Libertarians and Open Borders

Libertarians and Open Borders

Thomas Allen

Most libertarians favor open borders and unlimited immigration. According to them, everyone ought to be free to live wherever he wants to live if the taxpayer does not have to pay for it. These libertarians place no value on countries (territory) or nations (people). However, most libertarians refuse to acknowledge that open borders and unlimited immigration are highly destructive to liberty — the thing that most libertarians claim to adore, ranking it just behind unrestrained capitalism.
Libertarians who advocate open borders and unlimited immigration are willing to sacrifice their ideology for the sake of their ideology. Do they really believe that if 100 million Latinos, 100 million Asian Indians, and 100 million East Asians migrated to the United States over the next several decades, they would become more libertarian than they are today? Do they really believe that people who have authoritarianism instilled in them for generations really appreciate liberty? If they did, they would already be living in countries that practice libertarian values.
Moreover, most of these people come from countries where only the opinions of people who wield power matter. Only members of the ruling faction have any rights; the purpose of government is to advance their agenda; rulers are above the law. Furthermore, the powerful are not expected to subordinate their ambition to the wishes of others. Political leaders are expected to loot the country. If given the chance, most of the oppressed in these countries would imitate their oppressors. Yet, libertarians want to flood the United States with people who hold these beliefs.
Only countries where the population is White or mostly White (at least 85 percent) have pursued libertarian ideas. When non-White countries have adopted libertarian ideas, Whites have nearly always imposed such ideas on them, and the remainder have copied them from Whites. When Whites withdraw or dwindle below a critical number, libertarian ideas vanish. Africa is a prime example.
One major cause of the United States becoming more Marxist and having a larger and more intrusive government is the influx of people from highly statist societies. Adding ever increasing numbers of these people will move the country further away from libertarian ideas.
Moreover, Marxists and their kindred control the school systems in the United States. Thus, they are indoctrinating the children of these new arrivals and the children of native-born Americans with Marxist ideas. Unless libertarians are willing to do an unlibertarian thing and capture control of the public school systems and teach these children libertarian ideas, rare will be a student who knows any libertarian ideas.
A historical example of immigration moving the United States from libertarianism toward statism occurred with the failed Revolution of 1848. Many radicals involved in that conflict fled to the United States. Soon afterward, they joined with the Yankee abolitionists and Puritan industrialists and established the imperial president in the person of Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln rewarded them by destroying the US Constitution and concentrating all political power in the US government. If a few thousand radicals uniting with the Puritan Yankee could cause this much destruction, imagine what several hundred million aliens united with the progressive liberals, who are descendants of the Puritan Yankee and 1848 radicals, could do to destroy what little remains of the United States. (Although progressive liberals despise nearly everything that libertarians advocate in the economic and political realm, they agree with libertarians on nearly everything that they advocate in the social realm.)
Additionally, many libertarians teach the idea that people should act like atomized individuals with no loyalty to their race, nation (ethnicity), or gene pool — especially those who follow Ayn Rand’s Objectivism. Like the neo-conservatives, these libertarians push the notion that the United States are a concept country. With their actions, they adamantly oppose the notion that the United States are a genetic country — or, perhaps more correctly today, were a genetic country since they have degenerated into a multiracial, multicultural empire. Furthermore, most libertarians seem to want to eliminate political borders altogether, which is a goal of the globalists, who are scheming to form a totalitarian global government.
Most libertarians have an uncontrollable compulsion to turn the United States into a third world ghetto with their open borders and unlimited immigration policies. Do they really believe that libertarianism could and would thrive in such an environment? So far, it never has. To the contrary, libertarianism has never even been considered in such an environment. People in such a society are too concerned about their next meal or even surviving the day to bother with libertarian ideas. America’s accumulated capital can only last so long. When it is consumed, such poverty will be the norm.
Open borders and unlimited immigration will end all hope of a libertarian society. Are libertarians this ignorant? Are they suicidal? Are they a front for the ruling elite, who want a one-world totalitarian government? Do they hate Whites and Western Civilization? What is their reason for promoting a policy that will destroy their goal of a libertarian society?

Copyright © 2019 by Thomas Coley Allen.

More political articles.

The Conservative Threat to the White Race

The Conservative Threat to the White Race

Thomas Allen

    Perhaps, the greatest threat that the White race faces today is the so-called White conservative spokesmen and leaders because their attack is unsuspected. They are Trojan horses.
    With rare exception, conservative leaders promote, or at least accept without protest, conditions that will genocide the White race. Sadly, most do not even know that which they condone leads to genocide. However, their ignorance does not lessen the genocide; most likely, it makes it more certain. Unfortunately, even if they know, most probably would not object to these conditions.
    Moreover, these conservative leaders do not even realize that the Black race and what little remains of the American Indian will be destroyed with the genocide of the White race. Blacks and other non-Whites are the tools of genocide. This is especially true since many of these conservatives do not oppose flooding the country with Indians and mestizos from Latin America and Melanochroi and Turanians from Asia, who are also being used to genocide the White race.
    A major cause of this problem is that most conservative live in fear of the “R” word — “racist” — although they are by definition racist (all Whites are racist by definition). They need to get over this fear. With more than 280 definitions, “racist” has become a meaningless word whose sole purpose is to smear the person against whom it is hurled.
    Furthermore, many conservatives have fallen in love with “diversity,” so much so, that distinguishing their worship of diversity from that of a liberal is often difficult. However, few acknowledge that integration and amalgamation destroy diversity. Real diversity can only be achieved with segregation and separation. Unfortunately, most of the conservatives who oppose diversity want to replace it with amalgamation, the melting pot. Amalgamation is nothing more than racial suicide, i.e., genocide.
    Another cause is that most conservatives do not know what a nation is. They believe that a nation can be multiracial and multiethnic. However, they confuse “nation” (a people) with “territory” (a country).  A nation or nationality is a people of the same biological race (species) who have a common origin, culture, language, and history and who have common traditions and customs. A country can be multiracial, multiethnic, and multicultural, but a nation cannot. When in their praise of nationalism, they imply or even state that a nation can be multiracial, they are covertly supporting genocide.
    Also, many conservatives show an inability to distinguish between a biological race and ethnicity or between a biological race and a nation. For example, Danes are an ethnicity and a nation of the White or Aryan race, while Zulus are an ethnicity and a nation of the Black or Negro race within the country of South Africa. Both Poles and Portuguese are ethnicities and nations of the Aryan race. Catalans and Basques are ethnicities of the Aryan race who live in the multiethnic country of Spain.
    What is the genocide that these conservative leaders condone? It is amalgamation through miscegenation. When two or more races interbreed, they are destroyed, which is genocide, i.e., the systematic annihilation of a race.
    Besides the fear of being smeared as “racist,” another reason that these conservatives fail to condemn miscegenation as genocide is ignorance. Most fail to realize that interracial mating is genocide because it is subtle and slow. This is ignorance that kills.
    Regrettably, others promote this genocide for the nefarious reason that they are agents of the ruling elite, who seek to annihilate the White race for satanic reasons (it is the race created in the image of God).
    These conservative leaders and spokesmen are much more dangerous to the White race than liberals. Their conservative followers know the hatred of liberals for Whites and their desire to destroy them. However, because of the conservative credentials of these conservative leaders, their followers give less attention to, or even ignore, the hostilities that these conservative leaders have toward the White race. Often, these leaders conceal their animus by praising Whites, expressing a desire to preserve or protect Whites, and protesting discrimination against Whites.
    Beware, if a conservative leader or spokesman (1) continuously or vigorously insists that he is not a racist, (2) praises Martin Luther King, (3) believes that a nation can be multiracial, (4) responds to racial diversity with amalgamation, which he calls assimilation, i.e., the “melting pot” principle, (5) does not object to interracial marriages, (6) gives the impression that the Black man is the same as the White man except that his skin contains more melanin and his hair is curlier,  (7) claims there is only one race: the human race, and (8) objects to aliens illegally entering the country, but expresses no concern about non-Whites entering if they do it legally, he may be an agent of the ruling elite, a coward, or an ignoramus. In any event, conservatives who value the White race need to jettison these traitorous conservative leaders. Such conservatives apparently place little or no value on the White race, the White gene pool. Any person who does not advocate the preservation of his own race and nation (ethnicity) — his gene pool — is a traitor to his people.

