongly disagrees; he declares that gold is money, whatever its form.) People desire them because of ease of converting them to money — presumably, he means coin and possibly bullion as reserves for paper money. However, gold bullion has been used as money, and not merely as backing for paper money, before and after coinage.
    According to him, civilized people today (1884) do not desire gold for ornamentation but solely for its use as money. If true, the manufacturing of gold jewelry would be an unprofitable undertaking.
    Weston claims that silver coin can be kept at parity with gold coin by limiting the quantity of silver coins. He cites several examples in Europe. Silver coins in the countries that he mentions were either subsidiary coins to gold coin or soon became subsidiary coins. These countries were on the gold standard, and their silver coins were convertible to gold either directly or indirectly. This convertibility — not their quantity — kept the monetary value of these coins at par with gold coin, although the silver content of these coins was worth less than the monetary value of the coin. (If the monetary value of a coin fixes the value of its bullion content as Weston contends, why did not the value of silver rise to match the monetary value of the silver coin?)
    Weston seems deceitful about subsidiary coins and uses them to support his contention that the metal content of a coin does not determine the value of the coin, but the value of the coin determines the value of its metal content. Subsidiary coins are token coins used for transactions so small that full-weight gold coins cannot be used without receiving change in token coins. Moreover, token coins can be redeemed in gold coin. If a subsidiary coin is to circulate, the value of its metal content has to be less than its monetary value or else it will be melted for its metal.
    Nevertheless, his comments on the European silver coins fit the silver dollar in the United States at that time. The silver dollar was fiat money whose quantity was fixed by Congress and the Secretary of the Treasury. According to Weston, it was kept at par with the gold dollar by limiting the quantity of silver dollars manufactured. Although the value of the metal content of the silver dollar was worth less than a dollar, Congress declared the silver dollar to have a legal-tender value of one dollar. Although the silver dollar could not be directly converted to gold, it could be converted indirectly to gold. One means of achieving this conversion was to deposit silver dollars in a bank and then withdraw the money in gold coin. This indirect conversion to gold kept the silver dollar at par with gold.
    Historical examples argue against Weston’s position. As shown below, the value of bullion controls the value of the coin, and not the monetary value stamped on the coin.
    In 1985, Congress authorized the minting of a one-ounce gold coin with a legal tender value of $50 and a one-ounce silver coin with a legal tender value of $1. This action occurred 14 years after gold had ceased having any formal part of the world’s monetary systems. Likewise, it occurred decades after silver had any formal part of the world’s monetary system except as subsidiary coins, which use ended in the mid-1960s.
    If the monetary value of gold coin determined the value of its gold bullion content, which was $327 at end of 1985, then the gold coin should have pulled the value, price, of bullion down to $50 per ounce. Instead of the coin pulling the value of bullion down, bullion raised the value of the coin up. Likewise, silver bullion in the one-ounce $1 silver coin raised the value of the coin instead of the silver coin pulling the value of bullion down to $1 per ounce.
    Under the  Bretton Woods system, the US government guaranteed the US dollar to have the value of one thirty-fifth of an ounce of gold and exchanged one ounce of gold at the rate of $35 per ounce when a foreign government or its central bank redeemed its dollars. During the 1960s, the value, price, of gold bullion rose above $35 per ounce. If Weston were correct in that the value of the monetary unit determines the value of bullion, such a dichotomy could not have occurred. The price of gold could not have risen above $35 per ounce. As a result of the divergence between the monetary unit and bullion, the Bretton Woods system was abandoned in 1971.
    The same effect occurred in Weston’s day when Congress authorized the issuance of government notes called US notes and nicknamed greenbacks. Soon after issuance, the $10 US note began trading at a discount to the $10 gold coin. Although the magnitude of the discount varied, the US note did not exchange at par with gold coin until it became redeemable in gold. If the monetary unit determines the value of bullion, then the $10 US note should have remained at par with the $10 gold coin. Moreover, if the monetary unit determined the value of bullion, then subsidiary silver coins should have remained in circulation. They did not. For several years subsidiary silver coins ceased circulating because their value as bullion exceeded their value as money.
    According to Weston, the value of the dollar is determined by the quantity of coin and paper money. As S. McLean Hardy’s statistical study shows, during the War, the value of the dollar had more to do with Confederate victories and defeats than with its quantity. Confidence, not quantity, gives inconvertible paper money its value, although its quantity affects confidence. Convertibility gives paper money its value whatever its quantity.
