Milton on the Holy Spirit : Responses to Arguments That the Holy Spirit Is God

Milton on the Holy Spirit

Responses to Arguments That the Holy Spirit Is God

Thomas Allen

[Editor’s note: The following is the continuation of the summary of John Milton’s view of the Holy Spirit, as presented in Milton on the Son of God and the Holy Spirit from His Treatise on Christian Doctrine (London, England: British & Foreign Unitarian Association, 1908). Page numbers enclosed in parentheses are to this book. Biblical quotations are Milton’s translations. My comments are enclosed in brackets.]
    Next, Milton discusses arguments put forth proclaiming the deity of the Holy Spirit. First, the divinity of the Holy Spirit is defended “on the ground, that the name of God seems to be attributed to the Spirit” (p. 123). Acts 5:3, 4 states, “'why hath Satan filled thine heart to lie to the Holy Ghost? . . . thou hast not lied unto men, but unto God.” Milton comments that this verse appears “too weak for the support of so great a doctrinal mystery” of the Trinity Doctrine. He adds, “For since the Spirit is expressly said to be sent by the Father, and in the name of the Son, he who lies to the Spirit must lie to God, in the same sense as he who receives an apostle, receives God who sent him” (p. 123). According to Paul, God has given men his Holy Spirit: “he therefore that despiseth, despiseth not man, but God, who hath also given unto us his Holy Spirit” – 1 Thessalonians 4:8. Moreover, the Holy Spirit in Acts 5:3, 4 may “signify God the Father; for Peter afterwards says, Acts v. 9, ‘how is it that ye have agreed together to tempt the Spirit of the Lord’” (p. 123). Further, Acts 5:32 states, “whom God hath given to them that obey him” (p. 124).
    Then, Milton discusses Acts 28:25 (“well spake the Holy Ghost by Esaias the prophet”). He notes “that the names Lord and Jehovah are throughout the Old Testament attributed to whatever angel God may entrust with the execution of his commands” (p. 124). He concludes, “It cannot therefore be inferred from this passage, any more than from the preceding [Acts 5: 3,4], that the Holy Ghost is God” (p. 124).
    Next Milton discusses 1 Corinthians 3:16 (“the temple of God . . . the temple of the Holy Ghost”). However, this verse does not say or even imply “that the Holy Spirit is God; for it is not because the Spirit alone, but because the Father also and the Son ‘make their abode with us,’ that we are called ‘the temple of God’” (pp. 124-125). Continuing, he states, “Therefore in I Cor. vi. 19, where we are called ‘the temple of the Holy Ghost,’ St. Paul has added, ‘which ye have of God,’ as if with the purpose of guarding against any error which might arise respecting the Holy Spirit in consequence of his expression” (p. 125). In Ephesians 2:22, Paul explains in “what sense we are called ‘the temple of the Holy Ghost’” (p. 125): “in whom ye also are builded together for an habitation of God through the Spirit.”
    For proof of the Holy Spirit’s omniscience, Trinitarians present 1 Corinthians 2:10, 11: “the Spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God: for what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him? even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God.” First, Milton remarks that verse 10 does not refer to “divine omniscience, but only respecting those deep things ‘which God hath revealed unto us by his Spirit’ — the words immediately preceding” (p. 125). He adds, “Besides, the phrase ‘all things’ must be restricted to mean whatever it is expedient for us to know: not to mention that it would be absurd to speak of God searching God, with whom he was one is essence” (pp. 125-126). In verse 11, “the essence of the Spirit is not the subject in question; for the consequences would be full of absurdity, if it were to be understood that the Spirit of God was with regard to God, as the spirit of a man is with regard to man. Allusion therefore is made only to the intimate relationship and communion of the Spirit with God, from whom he originally proceeded” (p. 126). To support his conclusion, he cites 1 Corinthians 2:14 (“we have received . . . the Spirit which is of God”). “That which is of God, cannot be actually God, who is unity” (p. 126). In Matthew 11:27 (“No man knoweth the Son, but the Father, neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him”), the Son proves that the Holy Spirit is not omniscient. The Son declares that the Holy Spirit does not know the Father or the Son unless the Son gives him such knowledge. Likewise, Mark 13:32 provides an additional argument against the omniscience of the Holy Spirit (p. 126).
    Trinitarians claim that the Holy Spirit is omnipresent because “the Spirit of God dwelleth in us.” Milton replies, “But even if it filled with its presence the whole circle of the earth, with all the heavens, that is, the entire fabric of this world, it would not follow that the Spirit is omnipresent” (p. 127). [Most Trinitarians seem to underestimate the quality of omnipresence and have little or no comprehension of omnipresence. To be omnipresent requires much more than dwelling in man, even in every human who exists, who has ever existed, who will ever exist. Omnipresence requires being everywhere simultaneously. It requires filling every void, particle, and spirit in the universe and beyond. Moreover, it requires filling hell completely and every being in it including Satan.]
    On the divine works of the Holy Spirit, Trinitarians cite Acts 2:34, 13:2, and 20:28, and 2 Peter 1:20. In response, Milton remarks that all that is needed to refute this assertion is Christ’s comment “respecting the Holy Spirit, the Comforter; namely, that he was sent by the Son from the Father, that he spake not of himself, nor in his own name, and consequently that he did not act in his own name; therefore that he did not even move others to speak of his own power, but that what he gave he had himself received” (p. 127).
    Trinitarians point to the miraculous conception (Matthew 1:18, 20 and Luke 1:35) as proof of the divine works of the Holy Spirit. Milton replies that “it is not to be understood with reference to his own person alone. For it is certain that, in the Old Testament, under the name of the Spirit of God, or of the Holy Spirit, either God the Father himself, or his divine power was signified” (p. 128). Commenting on Luke 1:35, Milton states that the Holy Spirit refers to God the Father, “unless we suppose that there are two Fathers — one Father of the Son of God, another Father of the Son of man” (pp. 128-129).
    To support that the Holy Spirit has divine honors, Trinitarians cite Matthew 28:19. Milton responds that although this verse mentions three persons, “there is not a word that determines the divinity, or unity, or equality of these three” (p. 129). Then, he cites passages that show that there were baptisms unto Moses (1 Corinthians 10:2), unto the baptism of John (Acts 19:3), in the name of Jesus Christ (Acts 2:38), into Jesus Christ and into his death (Romans 6:3), and into one body (1 Corinthians 12:13). Thus, Milton notes:

To be baptized therefore in their name, is to be admitted to those benefits and gifts which we have received through the Son and the Holy Spirit. . . . when we are baptized in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, this is not done to impress upon our minds the inherent or relative natures of these three persons, but the benefits conferred by them in baptism on those who believe  — namely, that our eternal salvation is owing to the Father, our redemption to the Son, and our sanctification to the Spirit (pp. 129-130).

    Continuing, Milton adds, “The power of the Father is inherent in himself, that of the Son and the Spirit is received from the Father” (p. 130). The Spirit does “everything in the name of the Father and the Son” (p. 130). To support his conclusion, Milton cites Matthew 28:18, 19, and 1 Corinthians 6:11 (“but ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God”). Commenting on 1 Corinthians 6:11, Milton notes that “the same three are mentioned as in baptism, ‘the Son,’ ‘the Spirit,’ and ‘our God’; it follows therefore that the Father alone is our God, of whom are both the Son and the Spirit” (p. 130).
    Trinitarians claim that the Holy Spirit’s deity is proven by the invocation being made to him as in 2 Corinthians 13:14 (“the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost, be with you all”). Milton replies, “This, however, is not so much an invocation as a benediction, in which the Spirit is not addressed as a person but sought as a gift, from him who alone is there called God, namely, the Father, from whom Christ himself directs us to seek the communication of the Spirit. . . . He who is sought from the Father, and given by him, not by himself, can neither be God, nor an object of invocation” (pp. 130-131). Continuing, he adds that “it is by the Son that we come to the Father, from whom finally the Holy Spirit is sent” (p. 131).
    Next he comments on 1 Corinthians 12: 4-6, where the Spirit, Lord, and God are mentioned. He states that “it is one God which worketh all in all, even in the Son and the Spirit, as we are taught throughout the whole of Scripture” (p. 132).
    Then, Milton comments on Matthew 12: 31, 32 (the unforgivable sin). First, “no reference to the personality of the Holy Spirit” (p. 132) is made. Second, “if to sin against the Holy Spirit were worse than to sin against the Father and Son, and if that alone were an unpardonable sin, the Spirit truly would be greater than the Father and the Son” (p. 132).  He understands that the “words must therefore apply to that illumination which, as it is highest in degree, so it is last in order of time, whereby the Father enlightens us through the Spirit, and which if any one resist, no method of salvation remains open to him” (p. 132). Nevertheless, Milton believes “that it is the Father himself who is here called the Holy Spirit. . . . [The] dreaded sin against the Holy Spirit will be in reality a sin against the Father, who is the Spirit of holiness” (pp. 132-133).
    Another argument for the deity of the Holy Spirit is that he “bestows grace and blessing upon the churches in conjunction with the Father and the Son: Rev. i. 4, 5, ‘grace be unto you and peace from him which is . . . and from the seven Spirits which are before his throne, and from Jesus Christ’” (p. 133). Milton replies, “[Clearly,] the Holy Spirit is not here meant to be implied; the number of the spirits is inconsistent with such a supposition, as well as the place which they are said to occupy, standing like angels before the throne” (p. 133). Milton concludes “that in this kind of threefold enumerations the sacred writers have no view whatever to the doctrine of three divine persons, or to the equality or order of those persons” (pp.133-134).
    Commenting on 1 John 5:7 [which is spurious, but was once a major proof text of the Trinitarians], Milton states that nothing in this verse “implies either divinity or unity of essence” (p. 134). He identifies additional problems with using this verse to support the Trinity Doctrine (pp. 133-135).
    Turning to 1 Timothy 5:21 (“I charge thee before God, and the Lord Jesus Christ, and the elect angels”), Milton remarks that one would have expected the Holy Spirit to have been named in third place, “if such ternary forms of expression really contained the meaning which is commonly ascribed to them” (p. 134) [and if the Trinity Doctrine is correct].
    Finally, Milton gives his description of the Holy Spirit: “[T]he Holy Spirit, inasmuch as he is a minister of God, and therefore a creature, was created or produced of the substance of God, not by a natural necessity, but by the free will of the agent, probably before the foundations of the world were laid, but later than the Son, and far inferior to him (p. 136). [Milton’s doctrine of the Holy Spirit is similar to that of pre-Nicaean orthodoxy.]