Copyright © 2019 by Thomas Coley Allen.

More political articles.

Are the United States a Communist Country?

Are the United States a Communist Country?

Thomas Allen

[Editor’s note: This article was submitted in 1988 to the “Southern National Newsletter” of the Southern National Party.]

    The United States are well on their way to becoming a communist country. About 70 percent [revised to about 80 percent] of the trip has been completed as the following comparison with the ten planks of the Communist Manifesto illustrates.
    1. “Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes.” The U. S. government owns 32 percent of the land in the United States. Indian reservations own 2 percent. State and local governments own 7 percent. Zoning, land use, rent control, and similar laws control much of the remaining 59 percent. Thus, governments in effect control most of the land in the country, i.e., have the benefit of ownership, while leaving landowners the responsibility of ownership. Much of the income that one may earn from his land is taxed away, and most of the taxes that a landowner pays on his property have nothing to do with protecting his land. Plank No. 1 has been essentially implemented — 8 points. [When what the Bureau of Land Management has done in recent years, this score needs to be raised to 9 points.]
    2. “A heavy progressive or graduated income tax.” The Sixteenth Amendment gave the U. S. government the authority to levy a progressive income tax. The U.S. government and most States levy a progressive income tax. Plank No. 2 has been implemented — 10 points.
    3. “Abolition of all rights of inheritance.” People still retain the right to will property and to inherit property. However, inheritance is taxed heavily enough that property left often has to be sold, and is, therefore, lost by the inheritor, to raise money to pay inheritance and estate taxes. Plank No. 3 has been partially implemented — 3 points. [Although some tax relief has been given in recent years, this plank still deserves at least 3 points.]
    4. “Confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels.” Southerners, whom the conquering horde considers rebels, have had much of their property confiscated over the years. Also, investments in foreign countries, which is a form of emigration, is controlled and restricted by the U.S. government. The U.S. government claims the authority to limit the amount of property that a citizen may take out of the country. Plank No. 4 has been partially implemented — 4 points. [With all the security laws enacted in recent years, the score for this plank needs to be raised to 6 points.]
    5. “Centralization of credit in the hands of the State, by means of a national bank with State capital and exclusive monopoly.” The Federal Reserve Act centralized credit in the hands of the U.S. government. It along with various other federal banking laws has established an exclusive banking monopoly controlled by the U.S. government. Federal debt accounts for a significant part of the reserves of the banking system. They have implemented Plank No. 5 — 10 points.
    6. “Centralization of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the State.” The U.S. government has centralized the control of communication and transportation in its hands. Some of the agencies that have been used to implement this plank are the post office, FCC, FPC, CAB, FAA, FMB, FRA, and ICC. Plank No. 6 has been implemented — 10 points.
    7. “Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the State; the bringing into cultivation waste lands, and the improvement of soil generally in accordance with a common plan.” The U.S. government has been implementing this plank over the years with such agencies as the Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Reclamation, the Corps of Engineers, and the Tennessee Valley Authority. Although the U.S. government and the States have usually refrained from taking over the ownership of factories, they have not hesitated to claim control of them. They tell employers whom they must hire, the kind of benefits to give employees, the minimum wage to pay employees, and a host of other items that are better left to negotiation between employers and employees because they are rightfully within their purview and not that of the government. Plank No. 7 has been substantially implemented — 8 points.
    8. “Equal liability of all to labor. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture.” This plank is one that the welfare state has managed to avoid. Plank No. 8 has barely been implemented — 1 point.
    9. “Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; A gradual abolition of distinction between town and country, by more equitable distribution of the population over the country.” Zoning, land use, and similar laws are removing the distinction between town and country. Agricultural and tax policies are forcing agricultural operations to resemble manufacturing industry.  Plank No. 9 is well on its way to being implemented — 8 points. [With the U.S. governments and State and local governments adopting laws to implement Agenda 21 and Agenda 2030 to greatly restrict the use of rural land and to force most people to live in cities, this plank has now been substantially implemented and deserves 10 points.]
    10. “Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children’s factory labour in its present form. Combination of education with industrial production, etc., etc.” Plank No. 10 has been completely implemented — 10 points.
    Out of a possible 100 points, the United States score 72 points [revised to 77 points]. That is, the United States have already implemented 72 percent [revised to 77 percent] of Marx’s planks. Therefore, judging by the ten planks that Marx presents in the Communist Manifesto, the United States have almost completed their journey of becoming a communist country.

Copyright © 1988, 2019 by Thomas C. Allen.

More political articles.