    Weston does acknowledge that paper money can depreciate against gold coin and cause gold coins to cease circulating. How can this be if the value of money determines the value of gold bullion in the coin? How can the value of the bullion content of a $10 gold coin rise above the $10 monetary value stamped on the coin, if the monetary value of the coin determines the value of its bullion content? The experience that he witnessed with the US note proves that the value of the monetary unit does not fix the value of its bullion content.
    Centuries before the first precious metal coin was ever minted, people bought and sold goods and services with gold and silver bullion. Genesis 23:16 records such an event when Abraham bought a burial plot for his deceased wife by weighing out silver.
    More proof that a coin’s bullion content governs its monetary value is that well-worn coins exchange by their weight rather than by the monetary value stamped on them unless the law prohibits such discounting. In which case, the law is often ignored by refusing to accept the worn coin in trade at its full monetary value. (Unfortunately, creditors often had to accept worn coins in payment of debt.) Some countries under the gold standard allowed by law exchanges of well-worn coins by weight rather than by tale. Even in some countries that prohibited such discounting guaranteed the full-weight of their coins by exchanging new full-weight coins for worn coins.
    Weston asserts that suspension of the gold standard, i.e., the suspension of convertibility of paper money, in one country adds to the number of gold coins in other countries. The resumption of the gold standard, i.e., returning to convertibility of paper money in gold coin, draws gold coins from other countries. He ignores the large sink of hoarded coins, gold bullion, jewelry, ornamentation, plate, and other gold products that can absorb the excess gold under suspension and can return it under resumption. Thus, according to him, the abandonment of the gold standard in one major commercial country causes the value of gold in other countries to fall. Resumption of the gold standard causes the value gold in other countries to rise.
    When a country suspends species payments, Weston claims that its coins flow to other countries and reduce the value of money, and by that, the value of gold, in these countries. If so, the effect is only temporary. The value of gold as bullion and in coin is nearly equal worldwide. Moreover, the global quantity of gold available for monetary use is so massive compared with what may flee one country that the effect of the fleeing gold would be small or even insignificant. Weston would counter that this new supply of gold is sufficient to lower its value worldwide.
    If Weston is correct in that whatever gold that flees a country that has suspended the gold standard flows into the monetary system of other countries, only a small part will end up in circulating gold coins. Most will go to banks as deposits and become the basis for credit expansion. Most of the money created by this expansion will be as checkable deposits while some will be as bank notes. This credit expansion is what causes monetary inflation and the resulting rising prices. Its contraction results in deflation and decline in prices. However, many problems associated with credit expansion can be avoided by using sound banking practices (not fractional reserve banking practices, which allows multiple parties to use the same money simultaneously). Sound banking practices include not borrowing short and lending long and backing all checkable deposits 100 percent with full-weight coin or commercial money.[6] (Commercial money is a real bill of exchange that is self-liquidating usually within 90 days or less; it can only function under a commodity standard like the gold standard.)
    The decline in purchasing power, Weston contends, results from a reduction in demand for gold as coin when the gold standard is suspended. However, he claims that the loss in purchasing power results from a loss of the value of gold coin. The reverse occurs when the gold standard is resumed and paper money is again convertible in gold. Purchasing power of coin and paper increases because the value of gold increases. He ignores the quality of money theory, which explains the fall and rise of money’s purchasing power, which he calls value. When the gold standard is suspended, low-quality inconvertible paper money, which has less value and purchasing power than gold, replaces gold coin. When the gold standard is resumed, a high-quality money, gold coin and paper money convertible in gold, replaces low-quality inconvertible paper money.
    Moreover, he seems to credit the rise and fall in prices mostly on changes in the supply and demand for monetary gold. He sees the changes in prices being caused by changes in the value of gold. He ignores changes in credit money, except bank notes, which he considers to be real money and not credit money,[7] have much more effect on prices than changes in the supply of gold.