Copyright © 2018 by Thomas Coley Allen.

Part 1

More religious articles.

Milton on the Holy Spirit: Scriptural Description of the Holy Spirit

Milton on the Holy Spirit

Scriptural Description of the Holy Spirit

Thomas Allen

    John Milton (1608–1674), who is best known as the author of Paradise Lost, believed in a unipersonal God instead of the triune God of three persons or gods in one God of today’s orthodox Christianity. The following summaries Milton’s view of the Holy Spirit as presented in Milton on the Son of God and the Holy Spirit from His Treatise on Christian Doctrine (London, England: British & Foreign Unitarian Association, 1908). About 150 years would pass before Milton’s essay was published. Page numbers enclosed in parentheses are to the book referenced above. Biblical quotations are Milton’s translations. My comments are enclosed in brackets.
    The Scriptures do not say in what manner the Holy Spirit, which is also “called the Spirit of the Father and the Son” (p. 109), exists or when it arose. “For though it be a Spirit, in the same sense in which the Father and Son are properly called Spirits; though we read that Christ by breathing on his disciples gave to them the Holy Ghost, or rather perhaps some symbols or pledge of the Holy Ghost, John XX. 22. — yet in treating of the nature of the Holy Spirit, we are not authorized to infer from such expressions, that the Spirit was breathed from the Father and the Son” (p. 109).
    Milton notes, “The terms emanation and procession employed by theologians on the authority of John xv. 26, do not relate to the nature of the Holy Spirit” (p. 109). He adds that on a single statement (“the Spirit of truth who proceedeth [or goeth forth] from the Father” – John 15:16) is a weak foundation on which to base the nature of the Holy Spirit — especially since these words relate to the mission of the Holy Spirit and not to its or his nature (pp. 109-110). Moreover, nowhere do the Scriptures say that the Holy Spirit is generated or created or “is any other mode of existence specifically attributed to it in Scripture” (p. 110). [Thus, the Trinity Doctrine of the Holy Spirit’s nature or substance is based on nothing more than pure speculation.]
    First, Milton examines Spirit in the Old Testament. He remarks, “The name of Spirit is also frequently applied to God and angels, and to the human mind” (p. 110). The Spirit sometimes “signifies God the Father himself — as Gen. vi. 3, ‘my Spirit shall not always strive with man’; sometimes the power and virtue of the Father, and particularly that divine breath or influence by which everything is created and nourished” (p. 110).
    Then, he notes that Spirit sometimes means an angle. For example, Isaiah 48:16 (“the Lord Jehovah and his Spirit hath sent me”) and Ezekiel 3:12 (“then the Spirit took me up”).
    Sometimes, Spirit means Christ, “who according to the common opinion was sent by the Father to lead the Israelites into the land of Canaan” (p. 111). [Like Trinitarians, Milton believed that the Son existed before his conception and that the preexisting Son interacted at times with Israel.] To support this supposition, Milton cites Isaiah 63: 10, 11 (“they rebelled and vexed his Holy Spirit . . . where is he that put his Holy Spirit within them”).
    Occasionally, Spirit “means that impulse or voice of God by which the prophets were inspired” (p. 111). An example is Nehemiah 9:30 (“thou testifiedst against them by thy Spirit in thy prophets”).
    At other times, Spirit means “that light of truth, whether ordinary or extraordinary, wherewith God enlightens and leads his people” (pp. 110-111). Examples are Numbers 14:24, Nehemiah 9:20, and Psalms 51:11, 12 and 143:10.  Then, Milton comments, “Undoubtedly neither David, nor any other Hebrew, under the old covenant, believed in the personality of that ‘good’ and ‘Holy Spirit,’
unless perhaps as an angel” (p. 112).
    More particularly, Spirit “implies that light which was shed on Christ himself” (p. 112). Examples are Isaiah 11:2 (“the Spirit of Jehovah shall rest upon him, the Spirit of wisdom and understanding, the Spirit of counsel and might, the Spirit of knowledge and of the fear of Jehovah”)  and 42:1 (“I have put my Spirit upon him”), which compares with Acts 10:38 (“how God anointed Jesus of Nazareth with the Holy Ghost and with power”).
    Additionally, Spirit is “used to signify the spiritual gifts conferred by God on individuals, and the act of gift itself” (p. 112). Then, Milton cites several supporting verses.
    Concluding, Milton writes, “Nothing can be more certain than that all these passages, and many others of a similar kind in the Old Testament, were understood of the virtue and power of God the Father, inasmuch as the Holy Spirit was not yet given, nor believed in, even by those who prophesied that it should be poured forth in the latter times” (pp. 112-113).
    Turning to the New Testament, Milton notes that “what is called the Holy Spirit, or the Spirit of God, sometimes means the Father himself” (p. 113). Matthew 1:18, 20 (“that which is conceived in her is of the Holy Ghost”) and Luke 1:35 (“the Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee; therefore also that holy thing which shall be born of thee, shall be called the Son of God”) are examples.
    Sometimes, Spirit “means the virtue and power of the Father” (p. 113). Luke 11:20 (“I cast out devils by the Spirit or finger of God”) and Romans 1:4 (“declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the Spirit of holiness, by the resurrection from the dead”) are examples.
    Milton notes that in many passages in the New Testament, phrases containing the word “Spirit” should “be understood of the power of the Father, than of the Holy Spirit himself” (p. 114). Examples are Hebrews 9:14, Luke 4:1 and 5:18 and Acts 1:2 and 10:38.
    Milton writes:

I am inclined to believe that the Spirit descended upon Christ at his baptism, not so much in his own name, as in virtue of a mission from the Father, and as a symbol and minister of the divine power. For what could the Spirit confer on Christ, from whom he was himself to be sent, and to receive all things? Was his purpose to bear witness to Christ? But as yet he was himself not so much as known. Was it meant that the Spirit should be then manifested for the first time to the church? But at the time of his appearance nothing was said of him or of his office; nor did that voice from heaven bear any testimony to the Spirit, but only to the Son. The descent therefore and appearance of the Holy Spirit in the likeness of a dove, seems to have been nothing more than a representation of the ineffable affection of the Father for the Son, communicated by the Holy Spirit under the appropriate image of a dove and accompanied by a voice from heaven declaratory of that affection. (pp. 114-115)

    Continuing, Milton notes that “the Spirit signifies a divine impulse, or light, or voice, or word, transmitted from above either through Christ, who is the Word of God, or by some other channel” (p. 115). Examples are Mark 12:36, Acts 1:16,  and 28:25, Hebrews 3:7, 9:8, and 10:15, 2 Peter 1:21, and Luke 2: 25, 26. He adds “that these and similar passages cannot be considered as referring to the express person of the Spirit, both because the Spirit was not yet given, and because Christ alone, as has been said before, is, properly speaking, and in a primary sense, the Word of God, and the Prophet of the Church” (p. 116). Citing Hebrews 1:1, Milton concludes that God “did not speak by the Holy Spirit alone, unless the term be understood in the signification which I have proposed, and in a much wider sense than was subsequently attributed to it” (p. 116).
    “Further, the Spirit signifies the person itself of the Holy Spirit, or its symbol” (p. 116). In Matthew 3:16, Mark 1:10, Luke 3:22, and John 1:32, a dove symbolizes the Spirit.
    Lastly, the Spirit “signifies the donation of the Spirit itself, and of its attendant gifts” (p. 117). John 7:39, Matthew 3:11, Acts 1:5 and 11:16 and 1 Thessalonians 5:19 are examples.
    Next, Milton asks who is this Holy Spirit, from where does he come, and what are his offices? He answers these questions by citing numerous passages where the Christ gives and the apostles give answers to these questions (pp. 118-119).
    Then, Milton notes that the Spirit “is called the Spirit of the Father, the Spirit of God, and even the Spirit of Christ” (p. 119). He cites several verses to support this claim.
    Milton writes,

If it be the divine with that a doctrine which is to be understood and believed as one of the primary articles of our faith, should be delivered without obscurity or confusion, and explained, as is fitting, in clear and precise terms — if it be certain that particular care ought to be taken in everything connected with religion, lest the objection urged by Christ against the Samaritans should be applicable to us —  “ye worship ye know not what,” John iv. 22 — if our Lord’s saying should be held sacred wherever points of faith are in question — “we know what we worship” — the particulars which have been stated seem to contain all that we are capable of knowing, or are required to know respecting the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as revelation has declared nothing else expressly on the subject. The nature of these particulars is such, that although the Holy Spirit be nowhere said to have taken upon himself any mediatorial functions, as is said of Christ, nor to be engaged by the obligations of a filial relation to pay obedience to the Father, yet he must evidently be considered as inferior to both Father and Son, inasmuch as he is represented and declared to be subservient and obedient in all things; to have been promised, and sent, and given; to speak nothing of himself; and even to have been given as an earnest (pp. 120-121).