Mencken on Corruption Under Democracy

Mencken on Corruption Under Democracy

Thomas Allen

    In 1926, H. L. Mencken (1880-1956) wrote Notes on Democracy in which he expressed his views on democracy and related issues. He was a journalist, satirist, and critic and a libertarian and one of the leaders of the Old Right. In his book, he describes corruption under democracy, pages 187-203. Below is an overview of his discussion on corruption under democracy; my comments are in brackets.
    Nine-tenth of the Puritan and democrat is “cruelty, envy and cowardice.” About the early Puritans of New England, Mencken writes, “He was not only a very carnal fellow, and given to lamentable transactions with loose women and fiery jugs; he was also a virtuoso of sharp practices, and to this day his feats in that department survive in fable.” Then he notes that no perceptible improvements have been found in his successors.
    Mencken remarks, “A sixth of the Americano’s income is rooked out of him by rogues who have at him officially, and in the name of the government; half the remainder goes to sharpers who prefer the greater risks and greater profits of private enterprise.” [Today, the government gets half and the sharpers still get half, if not more, of the remainder. Thus, they typical American has much less to live on than he did in the 1920s.] “All schemes to save him from such victimizations have failed in the past, and all of them . . . are bound to fail in the future.”
    Dreaming eternally of utopia makes the democratic man easy “prey to shibboleths, and those that fetch him in his political capacity are more than matched by those that fetch him in his role of private citizen.” The poor old democrat is always facing schemes “full of virtuous pretences,” only to discover that “they are unmitigated swindles.” [Pick your favorite federal program as an example.]
    “All observers of democracy . . . have marvelled at its corruptions on the political side.” Democracy brings bribery, “and thus destroy[s] the integrity and authority of the State.” [In a democracy, incumbent politicians are notorious for bribing voters with money from the public treasury and businesses with subsidizes and special privileges. Also, lobbyists are notorious for bribing politicians with contribution to their election campaigns and by other means. Foreign governmental officials bribed Secretary of State Hillary Clinton with donations to the Clinton Foundation.] Historians marvel that such blatant bribery occurs in a democracy “and marvel even more that democracy takes them calmly, and even lightly.” Democracy seems to accept bribery as inevitable and natural. Commenting on corruption during the Harding administration, Mencken states that a “small body of specialists in rectitude . . . ventured to protest, and in the end they found themselves far more unpopular than the thieves.” [Whenever a whistle blower presents evidence of corruption and even crimes by high-ranking personnel of the U.S. government, most often the whistle blower is persecuted and often prosecuted while the culprit remains unmolested and goes free.]
    Although “[s]uch phenomena . . . puzzle the more academic pathologists of democracy, . . . they seem to be in strict accord with God’s invariable laws.” Then Mencken asks, “Why should democracy rise against bribery? It is itself a form of wholesale bribery.” He adds, “In place of a government with a fixed purpose and a visible goal, it sets up a government that is a mere function of the mob’s vagaries, and that maintains itself by constantly bargaining with those vagaries. Its security depends wholly upon providing satisfactory bribes for the prehensible minorities that constitute the mob, or that have managed to deceive and inflame the mob.” [Thus, bribery is an essential, vital part of democracy.] “The whole process of government under democracy . . . is a process of” granting privileges and benefits to various groups in exchange for granting privileges and benefits to other groups. Moreover, “[t]he very head of the State, having no title to his office save that which lies in the popular will, is forced to haggle and bargain like the lowliest office-seeker.” [Many third-world countries have solved this problem by having  their president elected for life — life being until assassinated or overthrown by some rival gang.] Mencken continues, “There has been no President of the United States since Washington who did not go into office with a long list of promises in his pocket, and nine-tenths of them have always been promises of private reward from the public store. It is surely not regarded as immoral by the democratic ethic to make and execute such promises, though statesmen of lofty pretensions, e.g., Lincoln, sometimes deny having made them.” He adds, “What is reproached as immoral is making them, and then not keeping them.”
    Commenting on the foreign policies of the United States, Mencken writes, “That the United States, in its foreign relations, has descended to gross deceits and tergiversations since the earliest days of the Republic was long ago pointed out by Lecky; it is regarded universally to-day as a pious fraud — which is to say, as a Puritan.” [What would one expect from foreign policies developed and controlled by Yankees? Historically, the United States have been notorious for betraying its friends and aiding its enemies — especially during the Cold War, when they betrayed nearly every ally whose government actively opposed Communism. One of the most detestable of these acts was the U.S. government betraying one its World War II allies, Chiang Kai-shek, in favor of Mao and his communist regime.]
    Next Mencken comments on democracy’s domestic relations. “The government deals with the citizens from whom it has its mandate in a base and disingenuous manner, and fails completely to maintain equal justice among them. It not only follows the majority in persecuting those who happen to be unpopular; it also institutes persecutions of its own, and frequently against men of the greatest rectitude and largest public usefulness.”
    About the Department of Justice, he remarks, “It has been engaged in sharp practices since the earliest days, and remains a fecund source of oppression and corruption to-day.” [Nothing has changed. Many lovers of liberty refer to it as the “Department of Injustice.”] Moreover, “it has actually resorted to perjury in its efforts to undo men guilty of flouting it, and at all times it has laboured valiantly to nullify the guarantees of the Bill of Rights.” [It still does today.]
    “As Mill long ago pointed out, the tyranny of the majority under democracy is not only shown in oppressive laws, but also in a usurped power to suspend the operation of laws that are just.” [John Stuart Mill {1806–1873} was an English philosopher, political economist and civil servant.] To this observation, Mencken adds, “In this enterprise a democratic government always marches ahead of the majority. Even more than the most absolute oriental despotism, it becomes a government of men, not of laws. Its favourites are, to all intents and purposes, immune to criminal processes, whatever their offences, and its enemies are exposed to espionage and persecution of the most aggravated sort.” [We see this today in America’s multitiered “justice” system. The well-connected people, such as Hillary Clinton, are not even charged when they commit crimes that would send a commoner to prison for life. On the other hand, people whose “crime” is merely supporting the Bill of Rights are prosecuted with full vigor and resources of the Department of “Justice” and are charged with a multitude of crimes. These people are usually convicted by a corrupt court system and are sentenced to the maximum possible term in prison. Likewise, specially protected groups like Black Lives Matter, Antifa, and the anti-Confederate protestors can violate all sorts of laws with impunity. Although politicians frequently prattle that we have a government of laws and not of men, the opposite is true.] Above all, the government “always shows that characteristically Puritan habit: . . . to wit, of inflicting as much mental suffering as possible upon its victims.”
    Next Mencken writes, “The constant and central aim of every democratic government is to silence criticism of itself. It begins to weaken, i.e., the jobs of its component rogues begin to be insecure, the instant such criticism rises. It is thus fidei defensor [defender of the faith] before it is anything else, and its whole power, legal and extra-legal, is thrown against the sceptic who challenges its infallibility. Constitutional checks have little effect upon its operations, for the only machinery for putting them into effect is under its control.” [Thus, the necessity of a well-armed citizenry — one that outguns the government.] Mencken continues, “No ruler, indeed, ever wants to be a constitutional ruler, and least of all the ruler whose reign has a term, and who must make hay, in consequence, while the sun shines. . . . No man would want to be President of the United States in strict accordance with the Constitution. There is no sense of power in merely executing laws; it comes from evading or augmenting them.”
    Mencken writes, “ I incline to think that this view of government as a group of men struggling for power and profit, in the face and at the expense of the generality of men, has its place somewhere in the dark recesses of the popular mind, and that it accounts, at least in large part, for the toleration with which public corruption is regarded in democratic states. Democratic man, to begin with, is corrupt himself: he will take whatever he can safely get, law or no law. He assumes, naturally and accurately, that the knaves and mountebanks who govern him are of the same kidney.” Democratic man is not shocked “to find them running true to the ordinances of their nature. If, indeed, any individual among them shows an unusual rectitude, and refuses spectacularly to take what might be his for the grabbing, Homo boobiens sets him down as either a liar or an idiot, and refuses to admire him.” [Does this explain in part the popularity of Presidents Clinton and Obama, who grabbed all they could?] “Democratic man is stupid, but he is not so stupid that he does not see the government as a group of men devoted to his exploitation that is, as a group external to his own group, and with antagonistic interests.” Moreover, democratic man believes that the government’s “central aim is to squeeze as much out of him as he can be forced to yield, and so he sees no immorality in attempting a contrary squeeze when the opportunity offers. Beating the government thus becomes a transaction devoid of moral turpitude.”
    Capitalism is secure in democratic societies. “Democratic man can understand the aims and aspirations of Capitalism; they are, greatly magnified, simply his own aims and aspirations.” [The type of capitalism described by Mencken should be called crony capitalism. It certainly is not free market capitalism. Under crony capitalism, capitalists use their control of the government, usually from behind the scene, to give themselves subsidies, contracts, and special privileges and to penalize competitors. Moreover, Mencken seems to contradict himself. Earlier in his book he describes the Dictatorship of the Proletariat as being democratic; however, the economy under it was not capitalistic in any form. Nevertheless, being by nature democratic, socialism is much more compatible with democracy than any form of capitalism.]
    Mencken notes, “An aristocratic society may hold that a soldier or a man of learning is superior to a rich manufacturer or banker; but in a democratic society the latter are inevitably put higher, if only because their achievement is more readily comprehended by the inferior man, and he can more easily imagine himself, by some favour of God, duplicating it.”
    Mencken observes that “the average American banker or business man, whatever his demerits otherwise, is at least more competent professionally than the average American statesman, musician, painter, author, Labour leader, scholar, theologian or politician.” [Perhaps this is why big bankers and big businessmen are the real power controlling the government.] Then Mencken notes, “The capitalists, in fact, run the country, as they run all democracies. . . . They organize and control the minorities that struggle eternally for power, and so get a gradually firmer grip upon the government. . . [T]hey [the capitalists] dispose of . . . [the] demagogues . . . and put the helm of state into the hands of trusted and reliable men.”
                                               
Copyright © 2017 by Thomas Coley Allen.

More political articles.

Milton on the Son of God – Part 3

Milton on the Son of God – Part 3

Thomas Allen

[Editor’s note:  Page numbers enclosed in parentheses are references to Milton on the Son of God and the Holy Spirit from His Treatise on Christian Doctrine by John Milton. The author’s comments are enclosed in brackets.]

      Some Trinitarians claim that according to some passages, “Christ is God; now if the Father be the only true God, Christ is not the true God; but if he be not the true God, he must be a false God” (p. 58). To this assertion, Milton replies “that the conclusion is too hastily drawn; for it may be that he is not ‘he that is true,’ either because he is only the image of him that is true, or because he uniformly declares himself to be inferior to him that is true. We are not obliged to say of Christ what the Scriptures do not say” (pp. 58-59). The Scriptures do not call Christ true God. Moreover, “he is not to be called a false God, to whom, as to his beloved Son, he that is the true God has communicated his divine power and glory” (p. 59).
      Trinitarians use Philippians 2:6 (“who being in the form of God”) to support their doctrine. Milton replies:

But this no more proves him to be God than the phrase which follows — “took upon him the form of a servant” — proves that he was really a servant, as the sacred writers nowhere use the word “form” for actual being. But if it be contended that “the form of God” is here taken in a philosophical sense for the essential form, this consequence cannot be avoided, that when Christ laid aside the form, he laid aside also the substance and the efficiency of God; a doctrine against which they protest, and with justice (p. 59).