    Weston fails to explain how the monetary unit gets its initial value. Under the gold standard, the monetary unit gets its value from gold. The monetary unit is defined as a specific weight of gold and the monetary unit has the value of that weight of gold. For example, the Gold Standard Act of 1900 defined the dollar as 23.22 grains of gold. Therefore, the dollar had the value of 23.22 grains of gold. This is more proof that the monetary unit derives its value from its metal content as the value of bullion precedes the monetary unit.
    This notion Weston rejects. He claims that the value of the monetary unit, the dollar, gives the 23.22 grains of gold its value. The dollar may give 23.22 grains of gold its price, but it does not give the gold its value. Value and prices are not the same things. Value is subjective; price is objective. Moreover, not everything that has value, has a price; for example, love of one’s mate and children has great value but no price.
    An example of the difference between price and value is that, under the gold standard, when a person buys a shirt for $10, the shirt has the value of 232.2 grains of gold and a price of $10. (Today, when one buys a shirt with a $10 federal reserve note, what is the value of the shirt? Without defining the dollar in terms of itself, which is a poor and unsatisfactory definition that should be unacceptable and not used, such as the value of the dollar is a dollar’s worth of goods, no one can definitively define the value of the dollar.)
    Before any commodity became money, a medium of exchange, it had to have value independently of its monetary use. Its monetary use adds to its value as a commodity, but does not create it. Weston acknowledges that gold had value as ornamentation, etc. before being coined, and its uses as coin add to that value and even gives gold its highest actual value. If true, no gold coin would ever be melted for use as ornamentation, for the highest value of gold is that in the form of a coin. However, as gold coins were often melted for their gold and that gold was used for other purposes, gold as coin is not always its highest use.
    Moreover, Weston is unclear about how paper money gets its value other than the government limiting its quantity. How this limitation initially gives paper money, especially inconvertible paper money, its initial value, he does not explain. Convertible paper money derives its value from the gold that it represents. Inconvertible paper money derives its value from the gold coin that it replaces. Quantity has nothing to do with this initial value.
    In his argument to prove that coin fixes the value of bullion, Weston shows that government can easily manipulate their monetary systems and the purchasing power of their money — usually to the detriment of the people. However, he fails to identify or to describe a governmentally manipulated monetary system that works better than, or even as well as, the gold-coin standard accompanied by a well-functioning credit system, although as an example, he offers Brazil, which used the price of gold as an index to regulate its fiat paper money supply.
     Under the gold-coin standard, the government does not regulate the quantity of gold coins produced. However, it often intervenes to restrict the quantity of bank notes issued, although such intervention is not necessary and probably undesirable as it can distort the markets. Market forces decide the quantity of gold coins minted and gold coins melted. When the government does not intervene, and to some extent, even when it does, market forces regulate the quantity of bank notes issued.
    Whether bank notes and government notes[8] are convertible or inconvertible to full-weight gold coin, Weston argues that they are money in their own right. They are real money and are not merely forms of credit money. True, they are used as a medium of exchange. Also, when they are inconvertible, they nearly always become the unit of account, especially if the government makes them legal tender. However, real money like full-weight gold or silver coin performs one monetary duty that these notes cannot perform. That is, full-weight coin not only discharges debt, it also extinguishes debt because it is no one else’s liability. Bank notes and government notes can only discharge debt. They do so by passing the obligation to another, which is ultimately the person or entity responsible for the note.[9] For example, the US government is the responsible party for today’s federal reserve note. Contrary to Weston’s assertion, bank notes and government notes are not real money; they are credit money and cannot extinguish debt.
    Weston rejects the notion that bills of changes and checkable deposits are money. According to him, they do not have the effect as bank notes and do not increase the quantity of money. Today, as checkable deposits far exceed bank notes as money in industrialized countries, most monetary disturbances like inflation comes from changes in checkable deposits than fluctuation in bank notes.
    Therefore, Weston’s quantity theory of money ignores commercial money, real bills of exchange, as part of the quantity of money. Like bank notes, commercial money is a form of credit money that can be used to purchase goods and discharge debts. Unlike bank notes, commercial money has a specific life, usually 90 days or less, before it expires. Commercial money often exceeds bank notes in quantity and even exceeds the quantity of coins and paper money. If the quantity of money is the sole determinant of the value of money, other things being equal, as Weston asserts, or even the primary determinant, then how can he ignore commercial money? Nevertheless, Weston rejects the notion that bills of exchange are money and, therefore, need no consideration as part of the quantity of money or any quantity of money theory.