[Trinitarians have certainly ignored Milton’s advice and conclusions.]
    Milton adds:

[nowhere do the Scriptures] expressly teach the doctrine of his [the Holy Spirit’s] divinity, not even in the passages where his office is explained at large, nor in those where the unity of God is explicitly asserted, as in John xvii. 3, I Cor. viii. 4, etc., nor where God is either described, or introduced as sitting upon his throne, — if, further, the Spirit be frequently named the Spirit of God, and the Holy Spirit of God, Eph. iv. 30, so that the Spirit of God being actually and numerically distinct from God himself, cannot possibly be essentially one God with him whose Spirit he is (except on certain strange and absurd hypotheses, which have no foundation in Holy Scripture, but were devised by human ingenuity, for the sole purpose of supporting this particular doctrine) — if, wherever the Father and the Holy Spirit are mentioned together, the Father alone be called God, and the Father alone, omitting all notice of the Spirit, be acknowledged by Christ himself to be the one true God (pp. 121-122).

    Continuing, Milton states, “It seems exceedingly unreasonable, not to say dangerous, . . . believers should be required to receive a doctrine, represented by its advocates as of primary importance and of undoubted certainty, on anything less than the clearest testimony of Scripture” (p. 122).

Copyright © 2018 by Thomas Coley Allen.

Part 2

More religious articles.

Milton on the Son of God – Part 3

Milton on the Son of God – Part 3

Thomas Allen

[Editor’s note:  Page numbers enclosed in parentheses are references to Milton on the Son of God and the Holy Spirit from His Treatise on Christian Doctrine by John Milton. The author’s comments are enclosed in brackets.]

      Some Trinitarians claim that according to some passages, “Christ is God; now if the Father be the only true God, Christ is not the true God; but if he be not the true God, he must be a false God” (p. 58). To this assertion, Milton replies “that the conclusion is too hastily drawn; for it may be that he is not ‘he that is true,’ either because he is only the image of him that is true, or because he uniformly declares himself to be inferior to him that is true. We are not obliged to say of Christ what the Scriptures do not say” (pp. 58-59). The Scriptures do not call Christ true God. Moreover, “he is not to be called a false God, to whom, as to his beloved Son, he that is the true God has communicated his divine power and glory” (p. 59).
      Trinitarians use Philippians 2:6 (“who being in the form of God”) to support their doctrine. Milton replies:

But this no more proves him to be God than the phrase which follows — “took upon him the form of a servant” — proves that he was really a servant, as the sacred writers nowhere use the word “form” for actual being. But if it be contended that “the form of God” is here taken in a philosophical sense for the essential form, this consequence cannot be avoided, that when Christ laid aside the form, he laid aside also the substance and the efficiency of God; a doctrine against which they protest, and with justice (p. 59).

According to Milton, “‘To be in the form of God,’ . . . seems to be synonymous with being in the image of God; which is often predicated of Christ, even as man is also said, though in a much lower sense, to be the image of God, that is, by creation” (p. 59).
      About Trinitarian gymnastics with the Scriptures, Milton writes:

It is singular, however, that those who maintain the Father and the Son to be one in essence, should revert from the gospel to the times of the law, as if they would make a fruitless attempt to illustrate light by darkness. They say that the Son is not only called God, but also Jehovah, as appears from a comparison of several passages in both testaments. Now Jehovah is the one supreme God; therefore the Son and the Father are one in essence (p. 61).

Further, Milton notes that the name of Jehovah is applied to angels when they represent his divine presence and speak his words. In support, he cites numerous verses (pp. 61-65).
      Then, citing several passages, he illustrates the absurdity of assuming that when one name is mentioned twice in the same sentence that the name is applied to two persons (pp. 65-66).
      Next, he discusses Exodus chapter 23 and 33 where God sends an angle to guide the Israelites. The angel addresses the Israelites as though he was Jehovah — he is called Jehovah. If the Israelites understood the angel to be Jehovah:

it follows that they must have conceived either that there were two Jehovahs, or that Jehovah and the angel were one in essence; which no rational person will affirm to have been their belief. . . . If the people had believed that Jehovah and that angel were one in essence, equal in divinity and glory, why did they mourn, and desire that Jehovah should go up before them, notwithstanding his anger, rather than the angel? . . . If, on the contrary, they did not consider the angel as Jehovah, they must necessarily have understood that he bore the name of Jehovah in the sense in which I suppose him to have borne it, wherein there is nothing either absurd or histrionic (pp 67-68).

      Some Trinitarians argue that this angel was Christ himself — citing 1 Corinthians 10:9 as support (p. 67). Therefore, he was Jehovah. Milton replies, if this angel had been Christ, he would have acted as a moderator and mediator (p. 68). He adds that “whether Christ, or some angel different from the preceding, the very words of Jehovah himself show that he was neither one with Jehovah, nor co-equal, for the Israelites are commanded to hear his voice, not on the authority of his own name, but because the name of Jehovah was in him” (p. 68). Continuing, he remarks, “[If] the angel was Christ, this proves no more than that Christ was an angel, according to their interpretation of Gen. xlviii. 16, ‘the angel which redeemed me from all evil’; and Isa. Ixiii. 9, ‘the angel of his presence saved them’” (p. 68).
      Next, Milton cites several passages from Revelations that he interprets as supporting his Christology (p. 70). Then he comments on the difficulties that they have caused some Trinitarians. For example, one Trinitarian accused the Arians of transposing and confusing some of the verses in the last chapter of Revelations; thus, he rearranged these verses to support his Trinity Doctrine (p. 70). Milton notes that action would have been unnecessary if this Trinitarian had observed that throughout the Old Testament, “angels are accustomed to assume the name and person, and the very words of God and Jehovah, as their own; and that occasionally an angel represents the person and the very words of God, without taking the name either of Jehovah or God, but only in the character of an angel, or even of a man” (p. 71) — for example, Judges 2:1.  About this issue, Milton writes:

But according to divines the name of Jehovah signifies two things, either the nature of God, or the completion of his word and promises. If it signify the nature, and therefore the person of God, why should not he who is invested with his person and presence, be also invested with the name which represents them? If it signify the completion of his word and promises, why should not he, to whom words suitable to God alone are so frequently attributed, be permitted also to assume the name of Jehovah, whereby the completion of these words and promises is represented? Or if that name be so acceptable to God, that he has always chosen to consider it as sacred and peculiar to himself alone, why has he uniformly disused it in the New Testament, which contains the most important fulfilment of his prophecies; retaining only the name of the Lord, which had always been common to him with angels and men? If, lastly, any name whatever can be so pleasing to God, why has he exhibited himself to us in the gospel without any proper name at all (pp. 71-72)?

[Some ancient manuscripts of Matthew do contain the name Jehovah, Yahweh.]
      Continuing, Milton discusses Isaiah 8:13, 14 along with 1 Peter 2:7, 8, Zachariah 11:13, 12:10 along with Acts 2:33 and John 19:37, and Malachi 3:1 to illustrate that Jehovah’s messenger is at times called “Jehovah” (pp. 72-75). Concluding, he adds, “That the name and presence of God is used to imply his vicarious power and might resident in the Son, is proved by another prophecy concerning John the Baptist, Isa. xl. 3, ‘the voice of him that crieth in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of Jehovah; make straight in the desert a highway for our God’”(pp. 75-76).
      Milton states “that the Son himself professes to have received from the Father, not only the name of God and of Jehovah, but all that pertains to his own being —  that is to say, his individuality, his existence itself, his attributes, his works, his divine honours; to which doctrine the apostles also, subsequent to Christ, bear their testimony” (p. 76). Then he cites John 3:35, 8:3, and Matthew 11:27 to support this conclusion.
      Next, he comments on Trinitarians using the two natures of Christ to “evade any arguments that may be brought against them. What Scripture says of the Son generally, they apply, as suits their purpose, in a partial and restricted sense; at one time to the Son of God, at another to the Son of Man — now to the Mediator in his divine, now in his human capacity, and now again in his union of both natures” (p. 77). [According to Trinitarians, Christ is 100 percent man and 100 percent God with no commingling of the two natures.] However, “the Son himself says expressly, ‘the Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into his hand,’ John iii. 35 — namely, because ‘he loveth him,’ not because he hath begotten him — and he hath given all things to him as ‘the Son,’ not as Mediator only” (p. 77).
      If Christ’s Deity had remained what it was before he became the mediator as Trinitarians claim, then “why does he ask and receive everything from the Father, and not from himself? If all things come from the Father, why is it necessary (as they maintain it to be) for the mediatorial office, that he should be the true and supreme God” (pp. 77-78). Therefore, all things that the Father gives the Son are the Father’s gifts to the Son (p. 78). In support, Milton cites John 16:15, Acts 17: 9, 10, Isaiah 9:6 (evidence that he receives his name from the Father), Philippians 2:9, Hebrews 1:4, and Ephesians 1:20, 21 (pp. 78-79).
    About the names given the son, Milton writes, “We need be under no concern, however, respecting the name, seeing that the Son receives his very being in like manner from the Father. John vii. 29, ‘I am from him.’ The same thing is implied John i. 1, ‘in the beginning’” (p. 79).
      About John 1:1, Milton notes:

[T]he notion of his eternity is here excluded not only by the decree, . . . but by the name of Son, and by the phrases — “this day have I begotten thee,” and “I will be to him a father.” Besides, the word “beginning” can only here mean “before the foundation of the world,” according to John xvii. 5, as is evident from Col. i. 15-17, “the first born of every creature: for by him were all things created that are in heaven, and that are in earth, etc., and he is before all things, and by him all things consist” (p. 79).