According to Milton, “‘To be in the form of God,’ . . . seems to be synonymous with being in the image of God; which is often predicated of Christ, even as man is also said, though in a much lower sense, to be the image of God, that is, by creation” (p. 59).
      About Trinitarian gymnastics with the Scriptures, Milton writes:

It is singular, however, that those who maintain the Father and the Son to be one in essence, should revert from the gospel to the times of the law, as if they would make a fruitless attempt to illustrate light by darkness. They say that the Son is not only called God, but also Jehovah, as appears from a comparison of several passages in both testaments. Now Jehovah is the one supreme God; therefore the Son and the Father are one in essence (p. 61).

Further, Milton notes that the name of Jehovah is applied to angels when they represent his divine presence and speak his words. In support, he cites numerous verses (pp. 61-65).
      Then, citing several passages, he illustrates the absurdity of assuming that when one name is mentioned twice in the same sentence that the name is applied to two persons (pp. 65-66).
      Next, he discusses Exodus chapter 23 and 33 where God sends an angle to guide the Israelites. The angel addresses the Israelites as though he was Jehovah — he is called Jehovah. If the Israelites understood the angel to be Jehovah:

it follows that they must have conceived either that there were two Jehovahs, or that Jehovah and the angel were one in essence; which no rational person will affirm to have been their belief. . . . If the people had believed that Jehovah and that angel were one in essence, equal in divinity and glory, why did they mourn, and desire that Jehovah should go up before them, notwithstanding his anger, rather than the angel? . . . If, on the contrary, they did not consider the angel as Jehovah, they must necessarily have understood that he bore the name of Jehovah in the sense in which I suppose him to have borne it, wherein there is nothing either absurd or histrionic (pp 67-68).

      Some Trinitarians argue that this angel was Christ himself — citing 1 Corinthians 10:9 as support (p. 67). Therefore, he was Jehovah. Milton replies, if this angel had been Christ, he would have acted as a moderator and mediator (p. 68). He adds that “whether Christ, or some angel different from the preceding, the very words of Jehovah himself show that he was neither one with Jehovah, nor co-equal, for the Israelites are commanded to hear his voice, not on the authority of his own name, but because the name of Jehovah was in him” (p. 68). Continuing, he remarks, “[If] the angel was Christ, this proves no more than that Christ was an angel, according to their interpretation of Gen. xlviii. 16, ‘the angel which redeemed me from all evil’; and Isa. Ixiii. 9, ‘the angel of his presence saved them’” (p. 68).
      Next, Milton cites several passages from Revelations that he interprets as supporting his Christology (p. 70). Then he comments on the difficulties that they have caused some Trinitarians. For example, one Trinitarian accused the Arians of transposing and confusing some of the verses in the last chapter of Revelations; thus, he rearranged these verses to support his Trinity Doctrine (p. 70). Milton notes that action would have been unnecessary if this Trinitarian had observed that throughout the Old Testament, “angels are accustomed to assume the name and person, and the very words of God and Jehovah, as their own; and that occasionally an angel represents the person and the very words of God, without taking the name either of Jehovah or God, but only in the character of an angel, or even of a man” (p. 71) — for example, Judges 2:1.  About this issue, Milton writes:

But according to divines the name of Jehovah signifies two things, either the nature of God, or the completion of his word and promises. If it signify the nature, and therefore the person of God, why should not he who is invested with his person and presence, be also invested with the name which represents them? If it signify the completion of his word and promises, why should not he, to whom words suitable to God alone are so frequently attributed, be permitted also to assume the name of Jehovah, whereby the completion of these words and promises is represented? Or if that name be so acceptable to God, that he has always chosen to consider it as sacred and peculiar to himself alone, why has he uniformly disused it in the New Testament, which contains the most important fulfilment of his prophecies; retaining only the name of the Lord, which had always been common to him with angels and men? If, lastly, any name whatever can be so pleasing to God, why has he exhibited himself to us in the gospel without any proper name at all (pp. 71-72)?

[Some ancient manuscripts of Matthew do contain the name Jehovah, Yahweh.]
      Continuing, Milton discusses Isaiah 8:13, 14 along with 1 Peter 2:7, 8, Zachariah 11:13, 12:10 along with Acts 2:33 and John 19:37, and Malachi 3:1 to illustrate that Jehovah’s messenger is at times called “Jehovah” (pp. 72-75). Concluding, he adds, “That the name and presence of God is used to imply his vicarious power and might resident in the Son, is proved by another prophecy concerning John the Baptist, Isa. xl. 3, ‘the voice of him that crieth in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of Jehovah; make straight in the desert a highway for our God’”(pp. 75-76).
      Milton states “that the Son himself professes to have received from the Father, not only the name of God and of Jehovah, but all that pertains to his own being —  that is to say, his individuality, his existence itself, his attributes, his works, his divine honours; to which doctrine the apostles also, subsequent to Christ, bear their testimony” (p. 76). Then he cites John 3:35, 8:3, and Matthew 11:27 to support this conclusion.
      Next, he comments on Trinitarians using the two natures of Christ to “evade any arguments that may be brought against them. What Scripture says of the Son generally, they apply, as suits their purpose, in a partial and restricted sense; at one time to the Son of God, at another to the Son of Man — now to the Mediator in his divine, now in his human capacity, and now again in his union of both natures” (p. 77). [According to Trinitarians, Christ is 100 percent man and 100 percent God with no commingling of the two natures.] However, “the Son himself says expressly, ‘the Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into his hand,’ John iii. 35 — namely, because ‘he loveth him,’ not because he hath begotten him — and he hath given all things to him as ‘the Son,’ not as Mediator only” (p. 77).
      If Christ’s Deity had remained what it was before he became the mediator as Trinitarians claim, then “why does he ask and receive everything from the Father, and not from himself? If all things come from the Father, why is it necessary (as they maintain it to be) for the mediatorial office, that he should be the true and supreme God” (pp. 77-78). Therefore, all things that the Father gives the Son are the Father’s gifts to the Son (p. 78). In support, Milton cites John 16:15, Acts 17: 9, 10, Isaiah 9:6 (evidence that he receives his name from the Father), Philippians 2:9, Hebrews 1:4, and Ephesians 1:20, 21 (pp. 78-79).
    About the names given the son, Milton writes, “We need be under no concern, however, respecting the name, seeing that the Son receives his very being in like manner from the Father. John vii. 29, ‘I am from him.’ The same thing is implied John i. 1, ‘in the beginning’” (p. 79).
      About John 1:1, Milton notes:

[T]he notion of his eternity is here excluded not only by the decree, . . . but by the name of Son, and by the phrases — “this day have I begotten thee,” and “I will be to him a father.” Besides, the word “beginning” can only here mean “before the foundation of the world,” according to John xvii. 5, as is evident from Col. i. 15-17, “the first born of every creature: for by him were all things created that are in heaven, and that are in earth, etc., and he is before all things, and by him all things consist” (p. 79).