    Likewise, Weston’s quantity theory of money also ignores checkable deposits, checkbook money, as part of the quantity of money. Like bank notes, checkable deposits are a form of credit money that can be used to purchase goods and discharge debt. Unlike bank notes, which can pass through many hands before returning to a bank, checks usually pass through only one or two hands before returning to a bank. The major difference between a bank note and checkbook money is that a bank note is an order drawn on a bank to transfer gold from the bank’s account to the bearer and a check is an order to transfer gold from the drawer’s account to bearer. In Weston’s time (1884), in the United States, checkable deposits exceeded bank notes and coin in purchasing goods and discharging debt. He acknowledges that checks are used for most transactions. Moreover, under fractional reserve banking, which was practiced in his day as it is today, checkable deposits exceed species, commercial money and in Britain bank notes and in the United States silver dollars and US notes held by the bank; thus, they exceed what Weston considers real money. Any quality of money theory that ignores checkable deposits is a highly deficient theory. Nevertheless, Weston rejects the notion that checkable deposits are money and, therefore, need no consideration as part of the quantity of money or any quantity of money theory.
    A bank note is merely a check that a bank writes on itself. (Under the system advocated by Weston as modeled after the British system after 1844, this is not the case. Under the British system, what were called bank notes were similar to gold certificates issued in the United States. Whereas gold certificates were fully backed by gold, a fraction of the British notes was backed by nontradable government securities. Like gold certificates, they were warehouse receipts promising to pay the bearer in gold. Unlike US gold certificates, which were not legal tender, British notes were legal tender. Although Weston implies that making bank notes legal tender makes them real money, he seems to accept gold certificates as real money though they were not legal tender.) A bank note, even if it is merely a warehouse receipt, is a credit instrument because it is someone else’s liability. Weston rejects the notion that bank notes are credit instruments: a check that the issuer writes on itself to pay the bearer money, i.e., gold coin. To him, bank notes are money in their own right and are not promises to pay money, i.e., gold coin.
    An interesting note cited by Weston is that John Stuart Mills mused that under the right conditions, deposits and checks might replace currencies altogether. Weston thought that such a replacement was absurd. However, today, most countries are moving to eliminate currency and to force people to use bank deposits and checks, preferably with debit cards instead of paper checks. If this happens, the quantity of money, according to Weston’s theory, goes to zero: Money would cease to exist by his definition of money. Then what would fix the value of gold bullion?
    Weston displays inordinate confidence in the government to manage the country’s monetary system. As the history of the last 100 years shows, governments are highly incompetent in managing their monetary systems if the objective is to avoid inflation, hyperinflation, panics, depressions, recessions, and other economic and monetary disturbances and disasters. If the objective is to transfer wealth and power from the common people to the rich and powerful, they has been highly successful.
    When his quantity theory of money fails, Weston has an out, which is “everything else being equal.” When it fails, it is because “everything else is not equal.”
    In conclusion, Weston argues that the value of gold bullion does not control the value of gold coin or paper money kept at par with it. To the contrary, the opposite is true: The maximum value of gold bullion fluctuates with and is regulated by the value of gold coin and paper money at parity with gold coin. Moreover, the value of the monetary unit depends, other things being equal, on the quantity of monetary units, both coin and paper money.
    Weston errs when he claims that the value of the monetary unit gives gold bullion its value. To the contrary, the value of gold bullion gives the monetary unit its value. The value of gold preceded its use as money, and its use as money preceded its use as coin. Weston confuses value with price. The monetary unit gives gold its price, which is objective, but it does not give gold its value, which is subjective.

Endnotes:
1. See “What is the Gold Standard” by Thomas Allen.

2. See “Is the Price of Gold Fixed Under the Gold Standard” by Thomas Allen.

3. See “The U.S. Note, 1862-1879" by Thomas Allen.

4. See “National Banking System” by Thomas Allen.

5.  See “The Silver Dollar 1873-1900" by Thomas Allen.

6. See “Real Bills Doctrine” by Thomas Allen.

7. See “Differences Between Real Money and Fiat Money” by Thomas Allen.

8. See "Difference Between Bank Notes and Government Notes" by Thomas Allen.

9. See “Extinguishing Debt” by Thomas Allen.

Copyright © 2017 by Thomas Coley Allen.

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