[Milton believes that the son created the heavens and the earth. This is also a commonly held belief of Trinitarians. Some unitarians disagree with Milton on this point.]
      About the Son being eternal, Milton remarks, “Him who was begotten from all eternity the Father cannot have begotten, for what was made from all eternity was never in the act of being made; him whom the Father begat from all eternity he still begets; he whom he still begets is not yet begotten, and therefore is not yet a Son; for an action which has no beginning can have no completion” (p. 80). Moreover, “it seems to be altogether impossible that the Son should be either begotten or born from all eternity. If he is the Son, either he must have been originally in the Father, and have proceeded from him, or he must always have been as he is now, separate from the Father, self-existent and independent” (p. 80).  He adds, “If he was originally in the Father, but now exists separately, he has undergone a certain change at some time or other, and is therefore mutable. If he always existed separately from, and independently of, the Father, how is he from the Father, how begotten, how the Son, how separate in subsistence, unless he be also separate in essence (p. 80)?”
      According to Milton, and contrary to Trinitarians, “the Father and the Son differ in essence” (p. 81). Both reason and the Scriptures support this conclusion. Milton writes a lengthy explanation for why they cannot have the same essences (pp. 81-83).
      Next, he comments on the existence of the Son: The Son derives his existence from the Father. In support, he cites John 5:26, 6:57, and Hebrews 1:8, 11, 12 (p. 83).
      About the Son being omnipresent, Milton remarks that “if the Father has given all things to the Son, even his very being and life, he has also given him to be wherever he is” (p. 83). [The Son is not truly omnipresent. A truly omnipresent being cannot move. There is no place where he can move because he is already there. Moreover, if he leaves a place, he is no longer omnipresent because there is a place where he is not. The Son ascended into heaven and will some day descend from heaven — thus, the Son moves from one place to another.] He argues that the apparent omnipresence of Jesus in John 1:48 (“before that Philip called . . . I saw thee”) cannot be used to prove that the Son is of the same essence as the father (pp. 83-84). Likewise, Matthew 18:20 (“there am I in the midst of them”) and 28:20 (“I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world”) do not assert absolute omnipresence (p. 84). [Omnipresence is being everywhere simultaneously. Being many places at once is not omnipresence. For example, a radio broadcast is in many places at once, but it is not omnipresent; it is not everywhere simultaneously.]
      Next, Milton discusses omniscience and cites many verses that purport that Jesus is omniscient (pp. 84-85). Then Milton notes that the Son did not know all things absolutely and cites several verses showing his lack of omniscience (p. 85). [According to Trinitarians, when Jesus appears to be omniscience, for example, John 21:11 {“thou knowest all things”}, he is acting in his divine nature. When he lacks knowledge, as when he did not know when the time of the destruction of the temple or when he would return and the end of the age would occur {Mark 13:32}, he is acting in his human nature. However, according to Revelation 1:1, Jesus is not omniscient; God has to give him the revelation. This occurred after the Son had shed his human body and could no longer be acting in his human nature.]
      Mostly by citing verses, Milton discusses the Son’s authority; his authority comes from the Father (pp. 86-87).
      Whatever omnipotence that he had, he had because all his power came from the Father (p. 87). To support this conclusion, Milton cites several verses. About the Son’s apparent omnipotence, Milton observed that “the nature of these works, although divine, was such, that angels were not precluded from performing similar miracles at the same time and in the same place where Christ himself abode daily” (p. 87) — for example, John 5:4 (“an angel went down at a certain season into the pool”). Moreover, the disciple performed the same works.
      Again citing Scripture, Milton discusses other gifts that Jesus received from the Father. They include the power of conversion (pp. 87-88), creation (pp. 88-89), remission of sins (p. 89), preservation (p. 90), renovation (pp. 90-91), conferring gifts (p. 91), mediatorial, i.e., his passion (pp. 90-91), resuscitation from death (p. 93), future judicial advent (p. 93), divine honors (p. 93), baptism in his name (p. 94), belief in him (pp. 94-96), and judgment (p. 99).
      About the passion, Milton asks, “How then can the Son be considered co-essential and co-equal with the Father (p. 92)?” About Jesus’ exclamation on the cross — “My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?” — he asks, “He whom the Son, himself God, addresses as God, must be the Father — why then did the Son call upon the Father (p. 92)?” Milton’s answer is that because “he felt even his divine nature insufficient to support him under the pains of death” (p. 92).
      Remarking further on Philippians 2:6, he notes that the Son’s possession of the divine gifts that the Father gave him was not robbery. Milton continues, “[I]f this passage imply his co-equality with the Father, it rather refutes than proves his unity of essence; since equality cannot exist but between two or more essences” (p. 100). He adds:

Further, the phrases “he did not think it” — “he made himself of no reputation” (literally, “he emptied himself”) appear inapplicable to the supreme God, For to think is nothing else than to entertain an opinion, which cannot be properly said of God. Nor can the infinite God be said to empty himself, any more than to contradict himself; for infinity and emptiness are opposite terms. But since he emptied himself of that form of God in which he had previously existed, if the form of God is to be taken for the essence of the Deity itself, it would prove him to have emptied himself of that essence, which is impossible (p. 100).

      Lastly, Milton proves that the Father is greater than the Son. For Jesus said, “My Father is greater than all” (John 10:29) and “my Father is greater than I” (John 14:28). Trinitarians respond “that Christ is speaking of his human nature” (p. 100). However, Milton doubts that “his disciples understand him as speaking merely of his human nature” (p. 100). He writes:

If therefore he said this, not of his human nature only (for that the Father was greater than he in his human nature could not admit of a doubt), but in the sense in which he himself wished his followers to conceive of him both as God and man, it ought undoubtedly to be understood as if he had said, My Father is greater than I, whatsoever I am, both in my human and divine nature; otherwise the speaker would not have been he in whom they believed, and instead of teaching them, he would only have been imposing upon them with an equivocation. He must therefore have intended to compare the nature with the person, not the nature of God the Father with the nature of the Son (p. 101).

He cites several verses to support his conclusion that the Father is greater than the Son (pp. 101-105).
      As shown above, Milton presents a unitarian argument akin to that of the Arians and the Jehovah’s Witnesses. All three believe in a preexisting Son, i.e., the Son existed before his conception. They believe that the Son has a beginning and, therefore, is not eternal. Further, they believe that the Father is the supreme God, the only true God, Jehovah of the Old Testament, and that God is one in person. Moreover, Milton was in agreement with most orthodox Christians from the mid-second century to early fourth century; they believed in a preexisting Son who was not eternal and who was subordinate to the Father. [Milton is unclear about whether Jesus was perfect man of a rational soul and the preexisting Son of a rational soul both occupying the same body without confusion of substances similar to the Trinitarian and Valentinian belief or Jesus was a human shell or sentient body with the preexisting Son providing the rational soul or mind similar to the Apollinarian belief or some other model.]

Copyright © 2018 by Thomas Coley Allen.

Part 2

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Milton on the Son of God – Part 2

Milton on the Son of God – Part 2

Thomas Allen

[Editor’s note:  Page numbers enclosed in parentheses are references to Milton on the Son of God and the Holy Spirit from His Treatise on Christian Doctrine by John Milton. The author’s comments are enclosed in brackets.]

    Not only does the Trinity Doctrine lack scriptural support, it also is lacking in reason. The “alternative therefore must be adopted, namely, that if God be one God, and that one God be the Father, and if notwithstanding the Son be also called God, the Son must have received the name and nature of Deity from God the Father, in conformity with his decree and will, after the manner stated before” (p. 25).
    Milton notes that Trinitarians insist “that wherever the name of God is attributed to the Father alone, it should be understood . . . to signify the three persons, or the whole essence of the Trinity, not the single person of the Father” (p. 27). He continues:

This is on many accounts a ridiculous distinction and invented solely for the purpose of supporting their peculiar opinion; although in reality, instead of supporting it, it will be found to be dependent on it, and therefore if the opinion itself be invalidated, for which purpose a simple denial is sufficient, the futile distinction falls to the ground at the same time. For the fact is, not merely that the distinction is a futile one, but that it is no distinction at all; it is a mere verbal quibble, founded on the use of synonymous words, and cunningly dressed up in terms borrowed from the Greek to dazzle the eyes of novices (p. 27).