[Milton believes that the son created the heavens and the earth. This is also a commonly held belief of Trinitarians. Some unitarians disagree with Milton on this point.]
      About the Son being eternal, Milton remarks, “Him who was begotten from all eternity the Father cannot have begotten, for what was made from all eternity was never in the act of being made; him whom the Father begat from all eternity he still begets; he whom he still begets is not yet begotten, and therefore is not yet a Son; for an action which has no beginning can have no completion” (p. 80). Moreover, “it seems to be altogether impossible that the Son should be either begotten or born from all eternity. If he is the Son, either he must have been originally in the Father, and have proceeded from him, or he must always have been as he is now, separate from the Father, self-existent and independent” (p. 80).  He adds, “If he was originally in the Father, but now exists separately, he has undergone a certain change at some time or other, and is therefore mutable. If he always existed separately from, and independently of, the Father, how is he from the Father, how begotten, how the Son, how separate in subsistence, unless he be also separate in essence (p. 80)?”
      According to Milton, and contrary to Trinitarians, “the Father and the Son differ in essence” (p. 81). Both reason and the Scriptures support this conclusion. Milton writes a lengthy explanation for why they cannot have the same essences (pp. 81-83).
      Next, he comments on the existence of the Son: The Son derives his existence from the Father. In support, he cites John 5:26, 6:57, and Hebrews 1:8, 11, 12 (p. 83).
      About the Son being omnipresent, Milton remarks that “if the Father has given all things to the Son, even his very being and life, he has also given him to be wherever he is” (p. 83). [The Son is not truly omnipresent. A truly omnipresent being cannot move. There is no place where he can move because he is already there. Moreover, if he leaves a place, he is no longer omnipresent because there is a place where he is not. The Son ascended into heaven and will some day descend from heaven — thus, the Son moves from one place to another.] He argues that the apparent omnipresence of Jesus in John 1:48 (“before that Philip called . . . I saw thee”) cannot be used to prove that the Son is of the same essence as the father (pp. 83-84). Likewise, Matthew 18:20 (“there am I in the midst of them”) and 28:20 (“I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world”) do not assert absolute omnipresence (p. 84). [Omnipresence is being everywhere simultaneously. Being many places at once is not omnipresence. For example, a radio broadcast is in many places at once, but it is not omnipresent; it is not everywhere simultaneously.]
      Next, Milton discusses omniscience and cites many verses that purport that Jesus is omniscient (pp. 84-85). Then Milton notes that the Son did not know all things absolutely and cites several verses showing his lack of omniscience (p. 85). [According to Trinitarians, when Jesus appears to be omniscience, for example, John 21:11 {“thou knowest all things”}, he is acting in his divine nature. When he lacks knowledge, as when he did not know when the time of the destruction of the temple or when he would return and the end of the age would occur {Mark 13:32}, he is acting in his human nature. However, according to Revelation 1:1, Jesus is not omniscient; God has to give him the revelation. This occurred after the Son had shed his human body and could no longer be acting in his human nature.]
      Mostly by citing verses, Milton discusses the Son’s authority; his authority comes from the Father (pp. 86-87).
      Whatever omnipotence that he had, he had because all his power came from the Father (p. 87). To support this conclusion, Milton cites several verses. About the Son’s apparent omnipotence, Milton observed that “the nature of these works, although divine, was such, that angels were not precluded from performing similar miracles at the same time and in the same place where Christ himself abode daily” (p. 87) — for example, John 5:4 (“an angel went down at a certain season into the pool”). Moreover, the disciple performed the same works.
      Again citing Scripture, Milton discusses other gifts that Jesus received from the Father. They include the power of conversion (pp. 87-88), creation (pp. 88-89), remission of sins (p. 89), preservation (p. 90), renovation (pp. 90-91), conferring gifts (p. 91), mediatorial, i.e., his passion (pp. 90-91), resuscitation from death (p. 93), future judicial advent (p. 93), divine honors (p. 93), baptism in his name (p. 94), belief in him (pp. 94-96), and judgment (p. 99).
      About the passion, Milton asks, “How then can the Son be considered co-essential and co-equal with the Father (p. 92)?” About Jesus’ exclamation on the cross — “My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?” — he asks, “He whom the Son, himself God, addresses as God, must be the Father — why then did the Son call upon the Father (p. 92)?” Milton’s answer is that because “he felt even his divine nature insufficient to support him under the pains of death” (p. 92).
      Remarking further on Philippians 2:6, he notes that the Son’s possession of the divine gifts that the Father gave him was not robbery. Milton continues, “[I]f this passage imply his co-equality with the Father, it rather refutes than proves his unity of essence; since equality cannot exist but between two or more essences” (p. 100). He adds:

Further, the phrases “he did not think it” — “he made himself of no reputation” (literally, “he emptied himself”) appear inapplicable to the supreme God, For to think is nothing else than to entertain an opinion, which cannot be properly said of God. Nor can the infinite God be said to empty himself, any more than to contradict himself; for infinity and emptiness are opposite terms. But since he emptied himself of that form of God in which he had previously existed, if the form of God is to be taken for the essence of the Deity itself, it would prove him to have emptied himself of that essence, which is impossible (p. 100).

      Lastly, Milton proves that the Father is greater than the Son. For Jesus said, “My Father is greater than all” (John 10:29) and “my Father is greater than I” (John 14:28). Trinitarians respond “that Christ is speaking of his human nature” (p. 100). However, Milton doubts that “his disciples understand him as speaking merely of his human nature” (p. 100). He writes:

If therefore he said this, not of his human nature only (for that the Father was greater than he in his human nature could not admit of a doubt), but in the sense in which he himself wished his followers to conceive of him both as God and man, it ought undoubtedly to be understood as if he had said, My Father is greater than I, whatsoever I am, both in my human and divine nature; otherwise the speaker would not have been he in whom they believed, and instead of teaching them, he would only have been imposing upon them with an equivocation. He must therefore have intended to compare the nature with the person, not the nature of God the Father with the nature of the Son (p. 101).

He cites several verses to support his conclusion that the Father is greater than the Son (pp. 101-105).
      As shown above, Milton presents a unitarian argument akin to that of the Arians and the Jehovah’s Witnesses. All three believe in a preexisting Son, i.e., the Son existed before his conception. They believe that the Son has a beginning and, therefore, is not eternal. Further, they believe that the Father is the supreme God, the only true God, Jehovah of the Old Testament, and that God is one in person. Moreover, Milton was in agreement with most orthodox Christians from the mid-second century to early fourth century; they believed in a preexisting Son who was not eternal and who was subordinate to the Father. [Milton is unclear about whether Jesus was perfect man of a rational soul and the preexisting Son of a rational soul both occupying the same body without confusion of substances similar to the Trinitarian and Valentinian belief or Jesus was a human shell or sentient body with the preexisting Son providing the rational soul or mind similar to the Apollinarian belief or some other model.]

Copyright © 2018 by Thomas Coley Allen.

Part 2

More religious articles.

Milton on the Son of God – Part 2

Milton on the Son of God – Part 2

Thomas Allen

[Editor’s note:  Page numbers enclosed in parentheses are references to Milton on the Son of God and the Holy Spirit from His Treatise on Christian Doctrine by John Milton. The author’s comments are enclosed in brackets.]

    Not only does the Trinity Doctrine lack scriptural support, it also is lacking in reason. The “alternative therefore must be adopted, namely, that if God be one God, and that one God be the Father, and if notwithstanding the Son be also called God, the Son must have received the name and nature of Deity from God the Father, in conformity with his decree and will, after the manner stated before” (p. 25).
    Milton notes that Trinitarians insist “that wherever the name of God is attributed to the Father alone, it should be understood . . . to signify the three persons, or the whole essence of the Trinity, not the single person of the Father” (p. 27). He continues:

This is on many accounts a ridiculous distinction and invented solely for the purpose of supporting their peculiar opinion; although in reality, instead of supporting it, it will be found to be dependent on it, and therefore if the opinion itself be invalidated, for which purpose a simple denial is sufficient, the futile distinction falls to the ground at the same time. For the fact is, not merely that the distinction is a futile one, but that it is no distinction at all; it is a mere verbal quibble, founded on the use of synonymous words, and cunningly dressed up in terms borrowed from the Greek to dazzle the eyes of novices (p. 27).

He adds that “since essence and hypostasis mean the same thing, . . . [then] there can be no real difference of meaning between the adverbs essentially and substantially (hypostatice), which are derived from them” (p.27). Consequently, if  “the name of God be attributed to the Father alone essentially, it must also be attributed to the Father alone substantially” (p. 27). “If . . . the Son, who has his own proper hypostasis, have not also his own proper essence, but the essence of the Father, he becomes on their hypothesis either no ens [a real thing, entity] at all, or the same ens with the Father; which strikes at the very foundation of the Christian religion” (p. 28).
    According to the Trinity doctrine, “wherever the Son attributes Deity to the Father alone, and as to one greater than himself, he must be understood to speak in his human character, or as mediator” (p. 29). [This is a fantastic doctrine that prevents Jesus from being able to deny that he is God. Every statement that he makes or action that he takes that shows that he is not Deity can be rejected because it is merely Jesus speaking or acting in his human character and not in his divine character.] Milton concedes this concept to the Trinitarian “[w]herever the context and the fact itself require this interpretation” (p. 29). However, “it can never be inferred from hence that he is one God with the Father” (p. 29).
    Continuing, Milton remarks that “simultaneous mention is made of the Father and the Son, that name [God] is uniformly ascribed to the Father alone” (p. 29) with a few exceptions. Then he cites several verses to support his claim (pp. 29-30).
    Milton writes, “The Son likewise teaches that the attributes of divinity belong to the Father alone, to the exclusion even of himself” (p. 31). For example, in Matthew 24:36 and Mark 13:32, Jesus declares that only the Father is omniscient and that he (Jesus) lacks the divine trait of omniscience. [Trinitarians claim that Jesus’ human character is not omniscient, but his divine character is.]
    According to Milton, “after the hypostatical union of two natures in one person [the union of the divine nature and human nature in Jesus such that, according to the Trinitarian Doctrine, Jesus is simultaneously 100 percent man and 100 percent Deity with no confusion of substance], it follows that whatever Christ says of himself, he says not as the possessor of either nature separately, but with reference to the whole of his character, and in his entire person, except where he himself makes a distinction” (p. 32). He adds, “Those who divide this hypostatical union at their own  discretion, strip the discourses and answers of Christ of all their sincerity; they represent everything as ambiguous and uncertain, as true and false at the same time; it is not Christ that speaks, but some unknown substitute, sometimes one, and sometimes another” (pp. 32-33).
    Moreover, Jesus’ will is independent of the Father, for in Matthew 26:39, Jesus says “not as I will, but as thou [the Father] wilt.” Milton comments, “Now it is manifest that those who have not the same will, cannot have the same essence” (p. 33). Then he cites several verses to show that the Father and Son do not have “in a numerical sense, the same intelligence or will” (p. 33): Matthew 24:36, Mark 13:32, and John 6:38.
    After referencing several prayers of Jesus to God the Father, Milton asks, “If these prayers be uttered only in his human capacity, which is the common explanation, why does he petition these things from the Father alone instead of from himself, if he were God? Or rather, supposing him to be at once man and the supreme God, why does he ask at all for what was in his own power (p. 34)?”
    According to Jesus, “there is none good but one, that is God” (Matthew 19:17). To this statement, Milton remarks “that he did not choose to be considered essentially the same with that one God; for otherwise this would only have been disclaiming the credit of goodness in one character, for the purpose of assuming it in another” (p. 34).
    Milton notes that “Christ assigns every attribute of the Deity to the Father alone. The apostles uniformly speak in a similar manner” (p. 35). He cites several verses as examples. Furthermore, many verses declare that the Father alone raised the Son from the dead (pp. 35-37).
    Next, Milton notes that “the Son uniformly pays worship and reverence to the Father alone, so he teaches us to follow the same practice” (p. 37). Thus, divine honors are owed to the Father. In support, he cites several verses (pp. 37-41).
    Trinitarians argue “that the Son is sometimes called God, and even Jehovah; and that all the attributes of the Deity are assigned to him likewise in many passages both of the Old and New Testament” (p. 41). Milton replies “that where the Father and the Son are mentioned together, the name, attributes, and works of the Deity, as well as divine honours, are always assigned to the one and only God the Father” (p. 41). Then he proceeds to demonstrate “that whenever the same properties are assigned to the Son, it is in such a manner as to make it easily intelligible that they ought all primarily and properly to be attributed to the Father alone” (p. 41).
    He notes that the name or title of “God” is occasionally given to angels and men. Angels are called gods in Psalm 97:7, 9 and Judges 6:22, 13:21, 22. The title “God” is attributed to angels when they appear as Jehovah’s representatives (God spoke through them). Examples are Genesis 21:17, 18 and 22:11, 12, 15, 16. In Exodus 22:28, judges are called gods “because they occupy the place of God to a certain degree in the administration of judgment” (p. 46). Moreover, the children of Israel are called gods in Psalm 82:6. Also, the house of David is called God in Zechariah 12:8, and Moses is called God in Exodus 4:16 and 7:1.
    One error that some Trinitarians make is to construe “Elohim,” the Hebrew word for God, incorrectly. Although Elohim is plural in number, it is singular in meaning. These Trinitarians assert that Elohim “is intended to intimate a plurality of persons in unity of essence” (p. 43). [Although this interpretation of Elohim was once a popular argument used by Trinitarians to support the Trinity Doctrine, few use it today. Most Trinitarians now admit that nothing in the Old Testament supports the doctrine of a triune God. However, it does consistently and emphatically support the doctrine of a unipersonal God.] Milton remarks that “if there be any significance at all in this peculiarity, the word must imply as many gods as it does persons” (p. 43).
    Continuing, Milton notes that the Son “was entitled to the name of God both in the capacity of a messenger and of a judge” (p. 46). In John 10:34-36, Jesus used this argument “when the Jews accused him of blasphemy because he made himself God” (p. 46).
    By identifying the Word as the Son, Trinitarians use John 1:1 to support their doctrine of the eternal Son. Milton responds that the verse does not say “from everlasting, but ‘in the beginning.’ ‘The Word’ — therefore the Word was audible” (p. 47). Since God cannot be seen or heard (John 5:37), the “Word therefore is not of the same essence with God” (p. 47). That the Word was with God does not necessarily mean that “he [or it as some unitarians would say] is one in essence with him with whom he was” (p. 47).
    Milton argues that John should be allowed to interpret what he means by the Word in John 1:1. In Revelations 19:13, John writes that “‘his name is called the Word of God’ — that is, of the one God: he himself is a distinct person. If therefore he be a distinct person, he is distinct from God, who is unity. How then is he himself also God? By the same right as he enjoys the title of the Word, or of the only begotten Son, namely, by the will of the one God” (pp 47-48).
    Continuing to John 1:2, Milton comments that the second verse “enforces what the apostle wished we should principally observe, not that he was in the beginning God, but in the beginning with God; that he might show him to be God only by proximity and love, not in essence” (p. 48). Unlike the Trinitarian explanation of John 1:1-2, this explanation is consistent with the remainder of John’s gospel.
    A favorite passage that Trinitarians use to prove the Trinity Doctrine is John 20:28, where Thomas says to Jesus, “My Lord and my God.” In response, Milton writes, “He [Thomas] must have an immoderate share of credulity who attempts to elicit a new confession of faith, unknown to the rest of the disciples, from this abrupt exclamation of the apostle, who invokes in his surprise not only Christ his own Lord, but the God of his ancestors, namely, God the Father” (p. 48). Yet, shortly before meeting Thomas, Jesus had declared, “I ascend unto my God and your God’ [John 20:17]. Now the God of God cannot be essentially one with him whose God he is. On whose word therefore can we ground our faith with most security; on that of Christ, whose doctrine is clear, or of Thomas, a new disciple, first incredulous, then suddenly breaking out into an abrupt exclamation in an ecstasy of wonder, if indeed he really called Christ his God? . . . [Nor] is it credible that he should have so quickly understood the hypostatic union of that person whose resurrection he had just before disbelieved” (pp. 48-49).
    Some Trinitarians claim that the lack of Jesus correcting Thomas in his remarks proves the Deity of Jesus, i.e., Jesus is God Himself, the second person of the triune God. Contrariwise, Milton argues that the lack of correction proves that Jesus is not a person of a triune God (pp. 49-50).
    Also, Matthew 1:23 (“they shall call his name Immanuel, which being interpreted is, God with us”) “does not prove that he [Jesus] whom they were so to call should necessarily be God but only a messenger from God” (p. 50).
    About Acts 16: 31, 34 (“believe on the Lord Jesus Christ . . . and he rejoiced, believing in God with all his house”), Milton remarks that “it does not follow from hence that Christ is God, since the apostles have never distinctly pointed out Christ as the ultimate object of faith; but these are merely the words of the historian, expressing briefly what the apostles doubtless inculcated in a more detailed manner — faith in God the Father through Christ” (p. 51).
    About Romans 9:5 (“who is over all, God blessed for ever”), he notes that some early church fathers omit “God” when quoting this passage. Moreover, the way translators punctuate this passage can give it different meanings. Milton concludes that “supposing that the words are spoken of the Son; they have nothing to do with his essence, but only intimate that divine honour is communicated to the Son by the Father, and particularly that he is called God” (p. 52). Continuing, he writes:

 But, it is said, the same words which were spoken of the Father, Rom. i. 25, “the Creator, who is blessed for ever. Amen,” are here repeated of the Son; therefore the Son is equal to the Father. If there be any force in this reasoning, it will rather prove that the Son is greater than the Father; for according to the ninth chapter, he is “over all,” which, however, they remind us, ought to be understood in the same sense as John iii. 31, 32, “he that cometh from above, is above all; he that Cometh from heaven is above all” (p. 52).

However, Milton adds that Christ “came not of himself, but was sent from the Father, and was obedient to him” (pp. 52-53). Moreover, Christ “never could have become a mediator, nor could he have been sent from God, or have been obedient to him, unless he had been inferior to God and the Father as to his nature. Therefore also after he shall have laid aside his functions as mediator, whatever may be his greatness, or whatever it may previously have been, he must be subject to God and the Father” (p. 53).
    As for 1 Timothy 3:16 (“God was manifest in the flesh”), many early manuscripts omit “God” [as do many translations since the King James]. However, Milton concedes that “when the context is duly examined, that the whole passage must be understood of God the Father in conjunction with the Son. For it is not Christ who is “the great mystery of godliness,” but God the Father in Christ” (p. 54). To support his conclusion, he cites Colossians 2:2 and 2 Corinthians 5:18, 19. Continuing, he writes, “‘was manifest in the flesh’ — namely, in the Son, his own image; in any other way he is invisible: nor did Christ come to manifest himself, but his Father, John xiv. 8, 9” (p. 54). (For more justifications of Milton’s conclusion, see pages 54-55).
    Next, Milton comments on Titus 2:13 (“the glorious appearing of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ”) in some detail and about various translations. He concludes that:

what is proposed to us as an object of belief, especially in a matter involving a primary article of faith, ought not to be an inference forced and extorted from passages relating to an entirely different subject, in which the readings are sometimes various, and the sense doubtful — nor hunted out by careful research from among articles and particles — nor elicited by dint of ingenuity, like the answers of an oracle, from sentences of dark or equivocal meaning — but should be susceptible of abundant proof from the clearest sources (p. 56).

[This advice Trinitarians ignore because the clearest passages support Unitarianism.]
    Then, Milton comments on 1 John 5:20 (“We know that the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding, that we may know him that is true, and we are in him that is true, (even) in his Son Jesus Christ: this is the true God, and eternal life”). Trinitarians use the second part of this verse to support their doctrine of a triune God. However, when the verse as a whole is considered, it does not support the Trinity Doctrine.
    Milton also comments on Hebrews 1:8 (p. 50), Acts 20:58 (p. 51), 1 John 3:16 (pp. 56-57), Jude 4 (pp. 59-58), Psalm 68:17-19, and Ephesians 4:5-8 (pp. 60-61).

Copyright © 2018 by Thomas Coley Allen.

Part 1, Part 3

More religious articles.