He adds that “since essence and hypostasis mean the same thing, . . . [then] there can be no real difference of meaning between the adverbs essentially and substantially (hypostatice), which are derived from them” (p.27). Consequently, if  “the name of God be attributed to the Father alone essentially, it must also be attributed to the Father alone substantially” (p. 27). “If . . . the Son, who has his own proper hypostasis, have not also his own proper essence, but the essence of the Father, he becomes on their hypothesis either no ens [a real thing, entity] at all, or the same ens with the Father; which strikes at the very foundation of the Christian religion” (p. 28).
    According to the Trinity doctrine, “wherever the Son attributes Deity to the Father alone, and as to one greater than himself, he must be understood to speak in his human character, or as mediator” (p. 29). [This is a fantastic doctrine that prevents Jesus from being able to deny that he is God. Every statement that he makes or action that he takes that shows that he is not Deity can be rejected because it is merely Jesus speaking or acting in his human character and not in his divine character.] Milton concedes this concept to the Trinitarian “[w]herever the context and the fact itself require this interpretation” (p. 29). However, “it can never be inferred from hence that he is one God with the Father” (p. 29).
    Continuing, Milton remarks that “simultaneous mention is made of the Father and the Son, that name [God] is uniformly ascribed to the Father alone” (p. 29) with a few exceptions. Then he cites several verses to support his claim (pp. 29-30).
    Milton writes, “The Son likewise teaches that the attributes of divinity belong to the Father alone, to the exclusion even of himself” (p. 31). For example, in Matthew 24:36 and Mark 13:32, Jesus declares that only the Father is omniscient and that he (Jesus) lacks the divine trait of omniscience. [Trinitarians claim that Jesus’ human character is not omniscient, but his divine character is.]
    According to Milton, “after the hypostatical union of two natures in one person [the union of the divine nature and human nature in Jesus such that, according to the Trinitarian Doctrine, Jesus is simultaneously 100 percent man and 100 percent Deity with no confusion of substance], it follows that whatever Christ says of himself, he says not as the possessor of either nature separately, but with reference to the whole of his character, and in his entire person, except where he himself makes a distinction” (p. 32). He adds, “Those who divide this hypostatical union at their own  discretion, strip the discourses and answers of Christ of all their sincerity; they represent everything as ambiguous and uncertain, as true and false at the same time; it is not Christ that speaks, but some unknown substitute, sometimes one, and sometimes another” (pp. 32-33).
    Moreover, Jesus’ will is independent of the Father, for in Matthew 26:39, Jesus says “not as I will, but as thou [the Father] wilt.” Milton comments, “Now it is manifest that those who have not the same will, cannot have the same essence” (p. 33). Then he cites several verses to show that the Father and Son do not have “in a numerical sense, the same intelligence or will” (p. 33): Matthew 24:36, Mark 13:32, and John 6:38.
    After referencing several prayers of Jesus to God the Father, Milton asks, “If these prayers be uttered only in his human capacity, which is the common explanation, why does he petition these things from the Father alone instead of from himself, if he were God? Or rather, supposing him to be at once man and the supreme God, why does he ask at all for what was in his own power (p. 34)?”
    According to Jesus, “there is none good but one, that is God” (Matthew 19:17). To this statement, Milton remarks “that he did not choose to be considered essentially the same with that one God; for otherwise this would only have been disclaiming the credit of goodness in one character, for the purpose of assuming it in another” (p. 34).
    Milton notes that “Christ assigns every attribute of the Deity to the Father alone. The apostles uniformly speak in a similar manner” (p. 35). He cites several verses as examples. Furthermore, many verses declare that the Father alone raised the Son from the dead (pp. 35-37).
    Next, Milton notes that “the Son uniformly pays worship and reverence to the Father alone, so he teaches us to follow the same practice” (p. 37). Thus, divine honors are owed to the Father. In support, he cites several verses (pp. 37-41).
    Trinitarians argue “that the Son is sometimes called God, and even Jehovah; and that all the attributes of the Deity are assigned to him likewise in many passages both of the Old and New Testament” (p. 41). Milton replies “that where the Father and the Son are mentioned together, the name, attributes, and works of the Deity, as well as divine honours, are always assigned to the one and only God the Father” (p. 41). Then he proceeds to demonstrate “that whenever the same properties are assigned to the Son, it is in such a manner as to make it easily intelligible that they ought all primarily and properly to be attributed to the Father alone” (p. 41).
    He notes that the name or title of “God” is occasionally given to angels and men. Angels are called gods in Psalm 97:7, 9 and Judges 6:22, 13:21, 22. The title “God” is attributed to angels when they appear as Jehovah’s representatives (God spoke through them). Examples are Genesis 21:17, 18 and 22:11, 12, 15, 16. In Exodus 22:28, judges are called gods “because they occupy the place of God to a certain degree in the administration of judgment” (p. 46). Moreover, the children of Israel are called gods in Psalm 82:6. Also, the house of David is called God in Zechariah 12:8, and Moses is called God in Exodus 4:16 and 7:1.
    One error that some Trinitarians make is to construe “Elohim,” the Hebrew word for God, incorrectly. Although Elohim is plural in number, it is singular in meaning. These Trinitarians assert that Elohim “is intended to intimate a plurality of persons in unity of essence” (p. 43). [Although this interpretation of Elohim was once a popular argument used by Trinitarians to support the Trinity Doctrine, few use it today. Most Trinitarians now admit that nothing in the Old Testament supports the doctrine of a triune God. However, it does consistently and emphatically support the doctrine of a unipersonal God.] Milton remarks that “if there be any significance at all in this peculiarity, the word must imply as many gods as it does persons” (p. 43).
    Continuing, Milton notes that the Son “was entitled to the name of God both in the capacity of a messenger and of a judge” (p. 46). In John 10:34-36, Jesus used this argument “when the Jews accused him of blasphemy because he made himself God” (p. 46).
    By identifying the Word as the Son, Trinitarians use John 1:1 to support their doctrine of the eternal Son. Milton responds that the verse does not say “from everlasting, but ‘in the beginning.’ ‘The Word’ — therefore the Word was audible” (p. 47). Since God cannot be seen or heard (John 5:37), the “Word therefore is not of the same essence with God” (p. 47). That the Word was with God does not necessarily mean that “he [or it as some unitarians would say] is one in essence with him with whom he was” (p. 47).
    Milton argues that John should be allowed to interpret what he means by the Word in John 1:1. In Revelations 19:13, John writes that “‘his name is called the Word of God’ — that is, of the one God: he himself is a distinct person. If therefore he be a distinct person, he is distinct from God, who is unity. How then is he himself also God? By the same right as he enjoys the title of the Word, or of the only begotten Son, namely, by the will of the one God” (pp 47-48).
    Continuing to John 1:2, Milton comments that the second verse “enforces what the apostle wished we should principally observe, not that he was in the beginning God, but in the beginning with God; that he might show him to be God only by proximity and love, not in essence” (p. 48). Unlike the Trinitarian explanation of John 1:1-2, this explanation is consistent with the remainder of John’s gospel.
    A favorite passage that Trinitarians use to prove the Trinity Doctrine is John 20:28, where Thomas says to Jesus, “My Lord and my God.” In response, Milton writes, “He [Thomas] must have an immoderate share of credulity who attempts to elicit a new confession of faith, unknown to the rest of the disciples, from this abrupt exclamation of the apostle, who invokes in his surprise not only Christ his own Lord, but the God of his ancestors, namely, God the Father” (p. 48). Yet, shortly before meeting Thomas, Jesus had declared, “I ascend unto my God and your God’ [John 20:17]. Now the God of God cannot be essentially one with him whose God he is. On whose word therefore can we ground our faith with most security; on that of Christ, whose doctrine is clear, or of Thomas, a new disciple, first incredulous, then suddenly breaking out into an abrupt exclamation in an ecstasy of wonder, if indeed he really called Christ his God? . . . [Nor] is it credible that he should have so quickly understood the hypostatic union of that person whose resurrection he had just before disbelieved” (pp. 48-49).
    Some Trinitarians claim that the lack of Jesus correcting Thomas in his remarks proves the Deity of Jesus, i.e., Jesus is God Himself, the second person of the triune God. Contrariwise, Milton argues that the lack of correction proves that Jesus is not a person of a triune God (pp. 49-50).
    Also, Matthew 1:23 (“they shall call his name Immanuel, which being interpreted is, God with us”) “does not prove that he [Jesus] whom they were so to call should necessarily be God but only a messenger from God” (p. 50).
    About Acts 16: 31, 34 (“believe on the Lord Jesus Christ . . . and he rejoiced, believing in God with all his house”), Milton remarks that “it does not follow from hence that Christ is God, since the apostles have never distinctly pointed out Christ as the ultimate object of faith; but these are merely the words of the historian, expressing briefly what the apostles doubtless inculcated in a more detailed manner — faith in God the Father through Christ” (p. 51).
    About Romans 9:5 (“who is over all, God blessed for ever”), he notes that some early church fathers omit “God” when quoting this passage. Moreover, the way translators punctuate this passage can give it different meanings. Milton concludes that “supposing that the words are spoken of the Son; they have nothing to do with his essence, but only intimate that divine honour is communicated to the Son by the Father, and particularly that he is called God” (p. 52). Continuing, he writes:

 But, it is said, the same words which were spoken of the Father, Rom. i. 25, “the Creator, who is blessed for ever. Amen,” are here repeated of the Son; therefore the Son is equal to the Father. If there be any force in this reasoning, it will rather prove that the Son is greater than the Father; for according to the ninth chapter, he is “over all,” which, however, they remind us, ought to be understood in the same sense as John iii. 31, 32, “he that cometh from above, is above all; he that Cometh from heaven is above all” (p. 52).

However, Milton adds that Christ “came not of himself, but was sent from the Father, and was obedient to him” (pp. 52-53). Moreover, Christ “never could have become a mediator, nor could he have been sent from God, or have been obedient to him, unless he had been inferior to God and the Father as to his nature. Therefore also after he shall have laid aside his functions as mediator, whatever may be his greatness, or whatever it may previously have been, he must be subject to God and the Father” (p. 53).
    As for 1 Timothy 3:16 (“God was manifest in the flesh”), many early manuscripts omit “God” [as do many translations since the King James]. However, Milton concedes that “when the context is duly examined, that the whole passage must be understood of God the Father in conjunction with the Son. For it is not Christ who is “the great mystery of godliness,” but God the Father in Christ” (p. 54). To support his conclusion, he cites Colossians 2:2 and 2 Corinthians 5:18, 19. Continuing, he writes, “‘was manifest in the flesh’ — namely, in the Son, his own image; in any other way he is invisible: nor did Christ come to manifest himself, but his Father, John xiv. 8, 9” (p. 54). (For more justifications of Milton’s conclusion, see pages 54-55).
    Next, Milton comments on Titus 2:13 (“the glorious appearing of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ”) in some detail and about various translations. He concludes that:

what is proposed to us as an object of belief, especially in a matter involving a primary article of faith, ought not to be an inference forced and extorted from passages relating to an entirely different subject, in which the readings are sometimes various, and the sense doubtful — nor hunted out by careful research from among articles and particles — nor elicited by dint of ingenuity, like the answers of an oracle, from sentences of dark or equivocal meaning — but should be susceptible of abundant proof from the clearest sources (p. 56).

[This advice Trinitarians ignore because the clearest passages support Unitarianism.]
    Then, Milton comments on 1 John 5:20 (“We know that the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding, that we may know him that is true, and we are in him that is true, (even) in his Son Jesus Christ: this is the true God, and eternal life”). Trinitarians use the second part of this verse to support their doctrine of a triune God. However, when the verse as a whole is considered, it does not support the Trinity Doctrine.
    Milton also comments on Hebrews 1:8 (p. 50), Acts 20:58 (p. 51), 1 John 3:16 (pp. 56-57), Jude 4 (pp. 59-58), Psalm 68:17-19, and Ephesians 4:5-8 (pp. 60-61).

Copyright © 2018 by Thomas Coley Allen.

Part 1, Part 3

More religious articles.

Milton on the Son of God – Part 1

Milton on the Son of God – Part 1

Thomas Allen

    John Milton (1608–1674), who is best known as the author of Paradise Lost, believed in an unipersonal God instead of the triune God of three persons or gods in one God of today’s orthodox Christianity. Thus, Jesus is the Son of God and not God the Son. The following summaries Milton’s view of Christ Jesus, the Son of God, as presented in Milton on the Son of God and the Holy Spirit from His Treatise on Christian Doctrine (London, England: British & Foreign Unitarian Association, 1908). About 150 years would pass before Milton’s essay was published. Page numbers enclosed in parentheses are to the book referenced above. My comments are enclosed in brackets.
    Milton notes that according to the Catholic Church, the Trinity Doctrine cannot be “proved from any passage of Scripture” (p. 1). [At least Catholics are more honest than Protestants.]
    His notion that Christ Jesus is not the second person of a triune God, Milton derives from the Scriptures and the Scriptures alone. [The Trinity Doctrine relies heavily on Greek philosophy, primarily that of Plato and his followers.] For him, the Scriptures alone are “the rule of faith” (p. 1).
    First, Milton discusses generation, “whereby God, in pursuance of his decree, has begotten his only Son” (p. 3). “Generation must be an external efficiency, since the Father and Son are different persons” (p. 3), which the Trinitarians acknowledge. Whereas Milton argues that the Son has a beginning, Trinitarians argue that he is “generated from all eternity” (p. 3).
    Milton notes that “the Father be said in Scripture to have begotten the Son in a double sense, the one literal, with reference to the production of the Son, the other metaphorical, with reference to his exaltation” (p. 4). However, many Trinitarians “have applied the passages which allude to the exaltation and mediatorial functions of Christ as proof of his generation from all eternity” (p. 4). Nevertheless, they claim “that it is impossible to find a single text in all Scripture to prove the eternal generation of the Son” (p. 4).
    Citing John 1:1-3, John 17:5, Colossians 1:15, 16, 18, Revelations 3:14, 1 Corinthians 8:6, and Hebrews 1:2, 5:10, Milton believes “the Son existed in the beginning, under the name of the logos or word, and was the first of the whole creation, by whom afterwards all other things were made both in heaven and earth” (p. 4). Milton states,  “All these passages prove the existence of the Son before the world was made, but they conclude nothing respecting his generation from all eternity” (p. 5). [Milton’s Christology is similar to that of the Arians and the Jehovah’s Witnesses, both of whom claim that the Son is God’s first creation. Contrary to this notion is that of Unitarians who believe that the Son first existed outside the mind of God when God begot him in the womb of Mary.]
    Citing verses concerning Christ’s “resuscitation from the dead, or to his unction to the mediatorial office” (p. 5), Milton concludes “that however the generation of the Son may have taken place, it arose from no natural necessity, as is generally contended, but was no less owing to the decree and will of the Father than his priesthood or kingly power, or his resuscitation from the dead” (pp. 6-7). Moreover, Jesus is called the Son of God “because he had no other Father besides God[:] . . . ‘God was his Father,’ John v. 18” (p. 7). God created Adam from dust and, therefore, was Adam’s creator. However, God is “properly the Father of the Son made of his own substance” (p. 7). [Trinitarians agree with him about the Son being the same substance as the Father.] He continues, “Yet it does not follow from hence that the Son is co-essential with the Father, for then the title of Son would be least of all applicable to him, since he who is properly the Son is not coeval with the Father, much less of the same numerical essence, otherwise the Father and the Son would be one person; nor did the Father beget him from any natural necessity, but of his own free will — a mode more perfect and more agreeable to the paternal dignity” (p. 7). He concludes that “the Son was begotten of the Father in consequence of his decree, and therefore within the limits of time, for the decree itself must have been anterior to the execution of the decree, as is sufficiently clear from the insertion of the word ‘to-day’” (p. 8).
    Citing several verses (John 1:14, 18, 3:16, 18, and 1 John 4:9) where the Son is called “only begotten,” Milton comments, “Yet he is not called one with the Father in essence, inasmuch as he was visible to sight, and given by the Father, by whom also he was sent, and from whom he proceeded; but he enjoys the title of only begotten by way of superiority, as distinguished from many others who are also said to have been born of God. . . . But since throughout the Scriptures the Son is never said to be begotten, except, as above, in a metaphorical sense, it seems probable that he is called only begotten principally because he is the one mediator between God and man” (p. 9).
    Next, he cites several verses (Romans 8:29, Colossians 1:15, 18, Hebrews 1:6, and Revelations 3:14) that refer to the Son as the “first born.” All these “passages preclude the idea of his co-essentiality with the Father, and of his generation from all eternity” (p. 9). [Some Unitarians disagree with Milton on his notion of the preexisting Son. According to some Unitarians, the Son existed in God’s mind as part of his foreordained plan. He did not really come into existence until his miraculous conception.]
    Milton notes that “since to generate another who had no previous existence, is to give him being, and that if God generate by a physical necessity, he can generate nothing but a co-equal Deity, which would be inconsistent with self-existence, an essential attribute of Divinity” (p. 10). Then, he inquires into “how or in what sense God the Father can have begotten the Son” (p. 10). After reviewing the Scriptures, he concludes “that God of his own will created, or generated, or produced the Son before all things, endued with the divine nature, as in the fulness of time he miraculously begat him in his human nature of the Virgin Mary” (p. 10). Moreover, “God imparted to the Son as much as he pleased of the divine nature, nay, of the divine substance itself, care being taken not to confound the substance with the whole essence, which would imply, that the Father had given to the Son what he retained numerically the same himself; which would be a contradiction of terms instead of a mode of generation” (p. 11).
    About the few verses that call the Son, God, which lead to the Trinitarian absurdity of trying to make two to be one, Milton remarks that Trinitarians could have avoided “such violence to reason” (p, 11) if they had paid attention to the Scriptures. Then he cites Psalm 82:6 where God calls the children of Israel gods and John 10:35. [Also, Moses is called God in Exodus 4:16 and 7:1. See below where Milton discusses this issue further.]
    According to the Scriptures, “there is in reality but one true independent and supreme God” (p. 13). Furthermore, “human reason and the common language of mankind, and the Jews, the people of God, have always considered him as one person only” (p. 13). Milton turns to the Scriptures to identify who this God is.
    Since Jesus, the only begotten Son, is in the bosom of the Father (John 1:18), he should know who is God. According to Jesus’ testimony, the Father is the one true God. This testimony is given in Mark 12:28, 29, and 32: “‘Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord’ or as it is in the Hebrew, ‘Jehovah our God is one Jehovah’” (p. 14). This conversation between Jesus and the scribe shows that the “unity of God is intended his oneness of person” (p. 15). John 8:41, 54 proves that God is the Father: “[W]e have one Father, even God. . . . [I]t is my Father that honoureth me; of whom ye say that he is your God.” For more proof, Milton cites John 17:3 (“this is life eternal, that they might know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent”) and John 20:17 (“I ascend unto my Father and your Father; and to my God and your God”). Therefore, if “the Father be the God of Christ, and the same be our God, and if there be none other God but one, there can be no God beside the Father” (p. 16).
    Moreover, Paul, like Jesus, teaches that there is but one God, the Father. [Paul does not teach a triune God or that the Father is one person in God and Jesus is another person in God, yet both are one God.] To support his argument (p. 16), Milton cites 1 Corinthians 8:4-6 (“there is none other God but one . . . there is but one God the Father”). As only one God exists, then not only are all other essences excluded, but all other persons are excluded (p. 16). In the above-cited passage, Paul clearly distinguishes Jesus Christ from God, who is the Father. Referring to 1 Corinthians 8:4-6, Milton adds that if a different causation “of whom all things” applies to God the Father and “by whom are all things” applies to Christ the Son, then“if a difference of causation prove a difference of essence, he [Christ] is distinguished also in essence” (p. 16). He adds, “Besides, since a numerical difference originates in difference of essence, those who are two numerically, must be also two essentially” (p. 17).
    Milton argues that when the Scriptures declare that all things are by Christ, “it must be understood of a secondary and delegated power” (p. 18).
    Referencing Ephesians 4:4-6, Milton argues that “there is one Spirit, and one Lord; but the Father is one, and therefore God is one in the same sense as the remaining objects of which unity is predicated, that is, numerically one, and therefore one also in person” (p. 19). Then, he cites 1 Timothy 2:5 (“there is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus”). He states that “the mediator, though not purely human, is purposely named man, by the title derived from his inferior nature, lest he should be thought equal to the Father, or the same God, the argument distinctly and expressly referring to one God” (p. 19). Rhetorically, he asks “how anyone can be a mediator to himself on his own behalf” (p. 19). [Some Unitarians would strongly object with Milton about Jesus not being purely human. If he were not purely human, he could not have been tempted as humans {Hebrews 2:18 and 4:15} are, suffered like them, or died like them, etc. He was like a man in all respects {Hebrews 2:17}. However, Jesus was a uniquely special man in that he was a special messenger of God the Father with a divine mission whose authority came directly from God the Father. He is the one and only Son of God, who has a unique and intimate relationship with God. Moreover, he was filled with the spirit of God. Unfortunately, Milton could not wean himself from the Greek philosophy that had infected Christianity and that underlies the Trinity Doctrine. Thus, he literally interprets passages that suggest that the Son really existed before his conception. Yet, he does not literally interpret passages that declare the Son to be a real man — fully human like every other human but without sin. Consequently, for him as for Trinitarians, the Son is man but not a man. A preexisting spirit incarnated in a human body may become man, but he cannot become a man. One can only become a man if his beginning is with conception — unless all humans preexist spiritually and are incarnated in a human body, which is a concept that nearly all Christians reject — Origen and those who believe in reincarnation being exceptions.]
    Next, he quotes Romans 5:10 (“we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son”). He remarks, “To whatever God we were reconciled, if he be one God, he cannot be the God by whom we are reconciled, inasmuch as that God is another person; for if he be one and the same, he must be a mediator between himself and us, and reconcile us to himself by himself; which is an insurmountable difficulty” (pp. 19-20). [Moreover, how can an immortal, eternal God die? Trinitarians would argue that only the human nature of Jesus died; his divine nature did not. Then many of these same Trinitarians would declare that mankind could not be saved except by the death of God.]
    Milton notes “that the Father alone is a self-existent God, and that a being which is not self-existent cannot be God” (p. 20). This is so evident that no explanation should be required. Then, he remarks:

[I]t is wonderful with what futile subtleties, or rather with what juggling artifices, certain individuals have endeavoured to elude or obscure the plain meaning of these passages; leaving no stone unturned, recurring to every shift, attempting every means, as if their object were not to preach the pure and unadulterated truth of the gospel to the poor and simple, but rather by dint of vehemence and obstinacy to sustain some absurd paradox from falling, by the treacherous aid of sophisms and verbal distinctions, borrowed from the barbarous ignorance of the schools (p. 20).

[Thus, he lambastes Trinitarians.]
    Trinitarians interpret John 10:30 (“I and my Father are one”) to mean that the Son and the Father are one in essence. Milton answers, “Two things may be called one in more than one way” (p. 21). In the previous verse (John 10:29), Jesus said that his Father was greater than all. In John 10:34-36, Jesus denies making himself God. About John 10:36, Milton writes, “This must be spoken of two persons not only not co-essential, but not coequal” (p. 21).
    Moreover, by failing to mention the Holy Spirit, John 10:30 fails to support the Trinity Doctrine. “[T]he Son and the Father without the Spirit are not one in essence” (p. 22) — so argue Trinitarians.
    How are the Son and Father one? “[T]hey are one, inasmuch as they speak and act with unanimity” (p. 22). Jesus said, “believe the works; that ye may know and believe that the Father is in me, and I in him” (John 10:38) and “the words that I speak unto you, I speak not of myself, but the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works” (John 14:10). Thus, when Jesus says that “I and my Father are one,” he means one in “intimacy of communion” (p. 22). He does not mean the unity of essence. He “declares himself to be one with the Father in the same manner as we are one with him — that is, not in essence, but in love, in communion, in agreement, in charity, in spirit, in glory” (p. 22). In support of this conclusion, he cites John 14:20, 21 and 17:21-23.

Copyright © 2018 by Thomas Coley Allen.

Part 2

More religious articles.

Do We Really Need to Return to Hamilton?

Do We Really Need to Return to Hamilton?
Thomas Allen

[Editor's note: Footnotes in the original are omitted.]

Two contrasting articles appear in the December 2010 issue of Chronicles. They are “Back to Hamilton” by William J. Quirk and “Prosperity” by Clyde Wilson. Quirk’s article reviews Paul Craig Roberts’ book How the Economy Was Lost: The War of the Worlds. Quirk focuses on Roberts’ promotion of protective tariffs as the means to revitalize America’s economy and increase the standard of living standard of middle-class Americans. Quirk seems to agree with Roberts.

Quirk does observe that when the dollar was connected with gold, prices remained fairly stable over time. However, under the true gold standard, general prices should decline over time because productivity rises faster than the money supply. Quirk also notes that gold disciplines politicians and checks governmental expenditures much more effectively than the supposedly independent Federal Reserve. (Where Roberts stands on the gold standard, I do not know. Based on some comments that he has made in his columns and in radio interviews, he does not appear to be an adherent of the gold standard.)

Roberts blames “globalization” for America’s economic problem. He is probably right. However, globalization has nothing to do with free trade. Trade as administered through the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other trade agreements is managed trade. An international bureaucracy answerable to no government manages world trade, which extends to local trade, for the benefit of the international corporations.

That people call these agreements free trade is a travesty. They prevent free trade instead of allowing it. The Thought Police are living and operating. To call WTO, NAFTA, and the like free trade agreements is like calling war, peace; freedom, slavery; and ignorance, strength.

Based on his paraphrase of Pat Buchanan’s statement, Roberts is aware that these agreements are not trade agreements — much less free trade agreements. Their objective is to strip the American worker of his wealth and transfer it to the elite, who control the international corporations.

Quirk shows that the median income rose from 1947 to 1973 and declined from 1998 to 2008. Actually, median income has been declining since 1973. This decline has much more to do with severing gold’s last hold on the dollar in 1971 than with trade agreements.

The common myth that big industry and especially big banks (because they supposedly control the world’s gold) love the gold standard is false. They abhor it because it inhibits their unbridled greed. They love fiat money, especially paper fiat money and its electronic equivalent.

Bankers can create fiat paper money and its electronic equivalent out of nothing. They cannot create gold out of nothing. That is why the gold standard was abandoned.

Big business likes fiat money because they are first in line to get it. Thus, they are first to spend the new money, so they use it before it loses its value. Then they use it to repay their loans after it has lost its value and with that cheat their creditors.

Roberts does not object to managed trade. He objects to who is managing it and how they are managing it. Roberts does not want to replace the current system of managed trade with free trade. He wants to replace it with another system of managed trade.

Quirk (or Roberts, the article is not clear about whom) points to Hamilton’s arguments. Hamilton offered two arguments, which are still used, to promote protective tariffs. (1) They are necessary to build and maintain the industrial base for war. Hence, adherents of protective tariffs fear that the military-industrial complex will not develop and mature unless protective tariffs are imposed. (2) Capital used in industry produces more wealth than that used in agriculture. Today’s proponents also claim that it produces more wealth than that used in services.

If the proponents of protective tariffs want to impose tariffs to protect the military-industrial complex, they should prohibit the importation of strategic metals and rare earths. These materials are essential to modern warfare. Therefore, the country should not depend on foreign sources. The prohibition of their importation, which is the ultimate objective of a protective tariff, would force the extraction of these metals from the oceans and land sources where their concentrations may be as high as micrograms per megaton. Consumer goods that used these materials would no longer exist because no one could afford them. Inferior products would replace items that used these materials. The computer age in America except for the U.S. government, which can manufacture and steal all the money that it needs, and multinationals, which can move their computer work to other countries, may die. No sacrifice is too great for the benefit of the military-industrial complex.

If the purpose of tariffs is to build and maintain a war machine, wouldn’t it be better to subsidize these industries directly from the Defense Department’s budget? Unlike direct subsidies, tariffs do not guarantee that these industries will be built or maintained. Furthermore, direct subsidies reveal the real cost of building and maintaining these industries. Knowing the real cost, the people can then decide if these industries are worth the cost. (A major reason for using trade restrictions like protective tariffs instead of direct subsidies is to conceal the real cost.)

Hamilton was an agent of the bankers and major industrialists. He was himself a banker and helped to found the Bank of New York. He wanted protective tariffs to transfer wealth from the common American, most of whom were farmers at that time, to his rich northern friends.