Milton on the Son of God – Part 1

Milton on the Son of God – Part 1

Thomas Allen

    John Milton (1608–1674), who is best known as the author of Paradise Lost, believed in an unipersonal God instead of the triune God of three persons or gods in one God of today’s orthodox Christianity. Thus, Jesus is the Son of God and not God the Son. The following summaries Milton’s view of Christ Jesus, the Son of God, as presented in Milton on the Son of God and the Holy Spirit from His Treatise on Christian Doctrine (London, England: British & Foreign Unitarian Association, 1908). About 150 years would pass before Milton’s essay was published. Page numbers enclosed in parentheses are to the book referenced above. My comments are enclosed in brackets.
    Milton notes that according to the Catholic Church, the Trinity Doctrine cannot be “proved from any passage of Scripture” (p. 1). [At least Catholics are more honest than Protestants.]
    His notion that Christ Jesus is not the second person of a triune God, Milton derives from the Scriptures and the Scriptures alone. [The Trinity Doctrine relies heavily on Greek philosophy, primarily that of Plato and his followers.] For him, the Scriptures alone are “the rule of faith” (p. 1).
    First, Milton discusses generation, “whereby God, in pursuance of his decree, has begotten his only Son” (p. 3). “Generation must be an external efficiency, since the Father and Son are different persons” (p. 3), which the Trinitarians acknowledge. Whereas Milton argues that the Son has a beginning, Trinitarians argue that he is “generated from all eternity” (p. 3).
    Milton notes that “the Father be said in Scripture to have begotten the Son in a double sense, the one literal, with reference to the production of the Son, the other metaphorical, with reference to his exaltation” (p. 4). However, many Trinitarians “have applied the passages which allude to the exaltation and mediatorial functions of Christ as proof of his generation from all eternity” (p. 4). Nevertheless, they claim “that it is impossible to find a single text in all Scripture to prove the eternal generation of the Son” (p. 4).
    Citing John 1:1-3, John 17:5, Colossians 1:15, 16, 18, Revelations 3:14, 1 Corinthians 8:6, and Hebrews 1:2, 5:10, Milton believes “the Son existed in the beginning, under the name of the logos or word, and was the first of the whole creation, by whom afterwards all other things were made both in heaven and earth” (p. 4). Milton states,  “All these passages prove the existence of the Son before the world was made, but they conclude nothing respecting his generation from all eternity” (p. 5). [Milton’s Christology is similar to that of the Arians and the Jehovah’s Witnesses, both of whom claim that the Son is God’s first creation. Contrary to this notion is that of Unitarians who believe that the Son first existed outside the mind of God when God begot him in the womb of Mary.]
    Citing verses concerning Christ’s “resuscitation from the dead, or to his unction to the mediatorial office” (p. 5), Milton concludes “that however the generation of the Son may have taken place, it arose from no natural necessity, as is generally contended, but was no less owing to the decree and will of the Father than his priesthood or kingly power, or his resuscitation from the dead” (pp. 6-7). Moreover, Jesus is called the Son of God “because he had no other Father besides God[:] . . . ‘God was his Father,’ John v. 18” (p. 7). God created Adam from dust and, therefore, was Adam’s creator. However, God is “properly the Father of the Son made of his own substance” (p. 7). [Trinitarians agree with him about the Son being the same substance as the Father.] He continues, “Yet it does not follow from hence that the Son is co-essential with the Father, for then the title of Son would be least of all applicable to him, since he who is properly the Son is not coeval with the Father, much less of the same numerical essence, otherwise the Father and the Son would be one person; nor did the Father beget him from any natural necessity, but of his own free will — a mode more perfect and more agreeable to the paternal dignity” (p. 7). He concludes that “the Son was begotten of the Father in consequence of his decree, and therefore within the limits of time, for the decree itself must have been anterior to the execution of the decree, as is sufficiently clear from the insertion of the word ‘to-day’” (p. 8).
    Citing several verses (John 1:14, 18, 3:16, 18, and 1 John 4:9) where the Son is called “only begotten,” Milton comments, “Yet he is not called one with the Father in essence, inasmuch as he was visible to sight, and given by the Father, by whom also he was sent, and from whom he proceeded; but he enjoys the title of only begotten by way of superiority, as distinguished from many others who are also said to have been born of God. . . . But since throughout the Scriptures the Son is never said to be begotten, except, as above, in a metaphorical sense, it seems probable that he is called only begotten principally because he is the one mediator between God and man” (p. 9).
    Next, he cites several verses (Romans 8:29, Colossians 1:15, 18, Hebrews 1:6, and Revelations 3:14) that refer to the Son as the “first born.” All these “passages preclude the idea of his co-essentiality with the Father, and of his generation from all eternity” (p. 9). [Some Unitarians disagree with Milton on his notion of the preexisting Son. According to some Unitarians, the Son existed in God’s mind as part of his foreordained plan. He did not really come into existence until his miraculous conception.]
    Milton notes that “since to generate another who had no previous existence, is to give him being, and that if God generate by a physical necessity, he can generate nothing but a co-equal Deity, which would be inconsistent with self-existence, an essential attribute of Divinity” (p. 10). Then, he inquires into “how or in what sense God the Father can have begotten the Son” (p. 10). After reviewing the Scriptures, he concludes “that God of his own will created, or generated, or produced the Son before all things, endued with the divine nature, as in the fulness of time he miraculously begat him in his human nature of the Virgin Mary” (p. 10). Moreover, “God imparted to the Son as much as he pleased of the divine nature, nay, of the divine substance itself, care being taken not to confound the substance with the whole essence, which would imply, that the Father had given to the Son what he retained numerically the same himself; which would be a contradiction of terms instead of a mode of generation” (p. 11).
    About the few verses that call the Son, God, which lead to the Trinitarian absurdity of trying to make two to be one, Milton remarks that Trinitarians could have avoided “such violence to reason” (p, 11) if they had paid attention to the Scriptures. Then he cites Psalm 82:6 where God calls the children of Israel gods and John 10:35. [Also, Moses is called God in Exodus 4:16 and 7:1. See below where Milton discusses this issue further.]
    According to the Scriptures, “there is in reality but one true independent and supreme God” (p. 13). Furthermore, “human reason and the common language of mankind, and the Jews, the people of God, have always considered him as one person only” (p. 13). Milton turns to the Scriptures to identify who this God is.
    Since Jesus, the only begotten Son, is in the bosom of the Father (John 1:18), he should know who is God. According to Jesus’ testimony, the Father is the one true God. This testimony is given in Mark 12:28, 29, and 32: “‘Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord’ or as it is in the Hebrew, ‘Jehovah our God is one Jehovah’” (p. 14). This conversation between Jesus and the scribe shows that the “unity of God is intended his oneness of person” (p. 15). John 8:41, 54 proves that God is the Father: “[W]e have one Father, even God. . . . [I]t is my Father that honoureth me; of whom ye say that he is your God.” For more proof, Milton cites John 17:3 (“this is life eternal, that they might know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent”) and John 20:17 (“I ascend unto my Father and your Father; and to my God and your God”). Therefore, if “the Father be the God of Christ, and the same be our God, and if there be none other God but one, there can be no God beside the Father” (p. 16).
    Moreover, Paul, like Jesus, teaches that there is but one God, the Father. [Paul does not teach a triune God or that the Father is one person in God and Jesus is another person in God, yet both are one God.] To support his argument (p. 16), Milton cites 1 Corinthians 8:4-6 (“there is none other God but one . . . there is but one God the Father”). As only one God exists, then not only are all other essences excluded, but all other persons are excluded (p. 16). In the above-cited passage, Paul clearly distinguishes Jesus Christ from God, who is the Father. Referring to 1 Corinthians 8:4-6, Milton adds that if a different causation “of whom all things” applies to God the Father and “by whom are all things” applies to Christ the Son, then“if a difference of causation prove a difference of essence, he [Christ] is distinguished also in essence” (p. 16). He adds, “Besides, since a numerical difference originates in difference of essence, those who are two numerically, must be also two essentially” (p. 17).
    Milton argues that when the Scriptures declare that all things are by Christ, “it must be understood of a secondary and delegated power” (p. 18).
    Referencing Ephesians 4:4-6, Milton argues that “there is one Spirit, and one Lord; but the Father is one, and therefore God is one in the same sense as the remaining objects of which unity is predicated, that is, numerically one, and therefore one also in person” (p. 19). Then, he cites 1 Timothy 2:5 (“there is one God, and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus”). He states that “the mediator, though not purely human, is purposely named man, by the title derived from his inferior nature, lest he should be thought equal to the Father, or the same God, the argument distinctly and expressly referring to one God” (p. 19). Rhetorically, he asks “how anyone can be a mediator to himself on his own behalf” (p. 19). [Some Unitarians would strongly object with Milton about Jesus not being purely human. If he were not purely human, he could not have been tempted as humans {Hebrews 2:18 and 4:15} are, suffered like them, or died like them, etc. He was like a man in all respects {Hebrews 2:17}. However, Jesus was a uniquely special man in that he was a special messenger of God the Father with a divine mission whose authority came directly from God the Father. He is the one and only Son of God, who has a unique and intimate relationship with God. Moreover, he was filled with the spirit of God. Unfortunately, Milton could not wean himself from the Greek philosophy that had infected Christianity and that underlies the Trinity Doctrine. Thus, he literally interprets passages that suggest that the Son really existed before his conception. Yet, he does not literally interpret passages that declare the Son to be a real man — fully human like every other human but without sin. Consequently, for him as for Trinitarians, the Son is man but not a man. A preexisting spirit incarnated in a human body may become man, but he cannot become a man. One can only become a man if his beginning is with conception — unless all humans preexist spiritually and are incarnated in a human body, which is a concept that nearly all Christians reject — Origen and those who believe in reincarnation being exceptions.]
    Next, he quotes Romans 5:10 (“we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son”). He remarks, “To whatever God we were reconciled, if he be one God, he cannot be the God by whom we are reconciled, inasmuch as that God is another person; for if he be one and the same, he must be a mediator between himself and us, and reconcile us to himself by himself; which is an insurmountable difficulty” (pp. 19-20). [Moreover, how can an immortal, eternal God die? Trinitarians would argue that only the human nature of Jesus died; his divine nature did not. Then many of these same Trinitarians would declare that mankind could not be saved except by the death of God.]
    Milton notes “that the Father alone is a self-existent God, and that a being which is not self-existent cannot be God” (p. 20). This is so evident that no explanation should be required. Then, he remarks:

[I]t is wonderful with what futile subtleties, or rather with what juggling artifices, certain individuals have endeavoured to elude or obscure the plain meaning of these passages; leaving no stone unturned, recurring to every shift, attempting every means, as if their object were not to preach the pure and unadulterated truth of the gospel to the poor and simple, but rather by dint of vehemence and obstinacy to sustain some absurd paradox from falling, by the treacherous aid of sophisms and verbal distinctions, borrowed from the barbarous ignorance of the schools (p. 20).

[Thus, he lambastes Trinitarians.]
    Trinitarians interpret John 10:30 (“I and my Father are one”) to mean that the Son and the Father are one in essence. Milton answers, “Two things may be called one in more than one way” (p. 21). In the previous verse (John 10:29), Jesus said that his Father was greater than all. In John 10:34-36, Jesus denies making himself God. About John 10:36, Milton writes, “This must be spoken of two persons not only not co-essential, but not coequal” (p. 21).
    Moreover, by failing to mention the Holy Spirit, John 10:30 fails to support the Trinity Doctrine. “[T]he Son and the Father without the Spirit are not one in essence” (p. 22) — so argue Trinitarians.
    How are the Son and Father one? “[T]hey are one, inasmuch as they speak and act with unanimity” (p. 22). Jesus said, “believe the works; that ye may know and believe that the Father is in me, and I in him” (John 10:38) and “the words that I speak unto you, I speak not of myself, but the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works” (John 14:10). Thus, when Jesus says that “I and my Father are one,” he means one in “intimacy of communion” (p. 22). He does not mean the unity of essence. He “declares himself to be one with the Father in the same manner as we are one with him — that is, not in essence, but in love, in communion, in agreement, in charity, in spirit, in glory” (p. 22). In support of this conclusion, he cites John 14:20, 21 and 17:21-23.

Copyright © 2018 by Thomas Coley Allen.

Part 2

More religious articles.