Wilson reveals the truth of this objective in his article when he writes, “When tariffs were beneficial to the Northern rich and burdensome on everyone else, the United States had tariffs; when ‘free trade’ is beneficial to the Northern rich and a burden to everyone else, we have ‘free trade.’” (Wilson argues that when discussing issues, such as free trade versus protective tariffs, one must look beneath the surface. One must find out who benefits. One will usually find that the ruling elite, and not the people, is the primary beneficiary. Consequently, the power of government needs to be severely restricted to limit the ability of the ruling elite to use it for its benefit.)

According to Quirk, Hamilton intended tariffs to provide temporary protection for America’s manufacturing. How long is “temporary?” The country has had protective tariffs of some sort ever since Congress adopted Hamilton’s proposal. (Yes, the United States still have some protective tariffs and other import restrictions even today with all these so-called “free trade” agreements.)

Do Quirk, Roberts, and other promoters of protective tariffs really believe that Lincoln was right when he sent 600,000 men to their deaths to impose his protective tariff on the South? Protective tariffs, which enriched the North at the expense of the South, were the major reason for the Southern States seceding. If they do not believe that Lincoln was justified in his actions, why? If he were, why? Lincoln was merely doing what they advocated: imposing protective tariffs.

Quirk, Roberts, and other proponents of protective tariffs are victims of Bastiat’s broken window syndrome. They see people being paid to repair the broken window and people selling the material for the repair. They wrongly conclude that breaking the window is good for the economy. They see only the work and selling that it causes. (This mentality misleads people to believe that the massive destruction of capital and labor in war is good for the economy.)

What they fail to see is what Bastiat and any good economist see. A good economist sees the lost of revenue to the people who would have received the window’s owner’s money if he had not had to pay for the broken window. For example, if the owner had wanted a new pair of shoes, a shoe store and manufacturer have suffered a loss. The country as a whole has lost. If the window had not been broken, the owner and the country would have had both a window and a new pair of shoes. After the window is broken, the owner and the country have only a new window. A new pair of shoes has been lost.

Protective tariffs work the same way. They divert money from where the consumer prefers to spend it to pay the tariff or a higher price. Thus, consumers buy less. The economy and country have less wealth.

Hamiltonians like Roberts point to protective tariffs and the economic growth, primarily industrial growth, in America’s history. They conclude that this growth resulted from the tariffs. Without the tariffs, growth would have been much lower — or at least they imply this conclusion. Protective tariff promoters treat “sequences as consequences.”

Wilson notes that treating sequences as consequences is a flawed way of thinking. He writes, “If B follows A, then A was the cause of B. In fact, in understanding the wealth of nations, that is a bad assumption — because there are always multiple variables, some of them unknown, unpredictable, too deep to be observed, and even spirited and unmeasurable.” Because Congress imposed a tariff and the industrial economy of the country grew does not mean that the tariff caused this growth.

Historical examples exist that suggest that the imposition of protective tariffs causes or at least contributes to depressions. Congress enacted the McKinley Tariff Act in 1890. This tariff raised rates and made circumvention more difficult. The country suffered a severe panic in 1893 and a depression that lasted until 1896 or 1897, depending on whose criteria are considered. Did the tariff cause the depression? If everything else is ignored, which the Hamiltonians seem to want to do in promoting tariffs, the answer is yes. Most likely the tariffs were a contributing factor. However, the primary cause was the fiat silver dollar primarily as the Treasury note of 1890.

If protective tariffs really do invigorate the economy as a whole, then apparently it lacks to power to overcome the negative effects of fiat money. If true, then imposing protective tariffs without first eliminating fiat money will not solve the country’s economic problems. It may even make the problems worse.

Quirk begins his article with a discussion of Ben Bernanke and the Federal Reserve. Quirk fails to mention that the Federal Reserve is a child of Hamilton. Hamilton was an advocate of centralized banking. As the United States already have centralized banking, no need exists to go back to Hamilton for that.

Although Roberts disagrees with Bernanke on many issues, the two do agree on one thing. They agree that higher prices are preferable to lower prices. Gasoline at $5 per gallon is better than gasoline at $1 per gallon. Bernanke wants to achieve higher prices through currency depreciation. Roberts wants to achieve them through protective tariffs.

Roberts complains, and rightly so, about the United States “financing its trade and budget deficits by turning over the ownership of existing U.S. assets” and by getting foreigners to buy U.S. Treasury debt with their trade surplus dollars. He claims that dependency on foreigners to finance budget and trade deficits is “beyond the reach of monetary and fiscal policies.” This is not exactly true. If the U.S. government cuts its expenditures to match, or preferably to be below, its revenue, it would not need foreigners to buy its debt. Moreover, reducing the size of the government to match its income would lessen the burden that the economy is currently forced to carry. It would diminish the distortions of the economy that the government’s expenditures cause. It would eliminate agencies whose purpose is to interfere with and thwart economic activity. Or at least it would significantly decrease their intervention. Elimination of debt is a fiscal policy that the U.S. government can undertake to halt the adverse effects described by Roberts.

Once America’s number one export, federal debt, is eliminated, the trade balance becomes self-correcting. If Say’s Law is still valid, and it is, the concern about the trade deficit and the lack of industrial productivity vanishes. If Americans do not produce anything with which to buy imports, foreigners will cease trading with them. Imports will fade away until Americans begin to produce something with which to buy imports. Trade balances automatically correct without governmental intervention. Governmental intervention only leads to more distortion and imbalance.

Based on Quirk’s review of Roberts’ book, Roberts does an excellent job of describing America’s economic problems and much of what has caused these problems. Unfortunately, he offers a false solution.

On the other hand, Wilson identifies the primary cause of America’s economic problems: too much governmental intervention. To solve America’s economic problems, this intervention needs to be drastically reduced.

Wilson begins by giving a good description of a prosperous society. A prosperous society has minimal debt, and its debt is temporary. Only a few people are very rich or very poor. Nearly everyone falls around the middle. Society’s wealth distribution is a narrow bell-shaped curve: It has a small standard deviation. Almost everyone “has an abundance of necessities and access to some small luxuries and leisure.” It has small, unobtrusive governments with the local governments being the most noticeable and important, and the national government, the least. Private patronage supports religion, charity, education, and the arts. Cultural cohesion flourishes.

America has lost most of these aspects of prosperity. Protective tariffs will not bring them back. On the contrary, they concentrate more power in Washington. They concentrate more wealth in the bank accounts of the politically powerful.

Protective tariffs may drive wages up, but this is not a given. However, the increase in prices that protective tariffs cause will nullify much, if not all, of the wage increase. Americans may be worse off after the imposition of protective tariffs. Their real income may decline, and they can afford fewer luxuries and probably fewer necessities. (The gold and silver standards are what drove real wages up during the nineteenth century and not tariffs.)

Wilson asserts, and correctly so, that hard work and merit resulting in an appropriate reward has largely vanished in today’s America. Conniving, scheming, and, most importantly, political connections and being a member of a politically promoted group reward people today. (In turn, the rich and powerful, i.e., the ruling elite, globalists, control most of these people.) After the ruling elite, these are the people who will benefit most from protective tariffs. The ruling elite will use them to control the tariffs and direct the tariffs to protect their interest.
Wilson concludes his article with the following:

Nobody can understand or completely manage a large economy. Surely, there are not many “lessons of history” more obvious and certain than that. But economics is a matter of human thought and action. Human thought and action can be applied to such matters as trade, labor, the money supply, in ways that are better or worse. But better or worse for whom! We need to remember what prosperity is supposed to feel like. But first we must find out who “we” are.

Thus, if improving the prosperity of the people is the objective, America is obviously going in the wrong direction. Ever more government has improved the prosperity of the ruling elite. However, it has diminished it for everyone else. If the people want to regain their lost prosperity, they need to do something different. They need a massive dismantlement of government.

The first step to take toward solving America’s economic problems is to withdraw from WTO, NAFTA, and similar agreements and organizations. (Withdrawal from the United Nations and all its subordinate organizations would also be beneficial.) Next is ending subsidizing off-shoring and oversea relocating along with all other corporate welfare. Closely related to this action is the elimination of the military-industrial complex by immediately ending all undeclared wars and closing all bases in foreign countries. An armed force necessary to deter attacks on the United States is much smaller than that needed to maintain a world empire. The gold and silver coin standards need to be reintroduced to operate parallel with the current federal reserve note standard with the intention of ending the latter. Abolishing the Federal Reserve and centralized banking is one of the most important elements toward long-term recovery. Eliminating the overly burdensome regulatory environment in which businesses are forced to operate is another necessary component. (This highly regulated environment exists primarily for the benefit of big businesses as it greatly reduces their competition.) Regulatory agencies that have no constitutional foundation, such as the Environmental Protection Agency (the States are perfectly capable of taking care of their environmental problems), should be immediately eliminated. Most important is a return to constitutional government, which would reduce the size of the U.S. government by 90 percent.

Roberts’ and Quirk’s solution differs significantly from the above. They believe that the solution to the economic problems caused by governmental intervention is more governmental intervention. The correct solution is to remove the governmental intervention that caused the problems.

Jefferson was right when he “objected to using government to encourage manufacturing.” The government should leave the economy alone and let manufacturing develop in its own way and at its own pace. Jefferson said, “[It] can hardly be wise in a government to attempt to give a direction to the industry of its citizens.”

Does the county really need to return to Hamilton? Hamilton supported the concentration of political and economic power into the hands of a few. The country has been operating under his philosophy since 1860. His philosophy has led it to where it is today. Has not the time long past to abandon Hamilton’s philosophy? Has not the time come to adopt Jefferson’s philosophy of decentralizing and dispersing political and economic power?

Copyright © 2010 by Thomas Coley Allen.

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